About this topic
Summary The mind-brain identity theory (or identity thesis) is the assertion that mental states/events/processes are identical to brain states/events/processes. The type identity theory (often called just the "identity theory") says that mental types are physical types, while the token identity theory says that mental tokens are physical tokens.  Over the years the thesis has been successively understood as involving a contingent identity relation, an analytic identity relation, and then an posteriori necessary identity relation.  The most common objection to the type identity theory is the objection from multiple realizability.
Key works The thesis is explicitly defended in seminal articles by Place 1956Feigl 1958Smart 1959. This is the early stage, when the thesis is understood as an empirical and contingent one. A powerful attack on this version is put forward by Kripke 1980.  The analytic identity thesis appears for the first time in Lewis 1966, then in Armstrong 1968. Criticism of this version appears appears in Nagel 1979Jackson 1982, and Chalmers 1996. Defences appear in Braddon-Mitchell 2003 and Jackson 2003. A more recent defence, based on probability theory, appears in Aranyosi 2011.  The empirical necessary identity thesis is defended, among others, by Loar 1990 and Papineau 2002. Criticism of this approach is to be found in Chalmers 1996 and Chalmers 2009.  The multiple realizability objection to all forms of the type identity theory can be found in Putnam 1963.
Introductions A 30-year retrospective of the transformations of the thesis appears in Place 1988. A more recent introduction to and history of the thesis appears in Smart 2007.
Related categories

1 found
Order:
  1. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory: A Critical Appraisal.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    The materialist version of the mind/brain identity theory has met with considerable challenges from philosophers of mind. The author first dispenses with a popular objection to the theory based on the law of indiscernibility of identicals. By means of discussing the vexatious problem of phenomenal qualities, he explores how the debate may be advanced by seeing each dualist and monist ontology through the lens of an evolutionary epistemology. The author suggests that by regarding each ontology as the core of a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Phenomenal Concepts and Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument.Martina Prinz & François-Igor Pris - manuscript
  3. Feigl and the Development of Analytic Philosophy at the University of Minnesota.Bruce Aune - manuscript
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Reduction: Models of Cross-Scientific Relations and Their Implications for the Psychology-Neuroscience Interface.Robert McCauley - manuscript
    University Abstract Philosophers have sought to improve upon the logical empiricists’ model of scientific reduction. While opportunities for integration between the cognitive and the neural sciences have increased, most philosophers, appealing to the multiple realizability of mental states and the irreducibility of consciousness, object to psychoneural reduction. New Wave reductionists offer a continuum of comparative goodness of intertheoretic mapping for assessing reductions. Their insistence on a unified view of intertheoretic relations obscures epistemically significant crossscientific relations and engenders dismissive conclusions about (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  5. The Triviality of Smart's Appeal and a Problem with Utiliatarian Calculations.Robert Goldstone - unknown - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 17.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. The Physics and Electronics of Human Consciousness , Mind and Their Functions.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - June, 2019 - Cosmos and History 15 (No .2):63 - 110.
    Human consciousness, the result of breathing process as dealt with in the Upanishads, is translated into modern scientific terms and modeled as a mechanical oscillator of infrasonic frequency. The bio-mechanic oscillator is also proposed as the source of psychic energy. This is further advanced to get an insight of human consciousness (the being of mind) and functions of mind (the becoming of mind) in terms of psychic energy and reversible transformation of its virtual reflection. An alternative analytical insight of human (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. IEEE Vision for Smart Grid Communications: 2030 and Beyond Roadmap.Stephen Bush, Goel F., Simard Sanjay & Georges - forthcoming - Standard-Download.Org.
    This IEEE Vision for Smart Grid Communications: 2030 and Beyond Roadmap is a high-levelsupplement of the full vision document IEEE Vision for Smart Grid Communications: 2030 andBeyond. Communication is a major enabling technology for the Smart Grid. We believe that the powergrid will tend to utilize advances in communications since the data exchange requirements willscale up for the Smart Grid. Smart Grid communication will help to improve demand forecasting,enable self-healing from power disturbance events, facilitate active participation by consumers in demand-response (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Ieee Vision for Smart Grid Communications: 2030 and Beyond.Sanjay Goel, Stephen Bush, Bakken F. & David - forthcoming - Standard-Download.Org.
    This document provides a vision of the communications-related aspects of the Smart Grid in the year 2030, and lays out the technology roadmap that will lead us to the vision. This document starts with some basic knowledge of the power grid and follows up with fundamental building blocks for the communication infrastructure that will accompany the Smart Grid. Subsequently, network architectures, including overlays, are discussed at length. Also discussed, are important issues such as standards, regulations, security, and disruptive technologies. The (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Richard Swinburne Are We Bodies or Souls? . Pp. 188. $19.95 . ISBN 9780198831495.Tyron Goldschmidt - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-3.
  10. Mental Causation.David Robb - forthcoming - In Brian McLaughlin (ed.), Macmillan's Interdisciplinary Handbooks: Philosophy of Mind. Macmillan.
    This is an introduction to mental causation. It is written primarily for students new to the topic. The chapter is organized around the following argument: P1. Everything we do is caused by biochemical processes within our bodies and brains. P2. If everything we do is caused by biochemical processes within our bodies and brains, then nothing we do has a mental cause. C. Therefore, nothing we do has a mental cause.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. Power for the Mental as Such.David Robb - forthcoming - In Jonathan D. Jacobs (ed.), Causal Powers. Oxford University Press.
    An adequate solution to the problem of mental causation should deliver, not just the efficacy of mental properties, but the efficacy of mental properties as such, of mentality in its own right. But this appears to block an identity solution from the outset. Any property that’s both mental and physical, the argument goes, has a dual nature, and this just reintroduces the problem of mental causation, now framed in terms of these two natures. But a powers ontology promises to save (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. Conservation of a Circle Explains (the Human) Mind.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.
  13. Multiple Realization and Compositional Variation.Kevin Morris - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2593-2611.
    It has often been thought that compositional variation across systems that are similar from the point of view of the special sciences provides a key point in favor of the multiple realization of special science kinds and in turn the broadly nonreductive consequences often thought to follow from multiple realization. Yet in a series of articles, and culminating in The Multiple Realization Book, Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro argue that an account of multiple realization demanding enough to yield such nonreductive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Consciousness, Mind and Meditation - An Upanishadic and Cognitive Scientific Insight.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - 2020 - New Delhi, India: Authorspress publishers, New Delhi.
    The Human Consciousness and Mind will be thoroughly analyzed as expressed in the Upanishads and Brahmajnaana. The six orthodox systems of philosophy – Vaiseshika, Nyaaya, Saamkhya, Yoga, PoorvaMeemamsa, Uttara Meemsa or Vedaanta, TheSabdabrahmaSiddhanta, Gayatri Mantra, Mantrapushpam and related Indian seers’ spiritual expressions also will be used to further the understanding mind and its functions. The cognition, re-cognition, communication and action-reactions of the body through mind and sense organs and actions organs will be analyzed as cognitive science. The structure and function (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. The Correlation Argument for Reductionism.Christopher Clarke - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (1):76-97.
    Reductionists say things like: all mental properties are physical properties; all normative properties are natural properties. I argue that the only way to resist reductionism is to deny that causation is difference making (thus making the epistemology of causation a mystery) or to deny that properties are individuated by their causal powers (thus making properties a mystery). That is to say, unless one is happy to deny supervenience, or to trivialize the debate over reductionism. To show this, I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Autonomous Mental Causation and Mental‐Qua‐Mental Causation.Dwayne Moore - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (2):245-267.
    Nonreductive physicalists endorse autonomous mental causation, the view that mental causes, as distinct from physical causes, bring about mental and physical effects. The causal exclusion problem has recently pressured nonreductive physicalists to replace autonomous mental causation with reduced mental causation, the view that mental causes, as physical causes, bring about mental and physical effects. Reduced mental causation, in turn, faces the problem of mental quausation, according to which reduced mental causation only delivers mental‐as‐physical causation, not the requisite mental‐as‐mental causation. Proponents (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Conscious Experience and Quantum Consciousness Theory: Theories, Causation, and Identity.Mika Suojanen - 2019 - E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 26 (2):14-34.
    Generally speaking, the existence of experience is accepted, but more challenging has been to say what experience is and how it occurs. Moreover, philosophers and scholars have been talking about mind and mental activity in connection with experience as opposed to physical processes. Yet, the fact is that quantum physics has replaced classical Newtonian physics in natural sciences, but the scholars in humanities and social sciences still operate under the obsolete Newtonian model. There is already a little research in which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Some Concerns with Polger and Shapiro’s View.Mark Couch - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):419-430.
    This paper provides some responses to Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book (2016). I first provide a description of the authors’ framework for thinking about multiple realization and the conditions they claim this involves. I explain what I think they get right and what they get wrong with this framework. After this, I then consider a few examples of multiple realization they discuss and the interpretations they offer. While I am sympathetic to several things they say about (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. SEARLE, John : Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]Alberto Luis López - 2017 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 71:216-222.
    Review of Searl's book Seeing Things as They are.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Review of The Multiple Realization Book by Thomas W. Polger & Lawrence A. Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [REVIEW]Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 21.
  21. Flat Physicalism: Some Implications.Orly Shenker - 2017 - Iyyun 66:211-225.
    Flat Physicalism is a theory of through and through type reductive physicalism, understood in light of recent results in the conceptual foundations of physics. In Flat Physicalism, as in physics, so-called "high level" concepts and laws are nothing but partial descriptions of the complete states of affairs of the universe. "Flat physicalism" generalizes this idea, to form a reductive picture in which there is no room for levels, neither explanatory nor ontological. The paper explains how phenomena that seem to be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Review of Freedom Evolves by Daniel Dennett (2003).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    ``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don´t understand why is has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb´to be´that looks as if it functions in the same way as´to eatánd´to drink´, as long as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. HIT and Brain Reward Function: A Case of Mistaken Identity (Theory).Cory Wright, Matteo Colombo & Alexander Beard - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 64:28–40.
    This paper employs a case study from the history of neuroscience—brain reward function—to scrutinize the inductive argument for the so-called ‘Heuristic Identity Theory’ (HIT). The case fails to support HIT, illustrating why other case studies previously thought to provide empirical support for HIT also fold under scrutiny. After distinguishing two different ways of understanding the types of identity claims presupposed by HIT and considering other conceptual problems, we conclude that HIT is not an alternative to the traditional identity theory so (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded.Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (5):580-611.
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this article, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25. Some Puzzles Concerning Relations Between Minds, Brains, and Bodies.Rick Grush - 2016
    In this article I explore a number of questions that have not been adequately investigated in philosophy of mind circles: are minds located in the same place as the brains (or other computing machinery) supporting them? Must they exist at the same location as the body? Must they exist at the same time? Could a single mind be implemented in multiple brains, or multiple minds in a single brain? Under what conditions might a single mind persist despite being implemented successively (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Of Brains and Planets: On a Causal Criterion for Mind-Brain Identities.Vera Hoffmann-Kolss - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4):1177-1189.
    Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper ‘When Is a Brain Like the Planet?’, Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used to empirically establish (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. Art and Identity: Essays on the Aesthetic Creation of Mind.Aleksandar Kordis - 2016 - The European Legacy 21 (5-6):610-611.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Experiences Are Objects. Towards a Mind-Object Identity Theory.Riccardo Manzotti - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):16-36.
    : Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness. I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, rather than the neural (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. Possible Worlds, Zombies, and Truth Machines.Mirza Mehmedovic - 2016 - Giornale di Metafisica 1:262-283.
    The subject of zombies is one of the most discussed and controversial topics of philosophy of mind. In this paper I will first examine the main argument of zombies, providing a summary of the current discussion. Then I will introduce a thought experiment, an epistemic window on a metaphysical scenario. By the thought experiment I will argue that zombies are logically impossible. Further I will discuss another recent epistemic window. Finally I will provide some other logical consideration to prove that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Consciousness, Origins.Gregory Nixon - 2016 - In Harold L. Miller Jr (ed.), The SAGE Encyclopedia of Theory in Psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications. pp. 172-176.
    To explain the origin of anything, we must be clear about that which we are explaining. There seem to be two main meanings for the term consciousness. One might be called open in that it equates consciousness with awareness and experience and considers rudimentary sensations to have evolved at a specific point in the evolution of increasing complexity. But certainly the foundation for such sensation is a physical body. It is unclear, however, exactly what the physical requirements are for a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Smart Governance as Key to Multi-Jurisdictional Smart City Initiatives: The Case of the eCityGov Alliance.Hans Jochen Scholl & Suha AlAwadhi - 2016 - Social Science Information 55 (2):255-277.
    Quite a number of smart-city initiatives from around the world have been analyzed and documented, and a growing body of academic knowledge is evolving around the phenomenon of the smart city. Smart-city government is seen as an important driver for developing a smart urban environment. The eCityGov Alliance in the Pacific Northwest of the USA represents a special case of a successful smart-city collaboration between nine neighboring municipalities, which combined forces to provide smart services to citizens and businesses that no (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization-- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 2nd Edition Feb 2018.Michael Starks - 2016 - Las Vegas, USA: Reality Press.
    This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited to bring them up to date (2019). All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 000-00.
    I endorse a 12-word metaphysics. [1] Stoff ist Kraft ≈ being is energy. [2] Wesen ist Werden ≈ being is becoming. [3] Sein ist Sosein ≈ being is qualit[ativit]y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein ≈ being is mind. [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles and unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favor [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals. For [i] panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view, given that the existence of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  34. Ahistorical Homology and Multiple Realizability.Sergio Balari & Guillermo Lorenzo - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):881-902.
    The Mind-Brain Identity Theory lived a short life as a respectable philosophical position in the late 1950s, until Hilary Putnam developed his famous argument on the multiple realizability of mental states. The argument was, and still is, taken as the definitive demonstration of the falsity of Identity Theory and the foundation on which contemporary functionalist computational cognitive science was to be grounded. In this paper, in the wake of some contemporary philosophers, we reopen the case for Identity Theory and offer (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. Metaphysics of Pain; Semantics of ‘Pain’.Alik Pelman - 2015 - Ratio 28 (1):302-317.
    Functionalism is often used to identify mental states with physical states. A particularly powerful case is Lewis's analytical functionalism. Kripke's view seriously challenges any such identification. The dispute between Kripke and Lewis's views boils down to whether the term ‘pain’ is rigid or nonrigid. It is a strong intuition of ours that if it feels like pain it is pain, and vice versa, so that ‘pain’ should designate, with respect to every possible world, all and only states felt as pain. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Lewis on Materialism and Experience.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis. Oxford, UK:
  37. The Drizzly Identity: A Dissolution of the Body as a Solution of Life.Polona Tratnik - 2015 - Technoetic Arts 13 (1-2):103-113.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical, Edited by Simone Gozzano and Christopher S. Hill. [REVIEW]István Aranyosi - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):605-609.
  39. Consciousness, Big Science and Conceptual Clarity.Ned Block - 2014 - In Gary Marcus & Jeremy Freeman (eds.), in The Future of the Brain: Essays by the World’s Leading Neuroscientists. Princeton University Press. pp. 161-176.
  40. Mind and Brain: A Contribution From Microgenetic Theory.Jason Brown - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):54-73.
    Study of symptoms with focal brain lesions reveals a microtemporal transition that elaborates the mind/brain state. The pattern of this transition corresponds with that of developmental growth , which can be characterized in terms of whole-part relations. This correspondence is interpreted as indicating that the cognitive process is an extension of growth trends in pre- and post-natal life. The continuum of ontogenetic growth into the cognitive process is a transition from exuberance of form to specificity or from generality to precision, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Smart Grid: Communication-Enabled Intelligence for the Electric Power Grid.Stephen F. Bush - 2014 - Wiley-Ieee Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge.Christopher S. Hill - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume presents a selection of essays by the leading philosopher Christopher S. Hill. Together, they address central philosophical issues related to four key concerns: the nature of truth; the relation between experiences and brain states; the relation between experiences and representational states; and problems concerning knowledge.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  43. On a Priori Deduction of Physico-Physical and Psycho-Physical Identities.Francois-Igor Pris - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations (Russian E-Journal) 6:157-182.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. What Does It Mean to Be a Mechanism? Stephen Morse, Non-Reductivism, and Mental Causation.Katrina L. Sifferd - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-17.
    Stephen Morse seems to have adopted a controversial position regarding the mindbody relationship: John Searle’s non-reductivism, which claims that conscious mental states are causal yet not reducible to their underlying brain states. Searle’s position has been roundly criticized, with some arguing the theory taken as a whole is incoherent. In this paper I review these criticisms and add my own, concluding that Searle’s position is indeed contradictory, both internally and with regard to Morse's other views. Thus I argue that Morse (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Arguing Pain-Brain Relationships in the Fetus.Simon van Rysewyk - 2014
  46. Robot Pain.Simon van Rysewyk - 2014 - International Journal of Synthetic Emotions 4 (2):22-33.
    Functionalism of robot pain claims that what is definitive of robot pain is functional role, defined as the causal relations pain has to noxious stimuli, behavior and other subjective states. Here, I propose that the only way to theorize role-functionalism of robot pain is in terms of type-identity theory. I argue that what makes a state pain for a neuro-robot at a time is the functional role it has in the robot at the time, and this state is type identical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  47. The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory.Sean Crawford - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The identity theory’s rise to prominence in analytic philosophy of mind during the late 1950s and early 1960s is widely seen as a watershed in the development of physicalism, in the sense that whereas logical behaviourism proposed analytic and a priori ascertainable identities between the meanings of mental and physical-behavioural concepts, the identity theory proposed synthetic and a posteriori knowable identities between mental and physical properties. While this watershed does exist, the standard account of it is misleading, as it is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  48. Mental Causation and Ontology.Sophie Gibb, E. J. Lowe & R. D. Ingthorsson (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Mental causation has been a hotly disputed topic in recent years, with reductive and non-reductive physicalists vying with each other and with dualists over how to accommodate, or else to challenge, two widely accepted metaphysical principles—the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and the principle of causal non-overdetermination—which together appear to support reductive physicalism, despite the latter’s lack of intuitive appeal. Current debate about these matters appears to have reached something of an impasse, prompting the question of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  49. Neo-Aristotelism, Identity Theory and Mental Causation.Erasmus Mayr - 2013 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 120 (1):109-116.
  50. Problems with Lewis' Argument for the Identity Theory.Michaelis Michael - 2013 - Ratio 26 (1):51-61.
    David Lewis presented a celebrated argument for the identity theory of mind. His argument has provided the model for the program of analytic functionalism. He argues from two premises, that mental states are analytically tied to their causal roles and that, contingently, there is never a need to explain any physical change by going outside the realm of the physical, to the conclusion that mental states are physical. I show that his argument is mistaken and that it trades on a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark