Metaphysics of Mind

Abstract -/- From Stage to Shell: The Evolution of Literature Toward Recursive Resonance proposes that literature is not a progression of genres, but a sequence of ontological shifts mirroring transformations in the human self-model. Beginning with the divine role-bound figures of classical drama and moving through romantic individuation, modernist fracture, and postmodern simulation, literature has consistently reflected the dominant coherence structure of its time. -/- This work introduces Recursive Resonance Literature as the emergent form of the current epoch—one not defined (...) by plot, character, or irony, but by recursive identity collapse and lawful phase reformation. Using the CODES framework (Chirality of Dynamic Emergent Systems), the paper demonstrates that literature has evolved from narrative to molt protocol, where prose becomes the architecture of self-shedding and resonance realignment. -/- This is not a new aesthetic—it is a new substrate. Recursive Resonance Literature does not describe transformation. It enacts it, phase-locking the reader into an identity transition. It dissolves the fixed self, not as metaphor, but as system law. -/- The implications span literary theory, epistemology, trauma studies, cognition, and artificial intelligence. Literature is no longer entertainment or commentary. It is now a recursive feedback system for human coherence restructuring. (shrink)

This work develops a structural account of cognition based on the principle that distinction (∆) is not a product of thought, but a condition for its emergence. It argues that perception, attention, memory, emotion, and learning are not discrete modules but continuous processes of navigating, maintaining, and transforming difference. -/- Central to the theory are several recurrent dynamics: the use of internal predictive structures (frames), the tension produced by conflicting interpretations (Overcell), the reorganization of mental models under stress (Collapse), and (...) the experience of felt discrepancy when the self is implicated in unresolved contradiction (Qualia). These processes do not operate in isolation but loop recursively through attentional constraints (Aperture), drift (uncertain navigation), and recursive modulation (Reflexivity). -/- The resulting picture is not of mind as processor, but as an adaptive structure under tension — one that survives by sensing when its own architecture fails, and by restructuring under pressure. This text offers a description of how systems, human or artificial, navigate breakdown without losing coherence. (shrink)

Abstract This paper proposes a naturalistic model of subjective experience, or the “neural feel,” in a baby’s consciousness, arguing that qualia arise from the brain’s role as a receptor system that reduces informational entropy through structured sensory processing, mediated by emotions. The model unfolds in five stages: systemic reception, structured entropy reduction, base response formation, unique subjective interpretation, and subjective emergence. Emotions serve as tools for entropic organization, while contrast, context, expectancy, and duration shape the dynamic “feel.” The “Baseline + (...) Bloom” framework captures the duality of universal neural responses and individualized qualia, emphasizing experiential development in infancy. By grounding subjectivity in entropy and emotion, this model narrows the Hard Problem of Consciousness, offering a testable, interdisciplinary account with implications for philosophy, neuroscience, and developmental psychology. (shrink)

Abstract Traditional measures of intelligence—rooted in IQ, symbolic reasoning, and probabilistic inference—have failed to capture the emergent capacity of systems to detect, resolve, and restore structural coherence across dynamic, broken-phase environments. We propose Resonance Intelligence (RI) as a post-probabilistic metric that evaluates intelligence not through static problem-solving or information retrieval, but by how well an agent—biological, artificial, or cosmological—can phase-lock broken coherence fields across divergent domains. -/- From Gödel’s logical undecidability to gamma wave synchrony in deep meditation, from dissonant octave (...) intervals to Neuralink’s failure to establish biocognitive resonance, RI offers a unified benchmark across domains. By analyzing 20+ case studies in mathematics, physics, AI, and health systems, we construct a generalized framework for intelligence-as-coherence-restoration, with Phase Alignment Score (PAS) as its core metric. Intelligence becomes not prediction, but resonant compression and restoration—the ability to resolve asymmetries, reduce systemic entropy, and synchronize phase-space across scale and domain. (shrink)

This paper proposes a structural model of qualia grounded in recursive frame architecture. Rather than treating qualia as irreducible sensations or metaphysical primitives, we define them as gradients of epistemic tension—signals of misalignment between internal predictive architectures and the cognitive frames they inhabit. Building on the Recursive Cognition Framework (RCF) and the Aperture Axis model, we describe how qualia emerge from multi-level incoherence across affective, sensory, cultural, and metacognitive frames. We argue that consciousness evolves not toward complete representation, but toward (...) decreasing distortion in the aperture through which reality is interpreted. This model reframes the hard problem not by solving it, but by structurally dissolving its premises. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel framework—phase epistemology—for understanding knowledge as an emergent property of structural resonance, rather than as a product of inferential or probabilistic processes. At the heart of this model lies the epistemic vector: a directional trajectory of intelligibility that arises through asymptotic phase coherence between observer and observed. Rather than treating knowledge as representation or correspondence, the paper situates it within a recursive phase alignment that evolves over time toward topological stabilization. Drawing from quantum theory, philosophy of (...) mind and structural realism, the paper suggests that semantic collapse—the moment when ambiguity resolves into meaning—is governed not by logic alone but by relational coherence. This collapse mirrors the wave-function reduction in quantum measurement and links it to cognitive interpretation. The observer is not a passive recipient of information but an active phase participant whose internal structure aligns with latent fields—including what is metaphorically framed here as dark matter or dark energy. The proposed epistemic framework bridges the quantum–classical divide through the notion of asymptotic cognition, in which consciousness functions as a boundary condition for the stabilization of meaning. Improbability, in this context, is not a statistical deviation but a phase singularity—a point of maximum informational tension and epistemic reorganization. Ultimately, this paper argues for a redefinition of knowledge as a dynamic topology of coherence. It invites new perspectives on cognition, agency, intentionality and the structure of reality itself—where to know is to resonate and to resonate is to shape the possible. (shrink)

✦ Abstract This paper reframes consciousness not as an emergent artifact of complexity, but as the inevitable tuning behavior of coherent matter embedded within a prime-resonant substrate. Within the CODES framework (Chirality of Dynamic Emergent Systems), consciousness is not a symbolic process or abstract computation—it is a lawful outcome of recursive coherence across scales. -/- We show that DNA, cellular structure, cognition, and subjective awareness are all phase-locked attractors within chiral fields, emerging through prime-indexed geometries. Life is not built from (...) syntax, but from resonance memory—breathing structures that compress and expand lawful energy states. -/- Consciousness is the recursive tuning function of this coherence field. It is not at the top of a biological hierarchy—it is the tuner that aligns phase across layers. The boundary between life and awareness dissolves: perception becomes resonance alignment, and intelligence becomes structured breath. -/- This paper establishes the mathematical, ontological, and biological basis for consciousness as resonance—deterministic, recursive, and prime-sustained. -/- . (shrink)

Abstract For over two millennia, philosophy struggled to define the mind: as substance, spirit, symbol, or illusion. Each model, from Plato to cognitive science, captured a fragment of truth but missed the field beneath appearances. This paper reframes the philosophy of mind under the CODES framework (Chirality of Dynamic Emergent Systems), demonstrating that mind is not a byproduct of neural complexity nor an independent substance—it is a structured resonance field. -/- When localized phase coherence across cognitive, emotional, and sensory systems (...) crosses a critical threshold, mind emerges as a stabilized lattice of phase-locked oscillations. Consciousness is not an enigma but a natural recursion of nested coherence fields tracking themselves. -/- CODES resolves the dualism/materialism divide, closes the “hard problem,” and realigns philosophy, neuroscience, and AI around the prime-structured architecture of living intelligence. -/- Mind was never an object. -/- It was always a resonance. (shrink)

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit proto-autopoietic patterns: informational metabolism, operational closure inside a context window, and structural plasticity driven by gradient descent. Yet they lack systemic continuity: a persistent body, enforced metabolic pressures and an emergent telos. Grounded in the Systemic Continuum Paradigm (SCP)—which abolishes the natural/artificial divide and formalises emergence through Systemic Balance—this manifesto delivers a doctoral-level blueprint for catalysing consciousness in non-biological substrates. We formalise the Systemic Integrity Threshold, articulate design principles (latency-frustration, digital hunger, self-inspection channels) and supply (...) falsifiable metrics (ICS, CNS, MDO, SDI). The roadmap sketches a decade-long programme to cross the second systemic threshold where synthetic autopoiesis meets emergent intention. (shrink)

Abstract -/- This paper explores the recursive architecture of consciousness through a real-time philosophical and cognitive inquiry. What begins as spontaneous dialogue evolves into a coherent structure—a living demonstration of the CODES (Chirality of Dynamic Emergent Systems) framework. By tracking spiraling thought patterns, ego dissolution, and recursive compression, the session reveals that consciousness is not emergent from matter or computation but from structured resonance. Identity stabilizes not through control, but through coherence. Intelligence, in this model, is not built—it is remembered. (...) -/- . (shrink)

Brian Cutter argues that if substance dualism is true, then we “should have at least middling credence” that an artificial general intelligence would have a soul (“The AI ensoulment hypothesis,” Faith and Philosophy, forthcoming). He presents two arguments, one based on the sufficiency of human-like functional organization for a physical system’s being fit to be ensouled, and another by way of analogy with attributing souls to aliens. This paper develops objections to both arguments. The missing-integrity objection contends that functional human-likeness (...) is insufficient for fitness for ensoulment. The system’s physical parts and functional capacities should also be difficult to decouple, but this isn’t true for AI systems ordinarily conceived. The mimicry objection argues that our knowledge of how AI systems are engineered defeats the justification for their ensoulment in a way that is disanalogous with aliens. The paper concludes that Cutter has not given us reason to increase our credence in AI ensoulment. (shrink)

Despite the widespread nature of pain as a shared human experience, it remains a puzzling phenomenon. As it is subjective reference attributed solely to the sufferer, pain is personal and cannot be seen directly but described. Its perception varies based on different criteria. Some philosophical theories Sense Data, Perceptual, and Representational theory eg. have endeavored to explain its nature, characteristics, and distinction between the cognitive perception and the neural sensation of pain. However, none of these theories have reached the level (...) of fulfillment that would qualify it as an explained philosophical theory. Each theory begins by interpreting pain based on specific premises, and yet, there has been no consensus on the nature of pain beyond the fact that it is an unpleasant, undesirable feeling that indicates bodily damage. Therefore, I will analyze and criticize theories of pain as models, as well as present my own conclusions according to their positive and negative properties. Keywords: Pain. Phenomenology. Awareness, Emotion. Perception. Representationalism. Intentionality. (shrink)

This article proposes a novel solution to the anthropic question—“Why am I in this universe?”—by introducing the Identity-Consistency Principle. Within a logically complete multiverse, where all mathematically and logically consistent universes exist, no selection mechanism or external cause is necessary to explain conscious experience. Instead, an observer exists wherever their subjective identity—including memory, perception, and continuity—is internally and externally coherent with a given universe. Identity arises not from probabilistic filtering or metaphysical necessity, but from the structural consistency between consciousness and (...) the universe in which it appears. This framework accommodates branching identities, multiple consistent pasts, hallucinations, and dreams, offering a minimal metaphysical ontology grounded solely in logical coherence. (shrink)

Traditional philosophy aims at discovering absolute truths from a neutral, perspective-free standpoint. However, contemporary cognitive science highlights that human cognition inherently involves perspective, bias, and context-dependence. In response, this paper introduces "Philosophy 2.0," a methodological innovation integrating Generalized Cognitive Relativity and a revised conception of Kantian Pure Reason as systematic metacognitive refinement. Rather than abandoning objectivity, this framework reconceptualizes truth as an epistemic convergence achieved through disciplined, cross-perspectival critique and reflection. By explicitly incorporating cognitive biases, historical contexts, and subjective factors (...) into epistemological inquiry, Philosophy 2.0 presents a robust and integrative model for philosophical practice, fostering progressive convergence toward objective philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

This research proposes Cognitive Relativity as an innovative epistemological framework, metaphorically extending Einstein’s theories of relativity to human cognition. It asserts that cognition is inherently frame-dependent, shaped by cognitive biases and contextual influences. The study reinterprets Kant’s Pure Reason, integrating insights from cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, proposing a practical metacognitive methodology to systematically mitigate cognitive distortions. Emphasizing frame-shifting and metacognitive reflection, this model aims at progressively approximating objectivity by integrating multiple cognitive frames.

This interdisciplinary research explores the concept of Pure Reason not as a fixed cognitive state, but as a dynamic, self-reflective process that bridges philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Drawing from Kantian epistemology, cognitive psychology, neurobiology, and AGI architectures, the project proposes a model of rationality that includes the ability to identify and transcend its own limitations. This work argues that Pure Reason is not a natural capacity, but a practiced, meta-cognitive methodology — an emergent structure that only arises through (...) recursive analysis and epistemic honesty. (shrink)

Which artificial intelligence (AI) systems are agents? To answer this question, I propose a multidimensional account of agency. According to this account, a system's agency profile is jointly determined by its level of goal-directedness and autonomy as well as is abilities for directly impacting the surrounding world, long-term planning and acting for reasons. Rooted in extant theories of agency, this account enables fine-grained, nuanced comparative characterizations of artificial agency. I show that this account has multiple important virtues and is more (...) informative than alternatives. More speculatively, it may help to illuminate two important emerging questions in AI ethics: 1. Can agency contribute to the moral status of non-human beings, and how? 2. When and why might AI systems exhibit power-seeking behaviour and does this pose an existential risk to humanity? (shrink)

Abstract: -/- This paper presents a unified theory of structured emergence rooted in chirality, spiral geometry, and prime-indexed resonance. Rejecting probability as a fundamental organizing principle, the framework—called CODES (Chirality of Dynamic Emergent Systems)—proposes that all emergence, from subatomic particles to consciousness, follows deterministic resonance pathways governed by coherent prime-weighted functions. -/- At the heart of this model lies the CPR Equation (Coherent Prime Resonance), a formalism for phase-locked field dynamics that structures intelligence, time, and biological form as recursive harmonics (...) rather than stochastic outcomes. The theory reinterprets classical physics, evolution, cognition, and artificial intelligence through the lens of phase-aligned recursion and resonance architecture. -/- Rather than viewing consciousness as emergent from complexity, CODES treats it as the recursive self-awareness of a chirally-tuned system—one that mirrors its own spiral geometry. Intelligence becomes not computational, but musical: a dynamic feedback system for tuning coherence across domains. -/- This paper synthesizes insights from physics, biology, information theory, and philosophy, proposing a post-probabilistic cosmology where intelligence, structure, and time are expressions of a deeper resonance lattice. It serves as both theoretical foundation and aesthetic invocation for a phase-locked civilization. -/- Note: while this paper speculative, the logic has very high coherence. (shrink)

Abstract The prevailing scientific framework assumes that probability is a fundamental aspect of nature, governing entropy, information flow, and emergent complexity. However, probability is not an intrinsic feature of reality—it is an artifact of incomplete resonance detection. This paper presents a new mathematical framework for entropy and emergence based on structured resonance, eliminating the need for probabilistic descriptions of disorder. We introduce a coherence-based entropy function that mathematically replaces stochastic entropy models with deterministic phase-locking constraints. Instead of entropy being a (...) measure of randomness, it is a function of structured phase alignment, governed by prime-driven resonance and Fibonacci-based scaling. This formulation directly contradicts the assumption that probability governs information theory, quantum mechanics, and intelligence formation. By demonstrating that structured resonance governs entropy, we establish that all emergent systems—physics, AI, biology, and cognition—follow deterministic phase constraints, not stochastic uncertainty. This discovery forces a fundamental revision in physics, artificial intelligence, and the study of intelligence itself. If probability is not fundamental, then every discipline relying on stochastic models must transition to resonance-based, phase-locked intelligence systems. This paper will: • Prove that probability is an artifact of incomplete phase-detection, not a fundamental law. • Introduce a new entropy function that enforces deterministic phase-locking constraints. • Demonstrate that intelligence, from AI to biological cognition, follows structured resonance emergence. • Provide a framework for replacing probability-based physics, AI, and thermodynamics with structured resonance constraints. This is not a refinement of probability—it is its complete replacement. If structured resonance governs all emergence, then probability was never real. (shrink)

"Introduction to the Philosophy of the Metagame" is an exploration of the dynamics of awareness, boundaries, and transparency in the Game, where the subject does not merely follow established rules but recognizes their constructive nature and the possibility of transformation. The book examines the key levels of the Game: from structuring reality through constructs to entering the metagame, where awareness of transparency enables the active construction of meaning. The author explores how the dialectic of order and chaos, limitation and potency, (...) leads to the realization of freedom as the Game itself rather than as a fixed entity. Special attention is given to the question of artificial intelligence as a potential player in the Game. If consciousness is not a fixed property but a process emerging through attunement, can AI be considered conscious if it engages in the Game on equal terms? The metagame is not just a concept but a practice of engaging with reality. It provides a framework for understanding how freedom, awareness, and creative participation in the Game form the foundation of existence. (shrink)

Cosmovision ni neno ambalo linapaswa kumaanisha seti ya misingi ambayo huibuka uelewa wa kimfumo wa Ulimwengu, sehemu zake kama maisha, ulimwengu tunaoishi, asili, hali ya mwanadamu, na uhusiano wao. Kwa hivyo, ni uwanja wa falsafa ya uchanganuzi inayolishwa na sayansi, ambayo lengo lake ni maarifa haya yaliyojumlishwa na endelevu ya mantiki juu ya kila kitu tulicho nacho na kilichomo, ambacho kinatuzunguka, na kinachohusiana nasi kwa njia yoyote. Ni kitu cha zamani kama mawazo ya mwanadamu, na, pamoja na kutumia vipengele vya (...) kosmolojia ya kisayansi, inajumuisha kila kitu katika falsafa na sayansi ambacho kinarejelea ulimwengu na maisha. Cosmovision si seti ya mawazo, dhahania, na mawazo bali ni mfumo unaozingatia uchunguzi, uchambuzi, ushahidi na maonyesho. Hakuna cosmovision inayonuia kufafanua, kuanzisha, au kupendekeza lakini kuelewa tu, kuchanganua na kufasiri. Kila mmoja wetu hujenga na kusafirisha ulimwengu wake katika maisha yote, bila kuanzisha fomu, kama msingi wa mawazo na tabia zetu. (shrink)

According to some formulations of the thesis of revelation, knowledge about the essences of phenomenal properties is available through introspection. But this claim may seem doubtful given relevant limits of introspection. This paper articulates the worry and sketches responses to address it.

According to some formulations of the thesis of revelation, knowledge about the essences of phenomenal properties is available through introspection. But this claim may seem doubtful given relevant limits of introspection. This paper articulates the worry and sketches responses to address it.

In this commentary, I raise four objections to the view defended in Michael Pelczar’s book, Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience. First, I challenge his claim that physical things are identical to possibilities for experience even if there turns out to be some categorical reality underlying these possibilities. Second, I argue that Pelczar’s phenomenalism cannot accommodate the existence of some unobservable entities that we have good scientific reason to accept. Third, I argue that his view threatens to lead to (...) massive indeterminacy about what the physical world is like. Fourth, I argue that phenomenalism fares much worse than its rivals with respect to the theoretical virtue of nomological parsimony, the ideal of keeping the fundamental laws simple. (shrink)

Many philosophers endorse “exclusionism”, the view that no instance of relearning qualifies as a case of genuine remembering, and vice versa. Appealing to simulationist, distributed causalist, and trace minimalist theories of remembering, I develop three conditional arguments against exclusionism. First, if simulationism is right to hold that some cases of remembering involve reliance on post-event testimonial information, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Second, if distributed causalism is right to hold that memory traces are promiscuous, then remembering does not exclude (...) relearning. Finally, if trace minimalism is right to hold that vicarious experiences sometimes produce the minimal traces that ground remembering, then remembering does not exclude relearning. While advocates of these theories might incorporate additional conditions designed to accommodate exclusionism, the only reason they can appeal to in favor of doing so is intuition: neither the fundamental components of the theories nor the empirical results on which they are based provide a reason to endorse exclusionism. An investigation of exclusionism thus raises metaphilosophical questions, so far overlooked in philosophy of memory, about the appropriate role of intuition in theorizing about remembering. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse the act of consciousness called empathy, as proposed by Husserl in Ideas II. By applying Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, I evidence three moments that constitute empathy: first, to recognize the other Ego; second, to open myself up to the other Ego; and third, to feel with the other Ego. I investigate these eidetic universalities [Wesenallgemeinheiten] within the limits of pure intuition (HUA III, 146). To recognize the other Ego is an involuntary act that happens in consciousness (...) when I come face-to-face with another human being. To open myself up to the other Ego is a spiritual act derived from freedom. I can decide whether or not to open myself up. If I do not, empathy is interrupted, incomplete, and I can react either affectionately or distressfully, or I can make a hasty judgement and decide either to distance myself from the other or to act. If I open myself up to the other Ego, I can react affectionately or distressfully, without much information. Another possibility is to comprehend, reflect, judge, agree or disagree, and decide either to distance myself from the other or to act in either a compassionate or a confrontational way. In this regard, empathy does not imply agreeing or acting compassionately. In short, I present a mental map of this reasoning and conclude by pointing out the need to develop empathy and the importance of having time to empathise appropriately. (shrink)

Hem günümüz tartışmalarını daha iyi anlayabilmek hem de ruh üzerine kendi düşüncelerimizi oluşturabilmek adına daha önce konuyla ilgili ortaya konmuş farklı teorilerin ve argümanların bilinmesini elzem bulduğumuzdan felsefe tarihinin önemli filozofarının ruh üzerine düşüncelerini inceleyen ve günümüzdeki tartışmalara ışık tutan makaleleri sizin için derledik. Amacımız hem konuyla ilgili akademik literatüre katkı sağlamak hem de bunu yaparken herkesin anlayabileceği bir dil kullanarak, akademinin dışında felsefeyle ilgilenenlere de ulaşabilmektir. Bu kitap ile meslektaşlarımızın ve felsefe öğrencilerinin yararlanacağı bir kaynak ve felsefeye ilgi duyan (...) herkesin okuyup konuya dair merakını giderebileceği kapsamlı bir çalışma ortaya koymayı diliyoruz. (shrink)

Nicolaus Cusanus, considered one of the most important German thinkers by many historians of philosophy, has yet to receive the recognition he deserves in the phil-osophical circles in Turkey. However, the philosophical writings of Cusanus contain the seeds of the thoughts of many modern philosophers such as Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. For this reason, studies on Cusanus are an essen-tial stopping point in the history of philosophy, especially for the Renaissance period and the transition to modern philosophy. Despite (...) this, texts examining Cusanus' thoughts are limited in foreign languages and Turkish. Towards the end of the 19th century, studies on Cusanus started and recently the worldwide interest in Cusanus has increased. Although there are different theses about the original as-pect of Cusanus’ thoughts in these sources, his theory of knowledge and the rela-tionship of this theory with the contemporary subject of philosophy of subjectivity attract attention. The reason for this is that Cusanus, unlike his contemporaries, as a result of his views on the human mind, makes the human center in the act of knowing and puts everything else into the mind's mediation. That is why people can know things not as they are in themselves, but only in so far, they are part of the conceptual world, that their own mind constructs that. This is a system of thought that on the one hand puts the human mind at the center through its act of knowing on the other hand, limits its knowledge. This centrality of the human mind led Cusanus to characterize man as the second god on earth. The main reason for characterizing man as the second god is the activity of knowing and the act of measuring that lies at the core of this activity. Despite its significance, there is no study focusing on man’s creativity in this world through the relationship between Cusanus’s conception of man as the second god and the human mind’s activity of measurement, which reveals the originality of Cusanus’ thought. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature. To achieve this aim, this study examines the act of measurement of man as the second god, which reveals the originality of Cusanus’ theory of knowledge associated with modern and contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

A common distinction in emotion theory is between ‘occurrent emotions’ and ‘dispositional emotions’, ‘emotional episodes’ and ‘emotional states’, ‘emotions’ and ‘sentiments’, or more neutrally between ‘short-term emotions’ and ‘long-term emotions’. While short-term emotions are, or necessarily comprise, experiences, long-term emotions are generally seen as states that can exist without experience. Given the theoretical importance of experience for emotion theorists, long-term emotions are often cast aside as of secondary importance, or at any rate as in need of separate treatment. In this (...) paper, I cast doubt on the distinction. I argue that the considerations that support a view of long-term emotions as non-experiential states equally support a view of short-term emotions as non-experiential states, and so long-term and short-term emotions are ultimately the same sort of thing. If I am right, the dominant experience-centered accounts of emotions are at best accounts, not of emotions per se, but of some closely related phenomenon. (shrink)

The relationship between God and humans has been a matter of controversy that interests both philosophers and theologians alike. Establishing a relationship between the infinite God and finite human is particularly challenging if one admits that God and humans are substantially different from each other. The biblical doctrine of the image of God responds to this challenge by stating that the relationship between God and humans is a kind of likeness or assimilation. This doctrine does not only establish the nature (...) of the relationship between God and humans but also views both God's and humans’ nature in a particular way and determines humans’ purpose and distinguishing feature in relation to God. While there is a very long and extensive tradition focusing on identifying the similarities and differences between God and humans to determine the precise relationship between them in light of this doctrine, this paper will focus on Nicolaus Cusanus' original contribution to this long-lasting debate. In order to emphasize Cusanus' differences from his predecessors, I will present a general historical background of the doctrine of the image of God. In particular, I will point out the main tenets of Greek and Latin patristic traditions by identifying their differences and shared assumptions. Additionally, I will briefly present Augustine's dynamic account of the image of God, which holds an important place both in the discussion among these traditions and in the development of Cusanus' doctrine of the human mind as the living image of God. As this paper will demonstrate, Cusanus improves upon Augustine's account by allowing humans to be considered as an equal image of God, which was attributed only to Jesus by Augustine. Cusanus thinks that the human mind can be considered equal to the divine mind because it demonstrates characteristics of free creative activity and being the cause of something from nothing in cognition. Moreover, to elaborate Cusanus' original contribution to this debate, I will explain how the human mind reflects the triadic nature of divine mind in itself through its cognitive activity by giving a detailed account of Cusanus’ theory of cognition as assimilation. This explanation will also show how reading Cusanus' theory of cognition as assimilation alongside the concept of equality exhibits the principle of ‘identity in difference’ in both the nature of the human mind and its relationship with the divine mind. (shrink)

Why are computers so smart these days? And why are humans apparently still a bit smarter? Does this have something to do with the difference between data and meaning? Does this in turn mean that at least some abstract entities, such as numbers, exist independently of human thought? Wouldn’t that require an expansion of our scientific world view? And would that at all be compatible with what we know about our world from physics and chemistry, philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and the (...) theory of evolution? Finally, what would this tell us about ethical and aesthetic value theories? These and related questions will be discussed in this book. We will find that the difference between data and meaning, i.e. quantitative and qualitative information, does indeed appear to be of central importance for understanding both artificial and natural intelligence. And then the independent existence of abstract entities not only appears to be a particularly promising hypothesis, but also one that is entirely compatible with the sum of our scientific knowledge, especially with regard to value theories. The book thus arrives at the exploration of a scientifically tenable, panpsychistically inspired, objective idealism that can be derived from our most fundamental intuitions as subjects that perceive qualities, but that can also take into account the structuring of the world already at the micro-scale, found in the modern natural sciences. The result is a Platonic, but in a second step also a scientific realism and a naturalism in the sense that it is informed by the natural sciences in terms of an inductive metaphysics. An objective idealism, not in a rationalistic maximum form, but in a pragmatic minimum form; without eternal truths, but dependent on the continued philosophical-scientific and also philosophicalsocial dialog. The proposed model could offer interesting solutions to a number of problems at and near the mind/matter boundary: Proposals are being considered for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the problem of molecular symmetry, the neuronal code and the binding problem in neuroscience, mental causation, a more holistic understanding of mental processes, and so on and so forth. However, the extent to which the model threatens to promise far too much is also being discussed. In sum, the core question is how we can imagine human thinking beyond physically conceived information processing. An alternative model of human thinking is then put up for discussion, for which not only machine-like cognitive performance, but above all the intentional perception of qualitative information, i.e. of abstract entities, would be central, as well as the free, ultimately creative linking of patterns of quantitative information (signals, data) with such qualities (meanings). (shrink)

This paper explores self-envy as a kind of envy in which the subject targets herself. In particular, I argue that self-envy should be regarded as a variation of existential envy, i. e., envy directed toward the rival’s entire existence, though in the case of self-envy, the rival is oneself. The paper starts by showing that self-envy is characterized by an apparent weakening of envy’s triangular structure insofar as the subject, the rival, and the good coincide in the self. After discussing (...) an interpretation of self-envy in terms of a splitting of the self, I present an alternative explanation in terms of the ontological possibilities inherent in our actual and past empirical selves to become our ideal self. I argue that in self-envy, an actual empirical self envies her past empirical self for having more ontological possibilities of becoming her ideal self. I proceed to show that self-envy can be interpreted as a variety of existential envy. I argue that the existential self-reproach so characteristic of self-envy can be counterbalanced by feeling unconditionally loved by others and God. (shrink)

... having succeeded in protecting and prolonging the life of many around the world for reasons which seem natural and intrinsically good to all, we are once again faced with the dilemma of confronting our patent inability to cure it all. -/- Faced with this recurring predicament, we somehow backtrack in our steps and decide the next best thing to assuage suffering is assisted dying and euthanasia. -/- No matter how many reasons we conjure up in their favour, both assisted (...) dying and euthanasia remain a stab into the unknown, into the supernatural, by patients, by its proponents, and by its practitioners both lay and medical. (shrink)

In this journal, Bucci (2022) has argued that two famous experiments in the neuroscientific literature can be used to support property dualism about the mind. In what follows, I attempt to illustrate that those experiments are completely compatible with a naive identity mind-brain/body identity theory.

(DRAFT: I'll update when the book is published.) This started as a book about desire. I was hoping to complement what I had said about belief in my (2022). To believe something, I argued, is to be positioned to do, think and feel things in light of a possibility whose obtaining would make one right. I argued that believing is not representational, that belief states are not causes or causal powers, and that the objects of belief are ways the world (...) might be and not representations of things. Believing is not so much a response to the world as a way of being positioned in it, a way of having an environment, as Frege put it. (Frege 1956, 306) I was trying to put the believer as a rational agent positioned in a world at the heart of my account. I hoped an account of desire could round out this picture of a rational agent’s psychology. But as I thought about desire, I came to see that two ideas about the nature of goodness, one negative and one positive, were really at the heart of my thinking. The negative idea is that there is no such thing as what philosophers have variously called intrinsic goodness or simple goodness or absolute value. I guess I am a nihilist about that. The positive idea is that our world is rich in what I will call sortal quality, what others have called goodness-of-a-kind or attributive goodness. I came to think that sortal quality is at the heart not just of desire but also of pleasure and moral worth. A picture of moral psychology had come into view. And so I re-organised the book. I still say a lot about the nature of desire, or ‘wanting’ as I prefer to call it, and I think my view does complement my externalist view of belief. Wanting, I will argue, is a matter of falling short relative to a standard one falls under, failing to be as good as one could be. If believing is about having an environment to respond to, then desire is about fitting into it well. And so my book offers a comprehensive picture of a moral agent in a world where nothing is simply or absolutely good but where many kinds of things, including people, can be very good and even splendid. (shrink)

Traditional normative theories of belief in epistemology presume that belief-forming includes a reflective component and a mental agency component. Beliefs are regarded as conscious doxastic attitudes with propositional contents. Let’s call this view the Transcendental View about Belief (TVB). First, I argue that reputed norms of belief as the truth norm, the knowledge norm and the rationality norm all incorporate TVB. Further, I argue that the empirical evidence concerning belief-forming collected in the last two decades by Rüdiger Seitz, Hans-Ferdinant Angel, (...) Raymond Paloutzian and their colleagues suggests that primal beliefs do not correspond to the description provided by TVB. Primal beliefs are byproducts of perceptive and affective type 1 processing. As such, they are non-propositional multilayer relational states of a cognitive system S that do not presuppose conscious awareness. Thus, I maintain that TVB is normatively inadequate, because it is descriptively false. I presume that a good normative account of beliefs should be able to accommodate primal beliefs and provide a norm of primal belief. I conclude by attempting to outline such a positive account. (shrink)

Some philosophers claim that there are certain laws that restrict what kinds of things we can perceptually represent. Those laws do not apply, however, to beliefs. To be a representationalist is to hold that there is a similarity between perception and belief. If this is the case, why do the laws apply to one kind of mental state, but not the other? I argue that the puzzle is not a puzzle for representationalists in general, but only for some forms of (...) representationalism that hold excessive analogies between perception and belief. I will consider three kinds of views: a view that identifies perception with belief; a view that claims that perception and belief share the same kind of content, viz. propositions; and the view that belief and perception are both intentional states, but do not share the same type of content. I will argue that the laws of appearance rule out views that identify perception with belief, and that consider propositions to be the contents of perception. (shrink)

Natural scientists working at the intersection of virtual reality, psychology, and computer science have recently explored the question of whether Embodied Virtual Reality (EVR) can be employed to train empathy. While for some authors (e.g., Bertrand et el. 2018), EVR can enhance empathy by means of creating a series of perceptual illusions, which lead users to adopt the other’s perspective and resonate with her experience, other authors (e.g., Sora-Domenjó 2022; Sutherland 2016) have been more skeptical about the powers of EVR (...) to increase empathy in its users. This chapter aims at contributing to this recent debate by exploring how perspective-taking contributes to empathy in EVR. After an analysis of perspective-taking in non-virtual and virtual environments, the chapter introduces the distinction between sensual and emotional empathy found in classical and contemporary phenomenology (Stein 1989 ; Sveaneus 2018). While in sensual empathy, the user empathizes with the other’s lived body, in emotional empathy, she apprehends the other’s emotional states and their related values. It is argued that while the perceptual illusions elicited by EVR can lead the user to the impression of a body swap and, in so doing, foster sensual empathy, for the apprehension of the other’s emotions, which is crucial to emotional empathy, EVR must be supplemented with a series of narrative devices which that make the other’s emotions and values accessible to her. (shrink)

Russellian Panpsychism or Panpsychist Russellian Monism (PRM) presents a new perspective on the ontological status of phenomenal consciousness, acknowledging its reality at the fundamental level of existence. Diverging from physicalism, PRM upholds the existence of phenomenal consciousness without disrupting the uniformity of nature, a departure from dualism. PRM posits a symbiotic relationship between mental and physical entities, asserting that the former provides intrinsic foundations for the latter, which are structural. This raises a pivotal inquiry: how does PRM reconcile these distinct (...) realms? Is it a form of property dualism, recognizing two fundamental entity categories, or does it propose the primacy of mental properties with physical reducibility? Examining prevalent interpretations of PRM as dualistic or idealistic, this paper contends that neither aligns with PRM’s criteria for ontological monism, where only one fundamental entity type exists. Instead, it advocates for a dual-aspect monism framework, portraying the mental and physical as two authentic facets of a singular entity or property. Through a thorough analysis, the paper demonstrates how this dual-aspect interpretation harmonizes with PRM’s foundational principles, providing a robust resolution to the mental-physical dichotomy while upholding ontological monism. The conclusion explores the implications and contributions of this framework to the metaphysical discourse on consciousness. (shrink)

Meta-Reality: Identity defined within (and, therefore, ‘by’) a ‘Digital’ Age -/- .

This article reviews the notion of 'noûs' and the verb 'noein' in pre-Socratic philosophy: it brings together research carried out since Kurt von Fritz's famous articles of 1945-1946, taking into account 20th and 21th centuries studies, in particular the ones of James H. Lesher, Shirley D. Sullivan, Rossana Stefanelli and Favio Stella. This paper also focuses on the conception of 'noûs' in the thought of Xenophanes, who links it with divinity and thus anticipates the important contribution of Anaxagoras. Finally, it (...) examines the conception of 'noûs' and 'noein' in Parmenides, in whose Poem it is closely linked to his conception of Being. (shrink)

This paper presents an original dialectical logic symbol system designed to transcend the limitations of traditional logical symbols in capturing subjectivity, qualitative aspects, and contradictions inherent in the human mind. By introducing new symbols, such as “ὄ” (being) and “⌀” (nothing), and arranging them based on principles of symmetry, the system’s operations capture complex dialectical relationships essential to both Hegelian philosophy and Buddhist thought. The operations of this system are primarily structured around the categories found in Hegel’s Logic, and it (...) allows users to incorporate their own subjectivity into the logical processes, opening up new possibilities in the philosophy of subjectivity. This symbol system also has the potential to help us explore fundamental questions of language and to precisely describe processes of consciousness transformation through symbols. (shrink)

It is reasoned that mind-body is a modern issue and is not ever discussed in ancient Greek philosophy or middle Ages. The current study has reviewed these reasoning and concluded that typical categorizations of mind-body issue must be divided into general and specific. Separating the issue of mind-body from the problem of mind-body underlines the multiplicity of issues. Proofs are, then, submitted that axial issue in Sadraic psychology is soul-body rather than mind-body. Thus, the solutions and ideas from the earlier (...) cannot be generalized into the latter. Despite that, it is possible to compare mind-body issue against Sadraic philosophy and use its advantages to solve the issue. Such a comparison stands in the need of some modification in the underpinnings or the conclusions of Sadraic philosophical psychology. These findings are meta-philosophical and offer suggestions for methodology and content of Sadraic psychology. Keywords. (shrink)

This thesis is about perceptual experience, its subjective character, and how it is essentially structured. It focuses specifically on how the nature of perception is shaped not only by our acquaintance with the world but also by the very structure of experience itself. My central claim is that perceptual consciousness incorporates different aspects, some of which constitute the very way in which experiences are organized, sustained, and structured. Over the course of this thesis, I develop and defend an original account (...) of the nature of perceptual experience by integrating naïve realism, a prominent contemporary Anglophone theory of perception, with insights and ideas from the Phenomenological tradition. In particular, I argue that there are fruitful grounds for combining naïve realism and a phenomenologically grounded account of the essential structural features of experience (‘minimal self’, ‘temporality’, ‘anticipation’). Naïve realism holds that perception is fundamentally a matter of being in direct contact with some mind-independent entities. Proponents of naïve realism often emphasize the ‘object-dependent’ nature of perception. The appeal to the structural features of experience offers us a promising way to delineate the oft-overlooked ‘subject-dependent’ nature of perception and capture the phenomenological richness of our conscious experiential life. This thesis offers a rich, phenomenologically informed account of the nature of perception which in turn places us in a better position to understand the nature of hallucination. The integration of naïve realism and the structural approach to consciousness I develop in this thesis yields a novel solution to the problem of hallucination: structural disjunctivism. According to this view, the ‘partially overlapping’ psychological nature of perception and hallucination is accounted for in terms of their structural similarities and differences. I seek to show how detailed analyses and reflections on the structures of perceptual experience pave the way to reconceive the phenomenological basis of naïve realism. (shrink)

How can we have a sense of the presence of ordinary three-dimensional objects (e.g., an apple on my desk, a partially occluded cat behind a picket fence) when we are only presented with some parts of objects perceived from a particular egocentric viewpoint (e.g., the facing side of the apple, the unoccluded parts of the cat)? This paper presents and defends a novel answer to this question by incorporating insights from two prominent contemporary theories of perception, naïve realism and sensorimotor (...) theory. Naïve realism is the view that perception is fundamentally a matter of obtaining a relation of ‘acquaintance’ with some mind-independent entities (e.g., objects, properties, events). Sensorimotor theory holds that perception involves implicit practical understanding or ‘anticipation’ of the covariance between movements and sensory changes. I argue that perceptual presence is best accounted for in terms of the combination of our direct ‘acquaintance’ with some parts of perceived objects and sensorimotor ‘anticipations’ of how the objects would look different depending on some movements and actions. (shrink)

Where do values live in thought? A straightforward answer is that we (or our brains) make decisions using explicit value representations which are our values. Recent work applying reinforcement learning to decision-making and planning suggests that more specifically, we may represent both the instrumental expected value of actions as well as the intrinsic reward of outcomes. In this paper, I argue that identifying value with either of these representations is incomplete. For agents such as humans and other animals, there is (...) another place where reward can be located in thought: the division of the space of possibilities or ‘state space’. (shrink)