Mind-Body Problem, General

There is a long-standing view that Malebranche and his fellow occasionalists accepted occasionalism to solve the problem of interaction between immaterial souls and extended bodies. Recently, however, scholars have shown this story to be a myth. Malebranche, Geulincx, La Forge, and Cordemoy adopted occasionalism for a variety of reasons, but none did so because of a need to provide a solution to a perceived mind-body problem. Yet there is one Cartesian for whom the “traditional” reading is largely on the mark. (...) François Lamy argues in the second volume of his De la Connoissance de Soi-Meme much as the standard story has it. In this article I discuss and analyze Lamy’s argument, showing how he deals with some of the many concerns that made occasionalism attractive, and how he brings out some of the thorny questions that an occasionalist must face. (shrink)

Descartes’ epistemologies of meditation and sense imply that we cannot know anything about the mind-body union, either in the Cartesian sense of having scientia or, more interestingly, in terms of any other concept of knowledge available to Descartes. After considering the implications of this conclusion for what we may know about mind-body interaction, it becomes clear that, on Descartes’ view, we at best can be said to know that mind-body interaction, if it does in fact take place, does not violate (...) a set of causal principles, without knowing how mind and body interact, or even if they interact at all. (This article is the winner of the 2010 Rockefeller Prize awarded by the American Philosophical Association.). (shrink)

This book presents the thesis that appearances should not be viewed simply as functions of a prevailing conceptual system. In addition to making a valuable contribution to the study of the mind/body problem, distinguished between first and second-order extensions, the book provides an excellent evaluation of the philosophy of physicalism and develops an exceptionally sound theory of personhood.

Die elf Beiträge dieses Bandes gehen aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln dem Problem der Verkörperung von Sinn nach: phänomenologische, psychoanalytische und sprachwissenschaftliche Ansätze bilden dabei den Schwerpunkt; sie werden aber durch Studien aus der Literaturtheorie, der politischen Theorie und der Filmwissenschaft ergänzt. Was heißt es – das ist die zentrale Frage –, den Körper als leibliches Medium aufzufassen, welches Sinn nicht nur verkörpert, sondern überhaupt erst entstehen lässt? Gibt es bereits eine Sprache des Leibes diesseits der Ebene ausdrücklicher Rede?

Ideal for courses in consciousness and the philosophy of mind, Consciousness and The Mind-Body Problem: A Reader presents thirty-three classic and contemporary readings, organized into five sections that cover the major issues in this debate: the challenge for physicalism, physicalist responses, alternative responses, the significance of ignorance, and mental causation. Edited by Torin Alter and Robert J. Howell, the volume features work from such leading figures as Karen Bennett, Ned Block, David J. Chalmers, Frank Jackson, Colin McGinn, David Papineau, and (...) many others. (shrink)

The incipient mind argument is the central argument of Evan Thompson’s solution to the so-called mind-body problem. This paper challenges Evan Thompson’s assumption of a pristine form of subjectivity, as well as of interiority in unicellular life forms. I claim that this assumption makes sense only as a useful strategy for an absolutist account of mind. In this paper, I argue that Thompson’s thesis is erroneous at the object-level, as well as at the meta-level of his argumentation. By paying greater (...) attention to the meta-level of his exposition, I show that Thompson’s assumption of an “incipient mind” obeys an absolutist, two-sided pattern of thinking and, therefore, that his argumentation fails to give an accurate account of the systemic generation and development of mind. After demonstrating this, I suggest an innovative action-based approach to mind in order to accurately give an account of its real-constructive development. (shrink)

This physics note entails a summary of an extended form of Eccles-Cartesian Interactive Dualism mind-body-multiverse paradigm called Noetic Field Theory: The Quantization of Mind (NFT), distinguished as a paradigm because it is comprehensive and empirically testable. NFT posits not only that the brain is not the seat of awareness but also that neither classical nor quantum mechanics are sufficient to describe mind as the required regime entails the new physics associated with Unified Field, UF Mechanics. This means that the brain (...) is merely a transducer (form of quantum computer) mediating mentation, sensory data and metabolic function. The so-called ‘Hard Problem’ of cognitive science arises as a category error in philosophy of mind, i.e. an incorrect posit of the question “what processes in the brain give rise to awareness” which instead should simply be queried “what processes give rise to awareness”. In the history of science whenever a hard problem has arisen it has later been shown that the underlying principles had not been understood. NFT posits these underlying principles in a comprehensive empirically testable manner solving the ancient mind-body problem in a manner that enables breaking the 1st person 3rd person barrier able to explain Psi-phenomena. The premise is that the mind-body is a naturally occurring form of ‘conscious quantum computer’ (QC), not that the QC is conscious but that it is modelled after those principles. Such QC technologies could lead to routine telepathic effect devices. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument for mind-body property dualism, based on the causal account of properties, according to which properties have their conditional powers essentially. It is argued that the epistemic possibility of physical but not phenomenal duplicates of actuality is identical to a metaphysical possibility, but irrelevant for establishing the falsity of physicalism. The proposed attack is in many ways inspired by a standard, broadly Kripkean approach to epistemic and metaphysical modality.

One of the deepest assumptions of Judaism and its offspring, Christianity, is that there is an important difference between human persons and everything else that exists in Creation. We alone are made in God’s image. We alone are the stewards of the earth. It is said in Genesis that we have “dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps (...) upon the earth.” It is difficult to see how a traditional theist could deny the significance of the difference between human persons and the rest of Creation. We human persons are morally and ontologically special. (shrink)

In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer (...) while maintaining that qualia themselves are non-physical properties. In this case the non-physical nature of qualia may play no role in accounting for the features of acquaintance. But although the account could be used by a dualist, its existence provides support for physicalism. (shrink)

During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, on this proposal, involve unique (...) cognitive mechanisms, but none that could not be fully physically implemented. David Chalmers has recently presented a Master Argument to show that the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – not just this or that version of it, but any version of it – fails. Chalmers argues that the phenomenal concepts posited by such theories are either not physicalistically explicable, or they cannot explain our epistemic situation with regard to qualia. I argue that it is his Master Argument that fails. My claim is his argument does not provide any new reasons to reject the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. I also argue that, although the Phenomenal Concept Strategy is successful in showing that the physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up physicalism in the light of the anti-physicalist arguments, the anti-physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up the anti-physicalist argument in the light of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy either. (shrink)

The book under review is a collection of thirteen essays on the nature phenomenal concepts and the ways in which phenomenal concepts figure in debates over physicalism. Phenomenal concepts are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. There are recent arguments, originating in Descartes’ famous conceivability argument, that purport to show that phenomenal experience is irreducibly non-physical. Second, phenomenal concepts are (...) widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. Both the anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist replies to these arguments turn on views about the nature of phenomenal concepts. In this review I survey the many ways in which the essays in this volume are engaged with anti-physicalist arguments and the role phenomenal concepts play in these arguments. (shrink)

Papineau in his book provides a detailed defense of physicalism via what has recently been dubbed the “phenomenal concept strategy”. I share his enthusiasm for this approach. But I disagree with his account of how a physicalist should respond to the conceivability arguments. Also I argue that his appeal to teleosemantics in explaining mental quotation is more like a promissory note than an actual theory.

Symposium contribution on Frank Jackson’s a priori entailment thesis – which he employs to connect metaphysics and conceptual analysis. In the book he develops this thesis within the two-dimensional framework and also proposes a formal argument for it. I argue that the two-dimensional framework doesn’t provide independent support for the a priori entailment thesis since one has to build into the framework assumptions as strong as the thesis itself.

This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As (...) he puts it, “zombies” are metaphysically possible. I attempt to show that this argument is refuted by considering an analogous argument in the mouth of a zombie. The conclusion of this argument is false so one of the premises is false. I argue at length that this shows that the original conceivability argument also has a false premise and so is invalid. (shrink)

Scientific materialism is still influential in certain academic spheres. In this article, I examine multiple lines of empirical evidence showing that this ideology, while partially true, is woefully incomplete and, therefore, obsolete. This evidence indicates that we humans cannot be reduced to powerless, biophysical machines since the psyche greatly influences the activity of the brain and the body, and can operate telosomatically. Based on this evidence, I introduce the Theory of Psychelementarity and present a few predictions. This theory proposes that (...) the psyche plays a role as primordial as that of matter, energy, and space-time. Another central premise of this theory is that the psyche cannot be reduced to physical processes. The TOP accounts for a number of well-studied psychophysical phenomena, which are reinterpreted in light of a post-materialist perspective. This theory also accounts for anomalous phenomena that are currently rejected by materialists. (shrink)

This is a review of After Phyiscalism (ed. B. P. Göcke, University of Notre Dame Press 2012), a collection of eleven essays addressing the mind-body problem from a non-physicalist point of view.

Une entité est phénoménalement consciente si et seulement s’il existe quelque chose comme l’effet-que-ça-fait d’être cette entité. À partir de cette définition, aucun test empirique ne peut être fourni pour établir si une entité S est consciente ou pas. S peut croire qu’elle est consciente parce qu’en effet elle l’est, mais pour qu’un sujet W puisse attribuer la conscience à S, une théorie est nécessaire. Cette théorie doit fournir des critères intersubjectifs, basés sur l’observation du comportement, les propriétés physiques ou (...) quelque chose de cette sorte. En bref : (C) Pour qu’un sujet S puisse établir si une autre entité W est consciente, il doit faire appel à une théorie empirique proposant un critère d’un point de vue à la troisième personne pour l’attribution de la conscience. Il n’est pas possible de prouver que la conscience est un phénomène réel, mais les éliminativistes ne peuvent pas prouver non plus que ce ne soit pas le cas. Pour le réaliste, la conscience est donnée comme un fait brut, alors que pour l’éliminativiste l’existence de la conscience est une affirmation théorique. J’adhère à une vision réaliste de la conscience, supportée par le fait qu’il me semble vraiment que j’ai des expériences phénoménales, et par l’idée que la dichotomie réalité/ apparence ne s’applique pas aux contenus phénoménaux. Il y a manifestement des corrélations entre les phénomènes physiques et mentaux, qui donnent de bonnes raisons de croire qu’il y a des relations causales entre le monde physique (y compris le corps) et les esprits (conscients). Le dualisme des substances, le dualisme des propriétés, l’épiphénoménalisme et le panpsychisme ne parviennent pas à fournir une explication convaincante de ces corrélations. Une forme de physicalisme apparaît être l’alternative la plus raisonnable, en dépit du fait que l’esprit ne semble pas, d’un point de vue subjectif, être de nature physique. (shrink)

Husserl's phenomenology of the body constantly faces issues of demarcation: between phenomenology and ontology, soul and spirit, consciousness and brain, conditionality and causality. It also shows that Husserl was eager to cross the borders of transcendental phenomenology when the phenomena under investigation made it necessary. Considering the details of his description of bodily sensations and bodily behaviour from a Merleau-Pontian perspective allows one also to realise how Husserl (unlike Heidegger) fruitfully explores a phenomenological field located between a science of pure (...) consciousness and the natural sciences. A phenomenological discussion of naturalism thus cannot limit itself to the task of discrimination, it must attempt to integrate what an eidetic analysis has separated: inside and outside, here and there, first-person and third-person perspective, motivation and causality. Husserl's phenomenology of the body thus shows that dualism is at best a methodological but never an ontological option for the mind-body problem. (shrink)

This paper argues that the “Canberra Plan” picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as David Armstrong, David Chalmers Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Joe Levine and David Lewis--neglects ground (Fine, 2001, 2012). To the extent that the point of view endorsed by the Canberra Plan has an account of the physical/functional ground of mind at all, it is in one version trivial and in another version implausible. In its most general (...) form, the point of view of the Canberra Plan is committed to unacceptably treating indexical or name-related facts as part of the ultimate physical/functional ground of the mental. (shrink)