Methodology of Linguistics, Misc

In this paper I provide a metatheoretical analysis of speech perception research. I argue that the central turning point in the history of speech perception research has not been well understood. While it is widely thought to mark a decisive break with what I call "the alphabetic conception of speech," I argue that it instead marks the entrenchment of this conception of speech. In addition, I argue that the alphabetic conception of speech continues to underwrite speech perception research today and (...) moreover that it functions as a dogma which ought to be rejected. (shrink)

The Minimalist Program for linguistic theory is Noam Chomsky's boldest and most radical version of his naturalistic approach to language. Cedric Boeckz examines its foundations, explains its underlying philosophy, exemplifies its methods, and considers the significance of its empirical results. He explores the roots and antecedents of the Program and shows how its methodologies parallel those of sciences such as physics and biology. He disentangles and clarifies current debates and issues around the nature of minimalist research in linguistics and shows (...) how the aims and ambitions of the Minimalist Program lie at the centre of the enterprise to understand how the human language faculty operates in the mind and is manifested in the world's languages.Professor Boeckx writes for advanced and graduate students of linguistics and for all those, in fields such as cognitive science and evolutionary biology, who want to know more about current developments in theoretical linguistics. (shrink)

Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) emphasize the importance of viewing language as activity. In this commentary I push further their claim by highlighting how constructions, rather than words, are the appropriate unit of analysis. In addition, I suggest how a discussion of indexicality paves the way for a better understanding of how language provides a powerful tool for children's construction of mind.

Here, I consider the recent application of phylogenetic methods in historical linguistics. After a preliminary survey of one such method, i.e. cladistic parsimony, I respond to two common criticisms of cultural phylogenies: that cultural artifacts cannot be modeled as tree-like because of borrowing across lineages, and that the mechanism of cultural change differs radically from that of biological evolution. I argue that while perhaps remains true for certain cultural artifacts, the nature of language may be such as to side-step this (...) objection. Moreover, I explore the possibility that cladistic parsimony can be justified even if is true by appealing to the inference pattern known among philosophers as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’. (shrink)

Chomsky proposes a reformulation of the theory of transformational generative grammar that takes recent developments in the descriptive analysis of particular ...

This book deals with the need to rethink the aims and methods of contemporary linguistics. Orthodox linguists' discussions of linguistic form fail to exemplify how language users become language makers. Integrationist theory is used here as a solution to this basic problem within general linguistics. The book is aimed at an interdisciplinary readership, comprising those engaged in study, teaching and research in the humanities and social sciences, including linguistics, philosophy, sociology and psychology.

This paper defends Some anti-Chomskian themes in Ignorance of Language (Devitt 2006a) from, the criticisms of John Collins (2007, 2008a) and Georges Rey (2008). It argues that there is a linguistic reality external to the mind and that it is theoretically interesting to study it. If there is this reality, we have good reason to think that grammars are more or less true of it. So, the truth of the grammar of a language entails that its rules govern linguistic reality, (...) giving a rich picture of this reality. In contrast, the truth of the grammar does not entail that its rules govern the psychological reality of speakers competent in the language and it alone gives a relatively impoverished picture of that reality. For, all we learn about that reality from the grammar is that it “respects” the rules of the grammar. (shrink)

Linguists take the intuitive judgments of speakers to be good evidence for a grammar. Why? The Chomskian answer is that they are derived by a rational process from a representation of linguistic rules in the language faculty. The paper takes a different view. It argues for a naturalistic and non-Cartesian view of intuitions in general. They are empirical central-processor responses to phenomena differing from other such responses only in being immediate and fairly unreflective. Applying this to linguistic intuitions yields an (...) explanation of their evidential role without any appeal to the representation of rules. Introduction The evidence for linguistic theories A tension in the linguists' view of intuitions Intuitions in general Linguistic intuitions Comparison of the modest explanation with the standard Cartesian explanation A nonstandard Cartesian explanation of the role of intuitions? Must linguistics explain intuitions? Conclusion. (shrink)

This volume presents the semiotic and linguistic theory of extended axiomatic functionalism, focusing on its application to linguistic description.

We compare our model of unsupervised learning of linguistic structures, ADIOS [1], to some recent work in computational linguistics and in grammar theory. Our approach resembles the Construction Grammar in its general philosophy (e.g., in its reliance on structural generalizations rather than on syntax projected by the lexicon, as in the current generative theories), and the Tree Adjoining Grammar in its computational characteristics (e.g., in its apparent affinity with Mildly Context Sensitive Languages). The representations learned by our algorithm are truly (...) emergent from the (unannotated) corpus data, whereas those found in published works on cognitive and construction grammars and on TAGs are hand-tailored. Thus, our results complement and extend both the computational and the more linguistically oriented research into language acquisition. We conclude by suggesting how empirical and formal study of language can be best integrated. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to understand what the notions of explanation and prediction in contemporary linguistics mean, and to compare various aspects that the notion of explanation encompasses in that domain. The paper is structured around an opposition between three main styles of explanation in linguistics, which I propose to call ‘grammatical’, ‘functional’, and ‘historical’. Most of this paper is a comparison between these different styles of explanations and their relations. A second, more methodological aspect this paper (...) seeks to clarify concerns the extent to which linguistic explanations can be viewed as predictive, rather than merely descriptive, and the problem of whether linguistic explanations ought to be causal, rather than noncausal. I argue that the notion of prediction is equally applicable in linguistics as in other empirical sciences. The extent to which the computational model of generative syntax can be viewed as providing a causal or psychologically realist model of language is more controversial. (shrink)

Some linguists have argued that sentences should not be studied in isolation. They argue, rather, that the structure of sentences is largely the result of constraints imposed upon them by the discourses they are embedded in. I want to argue that this approach is misguided and that sentence-level syntax and discourse structure constitute distinct domains of study, at least in part because grammar is underdetermined by function. Moreover, I argue that discourse and sentence structures illustrate two types of cognition, dynamic (...) vs. static, and thai these necessarily involve different theoretical constructs for their explanation. That is, they constitute distinct epistemological domains. An important conclu-sion of this study is that principles of sentence grammar cannot be discovered by studies of discourse, but only by careful, theory-guided examination of individual sentences. Because it draws on multiple cognitive domains, discourse itself is inherently resistant to analysis by any single theoretical framework or discipline. Sentence grammar, on the other hand, is amenable to study by a single discipline, i.e., linguistics. These ideas are explored partially here via a review of the book Pragmatics of Word Order Flexibility. It is argued that the studies in this collection have little light to shed on syntactic studies, other than the fact that discourse can exploit independently available syntactic structures. (shrink)

This paper defends an orthodox model of the linguistic intuitions which form a central source of evidence for generative grammars. According to this orthodox conception, linguistic intuitions are the upshot of a system of grammatical competence as it interacts with performance systems for perceiving and articulating language. So conceived, probing speakers’ linguistic intuitions allows us to investigate the competence–performance distinction empirically, so as to determine the grammars that speakers are competent in. This model has been attacked by Michael Devitt in (...) his recent book and a series of papers. In its place, Devitt advances a model of linguistic intuitions whereby they are speakers’ theory-laden judgements about the properties of languages. In this paper, I try to make clear the rationale behind the orthodox model and the inadequacies of Devitt's model. (shrink)

It matters to a number of projects whether monomorphemic lexical items (‘boy’, ‘cat’, ‘give’, ‘break’, etc.) have internal linguistic structure. (Call the theory that they do the Decomposition Hypothesis (DC).) The cognitive science consensus is, overwhelmingly, that DC is true; for example, that there is a level of grammar at which ‘breaktr’ has the structure ‘cause to breakint’ and so forth. We find this consensus surprising since, as far as we can tell, there is practically no evidence to support it. (...) (For example, there is no psychological evidence that you can’t have a word that expresses the concept BREAKTR unless you have the concept CAUSE. But there ought to be if CAUSE is a constituent of BREAKTR) This isn’t, of course, to say that there are no prima facie arguments at all for DC. The best one’s we’ve heard are the Impossible Word Arguments (IWA). That being so we’re very interested in whether IWAs are, in fact, sound. (shrink)

This study investigates the ways in which Noam Chomsky and W. V. O. Quine view the relationship between formal grammars and natural languages, how their respective philosophical commitments shape their views, and whether or not we, their readers, have a basis for adjudicating between differences of opinion about the nature of grammar. I first argue that a popular reading of Quine's position which turns on his allegiance to behaviorism is problematic and based on a misconception. Quine's behaviorism must be distinguished (...) from B. F. Skinner's behavioral psychology, I claim, for it is best understood as a theory of the evidential constraints which scientific methodology imposes on analysis and translation. This conclusion undergirds the further claim that the central theses of Quine's epistemology are scientifically well motivated and that his understanding of formal grammars as purely descriptive is therefore justifiable. Moreover, the legitimacy of Quine's position on language and meaning, i.e., its consistency with the principles and procedures of natural science, presents a serious challenge to those who purport to justify linguistic theory on the basis of a speaker's intuition about grammatical structure. ;I then turn to Chomsky's early work, arguing that Chomsky both recognizes the seriousness of Quine's challenge and attempts to circumvent a reliance on intuition by appealing to formal standards of adequacy for grammars. Chomsky's reluctance to appeal to intuition as the justificatory foundation of linguistics is, I claim, the result of a strong and largely unrecognized allegiance to the central tenets of American structuralism. Once his work is recast in light of this allegiance, an answer to Quine's challenge presents itself---an answer which reveals the nature and significance of linguistic metatheory. However, this response assumes that the theoretical structure of one's metatheory can be justified on scientific grounds, an idea which ultimately compels Chomsky to interpret the study of grammar in psychological terms. I conclude by arguing that the philosophical significance of Chomsky's shift to the Language Acquisition Problem lies in the broadened conception of evidence which ensues and the way in which that shift changes the face of the debate between him and Quine. (shrink)