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  1. Practical Wisdom: A Virtue for Resolving Conflicts Among Practical Reasons.Andres Luco - 2017 - In Noell Birondo & S. Stewart Braun (eds.), Virtue's Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons. New York, NY, USA: pp. 147 - 167.
    Normative reasons for action are facts or considerations that contribute to the justification of an action. Sometimes, normative reasons for action conflict: one reason may favor doing something, while another may favor not doing it. These conflicts can be so radical that it seems difficult, if not impossible, to judge which reason should ultimately guide one’s actions. According to a theory of practical rationality known as reasons pluralism, there are some radical cases of conflict among normative reasons for action in (...)
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  2. Moral Pickles, Moral Dilemmas, and the Obligation Preface Paradox.Daniel Immerman - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    This paper introduces and defends a new position regarding the question of whether it is possible to have conflicting moral obligations. In doing so, it focuses on what I call a moral pickle. By “moral pickle” I mean a set of actions such that you ought to perform each and cannot perform all. Typically, when people discuss conflicting moral obligations, they focus on the notion of a moral dilemma, which is a type of moral pickle involving two conflicting actions. In (...)
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  3. When Will a Consequentialist Push You in Front of a Trolley?Scott Woodcock - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):299-316.
    As the trolley problem runs its course, consequentialists tend to adopt one of two strategies: silently take comfort in the fact that deontological rivals face their own enduring difficulties, or appeal to cognitive psychology to discredit the deontological intuitions on which the trolley problem depends. I refer to the first strategy as silent schadenfreude and the second as debunking attack. My aim in this paper is to argue that consequentialists ought to reject both strategies and instead opt for what I (...)
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  4. Modeling Parity and Incomparability.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2004 - In .
  5. Does It Matter Who is Driving the Trolley?Matej Sušnik - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (1):49-63.
    Contemporary defenses of the doctrine of double effect are mainly focused on avoiding the absurdity charge raised by Judith Thomson (). There are two strategies proposed in the literature for refuting Thomson's argument. In this paper I argue that answering Thomson's challenge comes at a heavy price: while both versions of the DDE that are developed within these two strategies successfully avoid the absurdity charge, they also remain incomplete. Thomson's argument reveals that the proponents of the DDE can at best (...)
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  6. Is A Purely First Person Account Of Human Action Defensible?Christopher Tollefsen - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (4):441-460.
    There are two perspectives available from which to understand an agent's intention in acting. The first is the perspective of the acting agent: what did she take to be her end, and the means necessary to achieve that end? The other is a third person perspective that is attentive to causal or conceptual relations: was some causal outcome of the agent's action sufficiently close, or so conceptually related, to what the agent did that it should be considered part of her (...)
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  7. The Trolley Problem Mysteries.F. M. Kamm - 2015 - Oup Usa.
    The Trolley Problem Mysteries considers whether who turns the trolley and/or how it is turned affect the moral permissibility of acting and suggests general proposals for when we may and may not harm some people to help others.
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  8. The Trolley Problem Mysteries.Eric Rakowski (ed.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press USA.
    A rigorous treatment of a thought experiment that has become notorious within and outside of philosophy - The Trolley Problem - by one of the most influential moral philosophers alive todaySuppose you can stop a trolley from killing five people, but only by turning it onto a side track where it will kill one. May you turn the trolley? What if the only way to rescue the five is to topple a bystander in front of the trolley so that his (...)
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  9. Are Enabling and Allowing Harm Morally Equivalent?Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (3):365-383.
    It is sometimes asserted that enabling harm is morally equivalent to allowing harm. In this article, I criticize this view. Positively, I show that cases involving self-defence and cases involving people acting on the basis of a reasonable belief to the effect that certain obstacles to harm will remain in place, or will be put in place, show that enabling harm is harder to justify than allowing it. Negatively, I argue that certain cases offered in defence of the moral equivalence (...)
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  10. Moral Dilemma and Moral Sense: A Phenomenological Account.Bryan Lueck - 2015 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 29 (2):218-235.
    In this paper I argue that a phenomenological account of moral sense-bestowal can provide valuable insight into the possibility of moral dilemmas. I propose an account of moral sense-bestowal that is grounded in the phenomenology of expression that Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed throughout the course of his philosophical work, and most explicitly in the period immediately following the publication of Phenomenology of Perception. Based on this Merleau-Pontian account of moral sense-bestowal, I defend the view that there are genuine moral dilemmas, i.e., (...)
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  11. Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.
    Recently many have argued that agents must sometimes have credences that are imprecise, represented by a set of probability measures. But opponents claim that fans of imprecise credences cannot provide a decision theory that protects agents who follow it from foregoing sure money. In particular, agents with imprecise credences appear doomed to act irrationally in diachronic cases, where they are called to make decisions at earlier and later times. I respond to this claim on behalf of imprecise credence fans. Once (...)
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  12. Adorno's Practical Philosophy: Living Less Wrongly.Fabian Freyenhagen - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    Adorno notoriously asserted that there is no 'right' life in our current social world. This assertion has contributed to the widespread perception that his philosophy has no practical import or coherent ethics, and he is often accused of being too negative. Fabian Freyenhagen reconstructs and defends Adorno's practical philosophy in response to these charges. He argues that Adorno's deep pessimism about the contemporary social world is coupled with a strong optimism about human potential, and that this optimism explains his negative (...)
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  13. Sometimes Psychopaths Get It Right: A Utilitarian Response to 'The Mismeasure of Morals'.Tyler Paytas - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (2):178-191.
    A well-publicized study entitled (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011) purportedly provides evidence that utilitarian solutions to a particular class of moral dilemmas are endorsed primarily by individuals with psychopathic traits. According to the authors, these findings give researchers reason to refrain from classifying utilitarian judgements as morally optimal. This article is a two-part response to the study. The first part comprises concerns about the methodology used and the adequacy of the data for supporting the authors’ conclusions. The second part seeks to (...)
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  14. Forcing the Choice Between Lives', Journal of Applied Philosophy, Ix (1992). For a Reply© Edinburgh University Press 2000 Utilitas Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2000. [REVIEW]Phillip Montague - 2000 - Utilitas 12 (1).
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  15. Is Incomparability A Problem For Anyone?N. Hsieh - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):65-80.
    The incomparability of alternatives is thought to pose a problem for justified choice, particularly for proponents of comparativism – the view that comparative facts about alternatives determine what one rationally ought to choose. As a solution, it has been argued that alternatives judged incomparable by one of the three standard comparative relations, “better than,” “worse than,” and “equally good,” are comparable by some fourth relation, such as “roughly equal” or “on a par.” This solution, however, comes at what many would (...)
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  16. Aggregation, Beneficence, and Chance.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2):1-19.
    It is plausible to think that it is wrong to cure many people’s headaches rather than save someone else’s life. On the other hand, it is plausible to think that it is not wrong to expose someone to a tiny risk of death when curing this person’s headache. I will argue that these claims are inconsistent. For if we keep taking this tiny risk then it is likely that one person dies, while many others’ headaches are cured. In light of (...)
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  17. Trolley Problem.F. M. Kamm - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  18. Incommensurability (and Incomparability).Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell. pp. 2591-2604.
    This encyclopedia entry urges what it takes to be correctives to common (mis)understandings concerning the phenomenon of incommensurability and incomparability and briefly outlines some of their philosophical upshots.
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  19. The Problem of Semantic Incomparability.Johannes Bechert - 1991 - In Dietmar Zaefferer (ed.), Semantic Universals and Universal Semantics. Foris Publications. pp. 12--60.
  20. Value Relations: Old Wine in New Barrels.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2011 - In .
    In Rabinowicz 2008, I considered how value relations can best be analyzed in terms of fitting pro-­‐attitudes. In the formal model presented in that paper fitting pro-­‐attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of "better", "worse", "equally as good as" and "incomparable in value". Unfortunately, though, the (...)
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  21. A Closer Look at Moral Dilemmas: Latent Dimensions of Morality and the Difference Between Trolley and Footbridge Dilemmas.Kuninori Nakamura - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (2):178-204.
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  22. A Dispositional Account of Conflicts of Obligation.Luke Robinson - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):203-228.
    I address a question in moral metaphysics: How are conflicts between moral obligations possible? I begin by explaining why we cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question simply by positing that such conflicts are conflicts between rules, principles, or reasons. I then develop and defend the “Dispositional Account,” which posits that conflicts between moral obligations are conflicts between the manifestations of obligating dispositions (obligating powers, capacities, etc.), just as conflicts between physical forces are conflicts between the manifestations of (certain) (...)
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  23. Patterned Moral Behavior.George W. Watson, Joseph Michlitsch & Thomas Douglas - 2007 - Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society 18:87-92.
    We posit that the weight a person assigns a moral principle is not stable between ideal, or un-contextual assessments and the weight the same moral principle is allocated when applied in a contextual dilemma. Second, we postulate that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior or judgment. Results indicate that the importance of moral principles is dynamic and that patterned moral behavior is a significant predictor of moral judgments.
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  24. Single-, Double-, and Triple-Loop Politics.Richard P. Nielsen - 1996 - The Ruffin Series in Business Ethics:187-211.
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  25. Moral Dilemmas and Broken Promises: A Historical-Philosophical Overview of the Nonviolent Movement.Domenico Losurdo - 2010 - Historical Materialism 18 (4):85-134.
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  26. A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Xiaofei Liu - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (1):63-81.
    Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a justification for the alleged moral difference. (...)
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  27. Another Look at Moral Blackmail.Lawrence Alexander - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:189-196.
    In this paper I describe cases of moral blackmail as cases where A is told by B that if A does not commit an otherwise immoral act, B will commit an immoral act of equal or greater gravity. I describe cases of moral dilemma as cases where A must commit an otherwise immoral act to avert a natural disaster of equal or greater gravity. I then argue that cases of moral blackmail are structurally identical to cases of moral dilemma in (...)
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  28. Double Bubble.Alistair Fruish - 2007 - Philosophy Now 61:52-54.
  29. The Double Edge.Richard Taylor - 2003 - Philosophy Now 40:52-54.
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  30. Boulders and Trolleys.D. W. Haslett - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (3):268-287.
    This discussion attempts to show that the elusive solution to the trolley problem lies hidden in the solution to another perennial problem in moral philosophy: the ducking puzzle. The key to solving the ducking puzzle is an important, but overlooked, exception to our obligation not to harm others, an exception for , which, it is argued here, is also the key to solving the trolley problem.
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  31. Double Marking Revisited.Val Brooks - 2004 - British Journal of Educational Studies 52 (1):29 - 46.
    In 2002, the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) published the report of an independent panel of experts into maintaining standards at Advanced Level (A-Level). One of its recommendations was for: 'limited experimental double marking of scripts in subjects such as English to determine whether the strategy would significantly reduce errors of measurement' (p. 24). This recommendation provided the impetus for this paper which reviews the all but forgotten literature on double marking and considers its relevance now.
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  32. Moral Dilemmas, by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.Philip L. Quinn - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):693-697.
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  33. How a Double Success Can Be a Fallure.Heidi Storl - 1994 - Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (1):125-135.
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  34. Can Morality Do Without Prudence?David Kaspar - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):311-326.
    This paper argues that morality depends on prudence, or more specifically, that one cannot be a moral person without being prudent. Ethicists are unaware of this, ignore it, or imply it is wrong. Although this thesis is not obvious from the current perspective of ethics, I believe that its several implications for ethics make it worth examining. In this paper I argue for the prudence dependency thesis by isolating moral practice from all reliance on prudence. The result is that in (...)
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  35. “Two Types of Moral Dilemmas”.Peter Vallentyne - 1989 - Erkenntnis 30 (3):301-318.
    die). In recent years the problem of moral dilemmas has received the attention of a number of philosophers. Some authors1 argue that moral dilemmas are not conceptually possible (i.e., that they are incoherent, given the nature of the concepts involved) because they are ruled out by certain valid principles of deontic logic. Other authors2 insist that moral dilemmas are conceptually possible, and argue that therefore the principles of deontic logic that rule them out must be rejected. In arguing for or (...)
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  36. Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino.Carl Baker - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):445-455.
    Simon Blackburn’s expressivist logic of attitudes aims to explain how we can use non-assertoric moral judgements in logically valid arguments. Patricia Marino has recently argued that Blackburn’s logic faces a dilemma: either it cannot account for the place of moral dilemmas in moral reasoning or, if it can, it makes an illicit distinction between two different kinds of moral dilemma. Her target is the logic’s definition of validity as satisfiability, according to which validity requires an avoidance of attitudinal inconsistency. Against (...)
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  37. Is Two the Same as Double? Or: Do Two Hermeneutic Activities Already Constitute a 'Double Hermeneutic'?L. F. P. Pijnenburg - unknown
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  38. Moral Dilemmas and Comparative Conceptions of Morality.Peter Vallentyne - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):117-124.
    Earl Conee is a well known contemporary defender of the impossibility of moral dilemmas. In his 1982 paper "Against Moral Dilemmas" he argued that moral dilemmas are impossible because the existence of such a dilemma would entail that some obligatory action is forbidden, which is absurd. More recently, in "Why Moral Dilemmas are Impossible" he has defended the impossibility of moral dilemmas by claiming that the moral status of an action depends in part on the moral status of its alternatives. (...)
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  39. Review of Heidi Hurd, Moral Combat. [REVIEW]Thaddeus Metz - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):434-436.
  40. Paradoxes in the Argumentation of the Comic Double and Classemic Contradiction.Benjamín García-Hernández - 2003 - Argumentation 17 (1):99-111.
    In the comedies of errors, and more precisely in the comedies of double, in which two identities become confused, the characters get into paradoxical situations reigned by the principle of contradiction. The classemic relationships that are based on the criterion of subjectivity are broken due to the intervention of the character appearing as the double, for the doubled and the double can appear as one subject or as two. In fact, in the added double one + one equals one (1 (...)
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  41. The Stoics on Hypotheses and Hypothetical Arguments.Susanne Bobzien - 1997 - Phronesis 42 (3):299-312.
    ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue (i) that the hypothetical arguments about which the Stoic Chrysippus wrote numerous books (DL 7.196) are not to be confused with the so-called hypothetical syllogisms" but are the same hypothetical arguments as those mentioned five times in Epictetus (e.g. Diss. 1.25.11-12); and (ii) that these hypothetical arguments are formed by replacing in a non-hypothetical argument one (or more) of the premisses by a Stoic "hypothesis" or supposition. Such "hypotheses" or suppositions differ from propositions in (...)
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  42. Dilemmas and Moral Realism.Nick Zangwill - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1):71.
    I distinguish two different arguments against cognitivism in Bernard Williams’ writings on moral dilemmas. The first turns on there being a truth of the matter about what we ought to do in moral a dilemma. That argument can be met by appealing to our epistemic shortcomings and to pro tanto obligations. However, those responses make no headway with the second argument which concerns the rationality of the moral regret that we feel in dilemma situations. I show how the rationality of (...)
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  43. Lincoln Allison, Ecology and Utility: The Philosophical Dilemmas of Planetary Management, Leicester University Press, 1991, Pp. 185.Daniel Holbrook - 1994 - Utilitas 6 (1):145.
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  44. Grouping and the Imposition of Loss.F. M. Kamm - 1998 - Utilitas 10 (3):292-.
    In this article, I critically examine Peter Unger's arguments for the claim that there is a duty to cause physical harm to oneself and others in order to save lives. This includes discussion of his view that when the method of cases involves several rather than merely two options our intuitive judgements support his radical thesis. In conclusion, I consider his attempt to reconcile his claims with common sense moral judgements.
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  45. Killing, Letting Die and Preventing People From Being Saved.Matthew Hanser - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (3):277.
    The distinction between killing and letting die is too simple. A third category must also be recognized. Like killing, preventing a person from being saved is a species of doing harm; like killing, it infringes one of the victim's negative rights. Yet preventing a person from being saved is morally on a par with letting die, which infringes one of the victim's positive rights. It follows that we cannot explain the moral inequivalence of killing and letting die by saying, as (...)
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  46. The Intended/Foreseen Distinction's Ethical Relevance.Thomas A. Cavanaugh - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (3):179-188.
  47. Moral Dilemmas and Ethical Reasoning.Carol Gibb Harding (ed.) - 1985 - Transaction Publishers.
    This book deals with moral dilemmas and the development of ethical reasoning in two senses.
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  48. Scanlon on Intention and Permissibility.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):578-585.
  49. The Consequences of Rejecting the Moral Relevance of the Doing–Allowing Distinction.Bashshar Haydar - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (2):222-227.
    The claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing enjoys a great intuitive appeal. If in addition to this claim, we reject the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction. In this short essay, I propose a different take on the argument in question. Instead of opting to reject its conclusion by defending the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction, we can no longer rely on the strong intuitive appeal of the claim that one is never (...)
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  50. In Search of the Deep Structure of Morality: An Interview with Frances Kamm.Alex Voorhoeve & Frances Kamm - unknown
    An extended discussion with Frances Kamm about deontology and the methodology of ethical theorizing. (An extended and revised version appears in Alex Voorhoeve, Conversations on Ethics, OUP 2009).).
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