Related categories

376 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 376
  1. added 2020-07-05
    Against Bloom: A Defense of Smithian Fellow-Feeling.Damian Masterson - 2020 - Dissertation,
    In his 2016 book, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion, Paul Bloom argues that “if we want to be good caring people, if we want to make the world a better place, then we are better off without empathy.” I’ve specifically chosen this formulation of Bloom’s position because it gets at the issue I will most directly challenge him on - that we would, or even could, be better off without empathy. The position I will defend is that our (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-06-08
    Sentimentalismo, consequenzialismo, etica laica. [REVIEW]Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2002 - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 9 (1):255-270.
    I suggest that Kantian ethics, that is, the ethics of the mature Kant, that of Thomas Nagel, Karl-Otto Apel and Onora O'Neill, is not the caricature of an "engineering" approach in normative ethics that Lecaldano wants to fight in his war on deontological ethics. The ethics of Kant and the Neokantians can be for a consequentialist ethic a more fearsome and interesting adversary than such targets as "common-sense morality", non-existent "dogmatic intuitionism" invented by Sidgwick, non-existent "Catholic morality" that Lecaldano tends (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2020-04-13
    Moral Testimony: Once More with Feeling.Guy Fletcher - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:45-73..
    It is commonly claimed that reliance upon moral testimony is problematic in a way not common to reliance upon non-moral testimony. This chapter provides a new explanation of what the problem consists in—one that enjoys advantages over the most widely accepted explanation in the extant literature. The main theses of the chapter are as follows: that many forms of normative deference beyond the moral are problematic, that there is a common explanation of the problem with all of these forms of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  4. added 2020-03-14
    The Mark of the Moral: Beyond the Sentimentalist Turn.Frank Hindriks & Hanno Sauer - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (4):569-591.
    In light of recent empirical data, many psychologists and philosophers have turned away from rationalism about moral judgment and embraced sentimentalism. In the process, they have rejected the classical “moral signature” as a way of distinguishing moral from conventional norms in favor of a sentimentalist approach to carving out the moral domain. In this paper, we argue that this sentimentalist turn has been made prematurely. Although we agree that the experiments reveal that the classical approach is flawed, we propose to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2020-02-28
    Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind: By May, Joshua, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, Pp. Xv + 264, £45. [REVIEW]Jeanette Kennett - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):199-201.
    Volume 98, Issue 1, March 2020, Page 199-201.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2020-02-12
    Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment.Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):727-729.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  7. added 2020-02-11
    Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith.Paul Russell - 1991 - Ethics 101 (4):873-875.
  8. added 2020-02-06
    Feeling Good: The Role of Feelings in the Making of Moral Judgement.Jeremias Koh Jian Min - unknown
    This thesis focuses on the question of whether moral feelings are necessary to the making of moral judgments. This is an important question and the answer one gives has more interesting implications than one might initially expect. I will argue that an experientialist account of moral concepts, on which moral judgments are beliefs about objective facts represented by moral feelings, provides the best naturalistic answer to the question. To make my point, I anchor my arguments in a series of comparisons (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2020-01-09
    Why Are You Proud of That? Cognitivism About "Possessive" Emotions.Jeremy Fischer - forthcoming - Southwest Philosophy Review 36 (2).
    Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of our pride. I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2019-12-29
    Smith, Adam.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2006 - In Virgilio Melchiorre (ed.), Enciclopedia Filosofica. Milan, Italy: Bompiani. pp. 10726-10730.
    A presentation of Adam Smith's epistemology, ethics, political theory and economics.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2019-12-11
    Sidgwick's Dualism of Practical Reason, Evolutionary Debunking, and Moral Psychology.Peter Andes - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):361-377.
    Sidgwick's seminal text The Methods of Ethics left off with an unresolved problem that Sidgwick referred to as the dualism of practical reason. The problem is that employing Sidgwick's methodology of rational intuitionism appears to show that there are reasons to favour both egoism and utilitarianism. Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer offer a solution in the form of an evolutionary debunking argument: the appeal of egoism is explainable in terms of evolutionary theory. I argue that like rational prudence, rational (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2019-10-20
    Daniel Kelly: Yuck! The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust. [REVIEW]Tom Cochrane - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 11 (37).
    I review Daniel Kelly's 2011 book on disgust. I am convinced by his arguments that disgust should not be appealed to in moral judgement. I am bit more sceptical about the model of disgust itself.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2019-07-15
    The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment.Joshua May - 2018 - In Karen Jones & Francois Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford University Press. pp. 286-306.
    I argue that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions aren’t integral to moral judgment. There’s ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. added 2019-06-27
    Review - Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2019 - Metapsychology 23 (24).
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2019-06-06
    Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism. [REVIEW]Makoto Suzuki - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):131-133.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2019-06-06
    Utilitarianism Without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill.Daniel Jacobson - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):159-191.
    This essay argues, flouting paradox, that Mill was a utilitarian but not a consequentialist. First, it contends that there is logical space for a view that deserves to be called utilitarian despite its rejection of consequentialism; second, that this logical space is, in fact, occupied by John Stuart Mill. The key to understanding Mill's unorthodox utilitarianism and the role it plays in his moral philosophy is to appreciate his sentimentalist metaethics—especially his account of wrongness in terms of fitting guilt and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  17. added 2019-06-06
    Sympathy, Disenchantment, and Authority: Adam Smith and the Construction of Moral Sentiments.Michael Bray - 2007 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 28 (1):159-193.
  18. added 2019-06-06
    Y a-T-Il des Sentiments Moraux?Paul Dumouchel - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):471-489.
    ABSTRACT: A quick survey of the literature reveals that authors disagree as to which sentiments are moral and which are not, they disagee as to how to distinguish between moral and other sentiments, and finally that often the same author will claim a sentiment is moral at some times but not at others. These difficulties arise, I argue, from an underlying concept of emotion that I call atomism. Viewing emotions as means of coordination among agents, rather than as psychic atoms, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. added 2019-06-06
    Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):680-681.
    Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments offers an account of moral responsibility. It addresses the question: what are the forms of capacity or ability that render us morally accountable for the things we do? A traditional answer has it that the conditions of moral responsibility include freedom of the will, where this in turn involves the availability of robust alternative possibilities. I reject this answer, arguing that the conditions of moral responsibility do not include any condition of alternative possibilities. In the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   129 citations  
  20. added 2019-06-06
    Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps.Richard Holton - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (2):137-168.
    The question is asked whether one can consistently both be a minimalist about truth, and hold that some meaningful assertoric sentences fail to be either true or false. It is shown that one can, but the issues are delicate, and the price is high: one must either refrain from saying that the sentences lack truth values, or else one must invoke a novel non-contraposing three-valued conditional. Finally it is shown that this does not help in reconciling minimalism with emotivism, where (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  21. added 2019-06-06
    Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility Paul Russell Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 200 Pp., $66.95. [REVIEW]Nathan Brett - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (3):659-661.
    In this closely argued book, Paul Russell challenges the standard way of capturing what Hume has to say on the subject of freedom and responsibility. The argument is not, however, one that derives from a narrow interest in discovering what Hume said and demonstrating its divergence from the common view. Russell’s goal is ultimately to use Hume “to shed light on contemporary philosophical problems”. Hume had already discovered, for example, the lesson that Strawson articulated in his critique of compatibilism and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2019-06-06
    Ayer's Ethical Theory: Emotivism or Subjectivism?*: David Wiggins.David Wiggins - 1991 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30:181-196.
    In 1936, in a chapter of Language, Truth and Logic clearly influenced by Hume and influenced also by Ogden's and Richards's The Meaning of Meaning, Ayer claimed that judgments of value, in so far as they are not scientific statements, are not in the literal sense significant but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false. To say ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’ is not to state any more than one would have stated by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2019-06-06
    Reply to J. W. Smith.David Bloor - 1983 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 15 (3):245.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. added 2019-06-06
    VII.—Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics.C. D. Broad - 1945 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45 (1):131-166.
  25. added 2019-06-05
    Slote , Michael . Moral Sentimentalism .New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 163. $65.00 (Cloth).Anita M. Superson - 2012 - Ethics 122 (2):448-453.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2019-06-05
    Value and Fitting Emotions.Michael S. Brady - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (4):465-475.
  27. added 2019-06-05
    Book ReviewsShaun Nichols,. Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment.New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pp. 226. $60.00. [REVIEW]Gopal Sreenivasan - 2006 - Ethics 116 (4):800-805.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2019-05-15
    Sontag on Impertinent Sympathy and Photographs of Evil.Sean T. Murphy - forthcoming - In Colin Marshall (ed.), Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality. Routledge.
    This chapter corrects for Susan Sontag's undeserved neglect by contemporary ethical philosophers by bringing awareness to some of the unique metaethical insights born of her reflections on photographic representations of evil. I argue that Sontag's thought provides fertile ground for thinking about: (1) moral perception and its relation to moral knowledge; and (2) the epistemic and moral value of our emotional responses to the misery and suffering of others. I show that, contrary to standard moral perception theory (e.g. Blum 1994), (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2019-04-26
    Jesse J. Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals , Pp. Ix +334.Ben Fraser - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (4):558-563.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2019-04-24
    Chornobyl as an Open Air Museum: A Polysemic Exploration of Power and Inner Self.Olga Bertelsen - 2018 - Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal 5:1-36.
    This study focuses on nuclear tourism, which flourished a decade ago in the Exclusion Zone, a regimented area around the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (Ukraine) established in 1986, where the largest recorded nuclear explosion in human history occurred. The mass pilgrimage movement transformed the place into an open air museum, a space that preserves the remnants of Soviet culture, revealing human tragedies of displacement and deaths, and the nature of state nuclear power. This study examines the impact of the site (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2019-03-14
    Osaammeko rakentaa moraalisia toimijoita?Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Panu Raatikainen (ed.), Tekoäly, ihminen ja yhteiskunta.
    Jotta olisimme moraalisesti vastuussa teoistamme, meidän on kyettävä muodostamaan käsityksiä oikeasta ja väärästä ja toimimaan ainakin jossain määrin niiden mukaisesti. Jos olemme täysivaltaisia moraalitoimijoita, myös ymmärrämme miksi jotkin teot ovat väärin, ja kykenemme siten joustavasti mukauttamaan toimintaamme eri tilanteisiin. Esitän, ettei näköpiirissä ole tekoälyjärjestelmiä, jotka kykenisivät aidosti välittämään oikein tekemisestä tai ymmärtämään moraalin vaatimuksia, koska nämä kyvyt vaativat kokemustietoisuutta ja kokonaisvaltaista arvostelukykyä. Emme siten voi sysätä koneille vastuuta teoistaan. Meidän on sen sijaan pyrittävä rakentamaan keinotekoisia oikeintekijöitä - järjestelmiä, jotka eivät (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2019-03-14
    Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow.Hanno Sauer - 2018 - New York: Routledge.
    In recent research, dual-process theories of cognition have been the primary model for explaining moral judgment and reasoning. These theories understand moral thinking in terms of two separate domains: one deliberate and analytic, the other quick and instinctive. -/- This book presents a new theory of the philosophy and cognitive science of moral judgment. Hanno Sauer develops and defends an account of "triple-process" moral psychology, arguing that moral thinking and reasoning are only insufficiently understood when described in terms of a (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2019-03-07
    Moral Sentimentalism in Counterfactual Contexts: Moral Properties Are Response-Enabled.Daniel Dohrn - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):69-82.
    According to moral sentimentalism, there are close connections between moral truths and moral emotions. Emotions largely form our moral attitudes. They contribute to our answerability to moral obligations. We take them as authoritative in guiding moral judgement. This role is difficult to understand if one accepts a full-blown moral realism, according to which moral truths are completely independent of our emotional response to them. Hence it is tempting to claim that moral truths depend on our emotional responses. I outline a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. added 2019-02-07
    Theory of Purposive Behavior, Desire, and Belief, with Applications to the Issues of Materialism and the Objectivity of Value Judgments.Gregory Dean Weber - 1980 - Dissertation, Indiana University
    I examine the relations of three kinds of mental state--desire, belief, and purpose--to their manifestations in behavior, and derive from these relations certain consequences for the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of value. -/- Part I deals with how a purpose that is actually being acted upon is manifested in behavior. Tolman and Pepper held the thesis T: An agent A acts with purpose G if and only if A "persists until" G and A is "docile" with respect to (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2019-02-04
    The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology.Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.) - 2009 - Routledge.
    _The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, Second Edition_ is an invaluable guide and major reference source to the major topics, problems, concepts and debates in philosophy of psychology and is the first companion of its kind. A team of renowned international contributors provide forty-nine chapters organised into six clear parts: Historical background to Philosophy of Psychology Psychological Explanation Cognition and Representation The biological basis of psychology Perceptual Experience Personhood. _The Companion_ covers key topics such as the origins of experimental (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. added 2018-12-07
    What Is Sentimentalism? What Is Rationalism? Commentary on Joshua May.Antti Kauppinen - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e157.
    In Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, Joshua May argues successfully that many claims about the causal influence of affect on moral judgment are overblown. But the findings he cites are compatible with many of the key arguments of philosophical sentimentalists. His account of rationalism, in turn, relies on an overly broad notion of inference, and leaves open crucial questions about how we reason to moral conclusions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. added 2018-11-08
    Psychopathy, Autism, and Basic Moral Emotions: Evidence for Sentimentalist Constructivism.Erick Ramirez - forthcoming - In Serife Tekin & Robyn Bluhm (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. Bloomsbury.
    Philosophers and psychologists often claim that moral agency is connected with the ability to feel, understand, and deploy moral emotions. In this chapter, I investigate the nature of these emotions and their connection with moral agency. First, I examine the degree to which these emotional capacities are innate and/or ‘basic’ in a philosophically important sense. I examine three senses in which an emotion might be basic: developmental, compositional, and phylogenetic. After considering the evidence for basic emotion, I conclude that emotions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. added 2018-09-24
    Using Benevolent Affections to Learn Our Duty.Marina Folescu - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):467-489.
    The puzzle is this: I argue that for Reid, moral sense needs benevolent affections – i.e. some of our animal, non-cognitive principles of action – to apply the rules of duty. But he also thinks that duty can conflict with benevolent affections. So what happens in these conflict cases? I will argue that Reid takes moral psychology seriously and that he believes that our natural benevolent affections can be used as indicators of duty. Although creative, his account has a major (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39. added 2018-09-24
    O Lugar das Emoções na Ética e na Metaética.Flavio Williges, Marcelo Fischborn & David Copp (eds.) - 2018 - Pelotas: NEPFil online/Editora da UFPel.
    Esta coletânea explora o papel desempenhado pelas emoções na teorização em ética e metaética. Inclui capítulos escritos por pesquisadores do Brasil e de outros países.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. added 2018-09-16
    Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P.F. Strawson's Freedom and Resentment.Paul Russell - 2016 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    The philosophical debate about free will and responsibility has been of great importance throughout the history of philosophy. In modern times this debate has received an enormous resurgence of interest and the contribution in 1962 by P.F. Strawson with the publication of his essay "Freedom and Resentment" has generated a wide range of discussion and criticism in the philosophical community and beyond. The debate is of central importance to recent developments in the free will literature and has shaped the way (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. added 2018-08-27
    La teoría del juicio moral en David Hume: un movimiento a tres tiempos.Alejandro Ordieres - 2017 - Estudios 15 (121):39-53.
    In David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, reason and passion are in constant interaction forming belief. Moral events are distinguished on three levels: moral sentiment, moral action and moral judgment, in which reason and passion interact, although with different functions at each level.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. added 2018-08-21
    L’indignation, le mépris et le pardon dans l’émergence du cadre légal d’Occupy Geneva.Frédéric Minner - 2018 - Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales 56 (2):133-159.
    Cet article s’intéresse au problème de la maintenance, c’est-à-dire au moment où les membres d’un collectif social tentent d’assurer dans le temps l’existence de leur collectif en instituant des règles pour réguler leurs comportements. Ce problème se pose avec acuité lorsque certains membres ne respectent pas ces règles communes. Pour maintenir la coopération sociale, les membres peuvent décider d’instituer des règles secondaires visant à sanctionner les transgressions des règles primaires déjà établies. La maintenance d’un collectif peut ainsi reposer sur l’émergence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43. added 2018-08-11
    Moral Reasoning and Emotion.Joshua May & Victor Kumar - 2018 - In Karen Jones, Mark Timmons & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 139-156.
    This chapter discusses contemporary scientific research on the role of reason and emotion in moral judgment. The literature suggests that moral judgment is influenced by both reasoning and emotion separately, but there is also emerging evidence of the interaction between the two. While there are clear implications for the rationalism-sentimentalism debate, we conclude that important questions remain open about how central emotion is to moral judgment. We also suggest ways in which moral philosophy is not only guided by empirical research (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44. added 2018-08-03
    Practical Reason, Sympathy and Reactive Attitudes.Max Khan Hayward - 2017 - Noûs:51-75.
    This paper has three aims. First, I defend, in its most radical form, Hume's scepticism about practical reason, as it applies to purely self-regarding matters. It's not always irrational to discount the future, to be inconstant in one's preferences, to have incompatible desires, to not pursue the means to one's ends, or to fail to maximize one's own good. Second, I explain how our response to the “irrational” agent should be understood as an expression of frustrated sympathy, in Adam Smith's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. added 2018-07-02
    The Origins of Emotivism, Expressivism and the Error Theory: Marty, Scheler, Russell, Ogden & Richards.Kevin Mulligan - 2017 - In Hamid Taieb & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Mind and Language – on the Philosophy of Anton Marty. De Gruyter. pp. 149-168.
  46. added 2018-07-01
    Review of Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives, Edited by Remy Debes and Karsten Stueber. [REVIEW]Michael Milona - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2018:N/A.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2018-02-18
    Moral Sentimentalism.Michael Slote - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):3-14.
    In a way reminiscent of Hume's approach in the Treatise, a reviving moral sentimentalism can use the notion of empathy to ground both its normative account of moral obligation and its metaethical account of moral language. A virtuous person is empathically caring about others and expresses such feeling/motivation in her actions. But the judgment that something is right or good is also based in empathy, and the sentimentalist can espouse a form of moral realism by making use of a Kripkean (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  48. added 2018-02-17
    Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. He maintains that we cannot get clear about ethics until we get clear about human nature. So these are the sorts of questions he addresses: Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers in an exploration of guilt, shame, disgust, and other moral emotions; he draws (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   280 citations  
  49. added 2018-01-25
    Are Emotions Perceptions of Value (and Why This Matters)?Charlie Kurth, Enter Author Name Without Selecting A. Profile: Haley Crosby & Enter Author Name Without Selecting A. Profile: Jack Basse - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    In Emotions, Values & Agency, Christine Tappolet develops a sophisticated, perceptual theory of emotions and their role in wide range of issues in value theory and epistemology. In this paper, we raise three worries about Tappolet's proposal.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. added 2017-10-20
    Love Redirected: On Adam Smith's Love of Praiseworthiness.Sveinung Sundfør Sivertsen - 2017 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 15 (1):101-123.
    Why be moral? Why, in the language of Adam Smith, act on what you think is praiseworthy even when it does not get you praise from other people? Because, answers Smith, you love praiseworthiness. But what is this love of praiseworthiness, and where does it come from? In this article, 1) I argue that we start to love praiseworthiness when we redirect our love of praise away from other people toward the ‘impartial spectator’-aspect of ourselves, and 2) show how this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 376