Edited by Alastair Wilson (University of Birmingham, Oxford University)
|Summary||According to modal primitivism, the nature of modality is sui generis and cannot be explained in non-modal terms. This thesis is compatible with many different approaches to modality, since it does not constrain the connections between modality and other topics.|
|Key works||deRosset 2009 surveys non-reductive theories of modality, from a possible-worlds perspective. Forbes 1985 defends modalism, an influential form of primitivism which locates modality in primitive modal operators. Wang 2013 argues that combinatorialism is a version of primitivism.|
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