This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

21 found
Order:
  1. Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind.Zoe Drayson - 2010 - Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
    This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. Where is the Problem of “Where is the Mind?”?C. Gershenson - manuscript
    We propose that the discussions about “where the mind is” depend directly on the metaphysical preconception and definition of “mind”. If we see the mind from one perspective (individualist), it will be only in the brain, and if we see it from another (active externalist), it will be embedded in the body and extended into the world. The “whereabouts” of the mind depends on our 1 of mind. Therefore, we should not ask if the mind is somewhere, but if it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. The Metaphysics of Cognitive Artifacts.Richard Heersmink - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):78-93.
    This article looks at some of the metaphysical properties of cognitive artefacts. It first identifies and demarcates the target domain by conceptualizing this class of artefacts as a functional kind. Building on the work of Beth Preston, a pluralist notion of functional kind is developed, one that includes artefacts with proper functions and system functions. Those with proper functions have a history of cultural selection, whereas those with system functions are improvised uses of initially non-cognitive artefacts. Having identified the target (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  4. Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  5. Action, the Unity of Consciousness, and Vehicle Externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 78--91.
  6. Vehicles, Contents, Conceptual Structure and Externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):1-6.
    We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice versa. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  7. How to Demarcate the Boundaries of Cognition.David Michael Kaplan - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (4):545-570.
    Advocates of extended cognition argue that the boundaries of cognition span brain, body, and environment. Critics maintain that cognitive processes are confined to a boundary centered on the individual. All participants to this debate require a criterion for distinguishing what is internal to cognition from what is external. Yet none of the available proposals are completely successful. I offer a new account, the mutual manipulability account, according to which cognitive boundaries are determined by relationships of mutual manipulability between the properties (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  8. Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Fred A. Keijzer & Maurice K. D. Schouten - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):109 - 125.
    We argue that embedded cognition provides an argument against Jaegwon Kim’s neural reduction of mental causation. Because some mental, or at least psychological processes have to be cast in an externalist way, Kim’s argument can be said to lead to the conclusion that mental causation is as safe as any other form of higher-level of causation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9. Intentionality, Cognitive Integration and the Continuity Thesis.Richard Menary - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):31-43.
    Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I suggest, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  10. Does Functionalism Entail Extended Mind?Kengo Miyazono - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    In discussing the famous case of Otto, a patient with Alzheimer’s disease who carries around a notebook to keep important information, Clark and Chalmers argue that some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook. In other words, some of Otto’s beliefs are extended into the environment. Their main argument is a functionalist one. Some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook because, first, some of the beliefs of Inga, a healthy person who remembers important information in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Minds, Intrinsic Properties, and Madhyamaka Buddhism.Teed Rockwell - 2009 - Zygon 44 (3):659-674.
    Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with the traditional view known as the Mind/Brain Identity theory. This has inspired a new theory about the mind known as the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. Now there is a growing controversy over whether these data actually require extending the mind out beyond the brain. Such arguments, despite their empirical diversity, have an underlying form. They all are disputes over where to draw the line (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12. Functionalism and Mental Boundaries.Larry Shapiro - unknown - Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2).
  13. Extended Cognition and Functionalism.Mark Sprevak - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):503-527.
    Andy Clark and David Chalmers claim that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head.1 Call this the “hypothesis of extended cognition” (HEC). HEC has been strongly criticised by Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa and Robert Rupert.2 In this paper I argue for two claims. First, HEC is a harder target than Rupert, Adams and Aizawa have supposed. A widely-held view about the nature of the mind, functionalism—a view to which Rupert, Adams and Aizawa appear to subscribe— entails HEC. Either (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   26 citations  
  14. A Problem for Representationalist Versions of Extended Cognition.Pierre Steiner - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (2):1-19.
    In order to account for how organisms can apprehend the contents of the external representations they manipulate in cognizing, the endorsement of representationalism fosters a situation of what I call cognitive overdetermination. I argue that this situation is problematic for the inclusion of these external representations in cognitive processing, as the hypothesis of extended cognition would like to have it. Since that situation arises from a commitment to representationalism (even minimal), it only affects the viability of representationalist versions of extended (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. The Bounds of Representation. A Non-Representationalist Use of the Resources of the Model of Extended Cognition.Pierre Steiner - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (2):235-272.
    Based on an endorsement of the hypothesis of extended cognition , this paper proposes a criticism of the representationalist assumptions that still pertain to these contemporary models of cognition. I first rehearse some basic problems akin to any representationalist model of cognition, before proposing some more specific arguments directed against the necessity, the plausibility, and the coherence of the marriage between extended cognition and contemporary representationalism . Extended and distributed models of cognition have the resources to get rid of representationalism, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. The Cost of Forfeiting Causal Inheritance.Justin T. Tiehen - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):491-507.
    Jaegwon Kim’s causal inheritance principle says that the causal powers of a mental property instance are identical with the causal powers of its particular physical realizer. Sydney Shoemaker’s subset account of realization is at odds with Kim’s principle: it says that a mental property instance has fewer causal powers than Kim’s principle entails. In this paper, I argue that the subset account should be rejected because it has intolerable consequences for mental causation, consequences that are avoided by accepting causal inheritance. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Cognitive Extension: The Parity Argument, Functionalism, and the Mark of the Cognitive.Sven Walter - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):285-300.
    During the past decade, the so-called “hypothesis of cognitive extension,” according to which the material vehicles of some cognitive processes are spatially distributed over the brain and the extracranial parts of the body and the world, has received lots of attention, both favourable and unfavourable. The debate has largely focussed on three related issues: (1) the role of parity considerations, (2) the role of functionalism, and (3) the importance of a mark of the cognitive. This paper critically assesses these issues (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18. Extended Functionalism.M. Wheeler - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  19. Minds, Things, and Materiality.Michael Wheeler - 2012 - In Jay Schulkin (ed.), New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Adaptation and Cephalic Expression. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In a rich and thought-provoking paper, Lambros Malafouris argues that taking material culture seriously means to be ‘systematically concerned with figuring out the causal efficacy of materiality in the enactment and constitution of a cognitive system or operation’ (Malafouris 2004, 55). As I understand this view, there are really two intertwined claims to be established. The first is that the things beyond the skin that make up material culture (in other words, the physical objects and artefacts in which cultural networks (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  20. In Defence of Extended Functionalism.Michael Wheeler - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    According to the extended cognition hypothesis (henceforth ExC), there are conditions under which thinking and thoughts (or more precisely, the material vehicles that realize thinking and thoughts) are spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors concerned are rightly accorded fully-paid-up cognitive status.1 According to functionalism in the philosophy of mind, “what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   38 citations  
  21. The Mind Beyond Itself.Robert A. Wilson - 2000 - In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. Oxford University Press.
    This paper argues that the metarepresentational systems we posses are wide or extended, rather than individualistic. There are two basic ideas. The first is that metarepresentation inherits its width from the mental representation of its objects. The second is that mental processing often operates on internal and external symbols, and this suggests that cognitive systems extend beyond the heads that house them.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations