Edited by Alastair Wilson (University of Birmingham)
|Summary||According to modal non-cognitivism, the function of modal discourse is not descriptive but normative. At a first pass, the view is that to regard a proposition as necessary is to commit to holding it fixed in counterfactual reasoning. Accordingly, it may be denied that modal sentences are truth-apt. The view closely mirrors non-cognitivism in meta-ethics, and many of the same arguments can be applied in both moral and modal cases.|
|Key works||Modal non-cognitivism can be traced back to Hume 1738. Thomasson 2007, Blackburn 1993 and Price 1997 outline sophisticated contemporary versions of expressivism about modality.|
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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