Metaphilosophy, Misc

These are some responses to an early version of Johnston's paper "The Personite Problem" (now published in Nous).

Recent decades have seen a surge in interest in metaphilosophy. In particular there has been an interest in philosophical methodology. Various questions have been asked about philosophical methods. Are our methods any good? Can we improve upon them? Prior to such evaluative and ameliorative concerns, however, is the matter of what methods philosophers actually use. Worryingly, our understanding of philosophical methodology is impoverished in various respects. This article considers one particular respect in which we seem to be missing an important (...) part of the picture. While it is a received wisdom that the word “ intuition ” has exploded across analytic philosophy in recent decades, the article presents evidence that the explosion is apparent across a broad swathe of academia. It notes various implications for current methodological debates about the role of intuitions in philosophy. (shrink)

Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve (...) to a grain to which we are sensitive in our everyday philosophising. The reason is that, unless we do so, we don’t get what we want from philosophical methodology. I argue that what we want is information that will aid us in formulating practical advice concerning how to do philosophy responsibly/well/better. (shrink)

This doctoral dissertation introduces economical unification as a method of analysis and shows how it is applied in dealing with some topics that are central in contemporary philosophy. The method resembles a production line that consists of three successive elements which are interconnected in two stages: -/- Economy > Ontology > Applications -/- In the first stage, an economically unified ontology is explicated by applying the principle of economy, which is an evaluation criterion of alternative ontologies. An economically unified ontology (...) is an empirically sufficient, metaphysically minimal and generally virtuous world-view or a belief system of a human being. In the second stage everything else is dealt with in terms of the ontology. -/- The central argument is that economical unification is a more progressive method than plain conceptual analysis which proceeds in the absence of an economically unified ontology and without the principle of economy. Its progressiveness results from having economy as an unambiguous evaluation criterion, which enables explicating a stable and minimal unified ontology which functions as a common base for all topics, and which enables defining and disambiguating meanings of concepts, thereby facilitating their genuine understanding and resolving problems around them, more efficiently than without an economically unified ontology, and without an unambiguous evaluation criterion that would enable explicating it. -/- The progressiveness of the method is substantiated by applying it in disambiguating some of the central concepts that are dealt with in contemporary philosophy such as time, truth and possibility, and in resolving problems around them. The method works: unification efficiently resolves problems whose central source is disunification itself. In other words, the absence of an economically unified ontology is a central source of problems and ambiguities in contemporary philosophy; in economical unification such problems are resolved by removing their source; their source is removed by replacing the absence of an economically unified ontology by bringing it in the center of the analysis. -/- The holistic method that handles special topics in the top-down order by relying on an understandable world-view, is very different from traditional conceptual analysis that proceeds in the absence of an economically unified ontology, and even in the absence of having it as the goal, i.e., without economy or the degree of virtuousness as the criterion. Moreover, the method was formulated in order to systematically overcome those limitations of plain conceptual analysis which result from their absence. Traditional conceptual analysis proceeds typically by investigating isolated topics and various angles to them, but this does not manage to interconnect the isolated topics and thus does not resolve problems which are due to the isolation itself. -/- It is practically impossible to unify many things by concentrating on one thing only, and the optimal rate of progress in philosophy and in science in general cannot be achieved if the analysis is limited into investigating isolated fragments. In order to achieve the optimal rate of progress, unification is needed in counterbalancing specialization. By looking at many individual pieces together, one can start streamlining them into a functional totality. In this process much is revealed about what kinds of parts are needed in the totality and what are not. The totality consists of interrelated parts, but in economical unification the overall picture of reality guides the development of its parts at least as strongly as the requirements for the parts guide the development of the totality. Economical unification can thus be seen merely as the project getting hold of the natural order where the totality and its parts interact, and whose alternative is to keep on investigating details of isolated parts blindfolded without worrying about their roles in a totality, for all parts that are applicable do have a role in a totality. -/- One can and one should scrutinize any suggested totality and replace it when a better one is available, but not before a better one has been presented. This holds for contemporary paradigmatic theories and for everything that comes after them. This brings the focus to the question of what is the objective meaning of better. The suggested answer is: the more economically unified, the better. The most important starting point in the project of economical unification is the acceptance of the principle of economy or the degree of virtuousness as the evaluation criterion, for without a commonly accepted and acknowledged criterion the path towards consensus is unnecessarily long and painful. The easiest way of accepting economy as the criterion is understanding that its general acceptance would accelerate the progress rate of science, including philosophy: virtuousness as the criterion of theories likely results into more virtuous science, faster than without it. Once we have a common criterion, people no longer have to settle on agreeing to disagree, but people have leaped forward into evaluating which theory is objectively better. Everything can be scrutinised, including economy, but rejecting it without replacing it with a more progressive criterion means that one does not fully appreciate progress. -/- Tämä väitöskirja esittelee ekonomisen unifikaation metodin ja soveltaa sitä filosofian keskeisiin aiheisiin. Metodi muistuttaa tuotantolinjaa mikä koostuu kolmesta peräkkäisestä elementistä jotka liittyvät toisiinsa kahdessa vaiheessa: -/- Ekonomia > Ontologia > Sovellukset -/- Ensimmäisessä vaiheessa eksplikoidaan ekonomisesti unifioitu ontologia soveltamalla ekonomian periaatetta, joka on vaihtoehtoisten ontologioiden arviointikriteeri. Ekonomisesti unifioitu ontologia on empiirisesti riittävä, metafyysisesti minimaalinen ja yleisesti hyveellinen maailmankuva. Toisessa vaiheessa sovellukset käsitellään ontologian avulla. -/- Keskeinen väite on, että ekonominen unifikaatio on edistyksellisempi metodi kuin pelkkä käsitteellinen analyysi mikä etenee ilman ekonomisesti unifioitua ontologiaa, käyttämättä ekonomian periaatetta arviointikriteerinä. Metodin edistyksellisyys juontuu selkeästä ekonomian periaatteesta, mikä mahdollistaa stabiilin, yhtenäisen ja minimaalisen ontologian eksplikoinnin. Ontologia toimii kaikkien sovellusten käsittelyn yhtenäisenä pohjana ja mahdollistaa käsitteiden merkitysten selkeyttämisen ja niiden ympärillä olevien ongelmien ratkaisun, tehokkaammin kuin pelkkä käsitteellinen analyysi ilman yhtenäistä ontologiaa, ja ilman selkeää arviointikriteeriä mikä mahdollistaisi yhtenäisen ontologian eksplikoinnin. -/- Metodin progressiivisuutta alleviivataan soveltamalla sitä. Joitain nykyfilosofian keskeisiä käsiteitä -kuten aika, totuus ja mahdollisuus- selkeytetään ja näitten ympärillä olevia ongelmia ratkaistaan. Metodi toimii: unifikaatio ratkaisee tehokkaasti ongelmia joiden keskinen syy on hajanaisuus. Toisin sanoen, ekonomisesti unifioidun ontologian poissaolo on nykyfilosofian ongelmien ja epämääräisyyksien keskeinen lähde; ekonomisen unifikaation metodissa tällaiset ongelmat ratkaistaan poistamalla niiden lähde; niiden lähde poistetaan korvaamalla ekonomisesti unifioidun ontologian poissaolo tuomalla se analyysin keskelle. -/- Holistinen unifikaation metodi joka käsittelee sovelluksia ylhäältä-alas järjestyksessä, luottamalla intuitiiviseen maailmankuvaan on hyvin erilainen kuin perinteinen käsitteellinen analyysi joka etenee ilman yhtenäistä maailmankuvaa ja jopa tavoittelematta sitä, eli ilman ekonomian periaatetta arviointikriteerinä joka suosii yhtenäistä ja kaikin puolin hyveellistä maailmankuvaa. Ekonominen unifikaatio on luotu jotta näiden puutteesta johtuvista rajoitteista päästäisiin systemaattisesti yli. Perinteinen käsitteellinen analyysi etenee tyypillisesti tutkimalle lukuisia näkökulmia eristyneisiin aiheisiin; tällainen analyysi ei onnistu yhdistämään hajanaisia aiheita eikä täten kykene ratkaisemaan ongelmia joiden syy on hajanaisuus itse. -/- Tieteen ja filosofian optimaalista edistystahtia ei voi saavuttaa rajoittumalla eristyneisiin fragmentteihin. Jotta optimaalinen edistystahti voitaisiin saavuttaa, unifikaatiota tarvitaan spesialisaation vastapainona. Katsomalla monia yksittäisiä osia yhdessä, voi ne saneerata toimivaksi kokonaisuudeksi. Tässä prosessissa selviää minkälaisia osia kokonaisuudessa tarvitaan ja mitä ei. Kokonaisuus koostuu yhteenliittyneistä osista, mutta ekonomisessa unifikaatiossa kokonaismaailmankuva ohjaa osiensa kehitystä vähintään yhtä vahvasti kuin vaatimukset osille ohjaavat kokonaisuuden kehitystä. Ekonomisen unifikaation voi täten nähdä luonnollisen järjestyksen tavoitteluna, missä kokonaisuus ja sen osat ovat interaktiossa, ja jonka vaihtoehto on jatkaa eristyneiden osien yksityiskohtien tutkimista side silmillä, huolehtimatta niiden roolista kokonaisuudessa, vaikka kaikki osat joita voi todellisuudessa käyttää, kuuluvat johonkin kokonaisuuteen. -/- Kaikkia ehdotettuja kokonaisuuksia tulee tarkastella kriittisesti ja korvata ne paremmalla heti kun tällainen on saatavilla, mutta ei ennen kuin tällainen on esitetty. Tämä pätee nykyisiin paradigmaattisiin teorioihin ja kaikkeen mikä tulee niitten jälkeen. Tämä keskittää huomion kysymykseen siitä mikä on sanan parempi objektiivinen merkitys. Ehdotettu vastaus on: mitä enemmän ekonomisesti unifioitu, sitä parempi. Tärkein lähtökohta ekonomisessa unifikaatiossa on luonnollisesti ekonomian periaate tai teoreettisten hyveiden arvostaminen, koska tie konsensukseen on tarpeettoman pitkä ja tuskallinen ilman yleisesti hyväksyttyä ja tiedostettua arviointikriteeriä. Helpoin tapa hyväksyä ekonomian periaate on ymmärtää että sen yleinen hyväksyminen kiihdyttäisi tieteen ja filosofian kehitystahtia: hyveellisyys teorioiden arviointikriteerinä luonnollisesti johtaa hyveellisempään tieteeseen, nopeammin kuin ilman sitä. Yleisen kriteerin nojalla, ihmisten ei tarvitse tyytyä olemaan samaa mieltä siitä että he ovat subjektiivisesti eri mieltä, vaan he ovat harpanneet eteenpäin arvioimaan mikä teoria on objektiivisesti parempi. Ekonomian periaatetta voi kritisoida ja parantaa, mutta sen hylkääminen, korvaamatta sitä edistyksellisemmällä kriteerillä, ei ole edistyksellistä. (shrink)

David Lewis and Peter van Inwagen have claimed that there are no “knockdown” arguments in philosophy. Their claim appears to be at odds with common philosophical practice: philosophers often write as though their conclusions are established or proven and that the considerations offered for these conclusions are decisive. In this paper, I examine some questions raised by Lewis’s and van Inwagen’s contention. What are knockdown arguments? Are there any in philosophy? If not, why not? These questions concern the nature of (...) the philosophical enterprise and our answers have implications for the limits on the attitudes of informed, rational thinkers. (shrink)

The idea of philosophy as a kind of therapy, though by no means standard, has been present in metaphilosophical reflection since antiquity. Diverse versions of it were also discussed and applied by more recent authors such as Wittgenstein, Hadot and Foucault. In order to develop an explicit, general and systematic model of therapeutic philosophy a relatively broad and well-structured account provided by Martha Nussbaum is subjected to analysis. The results obtained, subsequently, form a basis for a new model constructed around (...) the set of notions intrinsically connected with any, philosophical, psychological, or medical, form of therapy. The conceptual framework of: disease and its symptoms, the health ideal, the process of treatment with its techniques, therapeutic theory, physician, patient, and the physician-patient relationship is constructed and investigated in the context of its possible metaphilosophical use. An illustrative application of this scheme to philosophical therapy developed by Stoicism is, then, discussed. Finally, the issue of the therapeutic metaphilosophy's scope as well as the problem of therapeutic philosophy's specificity and integrity are briefly indicated. (shrink)

Conceptual analysis, like any exclusively theoretical activity, is far from overrated in current psychology. Such a situation can be related both to the contingent influences of contextual and historical character and to the more essential metatheoretical reasons. After a short discussion of the latter it is argued that even within a strictly empirical psychology there are non-trivial tasks that can be attached to well-defined and methodologically reliable, conceptual work. This kind of method, inspired by the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter (...) Strawson (conceptual grammar), and Gilbert Ryle (conceptual geography), is proposed and formally depicted as being holistic, descriptive, and connective. Finally, the newly presented framework of connective conceptual analysis is defended against the “Charge from Psychology,” in a version developed by William Ramsey, claiming that conceptual analysis is based on psychological assumptions that have already been refuted by empirical psychology. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher recently argued for a reconstruction in philosophy. According to him, the contemporary mainstream of philosophy has deteriorated into something that is of relevance only to a few specialists who communicate with each other in a language nobody else understands. Kitcher proposes to reconstruct philosophy along two axes: a knowledge axis and a value axis. The present article discusses Kitcher's diagnosis as well as his proposal of a therapy. It argues that there are problems with both, and it ends (...) with an alternative view of what some core problems of the profession currently are. (shrink)

This is a critical review of Raymond Martin's 'Self-Concern'(1998).

Metaphysical theories are often counter-intuitive. But they also often are strongly supported and motivated by intuitions. One way or another, the link between intuitions and metaphysics is a strong and important one, and there is hardly any metaphysical discussion where intuitions do not play a crucial role. In this article, I will be interested in a particular kind of such intuitions, namely those that come, at least partly, from experience. There seems to be a route from experience to metaphysics, and (...) this is the core of my interest here. In order to better understand such ‘arguments from experience’ and the kind of relationship there is between this type of intuitions and metaphysical theories, I shall examine four particular cases where a kind of experience-based intuition seems to motivate or support a metaphysical theory. At the end of the day, I shall argue that this route is a treacherous one, and that in all of the four cases I shall concentrate on, phenomenological considerations are in fact orthogonal to the allegedly ‘corresponding’ metaphysical claims. An anti-realist view of metaphysics will emerge. (shrink)

Metaphysical theories heavily rely on the use of primitives to which they typically appeal. I will start by examining and evaluating some traditional well-known theories and I will discuss the role of primitives in metaphysical theories in general. I will then turn to a discussion of claims of between theories that, I think, depend on equivalences of primitives, and I will explore the nature of primitives. I will then claim that almost all explanatory power of metaphysical theories comes from their (...) primitives, and so I will turn to scrutinize the notion of "power" and "explanatory". (shrink)

What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine their views on 30 central philosophical issues. This article documents the results. It also reveals correlations among philosophical views and between these views and factors such as age, gender, and nationality. A factor analysis suggests that an individual's views on these issues factor into a few underlying components that predict much of the variation in those views. The results of a metasurvey (...) also suggest that many of the results of the survey are surprising: philosophers as a whole have quite inaccurate beliefs about the distribution of philosophical views in the profession. (shrink)

Traditionally, the negative way is a process by which the mental process ties to reach truth about its object through negation of what it is not rather than through affirmation of what it is. In dialectics, the negative moment is one where we examine critically a proposition though the affirmation of its contrary. But in philosophy as a pedagogy or as a practice, there is a tradition, like with Socrates, the cynics or the Zen master, which is more concerned about (...) interrupting the mental process and obtaining silence than explaining. Philosophy has here little to do with “science,” and more with an ascetic conception of “being,” where one shows the absurdity of speech, common or erudite. Consciousness therefore becomes the condition and substance of truth, in a sort of antiphilosophy. Antiphilosophy which pretends to show and shock more than it pretends to tell and explain, is already very present and visible within philosophy itself, for example in the character of Socrates, and his devastating irony, this form of speech that says the contrary of what it says. The cynic, with its total lack of respect for anything and anyone, provides in this context an interesting historical example: it is the rare case of a philosophical school whose name is used as well as a moral condemnation. The XIV century Turkish figure Nasruddin Hodja has a lot do with this tradition. Although he inscribes himself in the Sufi current, he is primarily known through his numerous outrageous and funny stories, very popular all around the Mediterranean. But behind the comic surface of an oral tradition, we discover profound and provocative insights about the man, the world, language, truth, and many other subjects. (shrink)

Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for (...) purely practical reasons. Finally, three limitations which call for further development of the method of explication are discussed. (shrink)

This article discusses the essence and form of various types of metatheory, paying special attention to metaphilosophy. It suggests the idea of the metatheoretical model—a completely new approach in philosophical discussion—and considers this concept with regard to the Platonic model and the Rhodian model. These models permit two different systems of metatheoretical construction. The paradigms of modern science allow the formation of metatheories that help further the development of logical, mathematical, and similar sciences. The Rhodian model allows the discovery of (...) methods that are helpful in building certain types of theory, as well as suggesting and examining theories that have special metatheoretical features and revealing their common features and differences with regard to other theories. The article discusses the complicated problem of the interrelation between philosophy and metaphilosophy and shows that metaphilosophy is also philosophy, not in the sense that metaphilosophy is a special part of philosophy but rather in the sense that metaphilosophy is a special kind of functioning of philosophy itself. (shrink)

Often philosophers have reason to ask fundamental questions about the aims, methods, nature, or value of their own discipline. When philosophers systematically examine such questions, the resulting work is sometimes referred to as “metaphilosophy.” Metaphilosophy, it should be said, is not a well-established, or clearly demarcated, field of philosophical inquiry like epistemology or the philosophy of art. However, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries there has been a great deal of metaphilosophical work on issues concerning the methodology of (...) philosophy in the analytic tradition. This article focuses on that work. (shrink)

In recent years a growing number of philosophers writing about the methodology of philosophy have defended the surprising claim that philosophers do not use intuitions as evidence. In this paper I defend the contrary view that philosophers do use intuitions as evidence. I argue that this thesis is the best explanation of several salient facts about philosophical practice. First, philosophers tend to believe propositions which they find intuitive. Second, philosophers offer error theories for intuitions that conflict with their theories. Finally, (...) philosophers are more confident in rejecting theories to the extent that they have several (intuitive) counterexamples involving diverse cases. I argue that these facts are better explained by philosophers’ using intuitions as evidence than by any plausible contrary explanations. I further argue that aspects of philosophical practice that my thesis may initially seem ill-suited to explain are in fact unsurprising whether or not my thesis is true. (shrink)

This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on mind and attention in Indian philosophy at Harvard University, on September 21st and 22nd, 2013, written by Kevin Connolly, Jennifer Corns, Nilanjan Das, Zachary Irving, and Lu Teng, and available at http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This portion of the report explores the question: Are there cross-cultural philosophical themes?

The syllogistic figures and moods can be taken to be argument schemata as can the rules of the Stoic propositional logic. Sentence schemata have been used in axiomatizations of logic only since the landmark 1927 von Neumann paper [31]. Modern philosophers know the role of schemata in explications of the semantic conception of truth through Tarski’s 1933 Convention T [42]. Mathematical logicians recognize the role of schemata in first-order number theory where Peano’s second-order Induction Axiom is approximated by Herbrand’s Induction-Axiom (...) Schema [23]. Similarly, in first-order set theory, Zermelo’s second-order Separation Axiom is approximated by Fraenkel’s first-order Separation Schema [17]. In some of several closely related senses, a schema is a complex system having multiple components one of which is a template-text or scheme-template, a syntactic string composed of one or more “blanks” and also possibly significant words and/or symbols. In accordance with a side condition the template-text of a schema is used as a “template” to specify a multitude, often infinite, of linguistic expressions such as phrases, sentences, or argument-texts, called instances of the schema. The side condition is a second component. The collection of instances may but need not be regarded as a third component. The instances are almost always considered to come from a previously identified language (whether formal or natural), which is often considered to be another component. This article reviews the often-conflicting uses of the expressions ‘schema’ and ‘scheme’ in the literature of logic. It discusses the different definitions presupposed by those uses. And it examines the ontological and epistemic presuppositions circumvented or mooted by the use of schemata, as well as the ontological and epistemic presuppositions engendered by their use. In short, this paper is an introduction to the history and philosophy of schemata. (shrink)

Professor Von Wright is a prominent analytical philosopher who has written about the very notion of analytical philosophy. Other analytical philosophers are present here and they have their ideas on this notion. As for me, I believe that it is not at all an obvious notion. Sometimes it seemed to me that analytical philosophy does not exist, or at least that there is no single common feature shared by all so-called analytical philosophers and only by them, though there are many (...) family resemblances. Therefore I thought I might take the opportunity of this meeting in honour of Professor Von Wright and propose as one of our themes for discussion, precisely the question: “what is analytical philosophy?”. The natural start is Professor Von Wright’s description of analytical philosophy. (shrink)

I work through 2 reviews and the first chapter of Rescher's book on meta-philosophy.

Meta-philosophy (Critique of philosophy=metaphysics, ontology, epistemology).

1 1 Ulrich de Balbian Meta-Philosophy Research Center (Meta-Philosophy) Death of Philosophy Part 2 PART 2 Philosophy subject-matter page2 Different approaches to doing philosophy (Methods) page 164 Metaphysics, Ontology, Epistemology page.

ABSTRACT https://web.facebook.com/metaphilosophyMPRC/ -/- https://www.academia.edu/31813592/_Meta-Philosophy_Why_read_Philosophy_of_original-_and_creative-thi nking_rather_than_derivative_academic_professionals_ -/- Meta-Philosophy and Philosophy’s rationale, aims, subject-matter and methods. https://web.facebook.com/metaphilosophyMPRC/ -/- What is philosophy for the creative-, original-thinking philosopher? Why is he doing philosophy? Where does his philosophical problems and insights come from? Comparing speculative/revisionary metaphysics, descriptive metaphysics and the explorative ‘metaphysics’ of the Socratic Method and the Philosophical Investigations. -/- Comments on, or thinking through and with philosophical problems that cannot be dis/solved, Suber’s Meta-philosophy themes and questions, surveys of philosophers (and their believes) and Plant’s (...) ‘On the Domain of Meta-philosophy’. Socio-cultural, psychological and other factors related to the doing of philosophy. (shrink)

Olavo de Carvalho reúne neste livro o essencial do que tem ensinado sobre René Descartes em seus cursos e conferências. Convencido de que a filosofia não nasce do gosto pelo raciocínio abstrato, mas do impulso de apreender e expressar o sentido universal da experiência acessível, o autor nos conduz a um retorno das idéias de Descartes às experiências reais que as originaram. Esse método não pretende dar uma explicação psicológica de uma filosofia, mas esclarecer o sentido efetivo que as idéias (...) tinham na consciência individual do filósofo que as pensou, para além – e por baixo – do sentido formal e dicionarizado que elas adquiriram ao longo da tradição filosófica. Para Olavo de Carvalho, a filosofia de Descartes não é um sistema abstrato de idéias, mas um drama cognitivo. (shrink)

Speculative fiction, such as science fiction and fantasy, has a unique epistemic value. We examine similarities and differences between speculative fiction and philosophical thought experiments in terms of how they are cognitively processed. They are similar in their reliance on mental prospection, but dissimilar in that fiction is better able to draw in readers (transportation) and elicit emotional responses. By its use of longer, emotionally poignant narratives and seemingly irrelevant details, speculative fiction allows for a better appraisal of the consequences (...) of philosophical ideas than thought experiments. (shrink)

O objetivo desta publicação é incentivar a produção filosófica de excelência por parte de pesquisadores notadamente influenciados pela filosofia de Wittgenstein e cujos temas possam suscitar um debate aprofundado. Além de desafiar o empreendimento filosófico contemporâneo, os temas aqui apresentados abordam questões que muitas vezes estão além daquelas consideradas por Wittgenstein em seu tempo. O leitor encontrará neste volume questões relacionadas ao ceticismo semântico e epistêmico, ao relativismo ético, às leituras literárias de Wittgenstein, ao problema das outras mentes e percepção (...) de aspectos, a intersubjetividade e o caráter contrassensual do Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, e, também, relacionadas ao Paradoxo de Moore. (shrink)

Say your name aloud to yourself in a quiet room. Imagine peeling an apple in your mind. Take the subway without trying to get anywhere. The simple meditations in this book have the potential to shake us awake from our preconceived certainties: our own identity, the stability of the outside world, the meanings of words. At once entertaining and startling, irreverent and wise, this book will provoke moments of awareness for readers in any situation and in all walks of life. (...) Enter the space of your favorite painting. Watch someone sleeping. The world won't look the same again. (shrink)

An inter-disciplinary philosophical treatise (written as an accredited Ph.D. thesis) that attempts to establish a new approach to moral objectivity. Inspired by the Buddha's Middle Way, but arguing from first premises, it challenges widespread and interlinked assumptions in both analytic and continental philosophy, whilst drawing on both these traditions together with psychological, religious and historical evidence. The first section of the book provides a detailed critique of existing approaches to ethics in the Western tradition. The second half then puts forward (...) positive and practical alternatives, and solutions to long-standing philosophical problems. (shrink)

Thought experiments are employed for a number of reasons and in many different disciplines. This paper explores the work of Novalis in relation to the method of thought experiments in theology, with a special focus on the encounter between Christianity and the science of his day. In a first step I revisit the ongoing philosophical discussion on thought experiments in order to highlight the lack of interest in the literary features of thought experiments. Step two is dedicated to a discussion (...) of the work of Novalis as far as his metaphysics of phantasy and imagination is concerned as it plays out in his romantic poetry. Building on the results of this discussion, in a third step I discuss the relationship (a) between thought experiments in theology and other disciplines, (b) between current discussions of thought experiments and previous periods of philosophical investigation into the ‘laboratory of the mind’, (c) between Christianity and science, and (d) between literary fiction and cognition. (shrink)

The papers in this volume present some of the most recent results of the work about contradictions in philosophical logic and metaphysics; examine the history of contradiction in crucial phases of philosophical thought; consider the relevance of contradictions for political and philosophical actuality. From this consideration a common question emerges: the question of the irreducibility, reality and productive force of (some) contradictions.

Many philosophers would, in theory, agree that the methods and tools of philosophy ought to be supplemented by those of other academic disciplines. In practice, however, the sociological data suggest that most philosophers fail to engage or collaborate with other academics, and this article argues that this is problematic for philosophy as a discipline. In relation to the value of interdisciplinary collaboration, the article highlights how experimental philosophers can benefit the field, but only insofar as they draw from the distinctive (...) methods of philosophy and overcome the charge of “amateur psychology” by more consistently collaborating with the scientists they seek to emulate. It concludes that philosophers ought to collaborate with other academics in order to gain an experience-based understanding of the methods of other disciplines in addition to an understanding of the content of these disciplines. (shrink)

Metaphysics has done everything to involve God in the world of being. However, in case of considering Reality as being and nothingness, naturally, the metaphysical approach toward the idea of God is losing its grounds. If Reality is being and nothingness, so the idea of God, too, should concern nothingness as well as being.

There is a common belief that non-being and nothingness are identical, a widespread, even general delusion the wrongness of which I will try to demonstrate in this work. And which I consider even more important, that is to define nothingness for further determination of “its” place and role in the reality and especially in human life.

As I tried to show in my earlier works (An Endeavor of New Concept of Being and Non-Being, Non-Being and Nothingness and Reality as Being and Nothingness), the environment in which the human being is finding itself should be characterized by being and nothingness, and any non-metaphysical philosophy must consider such an understanding of Reality as the utmost category which is above being, Universe, etc. In this article, I will try to shed light on the place and role of the (...) human being or the presence or this-being in Reality as being and nothingness. (shrink)

A discussion on PhilPapers.org, initiated by myself, has prompted me to write this sketch.

The article below is the summary of two earlier works of mine, An Endeavor of New Concept of Being and Non-Being and Non-Being and Nothingness. Only being and nothingness in their unity characterize the environment in which the human being is finding itself, and any non-metaphysical philosophy must consider such an understanding of Reality as the utmost category which is above being, Universe, etc.

The work below is the resume of my forthcoming book which I hope to complete in a year or two. As a matter of fact, this is the synthesis of five previous papers of mine, An Endeavor of New Concept of Being and Non-Being, Non-Being and Nothingness, Reality as Being and Nothingness, Presence in Reality, and God and Reality, or to be more correct, the integrity of them, as only in this connection do they acquire their genuine meaning and significance. (...) I would ask the reader to try to catch what I would call the core of the views stated below, regardless of how controversial or unconventional they may seem at the first sight. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to show that the reality is not only the world of being, it is equally the world of non-being. Such an approach, as I think, is not nihilism, on the contrary - it helps to resolve many problems and contradictions confusing the philosophical mind. The reader will not find any citations or references in this work because I tried to bring it closer to Philosophy as it used to be in its early stages and (...) from which it has departed so far nowadays. (shrink)

I outline the main arguments of my book, Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses (Westview, 2000), in which I defend an anti-theoretical approach to traditional problems in epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of language, focusing especially on external-world scepticism, the indeterminacy of reference, relativism and first-person authority, contending that these problems arise from embracing philosophical commitments that are not quite contradictory, but which suffer from what I describe as "epistemic neuroses"--an acceptance of methodological commitments that make these problems look like problems (...) at the same time as they render them insoluble. I contend that such epistemic neuroses plague both the analytical and continental traditions in philosophy alike. (shrink)

I respond to criticisms of my book, Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses (Westview, 2000), by Mark Migotti and Phil Hanson.