Minority Rights

The objective of this article is to consider how multiculturalism, minority rights, and nationbuilding have been defended by Will Kymlicka. For this purpose, I will first attempt to spell out the answers to the following questions: is it possible to defend minority rights in a liberal state? What is the problem regarding this defence of national minorities? Does anybody benefit from minority rights within a nationbuilding process? In order to find out the answer to these questions, I will first introduce (...) the main line of thought found in Will Kymlicka’s views on the defence of the rights of national minorities, the nationbuilding process, and multiculturalism. Later, I will reassess the views of Kymlicka in finding the ways to defend national minorities with the aim of providing support to the minority cultures. (shrink)

The article discusses the rights of minorities in the system of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It establishes a conceptual distinction between universal rights, specific rights of minorities in general and specific rights of particular minorities. Universal rights correspond to all individuals (e,g,, “no one shall be subjected to torture”) or all groups of a certain class (e.g., “all families are entitled to protection”). Minority groups and their members are entitled to these rights in the same way (...) as any other individual or group. Specific rights of minorities in general are granted to minority groups (e.g., “minority groups have the right to speak their own language”) or their members (e.g., “persons belonging to a minority group have the right to speak the language of the group”). Finally, specific rights of particular minorities are granted to specific groups identified by their characteristics (e.g., “the linguistic minority X has the right to speak the X language”) or their members (e.g., “any member of the linguistic minority X has the right to speak the X language”). Treaties and international declarations often refer to universal rights and specific rights of minorities in general. However, these rights are usually recognised in broad terms, and their implementation may lead to the recognition of specific rights in favour of particular minorities or their members. Protection of minorities (in the broad sense of the expression) is based on two pillars: on the one hand, the protection against discrimination; on the other hand, the protection of minorities in the strict sense. The first pillar is an aspect of the general principle of nondiscrimination and requires respect for both formal and substantive equalities. The protection of minorities in the strict sense involves the preservation of their particular identity. The purpose of the equality in a formal sense is achieved through universal rights, to the extent that these are granted to minority groups and their members. On the contrary, to achieve equality in a substantive sense, it could be necessary to implement positive measures. The implementation of these measures will usually lead to the recognition of specific rights of minority groups or their members. Finally, the protection of the distinctive characteristics of the minorities will also be done through specific rights. Thus, on the one hand, there are rights, which are intended to protect the minority forms of life (i.e. to protect differences), and, on the other hand, those that are intended to allow minorities equal access to different uniform social goods (i.e. to protect equality). Whereas the former ones seek to protect and promote the particularities of the minority culture (e.g., the right to receive education in their own language), the latter ones are recognised to overcome the disadvantages that minority groups and their members face and are not intended to promote peculiarities, but rather to permit equal access to resources and social opportunities. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights enshrines specific rights of minorities intended to protect and promote their own forms of life. Although economic rights are not mentioned (the article refers to the rights “to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, [and] to use their own language”), they may stem from the explicitly recognised rights. The rights recognised by the Covenant are not collective, but individual rights (“in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right [...]”). The rights recognised in the Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities are of the same nature. The principle of equality and non-discrimination is contained in Articles 2.1 and 26 of the Covenant. This principle forbids direct and indirect discrimination, be it de iure or de facto. As this is a universal right, minorities can also benefit from it. According to the Human Rights Committee, Article 27 imposes on States the adoption of positive measures that exceed an attitude of mere abstention. In the same way, positive measures may be necessary to make the principle of equality and non-discrimination effective. Although neither Article 27 nor Articles 2.1 and 26 refer to individuals belonging to a specific minority, the concrete implementation of these articles through positive measures may produce specific rights for persons belonging to particular minority groups. (shrink)

All major western countries today contain groups that differ in their religious beliefs, customary practices or ideas about the right way in which to live. How should public policy respond to this diversity? In this important new work, Brian Barry challenges the currently orthodox answer and develops a powerful restatement of an egalitarian liberalism for the twenty-first century. Until recently it was assumed without much question that cultural diversity could best be accommodated by leaving cultural minorities free to associate in (...) pursuit of their distinctive ends within the limits imposed by a common framework of laws. This solution is rejected by an influential school of political theorists, among whom some of the best known are William Galston, Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu Parekh, Charles Taylor and Iris Marion Young. According to them, this 'difference-blind' conception of liberal equality fails to deliver either liberty or equal treatment. In its place, they propose that the state should 'recognize' group identities, by granting groups exemptions from certain laws, publicly 'affirming' their value, and by providing them with special privileges or subsidies. In Culture and Equality, Barry offers an incisive critique of these arguments and suggests that theorists of multiculturism tend to misdiagnose the problems of minority groups. Often, these are not rooted in culture, and multiculturalist policies may actually stand in the way of universalistic measures that would be genuinely beneficial. (shrink)

When groups feature in political philosophy, it is usually in one of three contexts: the redressing of past or current injustices suffered by ethnic or cultural minorities; the nature and scope of group rights; and questions around how institutions are supposed to treat a certain specific identity/cultural/ethnic group. What is missing from these debates is a comprehensive analysis of groups as both agents and objects of social policies. While this has been subject to much scrutiny by sociologists and social psychologists, (...) it has received less attention from a normative and philosophical point of view. This volume asks: what problems are posed to political philosophy by a collection of individuals who act or are treated in a collective way? Focusing not only on ways in which institutions should treat groups, but also on the normative implications of considering groups as possible social agents, when acting either in vertical relations with the state or in horizontal relations with other groups (or individuals), this book explores these issues from both theoretical and practical perspectives, combining questions about the nature of groups, and their social and political impacts, with the particular, pressing considerations to which such groups give rise. (shrink)

Shvaćajući kulturni pluralizam kao činjenicu suvremenog liberalno demokratskog društva, uočava se njegova problematičnost u odnosu na same liberalno-demokratske ideje. Demokracija polazi od prava većine, a liberalizam polazi od pojedinca kojemu su osigurana temeljna prava i dužnosti zanemarujući činjenicu njegova mogućeg pripadanja manjinskoj kulturi. Može li se odgovor na zahtjev kulturne različitosti pronaći isključivo u teoriji ljudskih prava ili je potrebno dopustiti postavljanje posebnih prava za pripadnike različitih manjinskih kultura? Je li takva posebna prava dovode u pitanje ideal jednakosti koji se (...) oduvijek smatrao temeljem pravednih odnosa? Will Kymlicka, polazeći sa svog liberalnog stajališta, navodi kako jedna obuhvatna teorija pravednosti u multikulturalnom društvu treba uključivati i opća prava, koja su pripisana svim pojedincima bez obzira kojim skupinama pripadali, ali i određena grupno-diferencirana prava ili »specijalni status« za manjinska prava.Understanding cultural pluralism, as a fact of the modern liberal democratic societies, it is problematic regarding the very liberal democratic ideas. Democracy starts with the majority rule, and liberalism is based on the individual, whose basic rights and duties are ensured, disregarding the fact of possible belonging to a minority culture. Can the answer to the demand of cultural diversity be found exclusively in the human rights theory or must we allow the setup of special rights for the for the members of different minority cultures? Do such “special rights” question the ideal of equality that was always considered to be a base of justice? Will Kymlicka, starting from his liberal standpoint, states that a comprehensive theory of justice in multicultural society must include both the general rights ascribed to all individuals, regardless of which groups they belong to, and the specific group-differentiated rights or “special status” for minority rights. (shrink)

In this paper I present a logical analysis of minorities and minority rights. I consider the question whether the classic social contract of a liberal democracy can be extended to include minorities without significant alteration to the accepted agreement between the individual and the state. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.24(3) 2005: 153-175.

This paper considers normative questions about the integration of legally resident immigrants into contemporary liberal democratic states. First, I ask to what extent immigrants should enjoy the same rights as citizens and on what terms they should have access to citizenship itself. I defend two general principles: (1) differential treatment requires justi.cation; (2) the longer immigrants have lived in the receiving society, the stronger their claim to equal rights and eventually to full citizenship. Second, I explore additional forms of economic, (...) cultural, social, and political integration. I argue that the integration of immigrants depends upon a process of mutual, but asymmetrical adaptation and that it is precisely because the immigrants have to adapt more that the receiving society bears a greater responsibility to take steps to promote equality between the immigrants and the existing population. (shrink)

Minority rights law has been an important axis for the evolution of international law itself. While much has been written about minority rights regimes in Europe, there is very little information available with regards to Asian experiences. Countries in Asia, with their diverse populations, are struggling with constructing legal systems that will deliver on the promise of equal rights to all its citizens. This book evaluates these attempts in four Asian states: India, China, Malaysia and Singapore by examining the theory (...) and practice of minority rights law in these vastly different settings. (shrink)

J’aborde tout d’abord l’objection relativiste aux droits humains, afin de pouvoir ensuite me concentrer sur d’autres questions soulevées par la question des droits humains et des minorités culturelles. Le but de ma discussion est d’identifier et d’interroger les tensions potentielles entre minorités culturelles et droits humains, afin de montrer en quoi les droits humains peuvent protéger les minorités culturelles et, ultimement, de problématiser la manière dont cette protection peut se déployer. Dans ce but, je commence par clarifier deux notions-clés de (...) ce débat : les minorités culturelles et les droits différenciés selon l’appartenance à un groupe, en en proposant une typologie. J’examine ensuite dans quelle mesure les aspects collectiviste et particulariste des droits différenciés se trouvent ou non en tension respectivement avec les aspects individualiste et universaliste des droits humains. Prenant comme points de référence quelques droits humains particuliers, je me penche enfin sur la situation de certaines minorités culturelles dans les démocraties libérales occidentales pour dégager les conditions délibératives de la réalisation de ces droits humains. Au fil de ces trois sections, une de mes préoccupations est de mettre en lumière les enjeux méthodologiques qui sous-tendent ces différents débats et de montrer la nécessité d’adopter une approche améliorative. I first address the relativist challenge to human rights, so as to be able to focus next on other questions raised by the question of human rights and cultural minorities. The aim of my discussion is to identify and to question the potential tensions between cultural minorities and human rights, in order to show how human rights can protect cultural minorities, and ultimately to problematize the way in which this protection can take place. To that end, I start by clarifying two key notions in this debate : cultural minorities and group-differentiated rights, by proposing a typology. I then examine to what extent the collectivist and the particularist aspects of group-differentiated rights are in tension respectively with the individualist and the universalist aspects of human rights. Taking as reference points a few particular human rights, I turn, finally, to the situation of certain cultural minorities in western liberal democracies to draw out the deliberative conditions of the realization of those human rights. Throughout all three sections, one of my concerns is to shed light on the methodological stakes underlying those different debates and to show that we should adopt an ameliorative approach. (shrink)

The relations between the majority and minorities in a democracy have been standardly viewed as the main subject matter of toleration: the majority should refrain from using its dominant position to interfere with some minorities’ practices or beliefs despite its dislike or disapproval of such practices or beliefs. Can the idea of toleration provide us with the necessary resources to understand and respond to the problems arising out of majority/minorities relations in a democracy? We reply in the negative and make (...) two main claims: first, that resorting to toleration is not enough to make sense of the problems deriving from the unequal participation of minorities in society, and, second, that it risks sanctioning the asymmetric relation between the majority and minorities informed by the negative judgement of the former towards some belief or practice of the latter. We suggest resorting instead to the idea of equal opacity respect for persons: all persons should be treated equally as moral agents, in accordance with their equally possessing the capacity for self-legislation, and as if they were opaque to our judgement for all those properties of theirs which exceed moral agency. Looking at the majority/minorities relations through such a lens enables us to understand (and appropriately respond to) what is problematic in such relations: the majority often fails to treat minorities as moral agents by failing to take their voices into account on an equal footing, by seeing them merely as recipients of certain provisions affecting them rather than their authors, and by considering them as legitimately exposed to the majority’s (negative) judgment. The purchase of our argument is illustrated by reference to two minorities whose treatment is paradigmatic of the problematic nature of majority/minorities relations across Europe: Muslims and Roma. (shrink)

This study examines Will Kymlicka's liberal defense of minority rights. The startingpoint of his argument is provided by a particular conception of individual freedom, which stresses the need for a context of choice in which it can be exercised. This contextof choice is conceived of as a societal culture, i.e. as „an intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history”. As far as societal-cultural membership is constitutive for the freedom (...) and identity of the individuals, it can be considered as a Rawlsian primary good. Confronted with the fact of multinational and poly-ethnic States, thisconsideration involves the need for an equal distribution and protection of this good for all composing national or ethnic minorities. Group-differentiated measures thus are required by the liberal care for individual freedom and equality; but simultaneously they are limited by these very same principles. This point reveals the main difference with a communitarian approach to cultural politics. For the communitarian self being constituted by particular cultural characteristics, a politicsof the common good aims at securing the character of a culture rather than its existence as a societal culture. Therefore it is regulated by considerations of cultural preservation as such, not as required by the liberal principles of individual equality and freedom. (shrink)

El ensayo recontruye los diferentes conceptos de derechos humanos y de minorías. Centrándose luego sobre las minorías culturales, analiza las difíciles relaciones entre derechos humanos liberales y derechos culturales positivos.

Will Kymlicka ha sido considerado como compatibilizador de liberales y comunitaristas en cuanto a los derechos de las minorías. Su distinción entre derechos de grupo como protecciones externas y como restricciones internas buscó dar cuenta de las reivindicaciones minoritarias sin vulnerar el principio liberal de autonomía. En este artículo se buscan dos objetivos: primero, adoptar una perspectiva crítica, al afirmar que tal distinción soslaya el eje central de la discusión, esto es, la problemática de la titularidad del derecho, y, segundo, (...) proponer una nueva clasificación de los derechos aplicables a las minorías que sea capaz de servir de modelo para futuros diseños institucionales. Will Kymlicka has attempted to harmonize the positions of liberals and communitarians with respect to minority rights. His distinction between group rights as external protections and internal restrictions sought to account for minority vindications without violating the liberal principle of autonomy. The objective of this article is twofold: first, to adopt a critical perspective by arguing that said distinction avoids the core of the discussion, that is, the issue of ownership of rights, and, second, to proposed a new classification of rights applicable to minorities that can serve as a model for future institutional designs. Will Kymlicka tem sido considerado como compatibilizador de liberais e comunitaristas quanto aos direitos das minorias. Sua distinção entre direitos de grupo como proteções externas e como restrições internas pretendeu dar conta das reivindicações minoritárias sem vulnerar o princípio liberal de autonomia. Este artigo apresenta dois objetivos: primeiro, adotar uma perspectiva crítica ao afirmar que essa distinção elude o eixo central da discussão, isto é, a problemática da titularidade do direito; segundo, propor uma nova classificação dos direitos aplicáveis à s minorias que seja capaz de servir de modelo para futuros desenhos institucionais. (shrink)

This essay tackles the question of whether liberal political theory can remain neutral and grant minority cultural rights. It is argued that although consequentialist neutrality is impossible to implement, justificatory neutrality does allow certain benefits to be guaranteed to minorities as rights ? although not as many as most multiculturalists demand. Particular attention is paid to the demands of minority members of exemptions from general laws. The article gives examples of how and why certain exemptions or revisions of general laws (...) are not only permissible but also required from a liberal point of view. (shrink)

Will Kymlicka’s theory of minority rights has been most influential. Kymlicka distinguishes two types of ethnocultural minorities: national groups in a multinational state and ethnic groups in an immigrant society. This article focuses on the ‘multinational’ aspect of this paradigm. It investigates the extent to which Kymlicka’s justification of self-government rights for nations can offer a just guideline for the way in which we should accommodate cultural diversity generated by a plurality of national groups within one state. Should we regulate (...) the cultural and linguistic market-place, and, if so, should we justify a right for all nations to a distinct societal culture with its own political and territorial boundaries?The answer the article develops is a moderate ‘yes, but’. We should recognize and protect cultural identities, since, as Kymlicka rightly argues, cultures provide us with constitutive contexts of choice.But there seems to be an inability in Kymlicka’s theory to deal with strongly multinational and multilingual situations. Kymlicka explicitly recognizes the fact that national cultures can be pluralistic , but he neglects diversity within the cultural structure itself. Nevertheless, our cultural world is full of such instances of vague boundaries, gray zones, minorities within minorities, bi-and multilingualism, etc.Consequently, the article attempts to supplement Kymlicka’s mosaic form of multiculturalism with a hybrid extension. It is highly commendable to recognize and protect cultures, provided we incorporate cultural hybridity into our multicultural theory. (shrink)

Do minority groups have a right to the preservation of their language? I argue that the rights of groups are always reducible to the rights of individuals. In that case, the question whether minorities have a right to the preservation of their language is a question of whether individuals have a right to it. I argue that, in the only relevant sense of ‘right’, they do not. They may have an interest in the preservation of their language, but, if so, (...) that interest must be weighed against the costs of satisfying it, and, normally at least, we should expect that the costs will be quite out of proportion to the weight of the interests involved. (shrink)

Will Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship represents an extraordinary attempt to put applied political philosophy to work in the empirical context of contemporary political debates about immigration and ethnic minorities in western society. This paper explores the methodological and interpretative difficulties of combining normative and empirical goals, in a critical discussion of the examples Kymlicka makes of multicultural issues in France, Britain and the US. It goes on to argue that these weaknesses lie in the Rawlsian influence in Kymlicka's work, and that (...) political philosophers may have to rethink their methodological approach if they wish to pursue further the kind of applied work which Kymlicka is aiming for. (shrink)

Liberal theories of justice have often been unable to include the recognition of minority rights or of multiculturalism because of their emphasis on individuals. In contrast, recent theories of cultural recognition and minority rights have underestimated the tensions between group and individual rights. It is precisely the incorporation of past wrongs and their impact on present politics that can advance the liberal theory of justice for cultural minorities and their members.

Despite the declarations of international documents on minority language rights, provision is patchy for supporting minority languages in the UK, where since the 1980s governments have deliberately or unwittingly greatly raised the profile and comparative standing of English. The partial exception to this trend has been the treatment of indigenous/regional minority languages, stimulated by policies of devolution intended to revive or create a sense of national identity, and to redress perceived historic linguistic injustices. In a multicultural state or region these (...) apparently reasonable goals appear to conflict with current views of citizenship that argue for inclusiveness and equal treatment for all under the law. In particular, the question arises why indigenous minority languages should receive official support and funding that is denied to speakers of minority ethnic languages. In this article, I examine various justifications offered for this, including higher population levels, the geographical concentration of indigenous speakers, the long historical ties between regional language and culture, and the notion of promotional rights. I attempt to show each argument lacks force and ignores the fact of natural language change. I argue for an approach to indigenous languages that weights support and funding according to a range of factors including the number of minority speakers, their perceived need and the benefits that would flow from funding. Support from the local community and private sources could also be encouraged. (shrink)

Cet article se propose de situer le livre Situation de la France (2015) de Pierre Manent dans le débat contemporain sur la gestion de la diversité religieuse, et ce, à partir de deux principales thèses interprétatives. La première thèse est que le modèle de Manent s’appuie sur une forme de collectivisme méthodologique. La seconde thèse est que la place que Manent accorde au discours religieux dans la « conversation civique » est justifiée par une volonté de faire contrepoids à la (...) primauté qui est généralement accordée au discours des droits de la personne dans les sociétés libérales contemporaines. (shrink)

Depuis 2006, le Québec débat âprement des règles gouvernant la laïcité de ses institutions et se trouve confronté à deux modèles apparemment irréconciliables : le républicanisme « jacobin » et le libéralisme individualiste, issus respectivement de la France et du Canada. En s’inspirant de la pensée du philosophe politique John Rawls, les auteurs proposent ici d’explorer une voie médiane mieux adap­tée à l’expérience québécoise. Dans ses travaux tardifs, Rawls met en avant une forme de libéralisme républicain affranchi de l’indi­vidualisme normatif (...) de Kant et de Mill et récuse le paternalisme qui vise à imposer aux citoyens une certaine éthique de vie. Tout en étant neutre à l’égard des conceptions individualiste et com­munautarienne de la personne, il cherche à équilibrer les droits collectifs des peuples avec les droits individuels des personnes. -/- C’est donc une conception strictement institutionnelle de la laïcité que présentent les auteurs, qui redéfinissent au passage l’interculturalisme, la liberté rationnelle et le consentement, ainsi que l’expérience religieuse, qui devient hybride, à la fois subjective et objective. En se servant de Rawls, ils expliquent clairement pourquoi l’expression de la religion fait partie de la liberté reli­gieuse, mais aussi pourquoi il faut faire la distinction entre les objets qui relèvent des libertés fondamentales et ceux qui sont sujets à des accommodements. Ils tracent ainsi une authentique troisième voie, qui pourrait bien faire sortir de l’impasse le débat québécois sur la laïcité. (shrink)

Social groups claim authority to impose restrictions on their members that the state cannot. Churches, ethnic groups, minority nations, universities, social clubs, and families all regulate belief and behavior in ways that would be obviously unjust in the context of a state and its citizens. All religions impose doctrinal requirements; many also enforce sexist practices and customs. Some universities impose stringent speech and conduct codes on their students and faculty. Parochial schools discriminate in their hiring practices. Those who complain about (...) such internal restrictions on the liberties of members might well be told to “love it or leave it.”. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to discuss two recent attempts to incorporate groupdifferentiated rights and entitlements into a broadly liberal conception of distributive justice. The first is John Roemer’s “pragmatic theory of responsibility,” and the second is Will Kymlicka’s defense of minority rights in “multinational” states.1 Both arguments try to show that egalitarianism, far from requiring a “color-blind” system of institutions and laws that is insensitive to ethnic, linguistic or subcultural differences, may in fact mandate special types of rights, (...) entitlements, or compensatory arrangements for members of minority groups. These proposals are attractive because they attempt to ground these special rights without reference to controversial philosophical doctrines, but merely through appeal to the widely accepted political norm of equality. Furthermore, if either of these arguments were to succeed, it would allow liberals to avoid many of the difficulties that have often led proponents of “the politics of difference” or the “politics of recognition” to adopt an oppositional stance toward more traditional forms of liberalism.2.. (shrink)

Should states extend customized political protections to 'minority nations' or 'minority cultures'? Part of the answer depends on whether the identities at stake are merely political artifacts created or exploited by 'ethnic entrepreneurs', or whether they are 'authentic' expression of an ongoing collective life. This essay argues that the real character of groups is persistently difficult to recognize, and that 'authenticity' is a problematic notion even in the abstract. Given these uncertainties, the essay argues that states should generally treat only (...) the claims of small and vulnerable groups as moral issues, while treating the claims of large groups primarily as political matters. The essay closes with a discussion of the legal criteria for recognizing Indian tribes in the United States, arguing that the standards used are generally plausible, if problematic in one key detail. (shrink)