Metaphysics, General Works

Reshaping the neo-Aristotelian doctrines about the human soul was Descartes’s most spectacular enterprise, which gave birth to some of the sharpest debates in the Republic of Letters. Neverthe- less, it was certainly Descartes’s intention, as already expressed in the Discours de la méthode, to show that his new metaphysics could be supplemented with experimental research in the field of medicine and the conservation of life. It is no surprise then that several natural philosophers and doctors, such as Henricus Regius from (...) Utrecht, who had studied in Padua with William Harvey, rallied in support, in order to gain a more substantial theoretical basis for their research. Taking as his ground some general metaphysical assumptions, such as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and perhaps the separability of the pure understanding, Regius intended to secure a new philosophy of man, which was able to reflect his medical interests and complement his account of human nature. This is the story that is now gaining currency, and it is surely accurate, at least in part. Desmond Clarke has recently defended the same view1, based on the remarkable studies of the Utrecht scholars Theo Verbeek and Erik-Jan Bos. Here I would like to challenge some aspects of this view and ask how Regius, who was perceived as the philosopher most closely associated with Descartes, became a betrayer of his mentor. (shrink)

The intentionality of sensation -- The first person -- Substance -- The subjectivity of sensation -- Events in the mind -- Comments on Professor R.L. Gregory's paper on perception -- On sensations of position -- Intention -- Pretending -- On the grammar of "Enjoy" -- The reality of the past -- Memory, "experience," and causation -- Causality and determination -- Times, beginnings, and causes -- Soft determinism -- Causality and extensionality -- Before and after -- Subjunctive conditionals -- "Under a (...) description" -- Analysis competition--tenth problem -- A reply to Mr. C.S. Lewis's argument that "naturalism" is self-refuting. (shrink)

The area of operative metaphysics speaks of a metaphysical system that does not just exist as an ivory tower apart from people’s experience, but one that could be applied to a concrete historical circumstance. This piece studies the concept of being as understood by Pantaleon Iroegbu, as being qua belongingness. The concept of being qua belongingness lies within the parameters of operative metaphysics. Pantaleon’s concept of being is analysed alongside the situation of crisis in the Niger Delta region, which the (...) researcher believes was born out of the feeling of neglect and marginalization. Placed alongside Pantaleon’s philosophy of belongingness which opines that to be is to belong, this piece proposes that if the Niger Delta people are given a sense of belongingness, the crisis in the region would come under a more genuine control. (shrink)

Leibniz notoriously insisted that no two individuals differ solo numero, that is, by being primitively distinct, without differing in some property. The details of Leibniz’s own way of understanding and defending the principle –known as the principle of identity of indiscernibles (henceforth ‘the Principle’)—is a matter of much debate. However, in contemporary metaphysics an equally notorious and discussed issue relates to a case put forward by Max Black (1952) as a counter-example to any necessary and non-trivial version of the principle. (...) Black asks us to imagine, via one of the fictional characters of his dialogue, a world consisting solely of two completely resembling spheres, in a relational space. The supporter of the principle is then forced to admit that although there are ex hypothesi two objects in that universe, there is no property (except trivial ones), not even relational ones, to distinguish them, and hence the necessary version of the principle is falsified. In this essay I will argue that Black’s possible world, together with the dialectic between the potential friends and foes of the Principle as expounded by Black himself.. (shrink)

A discussion paper on Daniel Schneider's (2015) response to Alison Peterman (2015) for the online 'Philpercs Symposium'. I side with Peterman against Schneider's notion of Infinite Dimensional Extension, with respect to Spinoza's notion of the attribute of extension.

I come not to clarify Aristotle’s defence of the principle of non-contradiction, but to put it in its proper context. I argue that remarks in Metaphysics IV.3 together with the argument of IV.4, 1006a11-31 show that Aristotle practises Plato’s method of dialectic in his defence of PNC. I mean this in the strong sense that he uses the very methodology described in the middle books of the Republic and, I claim, illustrated in such dialogues as Parmenides, Sophist and Theaetetus.

My goal is to illuminate truth-making by way of illuminating the relation of making. My strategy is not to ask what making is, in the hope of a metaphysical theory about is nature. It's rather to look first to the language of making. The metaphor behind making refers to agency. It would be absurd to suggest that claims about making are claims about agency. It is not absurd, however, to propose that the concept of making somehow emerges from some feature (...) to do with agency. That's the contention to be explore in this paper. The way to do this is through expressivism,. Truth-making claims, and making-claims generfally, are claims in which we express mental states linked to our maipulation of concepts, like truth. In particular, they express disposition to undertake derivations using inference rules, in which introduction rules have a specific role. I then show how this theory explains our intuitions about truth's asymmetric dependence on being. (shrink)

I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to be unambiguous. Ch. 2 is (...) a critical historical survey of deflationary theories, where notably disquotationalism is found untenable as a descriptive theory of “true”. In Ch. 3, I aim to show that deflationism cannot be finitely and non-circularly formulated by using “true”, and so must only mention it. Hence, it must be a theory specifically about the word “true” (and its foreign counterparts). To capture the ordinary notion, the theory must thus be an empirical, use-theoretic, semantic account of “true”. The task of explaining facts about truth now becomes that of showing that various sentences containing “true” are (unconditionally) assertible. In Ch. 4, I defend the claim (D) that every sentence of the form “That p is true” and the corresponding “p” are intersubstitutable (in a use-theoretic sense), and show how this claim provides a unified and simple account of a wide variety of occurrences of “true”. Disquotationalism then only has the advantage of avoiding propositions. But in Ch. 5, I note that (D) is not committed to propositions. Use-theoretic semantics is then argued to serve nominalism better than truth-theoretic ditto. In particular, it can avoid propositions while sustaining a natural syntactic treatment of “that”-clauses as singular terms and of “Everything he says is true”, as any other quantification. Finally, Horwich’s problem of deriving universal truth-claims is given a solution by recourse to an assertibilist semantics of the universal quantifier. (shrink)

The articles in this special issue of the yearbook Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy all concern, in one way or another, Hume’s epistemology and metaphysics. -/- There are discussions of our knowledge of causal powers, the extent to which conceivability is a guide to modality, and testimony; there are also discussions of our ideas of space and time, the role in Hume’s thought of the psychological mechanism of ‘completing the union’, the role of impressions, and Hume’s argument against the (...) claim that our perceptions are ‘locally conjoined’ with any entity (namely, a soul). (shrink)

This survey of metaphysics covers the historical or classical aspects of the subject as well as those currently in the post-Wittgensteinian limelight--principally materialism, platonism, essentialism, and anti-realism. Benardete sees contemporary metaphysical preoccupations as more or less thinly disguised revisitings of those of the past, and explains how metaphysics and mathematical logic are interrelated and how metaphysical studies can illuminate both scinece and the humanities.

Oxford Studies in Metaphysicsis the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field.OSMoffers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the ...

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character: this series is a much-needed focus for it.

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character: this series is a much-needed focus for it.

Sometimes, I like to write 'philosophical stories' that explain a philosophical problem, and this book is a compilation of five such stories. So this is a book for non-philosophers or for beginners in philosophy. There is a story of a bald punk that allows me to explain theories of vagueness, a story about brains in vats that gives rise to a discussion of scepticism about the external world, a story about a theft in a museum where the thief is condemned (...) twice (once for stealing a statue, and once for stealing a piece of bronze of which the statue was made), a time travel story, and a ship od Theseus revisited story. I hope to have achieved something that is both fun and serious and that will give a good picture of what philosophy is to the general public. The book is also intented for first or second year philosophy students, who can find there a starting point for understanding some debates. (shrink)

"With its signal distinction between 'intuition' and 'analysis' and its exploration of the different levels of Duration, _An Introduction to Metaphysics_ has had a significant impact on subsequent twentieth century thought. The arts, from post-impressionist painting to the stream of consciousness novel, and philosophies as diverse as pragmatism, process philosophy, and existentialism bear its imprint. Consigned for a while to the margins of philosophy, Bergson’s thought is making its way back to the mainstream. The reissue of this important work comes (...) at an opportune time, and will be welcomed by teachers and scholars alike." --Peter A. Y. Gunter, University of North Texas. (shrink)

It is argued in this essay that we can have an »original grasp of the attitude of other persons« (»originales Erfassen«) of persons’ acts, like love hence we know about love not only because of our self-awareness. In this essay I examine two different kinds of spousal love and compare them with each other. For this examination I am using the example of the spousal love of St. Agnes, the bride of Christ.

This book contains a concise introduction to one of the most fundamental branches of philosophy, which deals with reality and its nature. Among the topics discussed are such metaphysical questions as "Are we fundamentally free?", "Does time really pass?", "Are there any abstract objects?", "What is causation?", "What are necessary and possible truths?". The book is aimed at absolute beginners, so it does not presuppose any previous knowledge of philosophy from the reader. For those who would like to pursue the (...) subject a bit deeper, the book comes equipped with an extended list of further reading. (shrink)

Professional philosophers and advanced students working in metaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.

I show that a particular version of Hume's Dictum together with the falsity of Composition as Identity entails an incoherency, so either that version of Hume's Dictum is false or Composition as Identity is true. I conditionally defend the particular version of Hume's Dictum in play, and hence conditionally conclude that Composition as Identity is true. I end by suggesting an alternative way out for a persistent foe of Composition as Identity, namely mereological nihilism.

Dem durch Kant verschütteten Verständnis der aristotelischen Kategorienlehre brach schon Brentanos erste Schrift 'Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles' Bahn. Zu ihrem Thema kehrt er in den hier vereinten Diktaten aus seinem letzten Jahrzehnt zurück.

Our raison d’être cannot be considered in isolation: it is inextricably bound to the raison d’être of the Other, as well as to the reason for all those things our minds perceive. In order to exist, we are therefore constrained to attribute meaning to the world. However, I suggest that this meaning is arbitrary; it is in no way justified, since existence is not founded on any tangible facts. The task facing humans is thus not to succeed in finding some (...) kind of truth, but to come to terms with their ontological error. As I will attempt to demonstrate in this book, this notion has deep-reaching implications that are both scientific (the relationship between the self, the observations made by the self and the notion of order) and metaphysical (the condition, limits and extensions of the self). Existence is in perpetual motion, it is a breath of air, made up of advances and interruptions. However, this breath would be nothing more than mere agitation if the conscious being did not assign it a degree of aesthetic continuity; in other words, if it did not conceive of itself, as well as the surrounding reality, in a sufficiently stable and coherent fashion to enable the emergence of its conscience. Reality is, in itself, pure chaos; it comprises neither form nor order. It is assigned these qualities by the conscious being, which is engaging in graceful action and employs great determination, since without such qualities its existence appears baseless. (shrink)

Notre raison d’être ne pourrait se concevoir isolément : elle est intimement liée à celle d’autrui ainsi qu’à la raison de toute chose se présentant à notre esprit. Nous voilà donc contraints, pour exister, d’octroyer un sens au monde. Or je suggère que ce sens est arbitraire ; il n’est justifié en rien, l’existence n’étant fondée sur aucun fait tangible. Il s’agit dès lors, pour l’être humain, non pas d’aboutir à une quelconque vérité, mais d’assumer son erreur ontologique. Ceci aura, (...) comme je tâcherai de le démontrer dans ce livre, des implications scientifiques (relation entre l’être, ses observations et la notion d’ordre) et métaphysiques (condition de l’être, ses limites et prolongements) profondes. L’existence est en perpétuel mouvement, elle est un souffle, composé de progressions et de ruptures. Ce souffle ne serait cependant que pure agitation si l’être conscient ne lui attribuait pas une certaine continuité esthétique, c’est-à-dire s’il ne se concevait pas lui-même, ainsi que la réalité qui l’entoure, de façon suffisamment stable et cohérente pour autoriser l’émergence de sa conscience. La réalité est, en tant que telle, pur chaos ; elle n’inclut aucune forme ni aucun ordre, seul l’être conscient lui prête de telles propriétés. Il le fait pour la beauté du geste, et y met d’autant plus de bonne volonté que son existence lui apparaîtrait, sinon, infondée. (shrink)

The Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology reflects the conviction that the history of metaphysics and current work in metaphysics and ontology can each throw valuable light on the other. Thus it is designed to serve both äs a means of making more widely accessible the results of recent scholarship in the history of philosophy, and also äs a unique work of reference in reladon to the metaphysical themes at the centre of much current debate in analyüc philosophy. The work contains (...) more man 450 shorter articies on specific themes and methods in metaphysics and ontology, together with biographical essays summarizing the thinking of the most important philosophers within the traditions dealt with. In addition, it contains about 20 longer survey arücles mapping out both historically and systemadcally the main areas of metaphysics and ontology. AU contributions have been speciaüy commissioned for this project from leading authorities in their respective fields. A special feature of the work is the pardcular attention that is paid to topics and issues of relevance to contemporary philosophical debates. The work includes also a series of arücles on the logical and mathematical tools of metaphysics and on the applications of metaphysical ideas within linguisdcs, psychology, cognitive science, and mathemadcs. (shrink)

This book is an accessible introduction to the central themes of contemporary metaphysics. It carefully considers accounts of causation, freedom and determinism, laws of nature, personal identity, mental states, time, material objects, and properties, while inviting students to reflect on metaphysical problems. The philosophical questions discussed include: What makes it the case that one event causes another event? What are material objects? Given that material objects exist, do such things as properties exist? What makes it the case that a person (...) may exist at two different times? An Introduction to Metaphysics makes these tough questions tractable by presenting the features and flaws of current attempts to answer them. Intended primarily for students taking a first class in metaphysics, this lucid and well-written text would also provide an excellent introduction for anyone interested in knowing more about this important area of philosophy. (shrink)

Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories give approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world. Debates between realists and their critics are at the very heart of the philosophy of science. Anjan Chakravartty traces the contemporary evolution of realism by examining the most promising strategies adopted by its proponents in response to the forceful challenges of antirealist sceptics, resulting in a positive proposal for scientific realism today. He examines the core principles (...) of the realist position, and sheds light on topics including the varieties of metaphysical commitment required, and the nature of the conflict between realism and its empiricist rivals. By illuminating the connections between realist interpretations of scientific knowledge and the metaphysical foundations supporting them, his book offers a compelling vision of how realism can provide an internally consistent and coherent account of scientific knowledge. (shrink)