Modal Primitivism
Edited by Alastair Wilson (University of Birmingham)
About this topic
Summary | According to modal primitivism, the nature of modality is sui generis and cannot be explained in non-modal terms. This thesis is compatible with many different approaches to modality, since it does not constrain the connections between modality and other topics. |
Key works | deRosset 2009 surveys non-reductive theories of modality, from a possible-worlds perspective. Forbes 1985 defends modalism, an influential form of primitivism which locates modality in primitive modal operators. Wang 2013 argues that combinatorialism is a version of primitivism. |
Introductions | deRosset 2009 |
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Related categories
Siblings:
- Modal Combinatorialism (51)
- Modal Conventionalism (49)
- Modal Noncognitivism (21)
- Modal Realism (328)
- Theories of Modality, Misc (167)
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Editorial team
General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario) David Chalmers (ANU, NYU) Area Editors: David Bourget Gwen Bradford Berit Brogaard Margaret Cameron David Chalmers James Chase Rafael De Clercq Ezio Di Nucci Barry Hallen Hans Halvorson Jonathan Ichikawa Michelle Kosch Øystein Linnebo JeeLoo Liu Paul Livingston Brandon Look Manolo Martínez Matthew McGrath Michiru Nagatsu Susana Nuccetelli Giuseppe Primiero Jack Alan Reynolds Darrell P. Rowbottom Aleksandra Samonek Constantine Sandis Howard Sankey Jonathan Schaffer Thomas Senor Robin Smith Daniel Star Jussi Suikkanen Lynne Tirrell Aness Kim Webster Other editors Contact us Learn more about PhilPapers |