Modal Combinatorialism

Edited by Alastair Wilson (University of Birmingham, Oxford University)
About this topic
Summary This category covers a variety of approaches to modality, characterized by their including a principle of recombination whereby there is a possibility for each way of combining some elements.
Key works Skyrms 1981 develops a combinatorialism inspired by Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A principle of recombination is at the heart of Lewisian modal realism (Lewis 1986). Armstrong 1989 sets out a fictionalist combinatorialism with distinctive commitments, among them that there are no alien universals (i.e. universals not instantiated at the actual world).
Introductions Wilson 2015
Related categories

44 found
  1. A Theory of Possibility. [REVIEW]J. R. A. - 1977 - Review of Metaphysics 31 (2):329-330.
  2. Selection From A Combinational Theory of Possibility.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
  3. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.D. M. Armstrong - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
    David Armstrong's book is a contribution to the philosophical discussion about possible worlds. Taking Wittgenstein's Tractatus as his point of departure, Professor Armstrong argues that nonactual possibilities and possible worlds are recombinations of actually existing elements, and as such are useful fictions. There is an extended criticism of the alternative-possible-worlds approach championed by the American philosopher David Lewis. This major work will be read with interest by a wide range of philosophers.
  4. The Nature of Possibility.D. M. Armstrong - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (4):575 - 594.
  5. Combinatorialism Revisited.David Armstrong - 2004 - In .
    The object of this paper is to argue once again for the combinatorial account of possibility defended in earlier work. But there I failed fully to realise the dialectical advantages that accrue once one begins by assuming the hypothesis of logical atomism, the hypothesis that postulates simple particulars and simple universals at the bottom of the world. Logical atomism is, I incline to think, no better than ‘speculative cosmology’ as opposed to ‘analytic ontology’, to use Donald Williams’ terminology. It is, (...)
  6. Real Possibilities.John C. Bigelow - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (1):37 - 64.
  7. Possibility and Combinatorialism: Wittgenstein Versus Armstrong.Raymond Bradley - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):15 - 41.
  8. Plenitude of Possible Structures.Phillip Bricker - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (11):607-619.
    Which mathematical structures are possible, that is, instantiated by the concrete inhabitants of some possible world? Are there worlds with four-dimensional space? With infinite-dimensional space? Whence comes our knowledge of the possibility of structures? In this paper, I develop and defend a principle of plenitude according to which any mathematically natural generalization of possible structure is itself possible. I motivate the principle pragmatically by way of the role that logical possibility plays in our inquiry into the world.
  9. Recombination and Intrinsicality.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Ratio 21 (1):1–12.
    In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis ' principle of recombination presupposes warrant for a combinatorial analysis of intrinsicality, which in turn presupposes warrant for the principle of recombination. This, I claim, leads to a vicious circularity: warrant for neither doctrine can get off the ground.
  10. David Malet Armstrong (8 July 1926 – 13 May 2014).Keith Campbell - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):617-618.
  11. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.Gerard Casey - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 32:274-283.
  12. A Puzzle About Restricted Recombination in Modal Realism.Nicola Ciprotti - 2006 - In Paolo Valore (ed.), Topics on General and Formal Ontology. Polimetrica. pp. 281.
    This paper addresses a specific issue inherent to David Lewis’s conception of possible worlds, namely whether or not they are liable to being limited in size. The paper purports to show that, if a certain argument against unlimited worlds’ size is valid, then the way of countering it by means of positing an upper limit to size (as Lewis himself and John Divers have suggested) leads to a troublesome distortion of some modal phenomena, such as de re ascriptions of properties. (...)
  13. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.M. J. Cresswell & D. M. Armstrong - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):660.
  14. What is the Principle of Recombination?Tom Stoneham David Efird - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):483-494.
    In this paper, we give a precise characterization of the principle of recombination and argue that it need not be subject to any restrictions.
  15. Combinatorialism and the Possibility of Nothing.David Efird & Tom Stoneham - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):269 – 280.
    We argue that Armstrong's Combinatorialism allows for the possibility of nothing by giving a Combinatorial account of the empty world and show that such an account is consistent with the ontological and conceptual aims of the theory. We then suggest that the Combinatorialist should allow for this possibility given some methodological considerations. Consequently, rather than being 'spoils for the victor', as Armstrong maintains, deciding whether there might have been nothing helps to determine which metaphysics of modality is to be preferred.
  16. A Combinatorial Theory of Modality.Janne Hiipakka, Markku Keinänen & Anssi Korhonen - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):483 – 497.
    This paper explores the prospects of a combinatorial account of modality. We argue against David M. Armstrong’s version of combinatorialism, which seeks to do without modal primitives, on the grounds, among other things, that Armstrong’s basic ontological categories are themselves subject to non-contingent constraints on recombination. We outline an alternative version, which acknowledges the necessity of modal primitives, at the level of ontology, and not just of our concepts.
  17. Is There A Quasi-Mereological Account of Property Incompatibility?Javier Kalhat - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (2):115-133.
    Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility faces the obvious difficulty that not all universals are compatible. In this paper I develop three objections against Armstrong’s attempt to account for property incompatibilities. First, Armstrong’s account cannot handle incompatibilities holding among properties that are either simple, or that are complex but stand to one another in the relation of overlap rather than in the part/ whole relation. Secondly, at the heart of Armstrong’s account lies a notion of structural universals which, building on an (...)
  18. Possible Worlds and Armstrong's Combinatorialism.Jaegwon Kim - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (4):595 - 612.
  19. Le combinatorialisme et le réalisme nomologique sont-ils compatibles?Max Kistler - 2004 - In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), La Structure Du Monde. Vrin, Paris. pp. 199-221.
    English title: Are combinatorialism and nomological realism compatible?
  20. Armstrong on the Metaphysics of Modality: Two Dilemmas.Anssi Korhonen - 2008 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 84:153.
  21. Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility.David K. Lewis - 1992 - In Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 196-214.
  22. Grounds, Roots and Abysses.Roberto Loss - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):41-52.
    The aim of this study is to address the “Grounding Grounding Problem,” that is, the question as to what, if anything, grounds facts about grounding. I aim to show that, if a seemingly plausible principle of modal recombination between fundamental facts and the principle customarily called “Entailment” are assumed, it is possible to prove not only that grounding facts featuring fundamental, contingent grounds are derivative but also that either they are partially grounded in the grounds they feature or they are (...)
  23. Two Theories of Modality A Reply to von Wachter.Fraser MacBride - 2004 - Metaphysica 6:111-128.
  24. Could Armstrong Have Been a Universal?Fraser MacBride - 1999 - Mind 108 (431):471-501.
    There cannot be a reductive theory of modality constructed from the concepts of sparse particular and sparse universal. These concepts are suffused with modal notions. I seek to establish this conclusion by tracing out the pattern of modal entanglements in which these concepts are involved. In order to appreciate the structure of these entanglements a distinction must be drawn between the lower-order necessary connections in which particulars and universals apparently figure, and higher-order necesary connections. The former type of connection relates (...)
  25. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.Cynthia Macdonald - 1991 - Philosophical Books 32 (3):163-164.
  26. Distance and Discrete Space.K. Mcdaniel - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):157-162.
    Given Lewis’s views about recombination and spatial relations, there are possible worlds in which space is discrete and yet the Pythagorean theorem is true – contrary to the so-called Weyl-Tile argument that concluded that the Pythagorean theorem must fail if space is discrete.
  27. Modality and Anti-Metaphysics.Stephen K. McLeod - 2001 - Ashgate.
    Modality and Anti-Metaphysics critically examines the most prominent approaches to modality among analytic philosophers in the twentieth century, including essentialism. Defending both the project of metaphysics and the essentialist position that metaphysical modality is conceptually and ontologically primitive, Stephen McLeod argues that the logical positivists did not succeed in banishing metaphysical modality from their own theoretical apparatus and he offers an original defence of metaphysics against their advocacy of its elimination. -/- Seeking to assuage the sceptical worries which underlie modal (...)
  28. Possible Worlds.Christopher Menzel - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This article includes a basic overview of possible world semantics and a relatively comprehensive overview of three central philosophical conceptions of possible worlds: Concretism (represented chiefly by Lewis), Abstractionism (represented chiefly by Plantinga), and Combinatorialism (represented chiefly by Armstrong).
  29. Topological Aspects of Combinatorial Possibility.Thomas Mormann - 1997 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 5:75 - 92.
    The aim of this paper is to show that topology has a bearing on<br><br>combinatorial theories of possibility. The approach developed in this article is “mapping account” considering combinatorial worlds as mappings from individuals to properties. Topological structures are used to define constraints on the mappings thereby characterizing the “really possible” combinations. The mapping approach avoids the well-known incompatibility problems. Moreover, it is compatible with atomistic as well as with non-atomistic ontologies.It helps to elucidate the positions of logical atomism and monism (...)
  30. Some Problems with the Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.Howard Robinson - 1998 - Acta Analytica 21:147-161.
  31. Alien Individuals, Alien Universals, and Armstrong's Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.Susan Schneider - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):575-593.
    Armstrong's combinatorialism, in his own words, is the following project: "My central metaphysical hypothesis is that all there is is the world of space and time. It is this world which is to supply the actual elements for the totality of combinations. So what is proposed is a Naturalistic form of a combinatorial theory."2 Armstrong calls his central hypothesis "Naturalism." He intends his well−known theory of universals to satisfy this thesis. He now attempts to give a naturalistic theory of modality.
  32. Williamson's Many Necessary Existents.Theodore Sider - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):250-258.
    This note is to show that a well-known point about David Lewis’s (1986) modal realism applies to Timothy Williamson’s (1998; 2002) theory of necessary existents as well.1 Each theory, together with certain “recombination” principles, generates individuals too numerous to form a set. The simplest version of the argument comes from Daniel Nolan (1996).2 Assume the following recombination principle: for each cardinal number, ν, it’s possible that there exist ν nonsets. Then given Lewis’s modal realism it follows that there can be (...)
  33. Another Look at Armstrong's Combinatorialism.Theodore Sider - 2005 - Noûs 39 (4):679–695.
    The core idea of David Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility is attractive. Rearrangement is the key to modality; possible worlds result from scrambling bits and pieces of other possible worlds. Yet I encounter great difficulty when trying to formulate the theory rigorously, and my best attempts are vulnerable to counterexamples. The Leibnizian biconditionals relate possibility and necessity to possible world and true in.
  34. Logical Atoms and Combinatorial Possibility.Brian Skyrms - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (5):219-232.
  35. Tractarian Nominalism.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (2):199 - 206.
  36. Two Thoughts on "A Tale of Two Parts".Joshua Spencer - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):485-490.
    In “A Tale of Two Simples,” I presented an argument against the possibility of extended heterogeneous simples that relied on the possibility of extended atomic regions of space. Andrew Jaeger has presented a parody of one part of my argument for a clearly absurd conclusion. In this short paper, I defend my argument by showing that there is a significant disanalogy between my support for a key premise in my argument and Jaeger’s support for the corresponding premise in his parody (...)
  37. Combinatorialism and Primitive Modality.Holly Gail Thomas - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (3):231 - 252.
  38. The Principle of Recombination and the Principle of Distinctness: A Puzzle for Armstrong's Theory of Modality.Holly Gail Thomas - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):444 – 457.
  39. The Ontological Turn Misunderstood: How to Misunderstand David Armstrong’s Theory of Possibility.von Wachter Daniel - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (2):105-114.
    This article argues that there is a great divide between semantics and metaphysics. Much of what is called metaphysics today is still stuck in the linguistic turn. This is illustrated by showing how Fraser MacBride misunderstands David Armstrong's theory of modality.
  40. The Ontological Turn Misunderstood: How to Misunderstand David Armstrong's Theory of Possibility.Daniel von Wachter - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (2):105-114, http://epub.ub.uni-muen.
    This article argues that there is a great divide between semantics and metaphysics. Much of what is called metaphysics today is still stuck in the linguistic turn. This is illustrated by showing how Fraser MacBride misunderstands David Armstrong's theory of modality.
  41. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.David Weissman - 1991 - Review of Metaphysics 44 (3):614-617.
  42. Hume's Dictum and Metaphysical Modality: Lewis's Combinatorialism.Jessica M. Wilson - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell. pp. 138-158.
    Many contemporary philosophers accept Hume's Dictum, according to which there are no metaphysically necessary connections between distinct, intrinsically typed entities. Tacit in Lewis 's work is a potential motivation for HD, according to which one should accept HD as presupposed by the best account of the range of metaphysical possibilities---namely, a combinatorial account, applied to spatiotemporal fundamentalia. Here I elucidate and assess this Ludovician motivation for HD. After refining HD and surveying its key, recurrent role in Lewis ’s work, I (...)
  43. What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It?Jessica M. Wilson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.
    Hume's Dictum (HD) says, roughly and typically, that there are no metaphysically necessary connections between distinct, intrinsically typed, entities. HD plays an influential role in metaphysical debate, both in constructing theories and in assessing them. One should ask of such an influential thesis: why believe it? Proponents do not accept Hume's arguments for his dictum, nor do they provide their own; however, some have suggested either that HD is analytic or that it is synthetic a priori (that is: motivated by (...)
  44. Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.José L. Zalabardo - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    José L. Zalabardo puts forward a new interpretation of central ideas in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus concerning the structure of reality and our representations of it in thought and language. He presents the picture theory of propositional representation as Wittgenstein's solution to the problems that he had found in Bertrand Russell's theories of judgment. Zalabardo then attributes to Wittgenstein the view that facts and propositions are ultimate indivisible units, not the result of combining their constituents. This is Wittgenstein's solution to the (...)