Edited by Anand Vaidya (San Jose State University)
|Summary||Modal error is that area of modal epistemology where philosophers debate what the best explanation is for why a subject believes that a proposition is possible or necessary when in fact the proposition has the opposite modal valence. In the epistemology of modality it is important for one to be able to give a coherent account of why it is that we fall into modal error.|
|Key works||One key work in the area of modal error is Bealer 2004. In this work Bealer gives a complete account of modal error consistent with his own view of how we acquire knowledge of metaphysical modality. In addition, he discusses the view proposed in Yablo 1993. Other key works in this area are Van Inwagen 1998 and Hawke 2011.|
|Introductions||A key introduction is Vaidya 2007|
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