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  1. Desires, Magnitudes, and Orectic Penetration.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1175-1185.
    Dustin Stokes argues for the existence of orectic penetration, a phenomenon in which a desire-like state penetrates our perceptual experience. His candidate for a case of orectic penetration is the most convincing candidate presented thus far. It is argued here that his candidate and his further arguments for the existence of orectic penetration do not support the claim that orectic penetration takes place. As a result, it is concluded that there are no convincing cases of desire-like states penetrating perceptual experience.
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  2. Erratum To: Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):1149-1150.
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  3. Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1151-1172.
    The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experiences has been a long-standing topic of disagreement among philosophers and psychologists. Although the notion of cognitive penetrability itself has also been under dispute, the debate has mainly focused on the cases in which cognitive states allegedly penetrate perceptual experiences. This paper concerns the plausibility of two prominent cases. The first one originates from Susanna Siegel’s claim that perceptual experiences can represent natural kind properties. If this is true, then the concepts we possess change the (...)
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  4. What Do You See, and How? The Cognitive Infrastructure of Vision.Sunny Auyang - manuscript
    Seeing a rose or hearing the doorbell is among the most common and immediate of experiences. Sense perceptions are also most fundamental and important; on them base all our factual knowledge and empirical science. Does their epistemological priority stem from their being unanalyzable primitives given to us? Do they have structures? If so, what are the structures and where do they come from? The importance of these questions extends beyond psychology to the justification of all knowledge and science.
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  5. Vision: Early Psychological Processes.Patrick J. Bennett - 2002 - In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
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  6. Cognitive Penetrability of the Face Structural Encoding: Electrophysiological Evidence.S. Bentin & Y. Golland - 2002 - Cognition 86:1-14.
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  7. Theory-Ladenness of Perception Arguments.Michael A. Bishop - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:287 - 299.
    The first aim of this paper is to adduce a framework for understanding theory-ladenness of perception arguments. The second aim is to begin to assess an important cluster of theory-ladenness arguments-those that begin with some psychological phenomenon and conclude that scientific controversies are resolved without appeal to theory-neutral observations. Three of the arguments (from expectation effects, ambiguous figures, and inverting lenses) turn out to be either irrelevant to or subversive of theory-ladenness. And even if we grant the premises of the (...)
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  8. Is Low-Level Visual Experience Cognitively Penetrable?Dávid Bitter - 2014 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9 (1):1-26.
    Philosophers and psychologists alike have argued recently that relatively abstract beliefs or cognitive categories like those regarding race can influence the perceptual experience of relatively low-level visual features like color or lightness. Some of the proposed best empirical evidence for this claim comes from a series of experiments in which White faces were consistently judged as lighter than equiluminant Black faces, even for racially ambiguous faces that were labeled ‘White’ as opposed to ‘Black’ (Levin and Banaji 2006). The latter result (...)
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  9. Attention and Perceptual Adaptation.Ned Block & Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):205-206.
  10. Dissecting Vision in Early Science and Medicine.Robert Michael Brain & Kelly Joan Whitmer - 2009 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52 (3):448-453.
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  11. Perception is Theory Laden: The Naturalized Evidence and Philosophical Implications.William F. Brewer - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):121-138.
    This paper proposes a set of criteria for an appropriate experiment on the issue of the theory ladenness of perception. These criteria are used to select a number of experiments that use: belief-based ambiguous figures, fragmented figures, or memory color. Crucially, the data in experiments of this type are based on the participant’s qualitative visual experience. Across many different types of experimental designs, different types of stimuli, and different types of belief manipulation, these experiments show the impact of belief/theory on (...)
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  12. The Theory Ladenness of the Mental Processes Used in the Scientific Enterprise: Evidence From Cognitive Psychology and the History of Science. In R. W. Proctor & E. J. Capaldi (Eds.). Psychology of Science: Implicit and Explicit Processes (289-334). New York: Oxford University Press.William F. Brewer (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    This chapter takes a naturalized approach to the philosophy of science using evidence from cognitive psychology and from the history of science. It first describes the problem of the theory ladenness of perception. Then it provides a general top-down/bottom-up framework from cognitive psychology that is used to organize and evaluate the evidence for theory ladenness throughout the process of carrying out science (perception, attention, thinking, experimenting, memory, and communication). The chapter highlights both the facilitatory and inhibitory role of theory in (...)
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  13. The Theory-Ladenness of Observation and the Theory-Ladenness of the Rest of the Scientific Process.William F. Brewer & Bruce L. Lambert - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S176-S186.
    We use evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science to examine the issue of the theory-ladenness of perceptual observation. This evidence shows that perception is theory-laden, but that it is only strongly theory-laden when the perceptual evidence is ambiguous or degraded, or when it requires a difficult perceptual judgment. We argue that debates about the theory-ladenness issue have focused too narrowly on the issue of perceptual experience, and that a full account of the scientific process requires an examination (...)
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  14. Top-Down and Bottom-Up Influences on Observation: Evidence From Cognitive Psychology and the History of Science. In A. Raftopoulos (Ed.), Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Attention, Action, Strategies, and Bottom-Up Constraints.(Pp. 31-47).William F. Brewer & Lester Loschky (eds.) - 2004 - Nova Science Publishers.
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  15. Cognitive Penetration and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Robert Briscoe - 2015 - In Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter critically assesses recent arguments that acquiring the ability to categorize an object as belonging to a certain high-level kind can cause the relevant kind property to be represented in visual phenomenal content. The first two arguments, developed respectively by Susanna Siegel (2010) and Tim Bayne (2009), employ an essentially phenomenological methodology. The third argument, developed by William Fish (2013), by contrast, is supported by an array of psychophysical and neuroscientific findings. I argue that while none of these arguments (...)
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  16. Do Intentions for Action Penetrate Visual Experience?Robert Briscoe - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-2.
  17. Cognitive Penetrability and High‐Level Properties in Perception: Unrelated Phenomena?Berit Brogaard & Bartek Chomanski - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):469-486.
    There has been a recent surge in interest in two questions concerning the nature of perceptual experience; viz. the question of whether perceptual experience is sometimes cognitively penetrated and that of whether high-level properties are presented in perceptual experience. Only rarely have thinkers been concerned with the question of whether the two phenomena are interestingly related. Here we argue that the two phenomena are not related in any interesting way. We argue further that this lack of an interesting connection between (...)
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  18. Consciousness and Knowledge.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection with this core theme, including the (...)
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  19. On Perceptual Readiness.Jerome S. Bruner - 1957 - Psychological Review 64 (2):123-52.
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  20. Cognitive Penetration and the Cognition–Perception Interface.Daniel C. Burnston - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    I argue that discussions of cognitive penetration have been insufficiently clear about what distinguishes perception and cognition, and what kind of relationship between the two is supposed to be at stake in the debate. A strong reading, which is compatible with many characterizations of penetration, posits a highly specific and directed influence on perception. According to this view, which I call the “internal effect view” a cognitive state penetrates a perceptual process if the presence of the cognitive state causes a (...)
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  21. Perceptual Integration, Modularity, and Cognitive Penetration.Daniel C. Burnston & Jonathan Cohen - 2015 - In A. Raftopoulos & J. Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Influences on Perception: Implications for Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press.
  22. Insularity and the Persistence of Perceptual Illusion.Philip Cam - 1990 - Analysis 50 (October):231-5.
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  23. On Music Perception and Cognition: Modularity, Structure, and Processing. [REVIEW]Lelio Camilleri - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (4):365-377.
    The paper treats issues concerning the modular modelisation of musical mental processes. Some musical phenomena, like musical illusions, are explained in the framework of modularity and hypotheses are advanced in which the modular model seems very promising for the study of musical perception and cognition. In addition, arguments are proposed to distinguish between levels of abstraction and knowledge in musical cognitive processes.Moreover, some aspects about the theory of musical competence and the theory of musical processing are identified and the possibilities (...)
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  24. Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity.Ariel S. Cecchi - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):63-95.
    Cognitive penetration of perception, broadly understood, is the influence that the cognitive system has on a perceptual system. The paper shows a form of cognitive penetration in the visual system which I call ‘architectural’. Architectural cognitive penetration is the process whereby the behaviour or the structure of the perceptual system is influenced by the cognitive system, which consequently may have an impact on the content of the perceptual experience. I scrutinize a study in perceptual learning that provides empirical evidence that (...)
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  25. Visual Experience: Cognitive Penetrability and Indeterminacy.Alon Chasid - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):119-130.
    This paper discusses a counterexample to the thesis that visual experience is cognitively impenetrable. My central claim is that sometimes visual experience is influenced by the perceiver’s beliefs, rendering her experience’s representational content indeterminate. After discussing other examples of cognitive penetrability, I focus on a certain kind of visual experience— that is, an experience that occurs under radically nonstandard conditions—and show that it may have indeterminate content, particularly with respect to low-level properties such as colors and shapes. I then explain (...)
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  26. A Critique of Pure Vision.Patricia S. Churchland, V. S. Ramachandran & Terrence J. Sejnowski - 1993 - In Christof Koch & Joel L. David (eds.), Large-scale neuronal theories of the brain. MIT Press. pp. 23.
    Anydomainofscientificresearchhasitssustainingorthodoxy. Thatis, research on a problem, whether in astronomy, physics, or biology, is con- ducted against a backdrop of broadly shared assumptions. It is these as- sumptionsthatguideinquiryandprovidethecanonofwhatisreasonable-- of what "makes sense." And it is these shared assumptions that constitute a framework for the interpretation of research results. Research on the problem of how we see is likewise sustained by broadly shared assump- tions, where the current orthodoxy embraces the very general idea that the business of the visual system is to (...)
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  27. Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor.Paul M. Churchland - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):167-87.
    The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; to show that his views on impenetrability are almost certainly (...)
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  28. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.Paul M. Churchland - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
    The present essay is addressed simultaneously to two distinct audiences.
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  29. Automatic Mechanisms for Social Attention Are Culturally Penetrable.Adam S. Cohen, Joni Y. Sasaki, Tamsin C. German & Heejung S. Kim - 2015 - Cognitive Science 40 (4):n/a-n/a.
    Are mechanisms for social attention influenced by culture? Evidence that social attention is triggered automatically by bottom-up gaze cues and is uninfluenced by top-down verbal instructions may suggest it operates in the same way everywhere. Yet considerations from evolutionary and cultural psychology suggest that specific aspects of one's cultural background may have consequence for the way mechanisms for social attention develop and operate. In more interdependent cultures, the scope of social attention may be broader, focusing on more individuals and relations (...)
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  30. Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception.Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1407-1418.
    Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of being a wren. Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of being a wren. I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have (...)
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  31. Perceptual Learning and Cognitive Penetration (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Two).Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor - manuscript
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: Can perceptual experience be modified by reason?
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  32. Report on the Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop.Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor - manuscript
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York on March 19th and 20th, 2012: 1. What is perceptual learning? 2. Can perceptual experience be modified by reason? 3. How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology? 4. How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception? 5. How is perceptual learning coordinated with action?
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  33. Cognitive Penetration? (Network for Sensory Research Toronto Workshop on Perceptual Learning: Question Four).Kevin Connolly, John Donaldson, David M. Gray, Emily McWilliams, Sofia Ortiz-Hinojosa & David Suarez - manuscript
    This is an excerpt from a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from the workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of Toronto, Mississauga on May 10th and 11th, 2012. This excerpt explores the question: What counts as cognitive penetration?
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  34. Is Perception Inferential?William Cornwell - 2004 - In Johan Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: August 8-14, 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Vol. XII. Niederosterreichkultur. pp. 80-82.
  35. Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception.Robert Cowan - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject’s perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ their experience. On the (...)
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  36. What is the Point of Attempting to Make a Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception?Boris Crassini, Jack Broerse, R. H. Day, Christopher J. Best & W. A. Sparrow - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):372-373.
    We question the usefulness of Pylyshyn's dichotomy between cognitively penetrable and cognitively impenetrable mechanisms as the basis for his distinction between cognition and early vision. This dichotomy is comparable to others that have been proposed in psychology prompting disputes that by their very nature could not be resolved. This fate is inevitable for Pylyshyn's thesis because of its reliance on internal representations and their interpretation. What is more fruitful in relation to this issue is not a difficult dichotomy, but a (...)
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  37. Representing High-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience.Parker Crutchfield - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):279 - 294.
    High-level theory is the view that high-level properties?the property of being a dog, being a tiger, being an apple, being a pair of lips, etc.?can be represented in perceptual experience. Low-level theory denies this and claims that high-level properties are only represented at the level of perceptual judgment and are products of cognitive interpretation of low-level sensory information (color, shape, illumination). This paper discusses previous attempts to establish high-level theory, their weaknesses, and an argument for high-level theory that does not (...)
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  38. Phenomenal Contrast Without the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.O. Deroy - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162:87 - 107.
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  39. Object-Sensitivity Versus Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Ophelia Deroy - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):87-107.
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  40. Two Types of Theories: The Impact of Churchland's Perceptual Plasticity.P. DesAutels - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):25-33.
    In this paper I argue that because Churchland does not adequately address the distinction between high-level cognitive theories and low-level embodied theories, Churchland's claims for theory-laden perception lose their epistemological significance. I propose that Churchland and others debating the theory-ladenness of perception should distinguish carefully between two main ways in which perception is plastic: through modifying our high-level theories directly and through modifying our low-level theories using training experiences. This will require them to attend to two very different types of (...)
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  41. Linguistic Intuitions and Cognitive Penetrability.Michael Devitt - 2014 - Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9 (1).
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  42. The Effect of Line Segment Length on Oriented-Line-Target Detection in Early Vision.L. M. Doherty & D. H. Foster - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. pp. 1373-1373.
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  43. Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neuroscience Inform Philosophy? [REVIEW]Zoe Drayson - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8):242-249.
  44. Cognitive-Phenomenological Penetration.Marius Dumitru - 2014 - Hypothesis 1 (1).
    The study of the mind has to grapple with both the unconscious and the conscious. While the phenomenon of cognitive penetration has already been explored especially in connection to the modularity of perceptual and cognitive processes, the phenomenon of cognitive-phenomenological penetration, the penetration within the stream of consciousness of the phenomenological fabric of experiences by the phenomenology of thought, has not been given much attention thus far. In this paper, I focus with analytic-phenomenological methods on cognitive-phenomenological penetration as a phenomenon (...)
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  45. Indexing the World? Visual Tracking, Modularity, and the Perception–Cognition Interface.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):215-245.
    Research in vision science, developmental psychology, and the foundations of cognitive science has led some theorists to posit referential mechanisms similar to indices. This hypothesis has been framed within a Fodorian conception of the early vision module. The article shows that this conception is mistaken, for it cannot handle the ‘interface problem’—roughly, how indexing mechanisms relate to higher cognition and conceptual thought. As a result, I reject the inaccessibility of early vision to higher cognition and make some constructive remarks on (...)
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  46. No Reconstruction, No Impenetrability (at Least Not Much) A Commentary on ``Is Vision Continuous with Cognition?'' by Z. Pylyshyn.Shimon Edelman - unknown
    Two of the premises of the target paper -- surface reconstruction as the goal of early vision, and inaccessibility of intermediate stages in the process presumably leading to such reconstruction -- are questioned and found wanting.
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  47. No Reconstruction, No Impenetrability (at Least Not Much).Shimon Edelman - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):376-376.
    Two of the premises of Pylyshyn's target article – surface reconstruction as the goal of early vision and inaccessibility of intermediate stages in the process presumably leading to such reconstruction – are questioned and found wanting.
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  48. Theory-Laden Experience and Illusions.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2011 - Ethos: Felsefe ve Toplumsal Bilimlerde Diyaloglar 4 (2):58-67.
    The persistence of certain illusions has been used to argue that some theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. Learning that one of these illusions is an illusion involves accepting theories. Nevertheless, the illusion does not go away. It seems then that these theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. This paper contests an assumption of this argument: that the only way in which our perceptions can be affected by holding these theories is by the illusion going away.
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  49. The Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception: Old Wine in a New Bottle.Howard Egeth - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):377-377.
    Pylyshyn's argument is very similar to one made in the 1960s to the effect that vision may be influenced by spatial selective attention being directed to distinctive stimulus features, but not by mental set for meaning or membership in an ill-defined category. More recent work points to a special role for spatial attention in determining the contents of perception.
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  50. A New Look at the New Look: Perceptual Defense and Vigilance.Matthew H. Erdelyi - 1974 - Psychological Review 81 (1):1-25.
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