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  1. Chimpanzee Mind Reading: Don't Stop Believing.Kristin Andrews - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (1):e12394.
    Since the question “Do chimpanzees have a theory of mind?” was raised in 1978, scientists have attempted to answer it, and philosophers have attempted to clarify what the question means and whether it has been, or could be, answered. Mindreading or theory of mind refers to the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. Some versions of the question focus on whether chimpanzees engage in belief reasoning or can think about false belief, and chimpanzees have been given nonverbal versions (...)
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  2. Telling Stories Without Words.Kristin Andrews - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.
    In this review article of Dan Hutto's bok Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons, I argue that we can take a functional approach to FP that identifies it with the practice of explaining behaviour -- that is, we can understand folk psychology as having the purpose of explaining behaviour and promoting social cohesion by making others’ behaviour comprehensible, without thinking that this ability must be limited to those with linguistic abilities. One reason for thinking that language must (...)
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  3. Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation.Luca Barlassina & Robert M. Gordon - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mindreading (or folk psychology, Theory of Mind, mentalizing) is the capacity to represent and reason about others’ mental states. The Simulation Theory (ST) is one of the main approaches to mindreading. ST draws on the common-sense idea that we represent and reason about others’ mental states by putting ourselves in their shoes. More precisely, we typically arrive at representing others’ mental states by simulating their mental states in our own mind. This entry offers a detailed analysis of ST, considers theoretical (...)
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  4. Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind", by Ian Apperly. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (13).
  5. Mindreading in Adults: Evaluating Two-Systems Views.Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):673-688.
    A number of convergent recent findings with adults have been interpreted as evidence of the existence of two distinct systems for mindreading that draw on separate conceptual resources: one that is fast, automatic, and inflexible; and one that is slower, controlled, and flexible. The present article argues that these findings admit of a more parsimonious explanation. This is that there is a single set of concepts made available by a mindreading system that operates automatically where it can, but which frequently (...)
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  6. Pushmi-Pullyu Representations and Mindreading in Chimpanzees.Laura Danón - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):208-236.
    Lurz and Krachun propose a new experimental protocol designed to discriminate genuine mindreading animals from mere behavior-readers and to give evidence in favor of the claim that chimpanzees are capable of attributing internal goals to others. They suggest that chimpanzees' variety of "internal goal attribution" consists in attributing to others basic intentional representations, baptized by Millikan as "pushmi-pullyu representations". Now, Millikan distinguishes what I propose to call 'pure' PPs from more complex varieties of PPs, which allow their owners to respond (...)
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  7. Animal Mindreading and the Principle of Conservatism.Tyler K. Fagan - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):189-208.
    Skeptics about nonlinguistic mindreading often use an inferential rule of thumb—the principle of conservatism—to cast doubt on purported empirical evidence of mindreading abilities in nonlinguistic creatures. This principle, if warranted, would seem to count generally against explanatory hypotheses that posit nonlinguistic mindreading, instead favoring mere behavior-reading hypotheses. Using a test case from research with chimpanzees, I show that this principle is best understood as an appeal to parsimony; that, regardless of how one conceives of parsimony, the principle is unwarranted; and (...)
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  8. A Simple Explanation of Apparent Early Mindreading: Infants’ Sensitivity to Goals and Gaze Direction.Marco Fenici - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):497-515.
    According to a widely shared interpretation, research employing spontaneous-response false belief tasks demonstrates that infants as young as 15 months attribute (false) beliefs. In contrast with this conclusion, I advance an alternative reading of the empirical data. I argue that infants constantly form and update their expectations about others’ behaviour and that this ability extends in the course of development to reflect an appreciation of what others can and cannot see. These basic capacities account for infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false (...)
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  9. Social Cognitive Abilities in Infancy: Is Mindreading the Best Explanation?Marco Fenici - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (3):387-411.
    I discuss three arguments that have been advanced in support of the epistemic mentalist view, i.e., the view that infants' social cognitive abilities manifest a capacity to attribute beliefs. The argument from implicitness holds that SCAs already reflect the possession of an “implicit” and “rudimentary” capacity to attribute representational states. Against it, I note that SCAs are significantly limited, and have likely evolved to respond to contextual information in situated interaction with others. I challenge the argument from parsimony by claiming (...)
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  10. The Expressive Function of Folk Psychology.Victor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to present a challenge to the received view in folk psychology. According to this challenge, the semantic assumption behind the received view, which considers that propositional attitude ascriptions are descriptions of the internal causally efficacious states underlying behavior, cannot account for the main function of reasons in terms of mental states.
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  11. Autism: Beyond “Theory of Mind”.Uta Frith & Francesca Happé - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):115-132.
  12. Understanding the Immediacy of Other Minds.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Alois Pichler - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1305-1326.
    In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts of knowing other minds and traditional theory of mind approaches to the problem of other minds. We argue that the current formulations of the debate are conceptually misleading and empirically unfounded. Rather, the real contribution of PA is to point out a certain ‘immediacy’ that characterizes episodes of mindreading. We claim that while the intuition of immediacy should be preserved for explaining the nature and function of some cognitive (...)
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  13. Précis of "Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading".Alvin I. Goldman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):431-434.
    This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman's view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.
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  14. Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Alvin L. Goldman - 2008 - Oup Usa.
    People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts (...)
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  15. Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others.Grace Helton - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):243-264.
    I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the movie. I further (...)
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  16. The Misidentification Syndromes as Mindreading Disorders.William Hirstein - 2010 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 15 (1-3):233-260.
    The patient with Capgras’ syndrome claims that people very familiar to him have been replaced by impostors. I argue that this disorder is due to the destruction of a representation that the patient has of the mind of the familiar person. This creates the appearance of a familiar body and face, but without the familiar personality, beliefs, and thoughts. The posterior site of damage in Capgras’ is often reported to be the temporoparietal junction, an area that has a role in (...)
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  17. Limits on Theory of Mind Use in Adults.Boaz Keysar, Shuhong Lin & Dale J. Barr - 2003 - Cognition 89 (1):25-41.
  18. Pragmatics, Cognitive Flexibility and Autism Spectrum Disorders.Mikhail Kissine - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (1):1-28.
    Pragmatic deficits of persons with autism spectrum disorders [ASDs] are often traced back to a dysfunction in Theory of Mind. However, the exact nature of the link between pragmatics and mindreading in autism is unclear. Pragmatic deficits in ASDs are not homogenous: in particular, while inter-subjective dimensions are affected, some other pragmatic capacities seem to be relatively preserved. Moreover, failure on classical false-belief tasks stems from executive problems that go beyond belief attribution; false-belief tasks require taking an alternative perspective on (...)
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  19. Sprawozdania z przekonań w perspektywie filozofii języka i kognitywistyki.Karolina Krzyżanowska - 2010 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 75:297-319.
    Zdania o przekonaniach nurtują filozofów od samego początku filozofii analitycznej. Wszystkie próby ujęcia języka naturalnego w ramy kompozycyjnej semantyki muszą się zmierzyć z generowanymi przez sprawozdania z przekonań łamigłówkami. Obecne w tradycji filozoficznej teorie nie tylko borykają się z różnymi problemami, ale ponadto nie uwzględniają psychologicznych aspektów przypisywania przekonań innym. W artykule formułuję postulaty, które psychologicznie adekwatna teoria powinna uwzględniać, a następnie przybliżam pojęcie ikoniczności, które stało się osią teorii zaproponowanej przez François Recanati’ego. Chociaż Recanati stara się brać pod uwagę (...)
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  20. The Role of the Position Effect in Theory and Simulation.Anton Kühberger, Christoph Kogler, H. U. G. Angelika & Evelyne Mösl - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):610–625.
    We contribute to the empirical debate on whether we understand and predict mental states by using simulation (simulation theory) or by relying on a folk psychological theory (theory theory). To decide between these two fundamental positions, it has been argued that failure to predict other people's choices would be challenging evidence against the simulation view. We test the specific claim that people prefer the rightmost position in choosing among equally valued objects, and whether or not this position bias can be (...)
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  21. Visual Perspective-Taking and Schizotypy: Evidence for a Simulation-Based Account of Mentalizing in Normal Adults.Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart - 2001 - Cognition 82 (1):1-26.
  22. The Development of Mental State Attributions in Women with X-Monosomy, and the Role of Monoamine Oxidase B in the Sociocognitive Phenotype.K. Lawrence, A. Jones, L. Oreland, D. Spektor, W. Mandy, R. Campbell & D. Skuse - 2007 - Cognition 102 (1):84-100.
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  23. Bertram F. Malle, How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction.W. L. Lee - 2005 - Philosophy in Review 25 (4):276-278.
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  24. Does the Autistic Child Have a Metarepresentational Deficit?Susan R. Leekam & Josef Perner - 1991 - Cognition 40 (3):203-218.
  25. Pretending and Believing: Issues in the Theory of ToMM.Alan M. Leslie - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):211-238.
  26. Metarepresentation and Autism: How Not to Lose One's Marbles.Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith - 1987 - Cognition 27 (3):291-294.
  27. Domain Specificity in Conceptual Development: Neuropsychological Evidence From Autism.Alan M. Leslie & Laila Thaiss - 1992 - Cognition 43 (3):225-251.
  28. Do 10-Month-Old Infants Understand Others’ False Beliefs?Yuyan Luo - 2011 - Cognition 121 (3):289-298.
  29. If Chimpanzees Are Mindreaders, Could Behavioral Science Tell? Toward a Solution of the Logical Problem.Robert Lurz - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):305-328.
    There is a persistent methodological problem in primate mindreading research, dubbed the 'logical problem,' over how to determine experimentally whether chimpanzees are mindreaders or just clever behavior-readers of a certain sort. The problem has persisted long enough that some researchers have concluded that it is intractable. The logical problem, I argue, is tractable but only with experimental protocols that are fundamentally different from those that have been currently used or suggested. In the first section, I describe what the logical problem (...)
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  30. Bertram F. Malle, How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction Reviewed By.Wendy Lynne Lee - 2005 - Philosophy in Review 25 (4):276-278.
  31. Ecology, Domain Specificity, and the Origins of Theory of Mind: Is Competition the Catalyst?Derek E. Lyons & Laurie R. Santos - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (5):481–492.
  32. Attributions as Behavior Explanations: Toward a New Theory.Bertram Malle - manuscript
    Attribution theory has played a major role in social-psychological research. Unfortunately, the term attribution is ambiguous. According to one meaning, forming an attribution is making a dispositional (trait) inference from behavior; according to another meaning, forming an attribution is giving an explanation (especially of behavior). The focus of this paper is on the latter phenomenon of behavior explanations. In particular, I discuss a new theory of explanation that provides an alternative to classic attribution theory as it dominates the textbooks and (...)
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  33. Intentional Action in Folk Psychology.Bertram F. Malle - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell.
  34. Three Puzzles of Mindreading.Bertram F. Malle - 2005 - In B. Malle & S. Hodges (eds.), Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Gap Between Self and Others. Guilford Press. pp. 26--43.
  35. Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Social Cognition.Bertram F. Malle - 2003 - In [Book Chapter] (in Press).
    The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any particular conscious (...)
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  36. The Origins of Belief Representation: Monkeys Fail to Automatically Represent Others’ Beliefs.Alia Martin & Laurie R. Santos - 2014 - Cognition 130 (3):300-308.
  37. Mindreading Knowledge.Aidan McGlynn - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 72-94.
  38. Domain-General Contributions to Social Reasoning: Theory of Mind and Deontic Reasoning Re-Explored.M. C. McKinnon & M. Moscovitch - 2007 - Cognition 102 (2):179-218.
  39. Flexible Goal Attribution in Early Mindreading.John Michael & Wayne Christensen - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (2):219-227.
  40. Some Reflections on the Theory Theory - Simulation Theory Discussion.Ruth G. Millikan - 2005 - In Susan Hurley & Nick Chater (eds.), Perspectives on Imitation: From Mirror Neurons to Memes, Vol II. MIT Press.
  41. Matthew Ratcliffe, Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation.Mary Beth Morrissey - 2010 - Schutzian Research. A Yearbook of Lifeworldly Phenomenology and Qualitative Social Science:218-226.
  42. Folk Psychology Meets the Frame Problem.Dominic Murphy - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 32 (3):565-573.
  43. Factive and Nonfactive Mental State Attribution.Jennifer Nagel - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):525-544.
    Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, nonfactive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or falsehoods. Researchers of mental state attribution often draw a sharp line between the capacity to attribute accurate states of mind and the capacity to attribute inaccurate or “reality-incongruent” states of mind, such as false belief. This article argues that the contrast that really matters for mental state (...)
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  44. Mindreading and Verbal Communication.Anna Papafragou - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (1-2):55-67.
  45. Metacognition and Theory of Mind.Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca - 2008 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
  46. Understanding the Mind as an Active Information Processor: Do Young Children Have a “Copy Theory of Mind”?Josef Perner & Graham Davies - 1991 - Cognition 39 (1):51-69.
  47. Framing and the Theory-Simulation Controversy. Predicting People's Decisions.Josef Perner & Anton Kühberger - 2002 - Mind and Society 3 (2):65-80.
    We introduce a particular way of drawing the distinction between the use of theory and simulation in the prediction of people's decisions and describe an empirical method to test whether theory or simulation is used in a particular case. We demonstrate this method with two effects of decision making involving the choice between a safe option (take amount X) and a risky option (take double the amount X with probability 1/2). People's predictions of choice frequencies for trivial (€ 0.75) as (...)
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  48. Adaptive Modelling and Mindreading.Donald M. Peterson & Kevin J. Riggs - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (1):80–112.
    This paper sets out to give sufficient detail to the notion of mental simulation to allow an appraisal of its contribution to ‘mindreading’ in the context of the ‘false-belief tasks’ used in developmental psychology. We first describe the reasoning strategy of ‘modified derivation’, which supports counterfactual reasoning. We then give an analysis of the logical structure of the standard false-belief tasks. We then show how modified derivation can be used in a hybrid strategy for mindreading in these tasks. We then (...)
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  49. Two Epistemic Issues for a Narrative Argument Structure.Gilbert Plumer - 2018 - In Steve Oswald & Didier Maillat (eds.), Argumentation and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017, Vol. 1. London, UK: College Publcations. pp. 519-526.
    The transcendental approach to understanding narrative argument derives from the idea that for any believable fictional narrative, we can ask—what principles or generalizations would have to be true of human nature in order for the narrative to be believable? I address two key issues: whether only realistic or realist fictional narratives are believable, and how could it be established that we have an intuitive, mostly veridical grasp of human nature that grounds believability?
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  50. The Transcendental Argument of the Novel.Gilbert Plumer - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):148-167.
    Can fictional narration yield knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional? This is the hard question of literary cognitivism. It is unexceptional that knowledge can be gained from fictional literature in ways that are not dependent on its fictionality (e.g., the science in science fiction). Sometimes fictional narratives are taken to exhibit the structure of suppositional argument, sometimes analogical argument. Of course, neither structure is unique to narratives. The thesis of literary cognitivism would be supported if (...)
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