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Summary Minimalism or deflationism about truth is a view that rejects truth is a substantial property (whether of sentences, propositions, or entities of other sorts). In a typical minimalist formulation, to say that 'S' is true is equivalent to asserting S. Minimalism is attractive for its simplicity and lack of deep metaphysical commitments. Critics argue that it is too simple to answer fundamental questions about truth, for example: why is truth valued over falsehood? Minimalism may also be threatened by semantic paradoxes because it seems to require unqualified commitment to the equivalence principle "'S' is true iff S". 
Key works The deflationary theory of truth has its origin in Frege 1956, Ramsey 1927, and Ayer 1935. Contemporary expressions of deflationary truth include disquotationalism: Field 1994, McGee 1993, Quine 1970; minimalism: Horwich 1998 Horwich 1999 Horwich 1998 Horwich 2009 Horwich 2001 Horwich 2004; prosententialism: Grover et al 1975, Grover 1992, Brandom 1994, Brandom 2002
Introductions Armour-Garb 2012 and Armour-Garb 2012 present not only a general account of deflationism about truth but also the primary challenges such a theory faces from its critics. Armour-Garb & Beall 2005 includes several influential papers on deflationism about truth. For a helpful overview of deflationary accounts of truth, see Stoljar 2008
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  1. added 2020-05-26
    Methodological Deflationism and Semantic Theories.Adam C. Podlaskowski - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-8.
    Methodological deflationism is a policy about how we should conduct ourselves when it comes to theories of truth: in particular, a deflationary theory of truth should be taken as one’s starting point, and the notion of truth should be inflated only as necessary. This policy is motivated, in part, by the need to balance the theoretical virtue of parsimony with that of explanatory sufficiency. In this article, the case is made that the methodological deflationist is in no position to properly (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-18
    A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Dorothy Grover - 1992 - Princeton University Press.
    In a number of influential articles published since 1972, Dorothy Grover has developed the prosentential theory of truth. Brought together and published with a new introduction, these essays are even more impressive as a group than they were as single contributions to philosophy and linguistics. Denying that truth has an explanatory role, the prosentential theory does not address traditional truth issues like belief, meaning, and justification. Instead, it focuses on the grammatical role of the truth predicate and asserts that “it (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-18
    Inheritors and Paradox.Dorothy Grover - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (10):590-604.
  4. added 2020-05-01
    Disquotationalism and the Compositional Principles.Richard Kimberly Heck - forthcoming - In Carlo Nicolai (ed.), Modes of Truth: The Unified Approach to Modality, Truth, and Paradox.
    What Bar-On and Simmons call 'Conceptual Deflationism' is the thesis that truth is a 'thin' concept in the sense that it is not suited to play any explanatory role in our scientific theorizing. One obvious place it might play such a role is in semantics, so disquotationalists have been widely concerned to argued that 'compositional principles', such as -/- (C) A conjunction is true iff its conjuncts are true -/- are ultimately quite trivial and, more generally, that semantic theorists have (...)
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  5. added 2019-11-05
    Metasemantics, Moral Realism and Moral Doctrines.Christine Tiefensee - manuscript
    In this paper, I consider the relationship between Matthew Kramer’s moral realism as a moral doctrine and expressivism, understood as a distinctly non-representationalist metasemantics of moral vocabulary. More precisely, I argue that Kramer is right in stating that moral realism as a moral doctrine does not stand in conflict with expressivism. But I will also go further, submitting that advocates of moral realism as a moral doctrine must be expressivists in some shape or form. Accordingly, if you do not want (...)
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  6. added 2019-11-05
    Relaxing About Moral Truths.Christine Tiefensee - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    As with all other moral realists, so-called relaxed moral realists believe that there are moral truths. Unlike metaphysical moral realists, they do not take themselves to be defending a substantively metaphysical position when espousing this view, but to be putting forward a moral thesis from within moral discourse. In this paper, I employ minimalism about truth to examine whether or not there is a semantic analysis of the claim ‘There are moral truths’ which can support this moral interpretation of one (...)
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  7. added 2019-11-05
    Expressivism, Minimalism and Moral Doctrines.Christine Tiefensee - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Cambridge
    Quasi-realist expressivists have developed a growing liking for minimalism about truth. It has gone almost unnoticed, though, that minimalism also drives an anti-Archimedean movement which launches a direct attack on expressivists’ non-moral self-image by proclaiming that all metaethical positions are built on moral grounds. This interplay between expressivism, minimalism and anti-Archimedeanism makes for an intriguing metaethical encounter. As such, the first part of this dissertation examines expressivism’s marriage to minimalism and defends it against its critics. The second part then turns (...)
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  8. added 2019-11-04
    Saving Which Differences? Creeping Minimalism and Disagreement.Christine Tiefensee - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1905-1921.
    Much thought has been devoted to how metaethical disagreement between moral realism and expressivism can be saved once minimalism starts creeping. Very little thought has been given to how creeping minimalism affects error-theories’ disagreement with their metaethical competitors. The reason for this omission, I suspect, is found in the belief that whilst locating distinctive moral realist and expressivist positions within a minimalist landscape poses a severe challenge, no such difficulties are encountered when differentiating error-theories from moral realism and expressivism. In (...)
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  9. added 2019-11-04
    Error-Theory, Relaxation and Inferentialism.Christine Tiefensee - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 49-70.
    This contribution considers whether or not it is possible to devise a coherent form of external skepticism about the normative if we ‘relax’ about normative ontology by regarding claims about the existence of normative truths and properties themselves as normative. I answer this question in the positive: A coherent form of non-normative error-theories can be developed even against a relaxed background. However, this form no longer makes any reference to the alleged falsity of normative judgments, nor the non-existence of normative (...)
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  10. added 2019-11-04
    Inferentialist Metaethics, Bifurcations and Ontological Commitment.Christine Tiefensee - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2437-2459.
    According to recent suggestions within the global pragmatism discussion, metaethical debate must be fundamentally re-framed. Instead of carving out metaethical differences in representational terms, it has been argued that metaethics should be given an inferentialist footing. In this paper, I put inferentialist metaethics to the test by subjecting it to the following two criteria for success: Inferentialist metaethicists must be able to save the metaethical differences between moral realism and expressivism, and do so in a way that employs understandings of (...)
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  11. added 2019-11-04
    Expressivism, Anti-Archimedeanism and Supervenience.Christine Tiefensee - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (2):163-181.
    Metaethics is traditionally understood as a non-moral discipline that examines moral judgements from a standpoint outside of ethics. This orthodox understanding has recently come under pressure from anti-Archimedeans, such as Ronald Dworkin and Matthew Kramer, who proclaim that rather than assessing morality from an external perspective, metaethical theses are themselves substantive moral claims. In this paper, I scrutinise this anti-Archimedean challenge as applied to the metaethical position of expressivism. More precisely, I examine the claim that expressivists do not avoid moral (...)
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  12. added 2019-10-13
    Truth and Theories of Truth.Panu Raatikainen - forthcoming - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
    The concept of truth and competing philosophical theories on what truth amounts to have an important place in contemporary philosophy. The aim of this chapter is to give a synopsis of different theories of truth and the particular philosophical issues related to the concept of truth. The literature on this topic is vast, and we must necessarily be rather selective and very brief about complex questions of interpretation of various philosophers. The focus of the chapter is mainly on selected systematic (...)
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  13. added 2019-10-08
    Propositions, Representation, and Truth.Geoff Georgi - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1019-1043.
    Theories of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances are committed to the thesis that sentences or other representations true in all and only the same circumstances express the same proposition. Theories of propositions as complex, structured entities are not committed to this thesis. As a result, structured propositions can play a role in our theories of language and thought that sets of truth-supporting circumstances cannot play. To illustrate this difference, I sketch a theory of transparent, non-deflationary truth consistent with some (...)
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  14. added 2019-09-09
    Deflationism and Truthmaking.Matthew Simpson - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    This paper is about the relationship between truthmaking—one of the pillars of contemporary metaphysics—and deflationism about truth—one of the main contenders in the debate about truth, and a key component of the broad anti-metaphysical philosophical approach known as pragmatism. Many philosophers have argued that deflationism and truthmaking are incompatible or in conflict in some interesting way. Some take this to count against deflationism, others to count against truthmaking. In this paper I argue that deflationism and truthmaking are compatible in most (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    Pluralisms in Truth and Logic.Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.) - 2018 - Palgrave Macmillan.
  16. added 2019-06-06
    From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth‐Theoretic Fictionalism.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):93-118.
    We argue that if Stephen Yablo (2005) is right that philosophers of mathematics ought to endorse a fictionalist view of number-talk, then there is a compelling reason for deflationists about truth to endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk. More specifically, our claim will be that, for deflationists about truth, Yablo’s argument for mathematical fictionalism can be employed and mounted as an argument for truth-theoretic fictionalism.
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  17. added 2019-06-06
    Truth as One and Many. [REVIEW]Michael Horton - 2011 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):157-161.
  18. added 2019-06-06
    Toward a Modest Correspondence Theory of Truth: Predicates and Properties: Dialogue.Patricia Marino - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (1):81-102.
    ABSTRACT: Correspondence theories are frequently charged with being either implausible-metaphysically troubling and overly general-or trivial-collapsing into deflationism's "'P' is true iff P." Philip Kitcher argues for a "modest" correspondence theory, on which reference relations are causaI relations, but there is no general theory of denotation. In this article, I start by showing that, understood this way, "modest" theories are open to charges of triviality. I then offer a refinement of modesty, and take the first steps toward articulating a modest correspondence (...)
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  19. added 2019-06-06
    Review: From a Deflationary Point of View. [REVIEW]Marian David - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):427-434.
    The review of this collection is primarily concerned with essays pertaining to Horwich's deflationary approaches to truth and meaning.
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  20. added 2019-06-06
    Disquotationalism, Truth and Justification: The Pragmatist’s Wrong Turn.Karyn L. Freedman - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):371-386.
    Cheryl Misak argues that since disquotationalism cannot distinguish between different kinds of declarative sentences it cannot make sense of the disciplined nature of moral discourse. This apparent weakness is overcome by her pragmatist theory of truth, which reinflates truth by linking it to our everyday practices of justification and verification. In this paper I argue that the criticism that a deflated notion of truth cannot capture our justificatory practices has no purchase with someone who has no such aspirations for the (...)
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  21. added 2019-06-06
    The Modest Account of Truth Reconsidered: With a Postscript on Metaphysical Categories: Dialogue.Wolfgang Künne - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (3):563-596.
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  22. added 2019-06-06
    Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth and Objectivity. [REVIEW]Matti Eklund - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (2):288-292.
    The basic elements of this framework were elaborated upon and defended at some length in Wright’s Truth and Objectivity —henceforth, T&O—which was a marvelous book. The present volume of essays, almost all previously published and including some that predate T&O, continues to discuss the same themes, and is, in virtue of the significance of the ideas discussed and the high level of the discussion, likewise a very important work. The collection is divided into five parts: Realism Reconfigured, Replies to Critics, (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-06
    Minimal Realism or Realistic Minimalism.Michael P. Lynch - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189):512-518.
  24. added 2019-06-06
    What Horwich’s Minimal Theory of Truth Does Not Explain.Gary L. Hardcastle - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):135-146.
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  25. added 2019-05-01
    What is Deflationism About Truth?Matti Eklund - forthcoming - Synthese:1-15.
    What is deflationism about truth? There are many questions that can be raised about this, given the numerous different characterizations of deflationism in the literature. Here I attend to questions about the characterization of deflationism that arise when we carefully distinguish between issues pertaining to concepts and issues pertaining to properties.
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  26. added 2019-05-01
    Minimalism, Supervaluations and Fixed Points.Sergi Oms - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):139-153.
    In this paper I introduce Horwich’s deflationary theory of truth, called ‘Minimalism’, and I present his proposal of how to cope with the Liar Paradox. The proposal proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as a consequence of that, it needs a constructive specification of which instances of the T-schema are to be excluded from Minimalism. Horwich has presented, in an informal way, one construction that specifies the Minimalist theory. The main aim of the paper is to present and scrutinize some (...)
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  27. added 2019-05-01
    Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):1-21.
    In this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a ‘deflationary’ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflationary truth and deflationary truthmaking, and then show how the latter can be found in (...)
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  28. added 2019-05-01
    Truth-Predicates Still Not Like Pronouns: A Reply to Salis.Arvid Båve - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (5):1421-1429.
    I here respond to Pietro Salis’s objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth. In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and “general semantic notions” like “equivalence”, “consequence”, and “sameness of content”, and make some further points about ’s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of “true”.
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  29. added 2019-05-01
    Deflationism Beyond Arithmetic.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1045-1069.
    The conservativeness argument poses a dilemma to deflationism about truth, according to which a deflationist theory of truth must be conservative but no adequate theory of truth is conservative. The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that the appropriate formal setting for evaluating the conservativeness argument is provided not by theories of truth over arithmetic but by those over (...)
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  30. added 2019-05-01
    A Minimalist Explanation of Truth's Asymmetry.Julian Dodd - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):389-404.
    Suppose that Eleanor is drowsy. Truth's asymmetry is illustrated by the following fact: while we accept that <Eleanor is drowsy> is true because Eleanor is drowsy, we do not accept that Eleanor is drowsy because <Eleanor is drowsy> is true. This asymmetry requires an explanation, but it has been alleged, notably by David Liggins, that the minimalist about truth cannot provide one. This paper counteracts this pessimism by arguing that the minimalist can successfully explain the asymmetry conceptually, rather than metaphysically. (...)
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  31. added 2019-05-01
    Disquotation and Infinite Conjunctions.Thomas Schindler & Lavinia Picollo - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):899-928.
    One of the main logical functions of the truth predicate is to enable us to express so-called ‘infinite conjunctions’. Several authors claim that the truth predicate can serve this function only if it is fully disquotational, which leads to triviality in classical logic. As a consequence, many have concluded that classical logic should be rejected. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we consider two accounts available in the literature of what it means to express infinite conjunctions with a (...)
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  32. added 2019-05-01
    Making Sense of Deflationism From a Formal Perspective: Conservativity and Relative Interpretability.Andrea Strollo - 2018 - In Gabriele Pulcini & Mario Piazza (eds.), Truth, Existence and Explanation. Springer Verlag.
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  33. added 2019-05-01
    Knowledge, Lies and Vagueness : A Minimalist Treatment.Patrick Greenough - unknown
    Minimalism concerning truth is the view that that all there is to be said concerning truth is exhausted by a set of basic platitudes. In the first part of this thesis, I apply this methodology to the concept of knowledge. In so doing, I develop a model of inexact knowledge grounded in what I call minimal margin for error principles. From these basic principles, I derive the controversial result that epistemological internalism and internalism with respect to self-knowledge are untenable doctrines. (...)
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  34. added 2019-05-01
    Lessons on Truth From Kant.Gila Sher - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):171-201.
    Kant is known for having said relatively little about truth in Critique of Pure Reason. Nevertheless, there are important lessons to be learned from this work about truth, lessons that apply to the contemporary debate on the nature and structure of truth and its theory. In this paper I suggest two such lessons. The first lesson concerns the structure of a substantive theory of truth as contrasted with a deflationist theory; the second concerns the structure of a correspondence theory of (...)
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  35. added 2019-05-01
    Putnam’s Conception of Truth.Massimo Dell'Utri - 2016 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 12 (2):5-22.
    After stressing how the attempt to provide a plausible account of the connection between language and the world was one of Putnam’s constant preoccupations, this article describes the four stages his thinking about the concepts of truth and reality went through. Particular attention is paid to the kinds of problems that made him abandon each stage to enter the next. The analysis highlights how all the stages but one express a general non-epistemic stance towards truth and reality—the right stance, according (...)
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  36. added 2019-05-01
    Minimalism, Reference, and Paradoxes.Picollo Lavinia - 2016 - In The Logica Yearbook 2015.
    The aim of this paper is to provide a minimalist axiomatic theory of truth based on the notion of reference. To do this, we first give sound and arithmetically simple notions of reference, self-reference, and well-foundedness for the language of first-order arithmetic extended with a truth predicate; a task that has been so far elusive in the literature. Then, we use the new notions to restrict the T-schema to sentences that exhibit "safe" reference patterns, confirming the widely accepted but never (...)
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  37. added 2019-05-01
    Insolubles and Consequences : Essays in Honour of Stephen Read.Michael De (ed.) - 2012 - College Publications.
    An interesting question is whether deflationism about truth (and falsity) extends to related properties and relations on truthbearers. Lionel Shapiro (2011) answers affirmatively by arguing that a certain deflationism about truth is as plausible as an analogous version of deflationism about logical consequence. I argue that the argument fails on two counts. First, it trivializes to any relation between truthbearers, including substantive ones; in other words, his argument can be used to establish that deflationism about truth is as plausible as (...)
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  38. added 2019-05-01
    Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. [REVIEW]Dorothy Grover - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):706-711.
    Theories of Truth introduces readers to issues that have been connected with truth—the only book of its kind. Richard Kirkham has an easy writing style and a good sense of what needs to be explained to students new to the literature. These facts make Theories of Truth a serious contender for use in the classroom. As with most introductions, use of the book should be supplemented with readings from the major authors covered. Beyond that supplementation, however, the text still needs (...)
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  39. added 2019-05-01
    Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction.Richard L. Kirkham - 1992 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    Theories of Truth provides a clear, critical introduction to one of the most difficult areas of philosophy. It surveys all of the major philosophical theories of truth, presenting the crux of the issues involved at a level accessible to nonexperts yet in a manner sufficiently detailed and original to be of value to professional scholars. Kirkham's systematic treatment and meticulous explanations of terminology ensure that readers will come away from this book with a comprehensive general understanding of one of philosophy's (...)
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  40. added 2019-04-26
    Leon Horsten. The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2011, Xii + 157 Pp. [REVIEW]Martin Fischer - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (3):403-405.
  41. added 2019-04-26
    Horwich's Semantic Deflationism.Darragh Byrne - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):371-391.
  42. added 2019-03-22
    The Logical Strength of Compositional Principles.Richard Heck - 2018 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 59 (1):1-33.
    This paper investigates a set of issues connected with the so-called conservativeness argument against deflationism. Although I do not defend that argument, I think the discussion of it has raised some interesting questions about whether what I call “compositional principles,” such as “a conjunction is true iff its conjuncts are true,” have substantial content or are in some sense logically trivial. The paper presents a series of results that purport to show that the compositional principles for a first-order language, taken (...)
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  43. added 2019-03-19
    Review of Douglas Edwards, The Metaphysics of Truth. [REVIEW]Mark Jago - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):970–976.
    The Metaphysics of Truth, by EdwardsDouglas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 208.
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  44. added 2019-02-04
    Anaphoric Deflationism, Primitivism, and the Truth Property.Pietro Salis - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):117-134.
    Anaphoric deflationism is a prosententialist account of the use of “true.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: as pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their content from previously introduced sentences. This kind of deflationism concerning the use of “true” (especially in Brandom’s version) is an explanation in terms of anaphora; the prosentence depends anaphorically on the sentence providing its content. A relevant implication of this theory is that “true” (...)
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  45. added 2018-12-18
    Theorizing about truth outside of one’s own language.Graham Seth Moore - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):883-903.
    A theory of truth is language-transcendent if it ascribes truth conditions to truth-bearers that are not expressible in our natural language; a theory is language-immanent if it is not language-transcendent. In this paper, I argue for the following theses. Whether the correct theory of truth is language-transcendent or language-immanent will have significant consequences for general philosophy. Prima facie, a language-transcendent theory is preferable. However, language-transcendent theories tend to require substantive metaphysical commitments concerning truth. Deflationist theories are particularly interesting in this (...)
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  46. added 2018-12-03
    Conservative Deflationism?Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):535-549.
    Deflationists argue that ‘true’ is merely a logico-linguistic device for expressing blind ascriptions and infinite generalisations. For this reason, some authors have argued that deflationary truth must be conservative, i.e. that a deflationary theory of truth for a theory S must not entail sentences in S’s language that are not already entailed by S. However, it has been forcefully argued that any adequate theory of truth for S must be non-conservative and that, for this reason, truth cannot be deflationary :493–521, (...)
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  47. added 2018-10-25
    There is No Truth-Theory Like the Correspondence Theory.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2019 - Discusiones Filosóficas 20 (34):15–41.
    I challenge the assumption that the pragmatist-, coherence-, identity- and deflationary theories of truth are essentially incompatible and rival views to the correspondence theory, without endorsing pluralism. With the exception of some versions of the identity theory, the alternative theories only appear to genuinely contradict the correspondence theory, either when they are wedded to a rejection of an objective reality, or when it is assumed that a ‘theory of truth’ is a theory of the function of the truth-predicate. I argue (...)
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  48. added 2018-09-18
    A note on Horwich’s notion of grounding.Thomas Schindler - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2029-2038.
    Horwich proposes a solution to the liar paradox that relies on a particular notion of grounding—one that, unlike Kripke’s notion of grounding, does not invoke any “Tarski-style compositional principles”. In this short note, we will formalize Horwich’s construction and argue that his solution to the liar paradox does not justify certain generalizations about truth that he endorses. We argue that this situation is not resolved even if one appeals to the \-rule. In the final section, we briefly discuss how Horwich (...)
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  49. added 2018-09-06
    Realism, Inferential Semantics, and the Truth Norm.Nicholas Tebben - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    Characteristic of neo-pragmatism is a commitment to deflationism about semantic properties, and inferentialism about conceptual content. It is usually thought that deflationism undermines the distinction between realistic discourses and others, and that the neo-pragmatists, unlike the classical pragmatists, cannot recognize that truth is a norm of belief and inquiry. I argue, however, that the distinction between realistic discourses and others can be maintained even in the face of a commitment to deflationism, and that deflationists can recognize that truth is a (...)
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  50. added 2018-07-14
    Disagreement and the Normativity of Truth Beneath Cognitive Command.Filippo Ferrari - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Aberdeen
    This thesis engages with three topics and the relationships between them: (i) the phenomenon of disagreement (paradigmatically, where one person makes a claim and another denies it); (ii) the normative character of disagreements (the issue of whether, and in what sense, one of the parties is “at fault” for believing something that’s untrue); (iii) the issue of which theory of what truth is can best accommodate the norms relating belief and truth. People disagree about all sorts of things: about whether (...)
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