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  1. Gratitude's Fitting Growth.Daniel Telech - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Philosophical discussion of gratitude tends to emphasize the way in which the emotion is responsive to manifestations of benevolence (or good will). In some cases, however, gratitude ‘grows’—or increases in strength— across time, in ways that are intuitively fitting but unaccounted for by gratitude’s sensitivity to benevolence. To make sense of this kind of gratitude-growth, I argue that there are conditions in which manifestations of benevolence— particularly, benevolent hopes—can rationally accommodate the unforeseen and unintended outcomes to which they give rise, (...)
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  2. Why Moral Intuitions are Not Emotions: A Critical Examination.Giulia Cantamessi & Dario Cecchini - 2025 - The Journal of Ethics:1-17.
    In this paper we argue that moral intuitions, understood as non-doxastic mental states, should not be reduced to emotions. We reject the moral-intuition-as-emotion view by arguing that having an emotion is neither necessary nor sufficient to have a moral intuition. In particular, we deny the necessity claim by stressing the existence of dispassionate moral intuitions, which lack emotional phenomenology, and by claiming that some moral intuitions have no corresponding emotions, as no emotion apprehends objects in terms of the same moral (...)
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  3. Focusing on emotions in climate education: A felt sense of the climate.Ole Martin Sandberg - 2024 - In Donata Schoeller, Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir & Greg Walkerden, Practicing Embodied Thinking in Research and Learning. Routledge. pp. 165-174.
    Using a course on climate change at the University of Iceland as a case study, this chapter illustrates the benefits of employing the methodologies of embodied critical thinking (ECT) in environmental education and of making the emotional and felt dimension an active focus in the educational process. Drawing on cognitive researchers like Eugene Gendlin and Antonio Damasio, the chapter emphasises the integral role of emotions in rationality and reflects on student responses, showcasing shifts from anxiety to hope and from despair (...)
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  4. Depression, Critique, and Critical Theory as Political Therapy.Jasper Friedrich - 2025 - Constellations.
    Critical theorists, especially in the Frankfurt School tradition, claim that normative thought and critique arise from experiences of suffering and oppression. It seems intuitive that oppression sometimes makes people sad and angry in ways that motivate critique and resistance; yet, other times, it leads to debilitating experiences of depression, resignation, and self-blame. Especially, in the context of our contemporary “mental health epidemic,” it is worth asking whether and how critique and resistance could possibly spring from such experiences. This paper therefore (...)
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  5. Speak peace in a world of conflict: the emotional structure of the White House meeting of Trump and Zelenskyy on February 28, 2025.Mika Turkia - manuscript
    The meeting in which the United States and Ukraine were supposed to sign a rare earth minerals deal attracted a lot of attention, and its course elicited strong opinions, especially in Europe. Common views included President Zelenskyy having been treated unfairly. A closer analysis of the meeting reveals a more multifaceted picture of the events. -/- The main difference in perspectives appeared to be whether to take a judgmental attitude towards Russia or maintain a neutral position. Many interpreted taking a (...)
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  6. Laugh It Off: Moral Admiration and Humorous Humility.Migdalia Arcila-Valenzuela - forthcoming - In David W. Shoemaker, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 9. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 193–211.
    First, this chapter argues that praise, as an expression of moral admiration, disrupts moral equality, in terms of equal relationships of accountability, that underpins the practices of moral communities. The disruption created by elevating the admired person to a position of moral superiority is called the pedestal problem. Second, this chapter contends that deflecting praise, rather than accepting or rejecting praise, is the most effective way to counteract the moral inequality introduced by moral admiration. Finally, this chapter introduces the phenomenon (...)
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  7. How Not to Hate Humanity: Schopenhauer's Response to Misanthropy.David Bather Woods - forthcoming - Mind.
    Schopenhauer has a longstanding reputation for misanthropy. The reputation is warranted, but it is also potentially misleading. Privately, Schopenhauer resisted being called misanthropic, possibly because of the false implication that he hated humanity. Recent philosophical studies of misanthropy have helped to forestall this implication by detaching the definition of misanthropy from hatred and associating it instead with a negative critical verdict of humankind that can be expressed in a wider range of responses. On this definition, whether Schopenhauer endorses the misanthropic (...)
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  8. Action‐based Benevolence.Waldemar Brys - 2025 - European Journal of Philosophy:e13058.
    This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the (...)
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  9. Action‐based Benevolence.Waldemar Brys - 2025 - European Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the (...)
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  10. Ressentiment and Identity.Paul Katsafanas - forthcoming - In Lucy Osler & Thomas Szanto, For, Against, Together: Antagonistic Political Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
    Ressentiment describes a psychological process in which a subject responds to feelings of inadequacy by altering his evaluative orientation in a way that enables him to blame the inadequacy on some outgroup. Ressentiment is taken to have far-reaching applicability: it has been used to explain many different forms of political antagonism, including those present in the authoritarian far-right, the far left, identity politics, populism, neo-Nazi movements, the manosphere, incels, and fanaticism. This essay asks what exactly ressentiment is and whether it (...)
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  11. Giving up gratitude.Daniel Coren - 2025 - Analytic Philosophy 66 (1):22-36.
    Resentment is a negative reaction to expressions of bad will. Gratitude is a positive reaction to expressions of good will. To give up resentment, when someone has wronged you, is to forgive them. We might expect an analog for giving up gratitude. The practice features in some ordinary and extraordinary moments in our lives. But it is unnamed and unstudied. I clarify what giving up gratitude is. I identify three types of ordinary and important cases. I then attend to implications; (...)
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  12. National Humiliation: Emotion, Narrative, and Conflict.Raamy Majeed - 2025 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 42 (1):287-302.
    National humiliation is increasingly being used as a way of explaining certain kinds of international conflict. In this article, I argue that while such explanations are presented on the back of plausible assumptions about emotion, such assumptions also make it unlikely that humiliation can play the myriad of explanatory roles attributed to it, for example, to explain the rise of Hitler, growing Chinese antagonism towards the West, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and so on. In response, I consider some other ways (...)
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  13. Moral Gratitude.Romy Eskens - 2025 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 42 (1):115-130.
    There are many examples of persons who appear to be grateful to other people's benefactors. In at least some of these examples, such third-party gratitude also seems fitting. However, these observations conflict with a widespread assumption in the philosophical literature about gratitude: that only beneficiaries can be fittingly grateful to benefactors. In this article, I argue that third-party gratitude exists and can be fitting, and that the assumption is therefore mistaken. More specifically, I defend two claims: (i) that there exists (...)
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  14. Unfair Emotions: Their Morality and Blameworthiness.Jonas Blatter - 2025 - New York: Routledge.
    This book provides a novel philosophical account of the unfairness of certain emotions. It explains how the concept of unfairness can be applied to emotions and how emotions can be the proper objects of second-person moral evaluation. Emotions are an integral part of our moral practices. While the links between emotions and morality have received much philosophical attention recently, the phenomenon of unfair emotions remains under-explored. This book examines an everyday phenomenon: that we often perceive other people's emotions as unfair, (...)
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  15. Fuel To My Fire / You Can't Stop Desire.E. M. Hernandez - manuscript
    Trans existence has recently been plagued by two different explanations: a natural, “born this way,” necessity and a social, often-thought perverted, choice. These contrasting explanations of necessity and choice create an explanatory false dichotomy and political double-bind. This talk constructs an alternative explanation for why people transition, one that centralizes the role of desire while recognizing the necessity of choice that arises from that desire. Toward this end, I present a moral psychology of desire. An explanation that recognizes the role (...)
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  16. The Positional Nature of Valuing.X. Zhang - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-28.
    This paper aims to explore one significant yet insufficiently elaborated aspect of valuing, namely the positional nature of valuing, which essentially reveals the fact that the valuer occupies a particular position or takes a specific viewpoint in relation to the object being valued. This positional nature of valuing does not merely embody a specific viewpoint from which the valuer’s beliefs, attitudes, reasons, and emotions are conveyed in a complex manner towards the valued object, but also constitute a particular position from (...)
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  17. Action-based Benevolence.Waldemar Brys - 2025 - European Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the (...)
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  18. Putting the Agency in Agent-Regret.Jake Wojtowicz - 2025 - American Journal of Bioethics 25 (2):21-22.
    In “Voluntary Acts and Responsible Agents,” Bernard Williams sketches what it means to be a mature agent. This mature agent tries to make sense of their own life, which is a life that is shared wit...
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  19. Empathy moments.Nathalie Cadena - 2025 - Trans/Form/Ação 48 (2):1-18.
    In this paper, I analyse the act of consciousness called empathy, as proposed by Husserl in Ideas II. By applying Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, I evidence three moments that constitute empathy: first, to recognize the other Ego; second, to open myself up to the other Ego; and third, to feel with the other Ego. I investigate these eidetic universalities [Wesenallgemeinheiten] within the limits of pure intuition (HUA III, 146). To recognize the other Ego is an involuntary act that happens in consciousness (...)
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  20. (1 other version)Unreliable emotions and ethical knowledge.James Hutton - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    How is ethical knowledge possible? One promising answer is Moral Empiricism: we can acquire ethical knowledge through emotional experiences. But Moral Empiricism faces a serious problem. Our emotions are unreliable guides to ethics, frequently failing to fit the ethical status of their objects, so the habit of basing ethical beliefs on one's emotions seems too unreliable to yield knowledge. I develop a new, virtue-epistemic solution to this problem, with practical implications for how we approach ethical decision-making. By exploiting a frequently (...)
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  21. Shames and Selves: On the Origins and Cognitive Foundations of a Moral Emotion.Charlie Kurth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    This paper develops an evolutionary account of shame and its moral value. In so doing, it challenges the standard thinking about shame. Typically, those who approach shame from an evolutionary perspective deny that it is a morally valuable emotion, focusing instead on its social significance. And those who see shame as morally valuable typically set aside questions about shame’s biological origins, if they see them as relevant at all. On my account, shame is an emotion that sensitizes us to self-originating (...)
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  22. Honing the Haptics of the Heart: A New Defence of the Perceptual Theory of Emotion.Brandon Yip - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    According to the perceptual theory of emotion, emotions are evaluative perceptions. However, emotions involve us in a way that regular perception does not and this has led to two influential objections to the perceptual theory have emerged. According to the first objection, the perceptual theory is false because the phenomenology of emotion is the phenomenology of response. According to the second objection, the perceptual theory is false because emotions are susceptible to evaluations of rationality and reason-responsiveness. In this essay, I (...)
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  23. Werterfahrung, Wertbindung und personaler Lebenszusammenhang.Moritz von Kalckreuth - 2024 - Zeitschrift Für Didaktik der Philosophie Und Ethik 2024 (2):27-35.
    The aim of this paper is to show that value-experiences and -attachments are to be understood as interwoven within the structure of a person’s life. Whereas the assumption of value-experiences as isolated mental states often fails to explain why we do not experience given values, referring to the person’s life allows to understand that our value-experiences are favoured, made difficult or excluded by other emotional phenomena or shared life forms. This model, though, differs from biological or psychological models by referring (...)
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  24. Grievance Politics and Identities of Resentment.Paul Katsafanas - 2025 - Philosophical Studies 182 (2):605-627.
    Does it make sense to say that certain evaluative outlooks and political ideologies are essentially negative or oppositional in structure? Intuitively, it seems so: there is a difference between outlooks and ideologies that are expressive of hatred, resentment, and contempt, on the one hand, and those expressive of more affirmative emotions. But drawing this distinction is more difficult than it seems. It requires that we find a way of maintaining the following claim, which I call Negative Orientation: although you claim (...)
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  25. In Defence of Despair about Climate Breakdown.Anh-Quân Nguyen - 2025 - In Ondřej Beran, Laura Candiotto, Niklas Forsberg, Antony Fredriksson & David Rozen, The philosophy of environmental emotions: grief, hope, and beyond. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Both within the climate movement and in academic circles, it has become common advice to avoid despair. Despair about the climate crisis is the opposite of hope and should be avoided on grounds of both rational aptness and pragmatic considerations. Despair about climate breakdown is only rationally apt if it is impossible for our actions to make a difference. As our actions do make a difference, despair is not a fitting response to climate change). Further, we have pragmatic reasons to (...)
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  26. The rhetoric of climate change. [REVIEW]Charlie Kurth - 2024 - Metascience (1):83-86.
    This is a review of Debra Hawhee's book, A Sense of Urgency. The uncertainty and magnitude of climate change make it difficult to talk about its impact in ways that can help us understand and confront what we face. Hawhee's example-driven book aims to show how the rhetoric of climate change is changing rhetoric itself for the better. While there is much to learn from Hawhee's discussion, the book carries a misplaced optimism about how climate change rhetoric is being used--and (...)
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  27. Alteridad y paternidad en Descartes.Pablo Pavesi - 2024 - Praxis Filosófica 60:e20213484.
    El problema de la alteridad puede plantearse en dos ámbitos: a) el de la alteridad absoluta, que Descartes desarrolla en la Tercera Meditación cuando el ego descubre su finitud como una negación y una aspiración de infinito; b) el de la alteridad relativa que me distingue de mi semejante. En primer lugar, arriesgamos una síntesis de los modos en que el alter ego pierde su alteridad al ser concebido como objeto de representación o de deseo. En segundo lugar, proponemos que (...)
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  28. Aposterioryczny intuicjonizm etyczny a percepcja moralna.Ignacy Kłaput - forthcoming - Filozofia Nauki.
    A posteriori ethical intuitionism is a view according to which our ethical beliefs can be justified non-inferentially, and we acquire such justification through experience. To give credence to this view, one can refer to moral perception as an ability that allows us to perceive moral properties and thus provides perceptual justification for our ethical beliefs. In this paper, I analyze various approaches to moral perception and their possible application to the foundationalist project of a posteriori ethical intuitionism. The result of (...)
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  29. Character and Emotion.Charles Starkey - 2015 - In Christian B. Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel & William Fleeson, Character: New Perspectives in Psychology, Philosophy, and Theology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 192-211.
    Despite the tremendous growth of interest in both emotion and character in recent years, little has been said about the relation between the two. I argue that emotions have a proximal and fundamental role in determining character. The proximal role consists in the effects of emotion on the way that a person perceives and ensuingly cognizes the object of emotion. This plays a significant part in determining character-relevant actions. The fundamental role consists in the function that emotions have in sustaining (...)
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  30. When is Jealousy Appropriate?Arina Pismenny - 2021 - Dialectica 75 (3):333-360.
    What makes romantic jealousy rational or fitting? Psychologists view jealousy’s function as preserving a relationship against a “threat” from a “rival”. I argue that its more specific aim is to preserve a certain privileged status of the lover in relation to the beloved. Jealousy is apt when the threat to that status is real, otherwise inapt. Aptness assessments of jealousy must determine what counts as a “threat” and as a “rival”. They commonly take for granted monogamous norms. Hence, compared with (...)
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  31. Sympathetic Joy.Daniel Coren - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (8):3275-3285.
    Unlike Yiddish (_fargin_) and Sanskrit (_muditā_), English has no single word to describe the practice of sharing someone else’s joy at their success. Sympathetic joy has also escaped attention in philosophy. We are familiar with schadenfreude, begrudging, envy, jealousy, and other terms describing either (a) pleasure at someone else’s misfortune or (b) displeasure at someone else’s good fortune. But what, exactly, is sympathetic joy? I argue that it is a short-term or long-term feeling of great delight at another’s good fortune, (...)
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  32. 'In Examining Others We Know Ourselves': Joanna Baillie on Sympathetic Curiosity, Moral Education, and Drama.Lauren Kopajtic - 2024 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 6.
    This paper argues that Joanna Baillie’s ‘Introductory Discourse’ to her Plays on Passions offers a theory of moral education based on an epistemology of passion—an account of how we come to know and understand the passions—both of which deserve further philosophical attention. Like her fellow Scots, David Hume and Adam Smith, Baillie offers a sentimentalist approach to human psychology, focusing on affective states as the primary constituents of character and determinants of action. She also shares a spectatorial approach to moral (...)
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  33. The Induction-of-Intrinsic-Desires Theory.Christoph Lumer - 2012 - In Alessandro Innocenti & Angela Sirigu, Neuroscience and the Economics of Decision Making. Abingdon; New York: Routledge. pp. 109-124.
    (1) Emotions influence decisions in various ways. In particular, they can induce new intrinsic desires. This mechanism is the topic of this paper. (2) After briefly discussing some rival approaches a new theory of such emotional decisions is presented. (3) The general framework into which this theory is integrated is an expectancy-valence or decision-theoretic model of decision, however with a strict distinction between intrinsic and other desires. (4) The specific part of the theory then explains emotional decisions by non-hedonic emotion-induced (...)
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  34. Neuroscience and the Economics of Decision Making.Alessandro Innocenti & Angela Sirigu (eds.) - 2012 - Abingdon; New York: Routledge.
    (1) Emotions influence decisions in various ways. In particular, they can induce new intrinsic desires. This mechanism is the topic of this paper. (2) After briefly discussing some rival approaches a new theory of such emotional decisions is presented. (3) The general framework into which this theory is integrated is an expectancy-valence or decision-theoretic model of decision, however with a strict distinction between intrinsic and other desires. (4) The specific part of the theory then explains emotional decisions by non-hedonic emotion-induced (...)
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  35. Fear as Preventer.Tim Kearl & Robert H. Wallace - 2025 - In Ami Harbin, The Philosophy of Fear: Historical and Interdisciplinary Approaches. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Fear is a preventer, sometimes robustly so. When fear robustly prevents, it changes or diminishes what an agent is able to do. Various popular conceptions of fear focus on its negative role: fear sometimes prevents us from acting as we should, as in certain cases of akrasia. But by the same token, fear sometimes prevents us from acting as we shouldn’t, as in certain other cases of inverse akrasia. We end with a plea on behalf of fear, both in light (...)
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  36. Do Good People Love Themselves? On Rational Self-love in Kant.Bas Tönissen - 2024 - Kant Studien 115 (4):433-453.
    Kant is frequently read as saying that all self-love is bad, and the virtuous agent is one who suppresses self-love as much as possible. This paper argues that this is mistaken and that the right kind of self-love – what Kant calls rational self-love – plays an important role in a successful moral life. It shows how Kant provides a detailed taxonomy of different kinds of self-love. He contrasts the (practical) incentive of self-love with the (pathological) feeling of it, self-love (...)
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  37. (1 other version)Interpersonal Hope and Loving Attention.Catherine Rioux - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    Imagine that your lover or close friend has embraced a difficult long-term goal, such as advancing environmental justice, breaking a bad habit, or striving to become a better person. Which stance should you adopt toward their prospects for success? Does supporting our significant others in the pursuit of valuable goals require ignoring part of our evidence? I argue that we have special reasons – reasons grounded in friendship – to hope that our loved ones succeed in their difficult goals. I (...)
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  38. : The Routledge Comprehensive Guide Volume II: Theories of Specific Emotions and Major Theoretical Challenges.Andrea Scarantino (ed.) - 2024 - Routledge.
  39. Oppressive Fear.Barrett Emerick - forthcoming - In Ami Harbin, The Moral Psychology of Fear. Bloomsbury.
    This paper explores some of the ways that fear can be both a manifestation of and major contributor to oppression. It argues for a pluralistic account of the reasons that justify feeling fear or working to let go of fear and provides a framework to grapple fruitfully with the question of when someone should work to let go of fear and work to avoid contributing to the fear of others. Part 1 argues that emotions are an appropriate target of moral (...)
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  40. Introduction.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - In Morality and the Emotions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 1–36.
    The place of emotions in morality is the subject of widespread and divisive philosophi- cal controversies. This is hardly a peculiarity of present debates; as the history of moral philosophy shows, the relation between morality and the emotions has always been problematic. This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to the cluster of problems about the emotions and their relation to morality. The task of this Introduction is to motivate this conviction by highlighting (...)
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  41. How anger helps us possess reasons for action.Steven Gubka - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    I argue that anger helps us possess reasons to intervene against others. This is because fitting anger disposes us to intervene against others in light of reasons to do so. I propose that anger is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize such interventions, in much the same way that perceptual experience is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize our judgements about our environment. In this way, anger can help us possess reasons that make specific actions rational (...)
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  42. Being Seen and Being with Others: Shame and Interpersonal Relationships.Brandon Yip - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    I seek to vindicate heteronomous shame: shame that one experiences in response to a judgment from another that one does not accept. I suggest that such experiences are instances of interpersonal shame. This is shame that involves a sensitivity to interpersonal ideals, whose instantiation depends partly on the attitudes of others. I defend the importance of such shame by showing how vulnerability to others is a constitutive part of rich interpersonal relationships. The account both casts light on and vindicates the (...)
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  43. A Social Practice Account of Responsible Persons.Miguel Egler & Alfred Archer (eds.) - 2024 - Tilburg, The Netherlands: Open Press Tilburg University.
    “The Descartes Lectures” is a biennial event at Tilburg University that invites a distinguished philosopher to deliver a series of three lectures, each followed by commentaries from other experts in the field. In 2022, Tilburg University had the honor of hosting Cheshire Calhoun for a series of talks on the important philosophical question of what it means to be a responsible person. The commentators for the lectures were Gunnar Björnsson, Jules Holroyd, and Heidi Maibom. This book is a compilation of (...)
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  44. (DRAFT) Can Moral Propositions Serve as Perceptual Content?Jr-Jiun Lian - 2021 - Taiwanese Philosophical Association Annual Conference 2021. Translated by Jr-Jiun Lian.
    Contentful Moral Perceptualists such as Audi (2013), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2014, 2015), and Werner (2016, 2018) claim that moral propositions can serve as the content of perception for moral subjects. However, in my original interpretation, recent critics of moral perceptualism, such as Faraci (2015), Väyrynen (2018), and Chudnoff (2015), subtly suggest that it is more reasonable to claim that moral propositions are the content of cognition rather than perception. Faraci, Väyrynen, and Chudnoff argue that the (...)
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  45. 道德感知與現象對比.Jr-Jiun Lian - 2023 - Dissertation, 國立中正大學 Translated by 祉鈞 連.
    道德感知主義(moral perceptualism)主張「(至少有一些)道德性質(moral properties)可以是主體感知內容(perceptual content)的一部分」,其中的支持者包含了Audi (2013, 2015); Lord (2018); McNaughton (1988); McBrayer (2010a, 2010b); Cowan (2015); Werner (2016, 2020b)。其中,Werner (2016)認為他所提出的「現象對比論證(Phenomenal Contrast Arguments, PCAs)」可以用來證立道德感知主義。此論證強調了某些道德情境中有「跨主體的現象對比」(inter-subjective phenomenal contrast)的存在;換句話說,兩個主體面對同一場景時,其經驗各別顯現出不同的現象特性/現象特徵(phenomenal character)。此論證認為對於「跨主體間的現象對比(inter-subjective phenomenal contrast)」的最佳解釋說明是兩個不同主體在道德感知經驗上有所差異(contrast in moral perceptual experience)。簡言之,根據此論證,跨主體的現象對比的最佳解釋是:某個主體感知到了道德性質,但另一個主體則缺乏這種感知。若此解釋成立,則其蘊含,主體的確可以感知到道德性質 (至少其中一個主體的確感知到了道德性質),也因此,道德感知主義就可以被證立。然而,Werner (2016)所擁護的現象對比論證與道德感知主義,卻遭受許多哲學家的質疑與抨擊,尤以Väyrynen(2018); Reiland(2021); Chudnoff(2015)等人為代表。他們也分別提供了各自對於「跨主體間的現象對比」的相競替代解釋方案,並嘗試論證他們的說法相較於Werner (2016)的道德感知主義解釋方案來得更有解釋效力、且更為合理。本篇論文的主要目標是,剖析與回應以下兩個問題:(I)上述質疑者的替代解釋方案是否說得通?它們是否較之道德感知主義的解釋方案來得更好呢?( II)道德感知主義者是否能恰當回應質疑者的挑戰呢?倘若Werner (2016, 2020b)的說法不足以回應質疑者的話,道德感知主義者是否能夠有其他的解套方案呢?針對問題(I),筆者將論證,Väyrynen(2018); Reiland(2021); Chudnoff(2015)等人對於道德感知主義的質疑大致上言之成理,可和Werner (2016)的理論成為具有同等解釋力的相競解釋方案。但針對問題(II),筆者將指出Väyrynen(2018); Reiland(2021); Chudnoff(2015)等人頂多只能說明「對錯好壞」這類的整體道德性質(overall moral properties)無法作為感知的內容,但並未排除掉道德主體仍舊可以感知到「道德顯著性」(moral salience)這類初步確定道德性質(pro-tanto moral properties)的可能性。也因此,這並未排除一種本論文所擁護的改良版本的道德感知主義。根據此改良版本的道德感知主義,雖然對錯好壞這類的整體道德性質本身也許無法做為感知的內容,然而道德顯著性仍然可 以是感知內容。筆者將此改良版本稱之為「道德顯著性感知主義」(moral salience perceptualism)。為了突顯此版本的優點,筆者將進一步論述,此改良版的道德感知主義可以恰當地解釋跨主體間的現象對比(inter-subjective phenomenal contrast),並可規避原來Werner (2016)版本所招來的質疑。 -/- 關鍵詞:道德感知主義、現象對比論證、道德顯著性、道德經驗與道德判斷、道德教育 .
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  46. Review Essay: A Deeper Understanding of Moral Standing. [REVIEW]Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel J. Miller - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Hypocrites, we are told, lack the moral standing to blame. But what is this standing to blame? Why would hypocrisy undermine it? Do any other conditions compromise standing to blame? Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s The Beam and the Mote offers the first book-length treatment on such complex questions. Yet the book admirably pushes even further, extending the scope of standing into other normative domains, such as praise, forgiveness, and encouragement. In our review, we critically engage with four of the book’s central topics: (...)
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  47. Loving a Narrator.Pilar Lopez-Cantero - 2024 - Passion: Journal of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotion 2 (1):48-63.
    We love people because of who they are, but can the idea of “who they are” be explained through a property that everyone has, such as agency? David Velleman believes this to be the case, and argues that love is an appraisal of a person’s incomparable value, which disarms the lover’s emotional defences. Modelling love on Kantian respect, Velleman claims that love is a response to a person’s rational nature, indirectly perceived though her empirical persona—her observable traits and behaviours, which (...)
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  48. The Heart and Its Attitudes.Stephen Darwall - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book is a systematic treatment-perhaps the first-of “attitudes of the heart”-remorse (versus guilt), love, trust, gratitude, personal anger (versus righteous anger), jealousy, and others-and their role in mediating personal relationship, attachment, and connection. This is obviously interesting in its own right, but it also shows how heartfelt attitudes mirror more extensively studied “reactive attitudes” of guilt, resentment, and blame (“attitudes of the will”). Whereas the latter mediate moral relations of mutual respect and accountability, attitudes of the heart are the (...)
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  49. Hate: toward a Four-Types Model.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (2):441-459.
    Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental (...)
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  50. What’s so bad about fanaticism?Paul Katsafanas - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-18.
    Fanaticism involves a robust and epistemically peculiar form of commitment: the fanatic is willing to sacrifice himself and others for the sake of his goal, and the fanatic is unable or unwilling to adjust his commitment in light of critical reflection. But is this always morally bad? While Cassam (Extremism: a philosophical analysis, Routledge, New York, 2022b) and Katsafanas (Philos Imprint 19:1–20, 2019; Philosophy of devotion: the longing for invulnerable ideals, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2023a) have offered accounts of fanaticism (...)
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