Metaphysics, General Works

What are some metaphysical fundamentals which constitute the reality? This question has occupied philosophers for a long time. The western tradition once dealt with conceptions of earth, air, water, fire, ether whereas the eastern tradition has studied notions like yin-yang(陰陽), taiji(太極), lichi(理氣). The question is now being researched under the name of physicalism or naturalism, and yet what is not yet clarified is the relationship between electromagnetic force as the fundamental of the physical and consciousness as the fundamental of the (...) mental. What is puzzling is that most philosophers insist on the overcoming of the traditional dualism while they tend to accept the distinction between electromagnetic force and consciousness. If they decide that the metaphysical paradigm of the duality is plausible then they should first present the grammar of functions of those concepts like individual, identity, causation. If they can see that the prospect of that traditional metaphysical paradigms are not hopeful, then they better start to look for an alternative metaphysical picture where the world can be understood more holistically. There have been alternative paradigms such as metaphysics of process and integration. It’s time to take a look at one of these. This paper tries to interpret the latter. -/- The notion of integration(誠) has been the subject studied for a long time as a teaching of Zhongyong, one of the key Confucian texts. Many has taken the word “誠” of Zhongyong to mean sincerity or faithfulness. Certainly there are anthropological or ethical dimension to the meaning of the word. But the whole text seems to direct a reader to see how the world is, the metaphysical dimension of the world. I will interpret the major thrust of Zhongyong to say that integration is a metaphysical fundamental. If one is to accept the evolution thesis of the body of human being then she is also to concede the evolution thesis of the mind of human being. If one is positive toward the evolutionary theory of the human mind then she is more likely open-minded toward the powers of the mind of physical things. This may allow to proceed to a thesis that integration is an information consciousness(chapter 1). Suppose that physical things of the world are integrational. Then the integration is not to be given from the outside but from within. Then when things are integrational they become integrators. Integrators are bound to possess some sort of power. I will discuss the thesis that integration is a dispositional power(chapter 2). If all things are bundles of informations then information is ubiquitous(chapter 3) and things may be passive in certain contexts but are active toward their informations, processing them in their own ways. If these three hypotheses are reasonable then my thesis of integration as a metaphysical fundamental would be plausible. (shrink)

The present text provides a logical theory which originated in the unification of a number of well-known philosophical logics as well as the introduction and study of new operators. Further M-logic contains an object theory. With both the logical part and the object part we achieve a formal calculus that is able to express many metaphysical dogmas.

1078 schlug Anselm von Cantury ein Argument für die Existenz Gottes vor, welches als ontologischer Beweis bekannt wurde. Es basiert auf der Erkennt-nis, dass die Nicht-Existenz Gottes zu einem Widerspruch führt, weswegen die Existenz Gottes als logisch notwendig erscheint. Obwohl diese Schlussfolgerung heutzutage als bedeutungslos kritisiert wird, ist sie immer noch Gegenstand philosophischer und theologischer Betrachtungen. In diesem Aufsatz wird eine moderne, d.h. wissenschaftliche, Metaphysik vorgestellt, die zu derselben Schlussfolgerung führte wie der ontologische Beweis – freilich aus einem ganz anderen (...) Grund. Sie zeigt, dass sich in einem physikalischen Universum, welches explizit auf einem unsichtbaren Fundament (i.e. dem EINEN) basiert, die Existenz des EINEN als logisch notwendig erweist, weil andernfalls eben dieses Universum intern von kontradiktorischer Natur wäre. (shrink)

Formal ontology as a main branch of metaphysics investigates categories of being. In the formal ontological approach to metaphysics, these ontological categories are analysed by ontological forms. This analysis, which we illustrate by some category systems, provides a tool to assess the clarity, exactness and intelligibility of different category systems or formal ontologies. We discuss critically different accounts of ontological form in the literature. Of ontological form, we propose a character- neutral relational account. In this metatheory, ontological forms of entities (...) are their standings in internal relations whose holding is neutral on the character of their relata. These relations are “formal ontological relations”. Entities belong to ontological categories because they stand in the same formal ontological relations. We hold a nominalist relationalism about ontological categories and forms. We conclude by showing that our metatheory is useful for understanding categorial fundamentality/non- fundamentality, different formal ontologies, and for unifying metaphysical questions. (shrink)

In Molière’s comedy The Imaginary Invalid a doctor “explains” that opium reliably induces sleep because it has a “dormitive virtue.” Molière intended this to be a satirical play on the use of opaque scholastic concepts in medicine, and since then the phrase “dormitive virtue” has become a byword for explanatory failure. However, contemporary work on the metaphysics of grounding and dispositions appears to permit explanations with a strikingly similar structure. In this paper I explore competing verdicts on dormitive virtue explanation, (...) using a model of explanation I call Contextualist Pluralist Non-Realist Backing, or CPN Backing. I show that CPN Backing illuminates the puzzle about dormitive virtue explanation, shows what is required for a resolution, and makes sense of conflicting responses to this case. (shrink)

This book argues for the use of nonideal theory in social ontology. The central claim is that a paradigm shift is underway in contemporary social ontology, from ideal to nonideal, and that this shift should be fully followed through. To develop and defend this central claim, the first step is to show that the key questions and central dividing lines within contemporary social ontology can be fruitfully reconstructed as a clash between two worlds, referred to as ideal and nonideal social (...) ontology. Ideal social ontology is characterized by consensus and cooperation, while nonideal social ontology is characterized by conflict and contestation. The second step is to show that, when taken together, objections to the standard model of ideal social ontology (the dominant version of ideal social ontology) imply that this model needs to be given up in favor of nonideal social ontology. In other words, we should look to nonideal rather than ideal social ontology for core concepts. The third step is to offer a positive account, called the power view, of nonideal social ontology. This account places the concept of social power at the core of a general theory of the social world and replaces the flat and narrow conception of power in ideal social ontology with a richer and more extensive conception. In addition, it rectifies a shortcoming in nonideal social ontology by attending to class, which has been notably and oddly overlooked in the literature. (shrink)

Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. If there is any (...) difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. If there is any difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. (shrink)

This book is the first volume featuring the work of American women philosophers in the first half of the twentieth century. It provides selected papers authored by Mary Whiton Calkins, Grace Andrus de Laguna, Grace Neal Dolson, Marjorie Glicksman Grene, Marjorie Silliman Harris, Thelma Zemo Lavine, Marie Collins Swabey, Ellen Bliss Talbot, Dorothy Walsh and Margaret Floy Washburn. The book also provides the historical and philosophical background to their work. The papers focus on the nature of philosophy, knowledge, the philosophy (...) of science, the mind-matter nexus, the nature of time, and the question of freedom and the individual. The material is suitable for scholars, researchers and advanced philosophy students interested in (history of) philosophy; theories of knowledge; philosophy of science; mind, and reality. (shrink)

As much as reality itself, its reflections and appearances have taken a significant place in philosophical discussions. While Plato's Allegory of the Cave is one of the first of these discussions, the philosophy of the virtual shows the final state of these discussions today. The virtual cave is the modern-day version of Plato's cave. Appearances in Plato's cave have their own mode of existence, and likewise, virtual objects in the virtual cave have their own mode of existence. There are many (...) philosophical similarities between the ancient cave and the virtual cave. So much so that, according to the first, the shadows in the cave are a different view of reality, while according to the second, the virtual images in the virtual cave are another view of reality. The philosophy of the ancient cave and virtual cave essentially point to the debates about what the nature of reality is. The ontological and epistemic dimensions of appearance and virtual image lead us to the discussion about the nature and whatness of reality. The most common and advanced virtual cave today is the metaverse. Metaverse consists of virtual communities that combine the reality of the physical world with the reality of the virtual world and are open to all kinds of manipulations. (shrink)

The validity of the senses we use to experience the cosmos is something we take for granted. The majority of the people view the senses as the most effective and potentially the only tool they have to reach reality. But as Shestov rightfully questioned, when was the last time the majority decided correctly on an important philosophical problem? The role of science and philosophy is to question the obvious and this is what we should do if we are to uncover (...) the true role of the senses. This paper uses a series of philosophy articles to touch on the problem of the senses and the answer portrayed is exciting as well as terrifying: The senses are not a helpful tool but more of a hurdle when it comes to understanding the cosmos…. (shrink)

Here, we defend the thesis whereby the event plays a main role of sense in the meaning of certain sentences. This thesis is based on the one hand on recent work in the metaphysics of so-called “happening” entities, which has led to a distinction between concrete physical processes and abstract events, the latter being conceived as psychological constructs accounting for stabilities or changes in the world. Furthermore, we look back at the work on intentionality carried out in the Brentanian school (...) at the turn of the 20th century and we relate abstract events to the mental states of affairs studied by Twardowski but which were then neglected by contemporary philosophers of language. Abstract events, thus characterized, have the contingent property of occurring, when facts obtain and realize them. We suggest that the facts in question correspond to Wittgensteinian states of affairs. (shrink)

Why quantum physics works. (Why quantum philosophy works.) And why it doesn’t. It’s all about fusion guitar. You could call it 'philosophical (and physical) fusion.' .

Priority Theory is an increasingly popular view in metaphysics. By seeing metaphysical questions as primarily concerned with what explains what, instead of merely what exists, it promises not only an interesting approach to traditional metaphysical issues but also the resolution of some outstanding disputes. In a recent paper, Louis deRosset argues that Priority Theory isn’t up to the task: Priority Theory is committed to there being explanations that violate a formal constraint on any adequate explanation. This paper critically examines deRosset’s (...) challenge to Priority Theory. We argue that deRosset’s challenge ultimately fails: his proposed constraint on explanation is neither well-motivated nor a general constraint. Nonetheless, lurking behind his criticism is a deep problem for prominent ways of developing Priority Theory, a problem which we develop. (shrink)

The relevance of analytic metaphysics has come under criticism: Ladyman & Ross, for instance, have suggested do discontinue the field. French & McKenzie have argued in defense of analytic metaphysics that it develops tools that could turn out to be useful for philosophy of physics. In this article, we show first that this heuristic defense of metaphysics can be extended to the scientific field of applied ontology, which uses constructs from analytic metaphysics. Second, we elaborate on a parallel by French (...) & McKenzie between mathematics and metaphysics to show that the whole field of analytic metaphysics, being useful not only for philosophy but also for science, should continue to exist as a largely autonomous field. (shrink)

El artículo analiza la noción de Procesos, como parte de la discusión relativa a la Filosofía del Proceso. Se sostiene la posición de que sólo existen objetos con procesos, con lo que, bajo una descripción naturalista, se omite de la realidad a entidades inmóviles, eternas y sin cambios. Como consecuencia, cabe preguntarse: (a) si hay procesos sin objetos; (b), en qué sentido los objetos universales y abstractos podrían prescindir de la noción de procesos, es decir, si habría objetos abstractos sin (...) procesos, asumiendo que por su parte los objetos particulares siempre están asociados a procesos; (c) el de si los procesos son teleológicos; y (d), y si el concepto de procesos implica el de flujo continuo, como se desprende de, por ejemplo, la filosofía del proceso de Whitehead. (shrink)

Monism is our name for a range of views according to which the connection between dispositions and their categorical bases is intimate and necessary, or on which there are no categorical bases at all. In contrast, Dualist views hold that the connection between dispositions and their categorical bases is distant and contingent. This paper is a defence of Monism against an influential conceivability argument in favour of Dualism. The argument suggests that the apparent possibility of causal behaviour coming apart from (...) categorical bases is best explained by Dualism. We argue that Monism can explain the apparent possibility as well, if we take metaphysically alien laws — namely, laws whose metaphysical nature is alien to the actual world — into account. (shrink)

I consider the claim that analytic statements are "true in virtue meaning", giving the claim a ground-theoretic interpretation.

Introduction to Synthisophy: roots, mission, description and conclusion.

Introduction to synthisophy; roots, mission, description, conclusion.

In this article I argue that if conscience, working properly, involves some form of ‘moral tug’, then this is incompatible with the state of ‘quiescence’ put forward as a central element of Eleonore Stump’s account of repentance. Quiescence is also a key notion for Stump’s theodicy in Wandering in the Darkness and Stump’s thesis in her book, Atonement. Quiescence is about an inactive, or neutral, or stationary, state of the will prior to turning to the good, or God, through receiving (...) God’s saving grace. But if God exerts a non–coercive pressure on people through their conscience to turn to him, and turn from evil, then this drawing towards the good, or tugging away from evil, can only be yielded to, or resisted. There is no neutral state. I give examples of language such as being ‘bound’ to obey one’s conscience, which seem to reflect such non–coercive pressure. I conclude by commenting on free will. (shrink)

This book is a collection of essays written by Bob Hale (three co-authored), with a critical introduction from Kit Fine. They comprise Hale’s final years of work, adding to and extending beyond his landmark monograph Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them (OUP, 2013, 2nd edition 2015). The essays develop and consolidate several key themes in Hale’s work, most notably the notion of definition, especially as it extends beyond definition of a word to definition of (...) a thing more generally, and its relations to essence and existence; how the recently influential notion of truthmaking relates to and illuminates some of these issues; and ontological questions connected with Hale’s metaphysical commitments on the one hand, and his commitments in the foundations of mathematics on the other. Several of the essays engage with and respond to work by Kit Fine, and contributions to Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale (OUP 2018). As such, these essays also demonstrate a rich and fruitful philosophical dialogue between Hale and his critics and friends. (shrink)

Przedmowa do II wydania "Tercetu metafizycznego" Barbary Skargi / Preface to the 2nd ed. of the Barbara Skarga's "Metaphysical Tercet".

Kit Fine is an English philosopher who is among the most important philosophers of the turn of the millennium. He is perhaps most influential for reinvigorating a neo-Aristotelian turn within contemporary analytic philosophy. Fine’s prolific work is characterized by a unique blend of logical acumen, respect for appearances, ingenious creativity, and originality. His vast corpus is filled with numerous significant contributions to metaphysics, philosophy of language, logic, philosophy of mathematics, and the history of philosophy. Although Fine is well-known for favoring (...) ideas familiar from the neo-Aristotelian tradition (such as dependence, essence, and hylomorphism), his work is most distinctive for its methodology. Fine’s general view is that metaphysics is not best approached through the study of language Roughly put, Fine’s approach focuses on providing a rigorous account of the apparent phenomena themselves, and not just how we represent them in language or thought, prior to any attempt to discern the reality underlying them. Furthermore, a strong and ecumenical respect for the intelligible options, demands patience for the messy details, even when they resist tidying or systematization. All this leads to a steadfastness in refusing to allow epistemic qualms about how we know what we seem to know interferes with our attempts to clarify just what it is that we seem to know. This article surveys the wide variety of Fine’s rich and creative contributions to philosophy, and it conveys what Fine’s distinctive methodology is and how it informs his contributions to philosophy. (shrink)

Critical Notice for: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: New Essays. Edited by Matthew H. Slater and Zanja Yudell. Oxford University Press, 2017. x + 258 pp.

Sendo a fenomenologia um modo não-especulativo de pensar, o artigo põe a questão sobre a possibilidade de descrever a metafísica em regime de redução fenomenológica, ou seja, a partir de uma atitude que não pretende discursar sobre o ser enquanto ser, mas sim a partir dos diferentes “modos de aparecer” dos principais “objetos” da metafísica: alma, mundo e Deus. Neste caso, que sentido deverá possuir, para o modo fenomenológico de pensar, o metá, presente na palavra metafísica?

La doctrina del choque (Anstoß), que Fichte desarrolla ante todo en el Fundamento de toda la Doctrina de la Ciencia, pero también en otros escritos de la época de Jena, ha sido desde antaño objeto de crítica tanto por los admiradores como por los detractores de la filosofía fichteana. Existen al menos dos modos específicamente diferentes y aparentemente contrapuestos de comprender su sentido: según una lectura, el choque sería una autoafección del propio Yo; según otra, un residuo realista, en última (...) instancia incompatible con los compromisos idealistas del pensamiento de Fichte. La tensión entre ambos modos de comprender la tesis del choque pueden reeconcontrarse en la confrontación entre las interpretaciones así llamadas epistemológica y ontológica de la tesis de la “cosa en sí” en la filosofía de Kant –tesis con la que de hecho suele asociarse la tesis fichteana del choque. En este contexto, Hegel parecería a primera vista presentarse –por ejemplo, si se considera el escrito de la Diferencia entre los sistemas de filosofía de Fichte y Schelling– como partidario de una interpretación robusta, ontológica, de la tesis del choque; sin embargo, si se analiza el corpus hegeliano en su conjunto la posición de Hegel resulta ser más matizada y próxima a una interpretación por así llamarla epistemológica de dicha tesis. Con todo, aun así la postura de Hegel sobre el sentido de la tesis fichteana del choque en el contexto de una filosofía idealista continúa siendo crítica. (shrink)

According to the classical account, propositions are sui generis, abstract, intrinsically-representational entities and our cognitive attitudes, and the token states within us that realize those attitudes, represent as they do in virtue of their propositional objects. In light of a desire to explain how it could be that propositions represent, much of the recent literature on propositions has pressured various aspects of this account. In place of the classical account, revisionists have aimed to understand propositions in terms of more familiar (...) entities such as facts, types of mental or linguistic acts, and even properties. But we think that the metaphysical story about propositions is much simpler than either the classical theorist or the revisionist would have you believe. In what follows, we argue that a proper understanding of the nature of our cognitive relations to propositions shows that the question of whether propositions themselves represent is, at best, a distraction. We will argue that once this distraction is removed, the possibility of a very pleasing, minimalist story of propositions emerges; a story that appeals only to assumptions that are shared by all theorists in the relevant debate. (shrink)

Es ist bekannt, dass Jacques Derrida Hegel als einen der radikalsten Vertreter jener Metaphysik der Präsenz beschrieben hat, die es zu dekonstruieren gilt, und zugleich zugestanden hat, dass Hegel wie kein anderer eben jene Irreduzibilität der Differenz gedacht hat, die Derrida durch die Dekonstruktion der metaphysischen Tradition zur Geltung bringen will. Derridas Verhältnis zu Hegel kann also gar nicht anders als kompliziert sein. Es ist voller innerer Spannungen, die dringend nach näherer Klärung verlangen, die die Literatur zu Derrida bisher aber (...) meist nur punktuell geliefert hat. Auf eine grundlegende und umfassende Klärung zielt nun Johannes-Georg Schüleins Studie zu Metaphysik und ihrer Kritik bei Hegel und Derrida. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider how it would be possible to think about the historicity of music through Hegel’s thought. I will compare Hegel’s idea with a historical event that is considered relevant in the history of music: Schoenberg’s twelve-tone music, taken here also as a model of immanent negation and Aufhebung of tonal system in music. Furthermore, I will take Schoenberg’s twelve-tone music as an instance and wonder about the role of music and its history in the sociocultural formation (...) (or, in Hegelian words, in the absolute Geist). I divide the exposition into four parts, namely: (1) the position of art before the absolute Geist; (2) a general exposition of art in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Art, placing music as a singular form of art; (3) an analysis of the characteristics of music in Hegel and (4) the comparison with Schoenberg’s twelve-tone music. I conclude that music, as an artistic form, brings the form of an internal feeling of a social subjectivity – a way to feel and understand sounds that transforms itself through history; in turn, both music and the form of an internal feeling of social subjectivity, have a historicity that can be understood as developed dialectically. Along these lines, the beginning of the Twentieth Century in music reveals, through Schoenberg and other composers, new intuitive configurations of this social subjectivity. (shrink)

This book is in honour of Professor Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th birthday. It consists of eighteen essays on metaphysical issues written by Swedish and international scholars.

In this study, I expound Avicenna's doctrine of truth as it is presented in his Metaphysics of the Healing. My aim is to establish two theses. First, that Avicenna has a rich and systematic metaphysical doctrine of truth that is worked out within the epistemological, ontological, aitiological, and theological investigations of the Ilāhiyyāt. Second, that his doctrine of truth draws upon the accounts of truth he found in his predecessors, and that he amplifies these accounts in light of his own (...) innovative account of the first principles of metaphysics, which he articulates at the outset of his Ilāhiyyāt. I show that these first principles, along with Avicenna's... (shrink)

This work will argue that Mahāyāna philosophy need not result in endorsement of some cosmic Absolute in the vein of the Advaitin ātman-Brahman. Scholars such as Bhattacharya, Albahari and Murti argue that the Buddha at no point denied the existence of a cosmic ātman, and instead only denied a localised, individual ātman (what amounts to a jīva). The idea behind this, then, is that the Buddha was in effect an Advaitin, analysing experience and advocating liberation in an Advaitin sense: through (...) a rejection of the individual ātman and knowledge (jñāna) of and immersion into the universal ātman-Brahman. I will explore how different religious traditions define and shape the Absolute according to their own religious convictions, illustrating a divergence in conception from the very start, before exploring key differences between the Advaitin conception of the Absolute as put forth by Śaṅkara and as defended by Bhattacharya in The Ātman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism. I then challenge Bhattacharya’s claims that prajñāpāramitā literature necessarily endorses the ātman-Brahman and that Mahāyāna philosophies reorientate Buddhists towards the truth of the ātman-Brahman. I do this by arguing that there are viable interpretations of Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra and Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka that do not advocate such a belief, that prajñāpāramitā literature can be viewed as a project in episteme rather than ontology, and that we need not find a ground of the same sort as the ātman-Brahman in the Buddhist flux of experience. I conclude by showing that whilst Absolutism is a theme in some schools of Buddhism, it need not be – contra Bhattacharya – the conclusion of two major Mahāyāna philosophies. (shrink)

El debate que se gestó alrededor del concepto de existencia en manos de Willard Van Orman Quine y Rudolf Carnap, dio al siglo XX un cúmulo de aportes significativos a la ontología. La postura realista, con algunas variantes, de Quine y el criterio anti-realista de Carnap, otorga insumos para pensar de mejor forma cómo se intenta dar descripciones acerca del inmobiliario del mundo. Conocer este debate es importante, ya que, se expone los alcances y limitaciones que implican las explicaciones ontológicas (...) acerca de la realidad que deben ser tenidas en cuenta en la actualidad. Este trabajo cumple esa función, la de explicar sintéticamente uno de los debates más importantes para la ontología. (shrink)

La physique contemporaine pourrait bien nous livrer un enseignement incroyable, à savoir que l'espace et le temps n'existent pas fondamentalement. Je présenterai succinctement les ontologies suggérées par les deux principaux programmes de recherche en gravité quantique : la théorie des cordes et la gravité quantique à boucles. Je soutiendrai ensuite qu'il est fructueux de prendre les différentes conceptions ontologiques de la conscience en philosophie de l'esprit en modèles pour la construction de solutions au problème de l'émergence de l'espace-temps.

Humans constantly produce strings of characters in symbolic languages, e.g., sentences in natural languages. We show that for any given moment in human history, the set of character strings that have been produced up to that moment, i.e., the sum total of human symbolic output up to that moment, is finite and so Turing computable. We then prove a much stronger result: a Turing machine can produce any particular set of symbolic output that we could possibly have produced. We then (...) discuss metaphysical and/or theological systems, e.g., Spinoza’s, Leibniz’s, or Aquinas’s. We argue that any particular metaphysical system could be the output of a Turing machine. We then briefly discuss (i) automated theorem proving, the attempt to generate and/or prove theorems using computers, and (ii) computational metaphysics, the attempt to apply methods from computer science such as automated theorem proving to metaphysics. We conclude by arguing that: (i) computational metaphysics can succeed, at least in theory; indeed, all human metaphysical reasoning could be automated; (ii) computational metaphysics – and indeed metaphysical systems in general – will have the same limitations as Turing machines; and (iii) a number of different methods – not currently used in computational metaphysics – could be used to advance metaphysical research. (shrink)

Edward Jonathan Lowe (usually cited as E. J. Lowe) was one of the most significant philosophers of the twentieth and early twenty-first century. He made sustained and significant contributions to debates in metaphysics, ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and philosophy of religion, as well as contributing important scholarly work in early modern philosophy (most notably on Locke). Over the length of his career, Lowe published eleven single-authored books, four co-edited collections, and well over 300 papers and (...) book reviews in journals and edited volumes. The range of topics covered in his published work is highly eclectic. Given this, and his prolific rate of publication, this article cannot aim to cover all of the questions that Lowe contributed work on. Instead, it will focus on some of his most significant contributions in metaphysics and ontology, and related topics in other areas of philosophy. This choice of focus stems, in part, from Lowe’s strong belief in the inescapability of metaphysical questions. Lowe argued for the need to approach metaphysics, and philosophy more broadly, in a serious, systematic fashion, likening metaphysics to putting together the pieces of a gigantic jigsaw puzzle, working with, rather than trying to overrule or being secondary to, natural science. Although the sections in this article focus on different topics, the highly systematic nature of Lowe’s work means that there are many potential points of intersection that could be drawn between them. In the interests of providing a navigable summary of Lowe’s work, this article highlights only some of these connections. (shrink)

This article argues for the elimination of the concept of life worth living from philosophical vocabulary on three complementary grounds. First, the basic components of this concept suffer from multiple ambiguities, which hamper attempts to ground informative evaluative and classificatory judgments about the worth of life. Second, the criteria proposed to track the extension of the concept of life worth living rest on unsupported axiological assumptions and fail to identify precise and plausible referents for this concept. And third, the concept (...) of life worth living is not shown to serve any major evaluative or classificatory purpose besides those served by already available axiological concepts. By eliminating the concept of life worth living, philosophers will free themselves of the task of addressing ill-posed axiological questions and ground reflection about the worth of life on more rigorous conceptual foundations. (shrink)

This book is an exploration and defense of the coherence of classical theism’s doctrine of divine aseity in the face of the challenge posed by Platonism with respect to abstract objects. A synoptic work in analytic philosophy of religion, the book engages discussions in philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and metaontology. It addresses absolute creationism, non-Platonic realism, fictionalism, neutralism, and alternative logics and semantics, among other topics. The book offers a helpful taxonomy of the wide range of options (...) available to the classical theist for dealing with the challenge of Platonism. It probes in detail the diverse views on the reality of abstract objects and their compatibility with classical theism. It contains a most thorough discussion, rooted in careful exegesis, of the biblical and patristic basis of the doctrine of divine aseity. Finally, it challenges the influential Quinean metaontological theses concerning the way in which we make ontological commitments. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage aborde la question de la réalité chez Bergson, en profitant de l’élan théorique qui se dégage de Durée et simultanéité, pour étendre l’enquête à d’autres passages canoniques du corpus. La thèse en est que loin de s’identifier à la mobilité ou au mouvant, par-delà la durée et sans même se confondre au réel, c’est la réalité qui se fait au sein de la métaphysique bergsonienne.

The depth and breadth with which these authors introduce fundamentals might intimidate more than encourage beginners.

According to Kemp Smith, Descartes believed that animals were devoid of feelings and sensations. This is the so-called ‘monstrous thesis,’ which I explore here in light of two Cartesian approaches to animals. Firstly, I examine their original treatment in function of Descartes’ early metaphysical approach, i.e., all natural phenomena are to be elucidated in terms of mental scrutiny. As pain would only exist in the understanding, and animals have neither understanding nor souls, Descartes held that they did not suffer. Secondly, (...) I look at the Cartesian late naturalism; specifically, at how animals are subsequently regarded as machines that may suffer. Lastly, I conclude that the ‘monstrous thesis’ is not Cartesian because animals are machines with feelings and sensations. However, Descartes’ surprising indulgence towards humans who kill and eat animals supposes that empathy for beings who may suffer is not necessary. This may raise doubts as to another ‘monstrous thesis.'. (shrink)

In the current philosophical literature, determinism is rarely defined explicitly. This paper attempts to show that there are in fact many forms of determinism, most of which are familiar, and that these can be differentiated according to their particular components. Recognizing the composite character of determinism is thus central to demarcating its various forms.

Multiplicity of Beings according to Saint Thomas Aquinas is a book that aimed to find an explanation of beings' diversity on the grounds of the metaphysical intrinsic principles of beings identified by Aristótle. Are matter and form causes of identity, individuation and diversity of substances? Aquinas answers this question by means of some demonstrations grounded on the very nature of matter and form, in the line of the doctrines contained in book 7 of the Aristotle's Metaphysics.

This volume covers a great range of topics within general metaphysics, featuring contributions by experts in the respective areas. The information contained is suitable for introductory as well as research purposes. The book equally targets laymen, students, and experts in their own right. Subjects range from the history of metaphysics, properties, objects, modality, structure, truth, etc. to methodological concerns of metaphysics.

An original metaphysical proposal building on classical and contemporary sources. In Centering and Extending, Steven G. Smith retrieves and refashions some of the best ideas of classical and early modern metaphysics to support insight into the natures of mental and material beings and their relations. Avoiding what he critiques as distortive paths of idealism, materialism, repressive monism, and overly permissive pluralism, Smith builds his framework on centering and extending as universal principles of formation. Identifying the basic consistency of being with (...) these principles in symmetrical partnership enables a naturalist process view that, unlike Whitehead’s, does not overbalance toward the subjective and teleological and, unlike Deleuze and Guattari’s, does not overbalance toward the material and chaotic. This view supports useful conceptions of mind and matter, form and energy, reason and cause, and a layered world order without relying on a blind concept of supervenience or emergence. It also respects and reinforces a division of roles between metaphysical sense-making and spiritual determinations of meaningfulness. Steven G. Smith is Jennie Carlisle Golding Professor of Philosophy at Millsaps College. He is the author of several books, including Worth Doing, also published by SUNY Press. (shrink)