- Epistemology of Disagreement and the Moral Non-Conformist.Benjamin Sherman - manuscriptdetails
- The Epistemic Argument for Hedonism.Neil Sinhababu - manuscriptdetails
- The Problem with Disagreement on Social Media: Moral Not Epistemic.Elizabeth Edenberg - forthcoming - In Elizabeth Edenberg & Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. Oxford, UK:details
- Moral Realism and the Problem of Moral Aliens.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology.details
- Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences, Written by Thomas Pölzler. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-9.details
- Change in Moral View: Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology.Michael Klenk - forthcoming - In Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge.details
- Disagreement, Anti-Realism about Reasons, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Brian Leiter - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
- The Epistemic Value of Civil Disagreement in Advance.Christopher W. Love - forthcoming - Social Theory and Practice.details
- Wang Yangming on ‘Unquestioning Obedience’ and Epistemic Superiority.Daryl Ooi - forthcoming - Philosophy East and West.details
- Disagreement and Doubts About Darwinian Debunking.Alexandra Plakias - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.details
- Pragmatist Quietism: A Metaethical System.Andrew Sepielli - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
- Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces.Folke Tersman & Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
- Whence the Demand for Ethical Theory?Damian Cueni & Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):135–46.details
- Moral Disagreement Scepticism Leveled.Jonathan Dixon - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):203-216.details
- Moral Judgement and Moral Progress: The Problem of Cognitive Control.Michael Klenk & Hanno Sauer - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (7):938-961.details
- Illocutionary Force and Attitude Mode in Normative Disputes.Teresa Marques - 2021 - Metaphilosophy (3-4):1-17.details
- Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-18.details
- Understanding Moral Disagreement: A Christian Perspectivalist Approach.Blake McAllister - 2021 - Religions 12 (5):318.details
- Ideální konsenzus, reálná diverzita a výzva veřejného ospravedlnění: k limitům idealizace v liberální politické teorii [Ideal Consensus, Real Diversity, and the Challenge of Public Justification: On the Limits of Idealisation in Liberal Political Theory].Matouš Mencl & Pavel Dufek - 2021 - Acta Politologica 2 (13):49–70.details
- Disagreement and Conflict: How Moral and Taste Judgements Do Not Differ.Giulio Pietroiusti - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):837-846.details
- Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1117-1125.details
- On the Evolution of Moral Conventions: A Functionalist Alternative to Buchanan and Powell’s Biocultural Theory of Moral Progress.Oskar Qvarfort - 2021 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
- Hinges, Disagreements, and Arguments: (Rationally) Believing Hinge Propositions and Arguing across Deep Disagreements.Harvey Siegel - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1107-1116.details
- Moral Relativism, Metalinguistic Negotiation, and the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Katharina Anna Sodoma - 2021 - Erkenntnis 1:1-21.details
- Richard Rowland: Moral Disagreement: New York, Routledge, 2021, Hardback (ISBN 978-1-138-58984-1). 258 Pp. [REVIEW]Marco Tiozzo - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (4):1053-1055.details
- Religious Disagreement Is Not Unique.Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-106.details
- Love’s Luck Knot.Carla Bagnoli - 2020 - Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 25 (1-2):195-208.details
- A Debunking Explanation for Moral Progress.Nathan Cofnas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3171-3191.details
- A Humean Approach to the Boundaries of the Moral Domain.Mark Collier - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18 (1):1-16.details
- Veřejný rozum a právo [Public Reason and Law].Pavel Dufek - 2020 - In Tomáš Sobek & Martin Hapla (eds.), Filosofie práva [Philosophy of Law]. Brno, Czechia: pp. 227–254.details
- The Epistemic Account of Faultless Disagreement.Xingming Hu - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2613-2630.details
- Third Factor Explanations and Disagreement in Metaethics.Michael Klenk - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):427-446.details
- Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology.Michael Klenk (ed.) - 2020 - New York: Routledge.details
- Cognitive Islands and Runaway Echo Chambers: Problems for Epistemic Dependence on Experts.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2803-2821.details
- Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.details
- Against Overgeneralisation Objections to the Argument From Moral Disagreement.Thomas Pölzler - 2020 - South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):261-273.details
- Contingency Inattention: Against Causal Debunking in Ethics.Regina Rini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):369-389.details
- Moral Realism and Expert Disagreement.Prabhpal Singh - 2020 - Trames: A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 24 (3):441-457.details
- Value Disagreement, Action, and Commitment.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2020 - In Katja Vogt & Justin Vlasits (eds.), Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 291-311.details
- How Rational Level-Splitting Beliefs Can Help You Respond to Moral Disagreement.Margaret Greta Turnbull & Eric Sampson - 2020 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 239-255.details
- Problems with Rowland’s Practical Conciliationism.Yuzhou Wang - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1639-1648.details
- Evolutionary Debunking, Self-Defeat, and All the Evidence.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York, NY, USA: Routledge.details
- Higher-Order Defeat in Realist Moral Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett - 2019 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 117-135.details
- Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics.Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.) - 2019 - Routledge.details
- The Moral Limits of Open‐Mindedness.Matt A. Ferkany - 2019 - Educational Theory 69 (4):403-419.details
- Moral Steadfastness and Meta-Ethics.James Fritz & Tristram McPherson - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):43-56.details
- Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Klemens Kappel & Frederik J. Andersen - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1103-1120.details
- Moral Philosophy and the ‘Ethical Turn’ in Anthropology.Michael Klenk - 2019 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie (2):1-23.details
- What's Wrong with Moral Deference?Jonathan Matheson - 2019 - Florida Philosophical Review 17 (1):1-6.details
- Do desacordo ao paradoxo epistêmico: uma análise da concepção de serviço de autoridade de Raz à luz da teoria do “ponto-cego” de R. Sorensen.Ramiro Ávila Peres - 2019 - Dissertatio 48:242-257.details
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|