Metaphor

Although researchers have paid much attention to the journey metaphor (e.g., Forceville, 2006a, 2011a, 2011b; Forceville & Jeulink, 2011), little seems known about its role for moral political cognition. Using data from the US and UK public discourses on the Euro crisis as an example, this paper draws on Lakoff’s (1996) Moral Politics Theory, demonstrating that the journey metaphor can play a crucial role for political cognition, and especially for moral political judgment.

I survey three analyses of metaphor, offered by Goodman, Rorty and Davidson, and find the first two unsatisfactory. To explain metaphor Goodman posits a relation--metaphorical reference--which is at best only an example of the phenomenon to be explained, and which at worst fails to distinguish metaphors from non-metaphors. Rorty's analysis casts metaphor as a linguistic object operating on verbal dispositions, but fails to account for the way in the interpretation of a metaphor depends upon an interpretation of its linguistic meaning. (...) On Davidson's theory a metaphor is a linguistic item that occurs in conversational space ; the interpretation of a metaphor thus relies on an appreciation of both its semantic features and the purposes of the speaker who is deploying it. In this way it illustrates several key Davidsonian thesis about interpretation: that theories of interpretation are designed to explain how speakers converge on shared beliefs, and how they do so using systematic descriptions of each other's utterances; that such descriptions are meant to apply to general, manifested behavior, and so evidence of a non-linguistic nature may be used to construct or evaluate interpretations; and that linguistic and non-linguistic evidence may interact in unusual ways. It is one consequence of such a theory that metaphors will lack distinctive, semantically-specifiable meanings. (shrink)

This volume offers an empirical and diachronic investigation of the foundations and nature of metaphor in English. Metaphor is one of the hot topics in present-day linguistics, with a huge range of research focusing on the systematic connections between different concepts such as heat and anger, sight and understanding, or bodies and landscape. Until recently, the lack of a comprehensive data source made it difficult to obtain an overview of this phenomenon in any language, but this changed with the completion (...) in 2009 of The Historical Thesaurus of English, the only historical thesaurus ever produced for any language. Chapters in this volume use this unique resource as a basis for case studies of semantic domains including Animals, Colour, Death, Fear, Food, Reading, and Theft, providing a significant step forward in the data-driven understanding of metaphor. (shrink)

Since the early 1980s, metonymy has progressively gained central stage in linguistic investigations. The advent of cognitive linguistics marked a new turn in the study of this trope conceived, not as a deviation from semantic conventions, but as a phenomenon rooted in non-language-specific mechanisms of conceptualization of the world. Acknowledging that metonymy is ultimately cognitive in nature, this paper proposes to consider metonymy from its multiple levels of manifestation, integrating cognitive, pragmatic, semantic, but also ontological angles of approach. Taking whole-for-part (...) metonymies as a case study, I aim to show how recent developments within these respective disciplines can enrich our understanding of such metonymic mechanisms, sometimes without even identifying them as such. This paper proposes to establish a dialog between these disciplines on the topic of WP-metonymy. So, after a presentation of the most standard cognitive and pragmatic approaches to WP-metonymy, I will argue for the relevance of recent semantic investigations on quantity gradability, and for the theoretical importance of keeping these two kinds of part-reference clearly apart. I will show that the literature on gradability provides strong semantic arguments for doing so. Finally, connecting the debate on WP-metonymy with the ontological debate on property inherence will open the way for a formal treatment of WP-metonymy within ground logic. (shrink)

This paper deals with three texts by Donald Davidson's that discuss the issue of linguistic innovation from different epistemological standpoints. I show that Davidson's theory of metaphor undergoes a crucial transformation: from an early stage in which metaphor is viewed as an unintelligible and exceptional element external to language, to a later stage in which it is conceived as intrinsic to language, and thus as potentially understandable. This tracing of Davidson's development leads me to formulate an understanding of the concepts (...) of metaphor, literalness and linguistic renovation that follows the later Davidson. According to this formulation, both metaphor and literal meaning are comprehensible, and must therefore be said to exist in a relationship of mutuality. This relationship of mutuality is language's inherent normativity: the fact that language necessarily depends both on the speaker's and hearer's commitment to the literal meaning of the words employed, and on their endorsement of the intended meaning as that which is actually meant. Without committing themselves to the literal, speaker and hearer simply cannot understand the usual reference of words; without committing themselves to the intended meaning in its necessary relation to the literal, speaker and hearer cannot understand one another on each new occasion of utterance. (shrink)

This is a book about the meanings of words and how they can combine to form larger meaningful units, as well as how they can fail to combine when the ...

This article provides an analysis of theories of metaphor, tracing how far those which have dominated Western thought until the past few decades are reflective of the definitions within which writers from Classical Greece were working. It is shown how, during the Middle Ages and beyond, in particular since the seventeenth century, definitions of metaphor which emphasised ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’ levels of meaning have led to serious misconceptions concerning its nature and function in the attempts of human beings to conceptualise (...) and make sense of their experiences. A discussion of these misconceptions is provided in some detail and traditional definitions are shown to have distorted the deeper insights held by classical writers, such as Aristotle, Demetrius and Longinus. The article continues with descriptive analyses of the mistaken nature of definitions of metaphor which confine it to creative, poetic forms of discussion. It is shown that conventional speech utterances comprise simple metaphors to a large extent and how these provide an immensely important base from which education could help pupils extend and enrich both their thought and language. This could be done by teaching them ways of interpreting the novel, poetic metaphors of others and how to create their own. (shrink)

This article shows how metaphor is basic to language structure. It is illustrated with practical examples of how metaphor is found within different social and cultural contexts, irrespective of historical time. Numerous examples are given of how metaphor works in efforts to communicate meaning. From an early age, young children are initiated into the use of metaphor. This appears to be understood intuitively, and examples of words games and riddles are given to show how children become familiar with the symbolic (...) use of language. It is discussed how this early facility to engage in ‘word play’ forms a basis for future development of language skills, helping children move on from familiar contexts which are understood intuitively by transferring their skills in order to interpret metaphorical language empirically in unfamiliar contexts. Theories concerning ‘dead’ and ‘living’ metaphors are explored, and attention is drawn particularly to the need to teach children how to rediscover the original meaning of Biblical metaphors, many of which have become so embedded in language and culture that they have lost their metaphorical significance. It is discussed how the interpretation and use of metaphor extends the capacity to reason and think reflectively, and the importance of education in developing this potential: this is required in many of the recently published Agreed Syllabuses of religious education and the Model Syllabuses of religious education, and would help address the requirements of the Education Reform Act concerning pupils’ spiritual and moral development. (shrink)

This dissertation shows how metaphor analysis may be used as an archeological method that takes the speech analyst beyond the surface of talk to disclose the generative density and sedimentation of possible meaning upon which a discourse is constructed. My analysis shows that within the context of the discourse of integrated medicine this method can bring certain semantic properties into view which might otherwise remain obscured or hidden. The method developed here is a critical one, framed in terms of the (...) problem of generativity , which is understood as the process of historical and intersubjective becoming. It involves questioning patterns of identity and difference that occur over the generations. The problem of generativity, originally explored and anticipated by Husserl, has been taken up by Anthony Steinbock and developed in terms of a generative phenomenological method. In this study I combine the historical and intersubjective frame of generative phenomenology with the textual and metaphoric focus developed in Paul Ricoeur's phenomenological hermeneutics. My investigation critically examines, from the standpoint of a participant-observer, 'the rule of metaphor' in the texts of six ethnographic interviews with "alternative" health care practitioners. (shrink)

Metaphor is a linguistic phenomenon that has been studied primarily in terms of a semantic analysis. I treat metaphor as a pragmatic tool used by interactants in the process of doing figurative work in their conversational interactions. The use of conversational metaphor has consequences for the actions of the participants engaged in doing the routine activity of talk. I examine the relationships between the organization and structure of talk and conversational metaphors. In addition, I discuss the complex relationship between metaphor (...) and context. I suggest that context is essential to the use and understanding of metaphor in talk. The functions and effects of metaphors are demonstrated. In sum, I analyze conversational metaphor through a pragmatic filter to discover the features of how participants accomplish the collaborative activity of doing figurative work in talk. (shrink)

Most theories of metaphor look at what occurs inside a metaphorical phrase and posit a shift in meaning in the metaphorical words. This includes the classic “Models and Metaphor,” by Max Black, who distinguishes between the literal words of the phrase and the metaphorical words. On this view, the two interact in such a way that the meanings of the metaphorical words change. In another view, Donald Davidson takes a radical stance in his “What Metaphors Mean” to assert that the (...) words in a metaphor mean nothing other than their original, literal meaning. Both theories suffer from problems: Black fails to explain how the metaphorical words change in meaning. Davidson, on the other hand, while succeeding in refuting most of the “other meaning” theories, only weakly suggests “use” of metaphor to explain its power. In this paper, I will clarify the two respective theories and attempt to reconcile or fuse them. We will find that Black looks to the language itself and finds a shift in meaning, while Davidson asserts that meaning stays literal, and we must instead look at what occurs between the speaker and hearer. An examination of Davidson’s later theory of interpretation applied to Black’s theory of metaphor will clarify Davidson’s ‘use’ as well as allow for literal meaning to stay in metaphor. (shrink)

This qualitative research project looks at how rhetoric is used in a science think-tank to formulate knowledge and facilitate interdisciplinary communication. It draws from the author's participant-observer experiences at the Santa Fe Institute since 1997 as a freelance writer, from a series of focused research questions related to rhetoric at the site, and from textual research. The study focuses on metaphor, which is the rhetorical trope that the SFI scientists identified as being of prime importance to their discourse. The central (...) question that emerged is, "What can the rhetorical challenges confronting members of the Santa Fe Institute tell us about the role of rhetoric---particularly metaphor---in science?" ;Results are presented in three sections, reflecting three related methodologies. The first part is a narrative by the author describing the rhetorical lessons learned by the author in writing the occasional article for the Institute and working with members editing those projects. The second and most extensive section is an analysis drawn from the author's interviews with 17 members of the Institute---the majority being scientists. Most of this section explores the role of metaphor in constituting theory at the Institute. The author argues that metaphors carry multiple meanings and inferences, which he calls "harmonics." These harmonics force scientists using metaphors to confront the implications of those terms, a process that is integral to building theory. In the third section of the project, the author examines a key word used at the Institute, the term "complexity," and shows how it has been used in the arts and sciences since Aristotle. This section concludes that abstract terms like "complexity" are not metaphors, although they serve as umbrella terms for new paradigms of thought. ;The author concludes that theory-constituting metaphors are especially important at a postmodern science think tank that is as much a center of philosophy as it is of empirical research. The Institute is deeply involved in refining the ideas shaping a new paradigm in science and society---the paradigm that information exchange creates reality, that information is the new materiality. (shrink)

Summary: This essay rejects the widespread thesis that conceptually creative metaphors are unpara‐phrasable on grounds that it misconceives the nature and function of paraphrase. Encouraged by a deceptively parallel rejection of the positivist reducibility thesis by philosophers of science, defenders of the unparaphrasability thesis mistakenly equated paraphrase with literal translation and in so doing failed to appreciate paraphrase's critical role in the systematic exploitation of metaphor's creative potential. This essay attempts to recast the terms of the paraphrasability debate by separating (...) paraphrase from literal translation and defending paraphrase's essential epistemic role in theory development. Three arguments for the paraphrasability of creative metaphor are presented followed by a critique of the major arguments for their unparaphrasability as formulated by Black, Cohen and Ricoeur. Résumé: Cet essai rejette, parce qu'elle repose sur une incomprehension de la nature et de la fonction de la paraphrase, la thése répandue selon laquelle des métaphores conceptuellement créatives ne peuvent pas être paraphraseées. Encouragés par un rejet faussement paralléle, par les philosophes des sciences, de la réductibilité positiviste, les défenseurs de la non‐paraphrasabilité ont confondu paraphrase et traduction littérale et, ce faisant, n'ont pas tenu compte du rôle critique de la paraphrase dans l'exploitation systématique du potentiel créatif de la métaphore. Cet essai tente de reformuler les termes du débat sur la paraphrasabilité en distinguant la paraphrase de la traduction littérale et en défendant le rôle épistémologique essentiel de la paraphrase dans le développe‐ment des théories. Trois arguments sont présentés pour la paraphrasabilité de la métaphore créative; suit une critique des principaux arguments contre la paraphrasabilité tels qu'ils ont été formulés par Black, Cohen et Ricoeur. Zusammenfassung: Es wird die weitverbreitete Auffassung widerlegt, wonach begrifflich kreative Metaphern nicht paraphrasierbar sind, weil sie Natur und Funktion der Paraphrase missversteht. Durch den scheinbar parallelen Fall der Verwerfung der Reduktionsthese durch Wissenschaftstheoretiker getäuscht setzten die Vertreter der These der Unparaphrasierbarkeit die Paraphrase mit der wört‐lichen Übersetzung gleich und sind deshalb nicht in der Lage, die kritische Funktion der Paraphrase bei der systematischen Verwertung des schöpferischen Potentials der Metapher zu erfas‐sen. Es wird versucht, das Problem der Paraphrasierbarkeit neu zu formulieren, indem die Paraphrase von der wörtlichen Übersetzung unterschieden wird und indem die erkenntnistheorelisch wesentliche Rolle der Paraphrase bei der Entwicklung von Theorien hervorgehoben wird. Es wer‐den drei Argumente zugunsten der Paraphrasierbarkeit von schopferischen Metaphern vorgelegt und die wichtigsten Argumente von Black, Cohen und Ricoeur gegen die Paraphrasierbarkeit kri‐tisiert. (shrink)

I argue that figurative speech, and irony in particular, presents a deep challenge to the orthodox view about sentence content. The standard view is that sentence contents are, at their core, propositional contents: truth-conditional contents. Moreover, the only component of a sentence’s content that embeds in compound sentences, like belief reports or conditionals, is the propositional content. I argue that a careful analysis of irony shows this view cannot be maintained. Irony is a purely pragmatic form of content that embeds (...) in compound sentences. The standard view cannot account for this fact. I sketch out a speech-act theoretic framework that can. But in accepting this alternative framework we are giving up on the whole idea of an autonomous semantics. (shrink)

This article reveals an overlooked way of interpreting sentences like “The Internet is crack [cocaine]” or “Libraries are supermarkets.” Many existing theories of metaphor could apply here. However, they can instead be interpreted in a likeness-exaggerating way, under which “Libraries are supermarkets” is simply an exaggerated way of saying that libraries are like supermarkets to a very high degree. This interpretation option follows from simple, general considerations about exaggeration and likeness scales. In this way it is preferable to the abbreviated-simile (...) view of metaphor, and in any case it can be added to any existing metaphor account. It has broad significance for the theory of metaphor and simile, but also provides a new, straightforward explanation of the special, likeness-strengthening effect in utterances such as “Libraries aren’t merely like supermarkets, they are supermarkets.” This effect exists despite evidence that X-is-Y metaphors do not generally convey more likeness than correspondin. (shrink)

The prevalent theories of metaphor in the literature, with very few exceptions, involve a conversion of either meaning or reference from the literal meaning or reference of the metaphor to either a corresponding simile or to a metaphorical meaning or reference. In this essay an altemative to the conversion view - i.e., a constancy theory - is offered that requires no such conversions. H.R Grice's notions of conversational maximes and implicatures provide a conceptual framework within which to account for metaphors (...) in a totally literal context. A selection procedure is suggested as the mechanism by which one can interpret metaphors and distinguish them from other figures of speech. (shrink)

Metaphor, I argue, is a type of expression that is used to communicate information beyond that communicated by its literal meaning. I argue that the literal meaning of metaphors are essential. I attempt to account for metaphor in such a way as to retain the literal meaning, while also accounting for what is called the "metaphorical meaning" of metaphors. Secondly, I am concerned with the mechanisms in virtue of which we are able to distinguish the metaphorical from the literal. ;Chapter (...) I is a discussion of the problems that I will consider in the dissertation. These include distinguishing metaphorical from literal expressions, Donald Davidson's learnability and scrutability criteria, the exclusionary criteria, conversion and constancy theories of metaphor, and truth-values of metaphors. ;Chapter II critically examines Aristotle's, Max Black's, and Monroe C. Beardsley's intensional conversion theories. Here I argue that conversion theories are inadequate and unnecessary to account for metaphorical attributions. ;Chapter III critically examines extensional conversion theories of metaphor including Nelson Goodman's version. I discuss the difficulties that arise in postulating such reference conversions. I argue that this type of conversion theory is also unsuccessful and unnecessary. ;Chapter IV is a critical examination of four types of emotive theory of metaphor, one of which is Max Rieser's. These theories maintain, and I deny, that metaphors have an "emotive meaning" in addition to or instead of their literal meaning. I consider the shortcomings and consequences of emotive views, and argue that the postulation of emotive meanings is also misguided and unnecessary. ;Chapter V offers an alternative to conversion theories. Here I argue for a theory requiring no meaning or reference conversions. My view involves H. P. Grice's notions of conversational maxims and implicatures. I conclude that metaphors retain their literal meaning, partly in virtue of which they generate implicatures. I also conclude that our recognition of, and ability to distinguish, metaphors from literal expressions involves the violations of conversational maxims. (shrink)

The gap between the prelinguistic and the linguistic levels cannot be bridged as easily as Lakoff's cognitive linguistics suggests. Lakoff's event structure metaphor is reviewed here. Compared with physical movement, the bringing together of separated elements which occurs in predication would not be metaphorical only because it departs from concrete physical experience, but, more significantly, because it relies on elements artificially separated by means of language. However, if we do not overlook this fundamental leap, the event structure metaphor is a (...) good tool to understand how predication takes place, and its application is even wider than Lakoff suggests. (shrink)

The gap between the prelinguistic and the linguistic levels cannot be bridged as easily as Lakoff's cognitive linguistics suggests. Lakoff's event structure metaphor is reviewed here. Compared with physical movement, the bringing together of separated elements which occurs in predication would not be metaphorical only because it departs from concrete physical experience, but, more significantly, because it relies on elements artificially separated by means of language. However, if we do not overlook this fundamental leap, the event structure metaphor is a (...) good tool to understand how predication takes place, and its application is even wider than Lakoff suggests. (shrink)

In the current study of metaphor it is commonly assumed that during a metaphorical reading both an impression of dissimilarity and an impression of similarity are created in the reader's mind. These separate impressions exist simultaneously and each of them is considered to have linear relations with the metaphor's aptness without either coming at the expense of the other. Thus far this assumption has never received any satisfactory theoretical justification. In this paper I discuss the problem of the simultaneous existence (...) of similarity and dissimilarity in the reader's awareness when engaged in metaphor comprehension. I examine the methods for resolving this problem, point out the shortcomings of the suggested solution and present an alternative solution. My solution uses a well-known distinction in the field of visual perception, that of global similarity versus dimensional similarity, and applies it to metaphor comprehension. While doing 50 1 also try to supply a novel perspective on the process of metaphor comprehension. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify the aesthetical, ontological, and political grounds upon which certain modern philosophers (above all Heidegger and Deleuze) denounce the metaphor as an alternative device for producing meaning through language. It comes to the conclusion that the critique of metaphor is based on the critique of analogy as defined by the laws of representation, which should be replaced by a more direct expression of immanence or being. On the basis of other philosophical assumptions from various traditions and (...) the insights of literary theory, it proposes an alternative model of the metaphor that is no longer founded on analogy and demonstrates its philosophical implications. (shrink)

Taking into account pragmatic considerations and recent linguistic and psychological studies, the author forges a new understanding of the relation between metaphoric and literal meaning. The argument is illustrated with analysis of metaphors from literature, philosophy, science, and everyday language.

It is widely accepted that, in the course of interpreting a metaphorical utterance, both literal and metaphorical interpretations of the utterance are available to the interpreter, although there may be disagreement about the order in which these interpretations are accessed. I call this the dual availability assumption. I argue that it does not apply in cases of metaphorical singular reference. These are cases in which proper names, complex demonstratives or definite descriptions are used metaphorically; e.g., ‘That festering sore must go’, (...) referring to a derelict house. We are forced to give up dual availability in these cases because a process of predicate transfer happens in the restriction clauses of such metaphorically used definite phrases , so that a denotation-less definite concept is never constructed. A process of enriched composition yields only a metaphorical referent/denotation. I compare cases of metaphorical reference both to cases of metonymic reference and to uses of epithets of the ‘That N of an N’ form. Reflection on the former is helpful in getting clear about the kind of property transfer involved in referential metaphors. Such transfer happens directly at the level of properties and is not mediated via a correspondence between objects, as is the case with metonymic reference. Reflection on epithets such as ‘that festering sore of a house’ is helpful since these are a sort of intermediate case between cases of literal and metaphorical reference. They provide support for my claim that in cases of metaphorical reference there is only a single referent . Moreover, constraints on the use of these epithets suggest that referential metaphors are similarly constrained. In particular, I argue that referential metaphors can only be used when the implicit category restriction is highly salient, and that the evaluative information conveyed by the metaphor serves primarily to indicate the speaker’s attitude towards the referent rather than being intended to help the hearer identify the referent. (shrink)