This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
About this topic
Summary G. E. Moore first observed that assertive utterances of the form ‘p and I don’t believe that p’ and ‘p and I believe that not-p’ are “perfectly absurd or contradictory” and found it philosophically puzzling why they should be so. The puzzle arises from the following fact: Even though we treat such assertions and the beliefs they purport to express as on a par with the formally self-contradictory ‘p & not-p’, Moore’s propositions, unlike ‘p & not-p’, could be true and are not absurd when embedded in a conditional, or when transposed into the third person or past tense. Since Wittgenstein, who coined the term ‘Moore’s Paradox’, philosophers from many different perspectives have argued that properly resolving the puzzle (or, more precisely, family of puzzles) teaches us something important about the nature of assertions and beliefs – though they disagree about both what a proper resolution looks like and what the lessons are.
Related categories

221 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 221
  1. added 2020-03-23
    Agency, Akrasia, and the Normative Environment.Gregory Antill - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):321-338.
    Just as the existence of practical akrasia has been treated as important evidence for the existence of our practical agency, the alleged absence of epistemic akrasia—cases in which a believer believes some proposition contrary to her considered judgments about what she has most reason to believe—has recently been marshaled as grounds for skepticism about the existence of similar forms of epistemic agency. In this paper, I defend the existence of epistemic agency against such objections. Rather than argue against the impossibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-03-06
    Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
    This paper argues that justification is accessible in the sense that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. I argue that the accessibility of justification is required for explaining what is wrong with believing Moorean conjunctions of the form, ‘p and I do not have justification to believe that p.’.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  3. added 2020-01-30
    Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion.Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper defends a new norm of assertion: Assert that p only if you are in a position to know that p. We test the norm by judging its performance in explaining three phenomena that appear jointly inexplicable at first: Moorean paradoxes, lottery propositions, and selfless assertions. The norm succeeds by tethering unassertability to unknowability while untethering belief from assertion. The PtK‐norm foregrounds the public nature of assertion as a practice that can be other‐regarding, allowing asserters to act in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-12-17
    Force, Content and the Varieties of Subject.Michael Schmitz - 2019 - Language and Communication 69:115-129.
    This paper argues that to account for group speech acts, we should adopt a representationalist account of mode / force. Individual and collective subjects do not only represent what they e.g. assert or order. By asserting or ordering they also indicate their theoretical or practical positions towards what they assert or order. The ‘Frege point’ cannot establish the received dichotomy of force and propositional content. On the contrary, only the representationalist account allows a satisfactory response to it. It also allows (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2019-11-20
    Representing Knowledge.Peter van Elswyk - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This essay is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented as knowing because their use of the declarative in a context tokens the act-type of assertion and assertions represent knowledge in what's asserted. I propose a semantic explanation on which declaratives covertly host a "know"-parenthetical. A speaker (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2019-06-06
    With and Without Absurdity: Moore, Magic and McTaggart's Cat: Peter Cave.Peter Cave - 2011 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 68:125-149.
    Here is a tribute to humanity. When under dictatorial rule, with free speech much constrained, a young intellectual mimed; he mimed in a public square. He mimed a protest speech, a speech without words. People drew round to watch and listen; to watch the expressive gestures, the flicker of tongue, the mouthing lips; to listen to – silence. The authorities also watched and listened, but did nothing.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2019-06-06
    Crimmins, Gonzales and Moore.Hajek Alan & Stoljar Daniel - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):208-213.
    Gonzales tells Mark Crimmins (1992) that Crimmins knows him under two guises, and that under his other guise Crimmins thinks him an idiot. Knowing his cleverness, but not knowing which guise he has in mind, Crimmins trusts Gonzales but does not know which of his beliefs to revise. He therefore asserts to Gonzales. (FBI) I falsely believe that you are an idiot.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  8. added 2019-06-06
    Shoemaker on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge.William S. Larkin - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 96 (3):239-252.
    Shoemaker argues that a satisfactory resolution of Moore's paradox requires a _self-intimation thesis that posits a "constitutive relation between belief and believing that one believes." He claims that such a thesis is needed to explain the crucial fact that the assent conditions for '_P' entail those for '_I believe that P'. This paper argues for an alternative resolution of Moore's paradox that provides for an adequate explanation of the crucial fact without relying on the kind of necessary connection between first (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. added 2019-06-06
    Moore’s Paradox, Asserting and Skepticism.Katheryn Doran - 1995 - Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):41-48.
  10. added 2019-06-06
    Moore's Paradox: Synonymous Expressions and Defining.B. H. Medlin - 1956 - Analysis 17 (6):125.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2019-05-27
    The Qubit.Ilexa Yardley - 2019
    Relative identity produces, because it is produced by, an uber-simple, always-conserved, circle. Zero, and one, is circumference, and diameter, literally, and figuratively. Explaining the metaphor. And, Nature.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2019-03-07
    Practical Moore Sentences.Matthew Mandelkern - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I discuss what I call practical Moore sentences: sentences like ‘You must close your door, but I don’t know whether you will’, which combine an order together with an avowal of agnosticism about whether the order will be obeyed. I show that practical Moore sentences are generally infelicitous. But this infelicity is surprising: it seems like there should be nothing wrong with giving someone an order while acknowledging that you do not know whether it will obeyed. I suggest that this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  13. added 2019-02-23
    Review of Meaning and the Growth of Understanding Wittgenstein's Significance for Developmental Psychology -- Chapman and Dixon Eds. (1987)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 209-224.
    Although now over 25 years old, many of the essays are quite contemporary. As expected, none of the authors grasp the full relevance of W for the description of behavior, missing most of the points made in my comments above, his many examples of how S1 becomes S2, his role as a pioneer in EP, and his attempts to separate nature from nurture. Brose has many good points and is aware of the foundational nature of On Certainty, but is too (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2019-02-09
    Disappearing Diamonds: Fitch-Like Results in Bimodal Logic.Weng San - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1003-1016.
    Augment the propositional language with two modal operators: □ and ■. Define ⧫ to be the dual of ■, i.e. ⧫=¬■¬. Whenever (X) is of the form φ → ψ, let (X⧫) be φ→⧫ψ . (X⧫) can be thought of as the modally qualified counterpart of (X)—for instance, under the metaphysical interpretation of ⧫, where (X) says φ implies ψ, (X⧫) says φ implies possibly ψ. This paper shows that for various interesting instances of (X), fairly weak assumptions suffice for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. added 2018-11-15
    Inferring by Attaching Force.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):701-714.
    The paper offers an account of inference. The account underwrites the idea that inference requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion. I reject views according to which such ‘takings’ are intuitions or beliefs. I sketch an alternative view on which inferring consists in attaching what I call ‘inferential force’ to a structured collection of contents.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. added 2018-10-11
    Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    If I were to say, “Agnes does not know that it is raining, but it is,” this seems like a perfectly coherent way of describing Agnes’s epistemic position. If I were to add, “And I don’t know if it is, either,” this seems quite strange. In this chapter, we shall look at some statements that seem, in some sense, contradictory, even though it seems that these statements can express propositions that are contingently true or false. Moore thought it was paradoxical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2018-10-11
    Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
    KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations has recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know it, p’. Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18. added 2018-09-06
    Suspicious Minds: Coliva on Moore’s Paradox and Commitment.Aidan McGlynn - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):313-322.
  19. added 2018-09-06
    Self-Intimation, Infallibility, and Higher-Order Evidence.Eyal Tal - 2018 - Erkenntnis:1-8.
    The Self-Intimation thesis has it that whatever justificatory status a proposition has, i.e., whether or not we are justified in believing it, we are justified in believing that it has that status. The Infallibility thesis has it that whatever justificatory status we are justified in believing that a proposition has, the proposition in fact has that status. Jointly, Self-Intimation and Infallibility imply that the justificatory status of a proposition closely aligns with the justification we have about that justificatory status. Self-Intimation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. added 2018-07-18
    Colivan Commitment, Vis-À-Vis Moore’s Paradox.Ted Parent - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):323-333.
    This is a contribution to a symposium on Annalisa Coliva's book _The Varieties of Self-Knowledge_. I present her notion of a "commitment" and how it is used in her treatment of Moore paradoxical assertions and thoughts (e.g., "I believe that it is raining, but it is not;" "It is raining but I do not believe that it is"). The final section notes the points of convergence between her constitutivism about self-knowledge of commitments, and the constitutivism from my book _Self-Reflection for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2018-04-28
    Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (2):96-130.
    In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard’s version of non-epistemicism, hinge commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge commitments. One of the main reasons in favour of NBT (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. added 2018-04-10
    A Commitment-Theoretic Account of Moore's Paradox.Jack Woods - forthcoming - In An Atlas of Meaning: Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface).
    Moore’s paradox, the infamous felt bizarreness of sincerely uttering something of the form “I believe grass is green, but it ain’t”—has attracted a lot of attention since its original discovery (Moore 1942). It is often taken to be a paradox of belief—in the sense that the locus of the inconsistency is the beliefs of someone who so sincerely utters. This claim has been labeled as the priority thesis: If you have an explanation of why a putative content could not be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2018-01-20
    If You Believe You Believe, You Believe. A Constitutive Account of Knowledge of One’s Own Beliefs.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Logos and Episteme:389-416.
    Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2017-08-16
    Replies to Beck, Chirimuuta, Rosenhagen, Smithies, and Springle.Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1).
    Replies to commentaries on "Can experiences be rational?", forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2017-02-15
    Eliminativism, Williams' Principle and Evans' Principle.John N. Williams - unknown
  26. added 2017-01-25
    Educating for Absurdity.L. Stone - 2006 - Journal of Thought 41 (3):67.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2017-01-22
    Absurdity, God and the Sad Chimps We Are.James DuBois - 2008 - Philosophy Now 66:14-17.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2017-01-22
    Freedom, Rationality, and Paradox.Jonathan Barnes - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):545 - 565.
    Any organised society needs some method for determining common policy: public decisions must be forged from private preferences, and particular interests must find a reconciliation in the general good. A society is tolerable only if its decisions are reached by a rational path; for, just as a reasonable man decides his private life on the basis of reasonable procedures, so a reasonable society must formulate its communal behaviour on the basis of reasonable principles. If the Principle of Rationality is violated, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. added 2017-01-22
    Contradiction and Absurdity.K. Baier - 1954 - Analysis 15 (2):31 - 40.
  30. added 2017-01-21
    The Irrational in Politics.G. S. Pomerants - 1993 - Russian Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):6-15.
    In the sixties I attempted to comprehend the Zen paradox: 1,400 years of handing down a tradition through absurd statements. I had to construct a theory of the absurd. It led me to the conclusion that not only connections among words could be absurd ; connections among objects themselves could also be absurd. God hung on the cross seemed an absurdity. The Apostle Paul acutely felt this absurdity, and later Tertullian felt it even more acutely. A thousand years later, for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2017-01-21
    Concerning the Absurdity of Life.Quentin Smith - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (255):119 - 121.
  32. added 2017-01-21
    Some Paradoxes of Counterprivacy.André Gombay - 1988 - Philosophy 63 (244):191 - 210.
    For many years G. E. Moore asked himself what was wrong with sentences like ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I don't believe that I did’, or ‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’. He discussed the problem in 1912 in his Ethics , and was still discussing it in 1944 in a paper to the Moral Sciences Club at Cambridge—an event we know about from a letter of Wittgenstein that I shall quote in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  33. added 2017-01-21
    Trivalence and Absurdity.George Englebretsen - 1975 - Philosophical Papers 4 (2):121-128.
  34. added 2017-01-21
    On “It's Raining, But I Don't Believe It”.L. W. Forguson - 1968 - Theoria 34 (2):89-101.
  35. added 2017-01-20
    Moore's Proof, Liberals, and Conservatives : Is There a (Wittgensteinian) Third Way?Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
    In the last few years there has been a resurgence of interest in Moore’s Proof of the existence of an external world, which is now often rendered as follows:1 (I) Here’s a hand (II) If there is a hand here, there is an external world Therefore (III) There is an external world The contemporary debate has been mostly triggered by Crispin Wright’s influential—conservative —“Facts and certainty” and further fostered by Jim Pryor’s recent—liberal—“What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”.2 This debate is worth (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  36. added 2017-01-19
    The Absurdity of Life.Steven Luper - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:1-17.
  37. added 2017-01-18
    Transcending Absurdity.Joe Mintoff - 2008 - Ratio 21 (1):64–84.
    Many of us experience the activities which fill our everyday lives as meaningful, and to do so we must (and do) hold them to be important. However, reflection undercuts this confidence: our activities are aimed at ends which are arbitrary, in that we have reason to regard our taking them so seriously as lacking justification; they are comparatively insignificant; and they leave little of any real permanence. Even though we take our activities seriously, and our everyday lives to be important, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  38. added 2017-01-18
    How Does Knowledge Start? A Reply to Pamela Moore.D. W. Hamlyn - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 15 (1):137–137.
  39. added 2017-01-18
    Absurdity and Types.Douglas Odegard - 1966 - Mind 75 (297):97-113.
  40. added 2017-01-18
    Is "Why Should I Be Moral?" An Absurdity?Kai Nielsen - 1958 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):25 – 32.
  41. added 2017-01-17
    Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):445-464.
    Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief isnormative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. added 2017-01-17
    Moore's Paradox and First Person Authority.Severin Schroeder - unknown
    This paper explores Wittgenstein's attempts to explain the peculiarities of the first-person use of 'believe' that manifest themselves in Moore's paradox, discussed in Philosophical Investigations, Part II, section x. An utterance of the form 'p and I do not believe that p' is a kind of contradiction, for the second conjunct is not, as it might appear, just a description of my mental state, but an expression of my belief that not-p, contradicting the preceding expression of my belief that p. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. added 2017-01-16
    2. On Moore’s Paradox.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 21-25.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. added 2017-01-16
    Gareth Moore's Radical Wittgensteinianism.Howard Robinson - 2003 - New Blackfriars 84 (989-990):353-360.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2017-01-15
    How to Commit Moore’s Paradox.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (4):169-192.
    Moore’s paradox is taken to be emblematic of peculiarities in the first person point of view, and to have significant implications for several issues in epistemology, in philosophy of language and mind. Yet, its nature remains elusive. In the first part of the paper, the main kinds of analysis of it hereto proposed in the literature are criticized. Furthermore, it is claimed that there are cases in which its content can be legitimately judged. Close inspection of those cases reveals that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  46. added 2017-01-15
    Belief, Assertion and Moore’s Paradox.Timothy Chan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395-414.
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore's Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief, the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion, the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions are absurd, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2017-01-15
    Justification and Moore's Paradox.A. Brueckner - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):264-266.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  48. added 2017-01-15
    In Defence of an Argument for Evans's Principle: A Rejoinder to Vahid.John N. Williams - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):167-170.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  49. added 2017-01-15
    Moore's Paradox and Evans's Principle: A Reply to Williams.H. Vahid - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):337-341.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  50. added 2017-01-15
    Moore's Paradoxes, Evans's Principle and Self-Knowledge.John N. Williams - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):348-353.
    I supply an argument for Evans's principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore's paradoxes.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
1 — 50 / 221