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  1. Realism, Anti-Realism, and Absolute Idealism.James W. Allard - 2007 - In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court. pp. 31--127.
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  2. Deepening the Controversy Over Metaphysical Realism.Sophie R. Allen - 2002 - Philosophy 77 (4):519-541.
    A significant ontological commitment is required to sustain metaphysical realism—the view that there is a single, objective way the world is—in order to defend it from common sense objections. This involves presupposing the existence of properties (or tropes, or universals) and relations between them which define the objective structure of the world. This paper explores the grounds for accepting this ontological assumption and examines a sceptical argument which questions whether, having assumed the world is objectively divided into fundamental properties, we (...)
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  3. A Sensible Metaphysical Realism.William Alston - 2001 - Marquette University Press.
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  4. Realism & Antirealism.William P. Alston (ed.) - 2002 - Cornell University Press.
  5. What Metaphysical Realism Is Not.William P. Alston - 2002 - In Realism & Antirealism. Cornell Up. pp. 97-115.
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  6. What is Realistic About Putnam's Internal Realism?David L. Anderson - 1992 - Philosophical Topics 20 (1):49-83.
    Failure to recognize the "realistic" motivations for Putnam's commitment to internal realism has led to a widely shared misunderstanding of Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism. Realist critics of these arguments frequently offer rebuttals that fail to confront his arguments. Simply put, Putnam's arguments --the brains in a vat argument as well as the model-theoretic argument -- are "reductios" that are intended to show that "metaphysical realism itself is not sufficiently realistic". If that claim can be substantiated then Putnam can go (...)
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  7. A Dogma of Metaphysical Realism.David Leech Anderson - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1):1-11.
    There is a dogma about metaphysical realism that is well nigh universal: "If one is a metaphysical realist about the external world, then one ought to be a semantic realist about external- world statements". I argue that this dogma should be rejected. It is possible for a metaphysical realist to be a "semantic dualist", holding that some middle- sized object statements receive a realist interpretation, but that most such statements require an antirealist interpretation. To show that a semantically dual language (...)
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  8. N/A.Marco Andreacchio - manuscript
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  9. Two Forms of Platonism: A New Interpretation of Jung's "Mythical Empiricism" and Vico's "Critical Metaphysics".Marco Andreacchio - manuscript
    This paper juxtaposes the thought of Carl G. Jung to that of Giambattista Vico , aiming primarily at overturning all currently dominant historicist readings of Vico's political philosophy. On the way, I illuminate Vico's rational or non-dogmatic response to both medieval Christian theology and modern "scientific" philosophy . The Vico emerging through his own arguments and "reasoning" is a reviver of political philosophy in the Socratic tradition of Plato and Cicero.
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  10. A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism.Jamin Asay - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
    Realism and anti-realism about a domain of thought are metaphysical theses that involve the natures of the truthmakers in that domain and the truthmaking relation that is operant in the domain. Truthmaker theory is not exclusive territory for realists: anti-realist views are also best understood in terms of how they understand truthmakers and truthmaking. In particular, I explore the possibility of projectivist truthmaking, and show how it makes sense of quasi-realism. In addition to critically examining some extant accounts of the (...)
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  11. Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers.Jamin Asay - 2011 - Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    Truthmaker theory begins with the idea that truth depends upon reality. When a truth-bearer is true, that is because something or other in the world makes it true. My dissertation offers a theory of truthmakers that shows how we should flesh out this thought while avoiding the contentious metaphysical commitments that are built into other truthmaker theories. Because of these commitments, many philosophers have come to view truthmaker theory as being essentially tied to correspondence theories of truth, and to metaphysical (...)
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  12. On Ground as a Guide to Realism.Emad H. Atiq - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):165-178.
    According to Fine (among others), a nonbasic factual proposition must be grounded in facts involving those of its constituents that are both real and fundamental. But the principle is vulnerable to several dialectically significant counterexamples. It entails, for example, that a logical Platonist cannot accept that true disjunctions are grounded in the truth of their disjuncts; that a Platonist about mathematical objects cannot accept that sets are grounded in their members; and that a color primitivist cannot accept that an object’s (...)
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  13. The Metaphysical Realism of Pope John Paul II.S. J. Avery Cardinal Dulles - 2008 - International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):99-106.
    Karol Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II) found phenomenology very helpful for the analysis of concrete human experience and for overcoming the ethical formalism ofKant. Phenomenology, he believed, could also enrich classical Thomism by exploring the lived experience of freedom, interiority, and self-governance. But phenomenology, in his opinion, needed to be supplemented by metaphysics in order to ground experiences such as the sense of duty in the real order. He criticized much modern philosophy for abandoning metaphysics and thus neglecting the sapiential (...)
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  14. Naturalism, Normativity, and Explanation: The Scientistic Biases of Contemporary Naturalism.Guy Axtell - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (3):253-274.
    The critical focus of this paper is on a claim made explicitly by Gilbert Harman and accepted implicitly by numerous others, the claim that naturalism supports concurrent defense of scientific objectivism and moral relativism. I challenge the assumptions of Harman's ‘argument from naturalism' used to support this combination of positions, utilizing. Hilary Putnam’s ‘companions in guilt’ argument in order to counter it. The paper concludes that while domain-specific anti-realism is often warranted, Harman’s own views about the objectivity of facts and (...)
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  15. Putnam and Metaphysical Realism.George Bailey - 1983 - International Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):11-14.
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  16. Putnam on Truth: Metaphysical Realism Vs. Kantian Constructivism.Ann Michelle Baker - 1990 - Dissertation, University of Washington
    This dissertation concerns Putnam's objections to the realist conception of truth and his alternative, "internal realist," conception. I evaluate two main kinds of argument that Putnam advances against the realist conception of truth. First, the realist conception requires that we are talking about a kind of world we could never, according to Putnam, be talking about, namely a world that exists in itself, independent of minds. He argues that our powers of representation could never establish the right kind of connection (...)
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  17. The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    Lynne Rudder Baker presents and defends a unique account of the material world: the Constitution View. In contrast to leading metaphysical views that take everyday things to be either non-existent or reducible to micro-objects, the Constitution View construes familiar things as irreducible parts of reality. Although they are ultimately constituted by microphysical particles, everyday objects are neither identical to, nor reducible to, the aggregates of microphysical particles that constitute them. The result is genuine ontological diversity: people, bacteria, donkeys, mountains and (...)
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  18. Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2006 - The Monist 89 (3):313-333.
    On September 11, 2001, as everyone knows, the towers of the World Trade Center in New York were attacked. I want to discuss this event in order to motivate a nonreductionist view of the extensions of everyday concepts. Next, I shall set out, and begin to defend, the particular view of nonreductionism that I favor—the Constitution View. Then, I shall consider two venerable metaphysical issues (the nature of vagueness and the mind-independent/mind- dependent distinction) in light of the Constitution View. If (...)
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  19. Ontic Structural Realism and Modality.Nora Berenstain & James Ladyman - 2012 - In Elaine Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.), Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality. Springer.
    There is good reason to believe that scientific realism requires a commitment to the objective modal structure of the physical world. Causality, equilibrium, laws of nature, and probability all feature prominently in scientific theory and explanation, and each one is a modal notion. If we are committed to the content of our best scientific theories, we must accept the modal nature of the physical world. But what does the scientific realist’s commitment to physical modality require? We consider whether scientific realism (...)
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  20. Metaphysical Realism as a Pre-Condition of Visual Perception.Stephen J. Boulter - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261.
    In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to things as they are in the world via non-projective perception. These (...)
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  21. A Brief History of Continental Realism.Lee Braver - 2012 - Continental Philosophy Review 45 (2):261-289.
    This paper explains the nature and origin of what I am calling Transgressive Realism, a middle path between realism and anti-realism which tries to combine their strengths while avoiding their weaknesses. Kierkegaard created the position by merging Hegel’s insistence that we must have some kind of contact with anything we can call real (thus rejecting noumena), with Kant’s belief that reality fundamentally exceeds our understanding; human reason should not be the criterion of the real. The result is the idea that (...)
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  22. Realism Without Parochialism.Phillip Bricker - manuscript
    I am a realist of a metaphysical stripe. I believe in an immense realm of "modal" and "abstract" entities, of entities that are neither part of, nor stand in any causal relation to, the actual, concrete world. For starters: I believe in possible worlds and individuals; in propositions, properties, and relations (both abundantly and sparsely conceived); in mathematical objects and structures; and in sets (or classes) of whatever I believe in. Call these sorts of entity, and the reality they comprise, (...)
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  23. Experience, Reality and Conditions for Description.Lars Brink - 1968 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-4):85 – 100.
    This paper deals with the problem of the External World, taking its point of departure in Peter Zinkernagel's Conditions for Description. In the first section I try to give an outline of the theses contained in that book. In the second I raise a main objection against it, pointing out that Zinkernagel, in one respect, has not sufficiently sharpened the argumentation between phenomenalism and realism. In the third section I turn realism and phenomenalism sharply against each other, presenting the latter (...)
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  24. Realism and Anti-Realism.Stuart Brock & Edwin Mares - 2006 - Routledge.
    There are a bewildering variety of ways the terms "realism" and "anti-realism" have been used in philosophy and furthermore the different uses of these terms are only loosely connected with one another. Rather than give a piecemeal map of this very diverse landscape, the authors focus on what they see as the core concept: realism about a particular domain is the view that there are facts or entities distinctive of that domain, and their existence and nature is in some important (...)
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  25. Conceiving One's Envatment While Denying Metaphysical Realism.Anthony Brueckner - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):469 – 474.
    J.D. Collier sees Putnam as arguing that metaphysical realism is false.' He sees the argument as proceeding from the background assumption that metaphysical realism has the consequence that truth is 'radically non-epistemic', so that 'an [epistemically] ideal theory could be radically wrong about the world' [3, p. 413]. But, according to Collier, Putnam argues that 'an ideal theory satisfying all of our methodological and theoretical constraints cannot be false' [3, p. 413]. Collier attempts to defend metaphysical realism against this Putnamian (...)
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  26. Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1984 - Analysis 44 (3):134--40.
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  27. Mentale Verursachung und metaphysischer Realismus.Godehard Brüntrup - 1995 - Theologie Und Philosophei 70:203-223.
    Article on mental causation and metaphysical realism.
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  28. Is Relativity a Requirement for Mind-Dependence?Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir - 2010 - In François Recanati, Isidora Stojanovic & Neftali Villanueva (eds.), Context-Dependence, Perspective and Relativity. Mouton de Gruyter. pp. 317–332.
  29. Chapter Six. Metaphysical Realism and Logical Antirealism.Panayot Butchvarov - 2015 - In Anthropocentrism in Philosophy: Realism, Antirealism, Semirealism. De Gruyter. pp. 104-129.
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  30. Metaphysical Realism and Logical Nonrealism.Panayot Butchvarov - 2002 - In Richard M. Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 282.
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  31. Metaphysical Realism.Panayot Butchvarov - 1999 - In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 562--563.
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  32. Brains in Vats and Model Theory.Tim Button - forthcoming - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge University Press.
    Hilary Putnam’s BIV argument first occurred to him when ‘thinking about a theorem in modern logic, the “Skolem–Löwenheim Theorem”’ (Putnam 1981: 7). One of my aims in this paper is to explore the connection between the argument and the Theorem. But I also want to draw some further connections. In particular, I think that Putnam’s BIV argument provides us with an impressively versatile template for dealing with sceptical challenges. Indeed, this template allows us to unify some of Putnam’s most enduring (...)
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  33. The Limits of Realism.Tim Button - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Tim Button explores the relationship between minds, words, and world. He argues that the two main strands of scepticism are deeply related and can be overcome, but that there is a limit to how much we can show. We must position ourselves somewhere between internal realism and external realism, and we cannot hope to say exactly where.
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  34. La Metafisica Del Nuovo Realismo E le Sue Implicazioni Etiche.Leonardo Caffo & Sara De Sanctis - 2012 - Bloom (14):31-37.
    The aim of this essay is to provide an overview of New Realism in its opposition and reaction to Postmodernism. An analysis of the implications of both philosophical approaches in diverse fields will be offered, from epistemology, to politics, to ethics. Ethical new realism is presented as particularly promising and important to the future of philosophy.
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  35. Le radici dell'essere: Metafisica e metaontologia in David Malet Armstrong.Francesco F. Calemi - 2014 - Armando Editore.
    Metafisica e metaontologia in David Malet Armstrong Francesco F. Calemi. CALEMI, Francesco F. Le radici dell'essere. Metafisica e metaontologia in David Malet Armstrong ; Prefazione di Stephen Mumford Roma : Armando, © 2013 160 p.
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  36. What Anchors Semiosis: How Descartes Changed the Subject.Marc Champagne - 2008-09 - RS/SI (Recherches Sémiotiques / Semiotic Inquiry) 28 (3-1):183–197.
    The goal of this article is twofold. First, it revises the historiographic partition proposed by John Deely in Four Ages of Understanding (2001) by arguing that the moment marking the beginning of philosophical Modernity has been vividly recorded in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy with the experiment with the wax. Second, an upshot of this historical study is that it helps make sense of Deely’s somewhat iconoclastic use of the words “subject” and “subjectivity” to designate mind-independent worldly things. The hope (...)
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  37. Some Convergences and Divergences in the Realism of Charles Peirce and Ayn Rand.Marc Champagne - 2006 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 8 (1):19-39.
    Structured around Charles S. Peirce's three-fold categorical scheme, this article proposes a comparative study of Ayn Rand and Peirce's realist views in general metaphysics. Rand's stance is seen as diverging with Peirce's argument from asymptotic representation but converging with arguments from brute relation and neutral category. It is argued that, by dismissing traditional subject-object dualisms, Rand and Peirce both propose iconoclastic construals of what it means to be real, dismissals made all the more noteworthy by the fact each chose to (...)
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  38. Putnam on Realism.Hugh S. Chandler - manuscript
    In 1974 Putnam was a ‘realist’ in regard to the physical world. By 1981 he had become a 'non-realist' in this regard. (I don’t know where he stands today.) In this paper I argue that his realism was more plausible than his non-realism. The physical world is what it is independently of any rational being’s interpretation of it.
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  39. -≫Putnam on Physical Realism.Hugh S. Chandler - manuscript
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  40. Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference.Daihyun Chung - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Ideas (Seoul National University):3-33.
    I happen to believe that though human experiences are to be characterized as pluralistic they are all rooted in the one reality. I would assume the thesis of pluralism but how could I maintain my belief in the realism? There are various discussions in favor of realism but they appear to stay within a particular paradigm so to be called “internal realism”. In this paper I would try to justify my belief in the reality by discussing a special use of (...)
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  41. Ontological Disunity and a Realism Worth Having.Steve Clarke - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):628-629.
    Ross & Spurrett (R&S) appear convinced that the world must have a unified ontological structure. This conviction is difficult to reconcile with a commitment to mainstream realism, which involves allowing that the world may be ontologically disunified. R&S should follow Kitcher by weakening their conception of unification so as to allow for the possibility of ontological disunity.
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  42. Devitt's Realism and Truth.Cleve James Van - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):657-663.
  43. In Defence of Objectivity and Other Essays: On Realism, Existentialism and Politics.Andrew Collier - 2003 - Routledge.
    This volume develops and defends critical realism whilst engaging critically with existentialist philosophy in a number of ways. The work of existentialist thinkers as diverse as Kierkegarrd, R.D. Laing, Heideggar and Sartre is discussed at length and Andrew Collier argues that there is much to be learnt from their work, especially in Heidegger's critique of the technological view of the world. However the book concludes with a defence of objectivity against the various forms of subjectivism advanced by the existentialists.
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  44. How Not to Defend Metaphysical Realism.John Collier - 1986 - Southwest Philosophy Review 3:19-27.
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  45. Empiricist Structuralism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Bridging Problem.Gabriele Contessa - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):514-524.
    [This paper is part of a book symposium on Bas van Fraassen's Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (OUP, 2010)].
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  46. Goodman and Putnam on the Making of Worlds.Damian Cox - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (1):33 - 46.
    Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are two of the twentieth century's most persuasive critics of metaphysical realism, however they disagree about the consequences of rejecting metaphysical realism. Goodman defended a view he called irrealism in which minds literally make worlds, and Putnam has sought to find a middle path between metaphysical realism and irrealism. I argue that Putnam's middle path turns out to be very elusive and defend a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and irrealism.
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  47. Metaphysical Realism and Idealisation.Damian Cox - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (3-4):465-487.
    Hilary Putnam's famous model-theoretic arguments have the virtue of presenting metaphysical realists with a clear challenge. On pain of embracing either an implausible antifallibilism or the radical indeterminacy of reference, metaphysical realists must appeal to metalinguistic levels of interpretation richer than our own in order to fix meaning. And sense must be made of this appeal. In this paper I begin the task of developing a version of metaphysical realism that takes up this challenge.
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  48. Realism.Daniel O. Dahlstrom (ed.) - 1984 - National Office of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
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  49. Horwich on 'Semantic' and 'Metaphysical' Realism.David Davies - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (4):539-557.
    Horwich argues that we should reject metaphysical realism, but that we can preserve semantic realism by adhering to a redundancy theory of truth and a confirmationist account of linguistic understanding. But the latter will give us semantic realism only if it allows that the truth-values of sentences may transcend our recognitional capacities, and this is possible only insofar as we covertly reintroduce metaphysical realism. In spite of its intuitive appeal, we should not endorse semantic realism, but this need not bear (...)
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  50. Language and Metaphysical Realism in Locke.Antoni Defez Martin - 2009 - Pensamiento 65 (244):279-295.
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