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  1. Functionalism and Mental Boundaries.Larry Shapiro - unknown - Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2).
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  2. Minds, Materials and Metaphors.Adam Toon - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    What is the relationship between mental states and items of material culture, like notebooks, maps or lists? The extended mind thesis (ExM) offers an influential and controversial answer to this question. According to ExM, items of material culture can form part of the material basis for our mental states. Although ExM offers a radical view of the location of mental states, it fits comfortably with a traditional, representationalist account of the nature of those states. I argue that proponents of ExM (...)
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  3. Group Minds as Extended Minds.Keith Raymond Harris - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (3):1-17.
    Despite clear overlap between the study of extended minds and the study of group minds, these research programs have largely been carried out independently. Moreover, whereas proponents of the extended mind thesis straightforwardly advocate the view that there are, literally, extended mental states, proponents of the group mind thesis tend to be more circumspect. Even those who advocate for some version of the thesis that groups are the subjects of mental states often concede that this thesis is true only in (...)
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  4. Vom Transhumanismus zur These des erweiterten Geistes: Ethische Implikationen?Jan G. Michel - 2018 - In Benedikt Paul Göcke & Frank Meier-Hamidi (eds.), Designobjekt Mensch: Die Agenda des Transhumanismus auf dem Prüfstand. Freiburg im Breisgau, Deutschland: pp. 199–224.
    Jan G. Michel klärt in seinem Artikel "Vom Transhumanismus zur These des erweiterten Geistes: Ethische Implikationen?" zunächst eine eindeutige These des Transhumanismus, den er als die Position versteht, dass menschliche Personen ihre gegenwärtigen physischen und mentalen Limitationen durch die von den Wissenschaften zur Verfügung gestellten Technologien erweitern können. Im Anschluss daran wendet er sich der in der Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognitionswissenschaft diskutierten sogenannten These des erweiterten Geistes zu und argumentiert, dass entgegen des ersten Eindrucks der für diese Debatte (...)
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  5. The Extended Mind Thesis is About Demarcation and Use of Words.Vincent C. Müller - 2018 - Reti, Saperi, Linguaggi: Italian Journal of Cognitive Sciences 2:335-348.
    The «extended mind thesis» sounds like a substantive thesis, the truth of which we should investigate. But actually the thesis a) turns about to be just a statement on where the demarcations for the «mental» are to be set (internal, external,…), i.e. it is about the «mark of the mental»; and b) the choice about the mark of the mental is a verbal choice, not a matter of scientific discovery. So, the «extended mind thesis » is a remark on how (...)
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  6. What Is Left of the Active Externalism Debate?Victor Loughlin & Karim Zahidi - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1614-1639.
    Since the publication of Clark and Chalmers' Extended Mind paper, the central claims of that paper, viz. the thesis that cognitive processes and cognitive or mental states extend beyond the brain and body, have been vigorously debated within philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Both defenders and detractors of these claims have since marshalled an impressive battery of arguments for and against “active externalism.” However, despite the amount of philosophical energy expended, this debate remains far from settled. We (...)
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  7. Does Functionalism Entail Extended Mind?Kengo Miyazono - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3523-3541.
    In discussing the famous case of Otto, a patient with Alzheimer’s disease who carries around a notebook to keep important information, Clark and Chalmers argue that some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook. In other words, some of Otto’s beliefs are extended into the environment. Their main argument is a functionalist one. Some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook because, first, some of the beliefs of Inga, a healthy person who remembers important information in (...)
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  8. Multilevel Poetry Translation as a Problem-Solving Task.Pedro Ata & Joao Queiroz - 2016 - Cognitive Semiotics 9 (2):139-147.
    Poems are treated by translators as hierarchical multilevel systems. Here we propose the notion of “multilevel poetry translation” to characterize such cases of poetry translation in terms of selection and rebuilding of a multilevel system of constraints across languages. Different levels of a poem correspond to different sets of components that asymmetrically constrain each other (e. g., grammar, lexicon, syntactic construction, prosody, rhythm, typography, etc.). This perspective allows a poem to be approached as a thinking-tool: an “experimental lab” which submits (...)
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  9. The Metaphysics of Cognitive Artifacts.Richard Heersmink - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):78-93.
    This article looks at some of the metaphysical properties of cognitive artefacts. It first identifies and demarcates the target domain by conceptualizing this class of artefacts as a functional kind. Building on the work of Beth Preston, a pluralist notion of functional kind is developed, one that includes artefacts with proper functions and system functions. Those with proper functions have a history of cultural selection, whereas those with system functions are improvised uses of initially non-cognitive artefacts. Having identified the target (...)
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  10. The Parity Argument for Extended Consciousness.Karina Vold - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (3-4):16-33.
    Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) argue that certain mental states and processes can be partially constituted by objects located beyond one’s brain and body: this is their extended mind thesis (EM). But they maintain that consciousness relies on processing that is too high in speed and bandwidth to be realized outside the body (see Chalmers, 2008, and Clark, 2009). I evaluate Clark’s and Chalmers’ reason for denying that consciousness extends while still supporting unconscious state extension. I argue that their (...)
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  11. A Problem for Representationalist Versions of Extended Cognition.Pierre Steiner - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (2):1-19.
    In order to account for how organisms can apprehend the contents of the external representations they manipulate in cognizing, the endorsement of representationalism fosters a situation of what I call cognitive overdetermination. I argue that this situation is problematic for the inclusion of these external representations in cognitive processing, as the hypothesis of extended cognition would like to have it. Since that situation arises from a commitment to representationalism (even minimal), it only affects the viability of representationalist versions of extended (...)
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  12. The Cost of Forfeiting Causal Inheritance.Justin Thomas Tiehen - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):491-507.
    Jaegwon Kim’s causal inheritance principle says that the causal powers of a mental property instance are identical with the causal powers of its particular physical realizer. Sydney Shoemaker’s subset account of realization is at odds with Kim’s principle: it says that a mental property instance has fewer causal powers than Kim’s principle entails. In this paper, I argue that the subset account should be rejected because it has intolerable consequences for mental causation, consequences that are avoided by accepting causal inheritance. (...)
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  13. Cognitive Spread: Under What Conditions Does the Mind Extend Beyond the Body?Zed Adams & Chauncey Maher - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):420-438.
    The extended mind hypothesis (EMH) is the claim that the mind can and does extend beyond the human body. Adams and Aizawa (A&A) contend that arguments for EMH commit a ‘coupling constitution fallacy’. We deny that the master argument for EMH commits such a fallacy. But we think that there is an important question lurking behind A&A's allegation: under what conditions is cognition spread across a tightly coupled system? Building on some suggestions from Haugeland, we contend that the system must (...)
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  14. How to Demarcate the Boundaries of Cognition.David Michael Kaplan - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (4):545-570.
    Advocates of extended cognition argue that the boundaries of cognition span brain, body, and environment. Critics maintain that cognitive processes are confined to a boundary centered on the individual. All participants to this debate require a criterion for distinguishing what is internal to cognition from what is external. Yet none of the available proposals are completely successful. I offer a new account, the mutual manipulability account, according to which cognitive boundaries are determined by relationships of mutual manipulability between the properties (...)
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  15. The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology, by Mark Rowlands. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (4).
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  16. Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind.Zoe Drayson - 2010 - Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
    This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional (...)
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  17. The Bounds of Representation: A Non-Representationalist Use of the Resources of the Model of Extended Cognition.Pierre Steiner - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (2):235-272.
    Based on an endorsement of the hypothesis of extended cognition , this paper proposes a criticism of the representationalist assumptions that still pertain to these contemporary models of cognition. I first rehearse some basic problems akin to any representationalist model of cognition, before proposing some more specific arguments directed against the necessity, the plausibility, and the coherence of the marriage between extended cognition and contemporary representationalism . Extended and distributed models of cognition have the resources to get rid of representationalism, (...)
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  18. Cognitive Extension: The Parity Argument, Functionalism, and the Mark of the Cognitive.Sven Walter - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):285-300.
    During the past decade, the so-called “hypothesis of cognitive extension,” according to which the material vehicles of some cognitive processes are spatially distributed over the brain and the extracranial parts of the body and the world, has received lots of attention, both favourable and unfavourable. The debate has largely focussed on three related issues: (1) the role of parity considerations, (2) the role of functionalism, and (3) the importance of a mark of the cognitive. This paper critically assesses these issues (...)
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  19. Extended Functionalism.M. Wheeler - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
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  20. In Defence of Extended Functionalism.Michael Wheeler - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 245--270.
    According to the extended cognition hypothesis (henceforth ExC), there are conditions under which thinking and thoughts (or more precisely, the material vehicles that realize thinking and thoughts) are spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors concerned are rightly accorded fully-paid-up cognitive status.1 According to functionalism in the philosophy of mind, “what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way (...)
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  21. Minds, Things and Materiality.Michael Wheeler - 2010 - In Jay Schulkin (ed.), New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Adaptation and Cephalic Expression. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In a rich and thought-provoking paper, Lambros Malafouris argues that taking material culture seriously means to be ‘systematically concerned with figuring out the causal efficacy of materiality in the enactment and constitution of a cognitive system or operation’ (Malafouris 2004, 55). As I understand this view, there are really two intertwined claims to be established. The first is that the things beyond the skin that make up material culture (in other words, the physical objects and artefacts in which cultural networks (...)
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  22. Intentionality, Cognitive Integration and the Continuity Thesis.Richard Menary - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):31-43.
    Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I suggest, and (...)
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  23. Minds, Intrinsic Properties, and Madhyamaka Buddhism.Teed Rockwell - 2009 - Zygon 44 (3):659-674.
    Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with the traditional view known as the Mind/Brain Identity theory. This has inspired a new theory about the mind known as the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. Now there is a growing controversy over whether these data actually require extending the mind out beyond the brain. Such arguments, despite their empirical diversity, have an underlying form. They all are disputes over where to draw the line (...)
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  24. Extended Cognition and Functionalism.Mark Sprevak - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):503-527.
    Andy Clark and David Chalmers claim that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head.1 Call this the “hypothesis of extended cognition” (HEC). HEC has been strongly criticised by Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa and Robert Rupert.2 In this paper I argue for two claims. First, HEC is a harder target than Rupert, Adams and Aizawa have supposed. A widely-held view about the nature of the mind, functionalism—a view to which Rupert, Adams and Aizawa appear to subscribe— entails HEC. Either (...)
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  25. Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
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  26. Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Fred Keijzer & Maurice Schouten - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):109 - 125.
    We argue that embedded cognition provides an argument against Jaegwon Kim’s neural reduction of mental causation. Because some mental, or at least psychological processes have to be cast in an externalist way, Kim’s argument can be said to lead to the conclusion that mental causation is as safe as any other form of higher-level of causation.
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  27. Action, the Unity of Consciousness, and Vehicle Externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 78--91.
  28. The Mind Beyond Itself.Robert A. Wilson - 2000 - In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 31-52.
    This paper argues that the metarepresentational systems we posses are wide or extended, rather than individualistic. There are two basic ideas. The first is that metarepresentation inherits its width from the mental representation of its objects. The second is that mental processing often operates on internal and external symbols, and this suggests that cognitive systems extend beyond the heads that house them.
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  29. Vehicles, Contents, Conceptual Structure and Externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):1-6.
    We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice versa. (...)
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  30. Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind.Keith Butler - 1995 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):723-726.
    This book is an extended discussion of individualism in the philosophy of mind.
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  31. Where is the Problem of “Where is the Mind?”?C. Gershenson - 2002
    We propose that the discussions about “where the mind is” depend directly on the metaphysical preconception and definition of “mind”. If we see the mind from one perspective (individualist), it will be only in the brain, and if we see it from another (active externalist), it will be embedded in the body and extended into the world. The “whereabouts” of the mind depends on our 1 of mind. Therefore, we should not ask if the mind is somewhere, but if it (...)
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