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Summary G. E. Moore first observed that assertive utterances of the form ‘p and I don’t believe that p’ and ‘p and I believe that not-p’ are “perfectly absurd or contradictory” and found it philosophically puzzling why they should be so. The puzzle arises from the following fact: Even though we treat such assertions and the beliefs they purport to express as on a par with the formally self-contradictory ‘p & not-p’, Moore’s propositions, unlike ‘p & not-p’, could be true and are not absurd when embedded in a conditional, or when transposed into the third person or past tense. Since Wittgenstein, who coined the term ‘Moore’s Paradox’, philosophers from many different perspectives have argued that properly resolving the puzzle (or, more precisely, family of puzzles) teaches us something important about the nature of assertions and beliefs – though they disagree about both what a proper resolution looks like and what the lessons are.
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  1. Moore's Paradox and the Transparency of Belief.Jonathan E. Adler & Bradley Armour-Garb - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
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  2. Comments on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge.Rogers Albritton - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):229-239.
  3. Pragmatic Paradoxes.Peter Alexander - 1950 - Mind 59 (236):536-538.
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  4. What Moore's Paradox Is About.Claudio Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33 - 58.
    On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which (...)
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  5. The Rationalism of Absurdity.Thomas C. Anderson - 1977 - Philosophy Today 21 (3):263-272.
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  6. Moore's Problem.Zilhão António - unknown
    Moore’s problem or Moore’s ‘paradox’ arises from the fact that consistent propositions of the form of and : It is raining but I believe it is not raining It is raining but I don’t believe it is raining strike us as being contradictory. Shoemaker explained this oddity by producing a proof that belief in such sentences is either inconsistent or self-refuting. For Sorensen many propositional attitudes have scopes smaller than the class of consistent propositions. Inaccessible consistent propositions are ‘blindspots’. Moore-propositions (...)
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  7. A Solution to Moore's Paradox.Lennart Åqvist - 1964 - Philosophical Studies 15 (1-2):1 - 5.
    Moore's paradox pits our intuitions about semantic oddness against the concept of truth-functional consistency. Most solutions to the problem proceed by explaining away our intuitions. But "consistency" is a theory-laden concept, having different contours in different semantic theories. Truth-functional consistency is appropriate only if the semantic theory we are using identifies meaning with truth-conditions. I argue that such a framework is not appropriate when it comes to analyzing epistemic modality. I show that a theory which accounts for a wide variety (...)
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  8. What Reflexive Pronouns Tell Us About Belief : A New Moore's Paradox de Se, Rationality, and Privileged Access.Jay David Atlas - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
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  9. Contradiction and Absurdity.K. Baier - 1954 - Analysis 15 (2):31 - 40.
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  10. The Normative Character of Belief.Thomas Baldwin - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
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  11. Avowals: Expression, Security, and Knowledge: Reply to Matthew Boyle, David Rosenthal, and Maura Tumulty. [REVIEW]Dorit Bar-On - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (1):47-63.
    In my reply to Boyle, Rosenthal, and Tumulty, I revisit my view of avowals’ security as a matter of a special immunity to error, their character as intentional expressive acts that employ self-ascriptive vehicles (without being grounded in self-beliefs), Moore’s paradox, the idea of expressing as contrasting with reporting and its connection to showing one’s mental state, and the ‘performance equivalence’ between avowals and other expressive acts.
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  12. Freedom, Rationality, and Paradox.Jonathan Barnes - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):545 - 565.
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  13. Dubious Objections From Iterated Conjunctions.Matthew A. Benton - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):355-358.
    The knowledge account of assertion - roughly: one should not assert what one does not know - can explain a variety of Moorean conjunctions, a fact often cited as evidence in its favor. David Sosa ("Dubious Assertions," Phil Studies, 2009) has objected that the account does not generalize satisfactorily, since it cannot explain the infelicity of certain iterated conjunctions without appealing to the controversial "KK" principle. This essay responds by showing how the knowledge account can handle such conjunctions without use (...)
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  14. Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion.Matthew A. Benton - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):684-687.
    The Knowledge Norm or Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) has received added support recently from data on prompting assertion (Turri 2010) and from a refinement suggesting that assertions ought to express knowledge (Turri 2011). This paper adds another argument from parenthetical positioning, and then argues that KAA’s unified explanation of some of the earliest data (from Moorean conjunctions) adduced in its favor recommends KAA over its rivals.
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  15. Saying and Disbelieving.Max Black - 1952 - Analysis 13 (2):25-33.
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  16. Metaphysics and Absurdity.H. Gene Blocker - 2012 - Upa.
    Blocker argues that the literary problem of absurdity is basically a metaphysical problem of being, focusing on the metaphysical distinction of being as essence and being as existence. This book compares philosophical prose with the fiction writing of four major absurdist writers—Camus, Sartre, Ionesco, and Beckett.
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  17. The Metaphysics of Absurdity.H. Gene Blocker - 1979
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  18. How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge.Rodrigo Borges - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (2):133-140.
    The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper (...)
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  19. [Double Quotes] P and I Will Believe That Not-P [Double Quotes]: Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief.Luc Bovens - 1995 - Mind 104 (416):737-760.
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  20. The Future Variant of Moore's Paradox.Luc Bovens - unknown
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  21. Nagel on Absurdity.H. Skott Brill - 1998 - Dissertation, Michigan State University
    Thomas Nagel, in three works that span two decades, sets forth his views on human absurdity. This dissertation critically examines these views and arrives at five general conclusions. ;The first concerns Nagel's criticisms of what he takes to be the "standard arguments for absurdity." In all, Nagel discusses four such arguments and offers what seem to be knock-down refutations of each. I argue, however, that upon reflection all of these refutations turn out to be wanting and, consequently, the so-called standard (...)
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  22. Justification and Moore's Paradox.A. Brueckner - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):264-266.
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  23. More on Justification and Moore's Paradox.Anthony Brueckner - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):497-499.
    In his , Williams offered a solution to Moore's paradox that centred on the concept of justification. Consider the omissive Moore-paradoxical sentence: p and I do not believe that p.Williams appealed to the principle Whatever justifies me in believing that p justifies me in believing that I believe that p.Suppose that I am justified in believing . Then I am justified in believing its first conjunct. By I am justified in believing that I believe that p. Since I am also (...)
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  24. Moore-Paradoxicality and the Principle of Charity.Anthony Brueckner - 2009 - Theoria 75 (3):245-247.
    In a recent article in Theoria , Hamid Vahid offered an explanation of the phenomenon of Moore-paradoxicality which employed Davidson's Principle of Charity regarding radical interpretation. I argue here that Vahid's explanation fails.
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  25. Justification and Moore's Paradox.Anthony Brueckner - 2006 - Analysis 66 (291):264–266.
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  26. Moore's Paradox and Partial Belief'.P. Castell - 1994 - European Review of Philosophy 1:45-53.
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  27. With and Without Absurdity: Moore, Magic and McTaggart's Cat.Peter Cave - 2011 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 68:125-149.
    Here is a tribute to humanity. When under dictatorial rule, with free speech much constrained, a young intellectual mimed; he mimed in a public square. He mimed a protest speech, a speech without words. People drew round to watch and listen; to watch the expressive gestures, the flicker of tongue, the mouthing lips; to listen to – silence. The authorities also watched and listened, but did nothing.
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  28. Introduction: Aiming at Truth.Timothy Chan - 2013 - In The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-16.
    In this introductory chapter to the volume The Aim of Belief, the editor surveys the fundamental questions in current debates surrounding the aim of belief, and identifies the major theoretical approaches. The main arguments of the ten contributions to the volume are outlined and located in the context of the existing literature.
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  29. Moore's Paradox is Not Just Another Pragmatic Paradox.Timothy Chan - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.
  30. Belief, Assertion and Moore's Paradox.Timothy Chan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395 - 414.
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA), the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions (...)
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  31. Belief, Assertion and Moore’s Paradox.Timothy Chan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395-414.
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore's Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief, the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion, the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions are absurd, (...)
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  32. Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):n/a-n/a.
    G.E. Moore noticed the oddity of statements like: “It's raining, but I don't believe it.” This oddity is often seen as analogous to the oddity of believing akratically, or believing what one believes one should not believe, and has been appealed to in denying the possibility of akratic belief. I describe a Belief Akratic's Paradox, analogous to Moore's paradox and centered on sentences such as: “I believe it's raining, but I shouldn't believe it.” I then defend the possibility of akratic (...)
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  33. Moore's Paradox and Moral Motivation.Michael Cholbi - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510.
    Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’). I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can be traced (...)
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  34. Pragmatic Paradox and Rationality.Ron Clark - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):229 - 242.
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  35. Mr. O'Connor's "Pragmatic Paradoxes".L. Jonathan Cohen - 1950 - Mind 59 (233):85-87.
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  36. How to Commit Moore’s Paradox.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (4):169-192.
    Moore’s paradox is taken to be emblematic of peculiarities in the first person point of view, and to have significant implications for several issues in epistemology, in philosophy of language and mind. Yet, its nature remains elusive. In the first part of the paper, the main kinds of analysis of it hereto proposed in the literature are criticized. Furthermore, it is claimed that there are cases in which its content can be legitimately judged. Close inspection of those cases reveals that (...)
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  37. Moore's Proof, Liberals, and Conservatives : Is There a (Wittgensteinian) Third Way?Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
    In the last few years there has been a resurgence of interest in Moore’s Proof of the existence of an external world, which is now often rendered as follows:1 (I) Here’s a hand (II) If there is a hand here, there is an external world Therefore (III) There is an external world The contemporary debate has been mostly triggered by Crispin Wright’s influential—conservative —“Facts and certainty” and further fostered by Jim Pryor’s recent—liberal—“What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”.2 This debate is worth (...)
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  38. Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Risk.Arthur W. Collins - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):308-319.
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  39. Racionalidade epistêmica e o Paradoxo de Moore.Cláudio de Almeida - 2009 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2):48-73.
    G. E. Moore identified a peculiar form of epistemic irrationality. Wittgenstein called it “Moore’s Paradox”. Neither of them knew exactly what he was talking about. And yet, the vast literature on the problem leaves no room for doubt: the paradox is deep; its resolution, elusive. But, up until now, we haven’t been in a position to appreciate its importance for contemporary epistemology. This paper puts forward an epistemological solution to the paradox. It also seeks to show that the paradox yields (...)
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  40. Moorean Absurdity : An Epistemological Analysis.Claudio de Almeida - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
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  41. What Moore's Paradox is About.Claudio de Almeida - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.
    On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore’s paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which (...)
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  42. Analogues of Knowability.David DeVidi & Tim Kenyon - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):481 – 495.
    An interesting recent reply to the Paradox of Knowability is Neil Tennant's proposal: to restrict the anti-realist's knowability thesis to truths the knowing of which is logically consistent. However, this proposal is egregiously ad hoc unless motivated by something other than the wish to save anti-realism from embarrassment. We examine Tennant's argument that his restriction is motivated by parallel considerations in cases that are neutral with respect to debates about realism. We conclude that the cases are not neutral, nor the (...)
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  43. Moore's Paradox, Asserting and Skepticism.Katheryn Doran - 1995 - Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):41-48.
  44. Assertion, Moore, and Bayes.Igor Douven - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361-375.
    It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. (...)
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  45. Absurdity, God and the Sad Chimps We Are.James DuBois - 2008 - Philosophy Now 66:14-17.
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  46. Trivalence and Absurdity.George Englebretsen - 1975 - Philosophical Papers 4 (2):121-128.
  47. Delusions, Self-Deception and Affective Influences on Belief-Formation.J. Fernandez & T. Bayne (eds.) - 2008 - Psychology Press.
    This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As pathologies of belief, delusions and self-deception raise many of the same challenges for those seeking to understand them. Are delusions and self-deception entirely distinct phenomena, or might some forms of self-deception also qualify as delusional? To what extent might models of self-deception and delusion share common factors? In what ways do affect and motivation enter into normal belief-formation, and how might they be implicated in self-deception and delusion? (...)
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  48. Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox.Jordi Fernández - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.
    I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore’s paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in (...)
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  49. On “It's Raining, But I Don't Believe It”.L. W. Forguson - 1968 - Theoria 34 (2):89-101.
  50. Thomason's Paradox for Belief, and Two Consequence Relations.Fraassen Bas C. Van - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):15 - 32.
    Thomason (1979/2010)'s argument against competence psychologism in semantics envisages a representation of a subject's competence as follows: he understands his own language in the sense that he can identify the semantic content of each of its sentences, which requires that the relation between expression and content be recursive. Then if the scientist constructs a theory that is meant to represent the body of the subject's beliefs, construed as assent to the content of the pertinent sentences, and that theory satisfies certain (...)
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