Moral Epistemology

Edited by Christopher Michael Cloos (University of California at Santa Barbara)
About this topic
Summary

Moral epistemology concerns moral knowledge and things related to moral knowledge. Is it possible for one to know that torturing babies for fun is wrong? Can one know that slavery is unjust? Moral skeptics doubt the possibility of moral knowledge and doubt its veracity. Some argue that the persistence of wide-spread moral disagreement among peoples, such as differing views on the morality of infanticide, abortion, and capital punishment, suggests there is no fact of the matter regarding moral claims. Some moral theorists argue for the possibility of justified moral beliefs sufficient to yield moral knowledge. Moral coherentists claims that moral beliefs are justified in virtue of being part of a coherent body of beliefs. Reflective equilibrium is a method of moral justification that is often regarded as a form of moral coherentism. It is a way of resolving conflicts between intuitive moral judgments and moral principles that seek to capture those judgments. Intuitionism is an alternative approach to the justification of moral beliefs. On this theory, moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified. Additionally, some theorists endorse moral rationalism. On this view, it is possible to have moral knowledge even when that knowledge is not based on sense experience. Moral knowledge is often compared to mathematical knowledge. Lastly, moral agents always operate under moral uncertainty. It is impossible to perfectly predict the moral goodness or value that will result from a given course of action. Various approaches try to deal with moral uncertainty, often by incorporating the calculation of expected utility into moral choice situations.

Key works

Brink 1989 argues that coherence between a moral belief and one’s other beliefs can justify that moral belief. Sayre-McCord 1996 also endorses this view but argues that things other than one’s beliefs can factor into coherence and justification. Audi 2004 and Huemer 2005 defend comprehensive accounts of moral intuitionism, but Sinnott-Armstrong 2006 argues that moral beliefs are not justified non-inferentially. McGrath 2008 argues that moral disagreement can prevent one from obtaining moral knowledge when one’s peer shares one’s basic moral commitments, yet Wedgwood 2007 argues against this position. Peacocke 2003 and Setiya 2012 defend accounts of moral rationalism involving the possession of moral concepts. Rawls ms articulates the method of reflective equilibrium in defending how one can arrive at the best conception of justice. Daniels 1996 extends the method of reflective equilibrium to include background theories of human nature and social stability.

Introductions For online introductions to moral epistemology see Tramel 2005 and Campbell 2014. For general overviews of the topic see Arrington 1989, Audi 1999, Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, and Zimmerman 2010.
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2028 found
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  1. Fallibility Without Facts.Will Gamester - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    If, as expressivists maintain, the function of normative thought and talk is not to represent or describe the world, then how can normative judgements be correct or incorrect? In particular, how can I make sense of my own normative fallibility, the possibility that my own normative judgements might be mistaken? In this paper, I construct and defend a substantive but non-representational theory of normative (in)correctness for expressivists. Inspired by Blackburn’s (1998: 318) proposal that I make sense of my fallibility in (...)
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  2. Quine on Ethics: The Gavagai of Moral Discourse.Necip Fikri Alican - 2021 - Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Quine on Ethics: The Gavagai of Moral Discourse is the first comprehensive treatment of Quine’s brief yet memorable foray into ethics. It defends him against his most formidable critics, corrects misconceptions in the reception of his outlook on morality as a social institution and ethics as a philosophical enterprise, and restores emphasis on observationality as the impetus behind his momentous intervention in ethical theory. The central focus is on Quine’s infamous challenge to ethical theory: his thesis of the methodological infirmity (...)
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  3. Religious Accommodation in Bioethics and the Practice of Medicine.William R. Smith & Robert Audi - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (2):188-218.
    Debates about the ethics of health care and medical research in contemporary pluralistic democracies often arise partly from competing religious and secular values. Such disagreements raise challenges of balancing claims of religious liberty with claims to equal treatment in health care. This paper proposes several mid-level principles to help in framing sound policies for resolving such disputes. We develop and illustrate these principles, exploring their application to conscientious objection by religious providers and religious institutions, accommodation of religious priorities in biomedical (...)
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  4. Iris Murdoch: Moral Vision.Anil Gomes - forthcoming - In Mark Hopwood & Silvia Panizza (eds.), The Murdochian Mind. Routledge.
    In the essays which make up The Sovereignty of Good, Iris Murdoch gives us a picture of moral life in which ‘the metaphor of vision [is] almost irresistibly suggested’. This chapter aims to clarify the role played by the metaphor of vision in Murdoch’s philosophical thinking. I’ll examine two different things which might be meant by the term ‘moral vision’: vision of moral things or vision which is itself moral. The suggestion will be that whilst both capture something important about (...)
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  5. On the Possibility of Wholesale Moral Error.Farbod Akhlaghi - 2021 - Ratio:1–13.
    The moral error theory, it seems, could be true. The mere possibility of its truth might also seem inconsequential. But it is not. For, I argue, there is a sense in which the moral error theory is possible that generates an argument against both non‐cognitivism and moral naturalism. I argue that it is an epistemic possibility that morality is subject to some form of wholesale error of the kind that would make the moral error theory true. Denying this possibility has (...)
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  6. Tra il dire e il fare. Gli esperti morali alla prova.Michel Croce - 2020 - Sesto San Giovanni (MI): Mimesis.
    Se nell’era della post-verità la competenza degli esperti è oggetto di continui attacchi, la figura dell’esperto morale è da sempre vista con un certo scetticismo. Riconoscerne l’esistenza implica ammettere che alcune persone sono moralmente superiori ad altre e richiede di determinare la natura della loro superiorità. Dobbiamo immaginare l’esperto morale come una persona virtuosa o come uno specialista in fatto di dilemmi etici? E quale contributo possiamo aspettarci dall’esperto morale all’interno delle nostre comunità? Il volume si propone di rispondere a (...)
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  7. Debunking, Epistemic Achievement, and Undermining Defeat.Michael Klenk - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Several anti-debunkers have argued that evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs fail to meet a necessary condition on undermining defeat called modal security. They conclude that evolution, therefore, does not debunk our moral beliefs. This article shows that modal security is false if knowledge is virtuous achievement. New information can undermine a given belief without giving one reason to doubt that that belief is sensitive or safe. This leads to a novel conception of undermining defeat, and it shows that successful (...)
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  8. Distinguishing Value-Neutrality From Value-Independence: Toward a New Disentangling Strategy for Moral Epistemology.Lubomira V. Radoilska - forthcoming - In Mark McBride & Visa A. J. Kurki (eds.), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer.
    This chapter outlines a new disentangling strategy for moral epistemology. It builds on the fundamental distinction between value-neutrality and value-independence as two separate aspects of methodological austerity introduced by Matthew Kramer. This type of conceptual analysis is then applied to two major challenges in moral epistemology: globalised scepticism and debate fragmentation. Both challenges arise from collapsing the fact/value dichotomy. They can be addressed by comprehensive disentangling that runs along both dimensions – value neutrality vs. value non-neutrality and value independence vs. (...)
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  9. Critical Notice of S. E. Toulmin's An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics.C. D. Broad - 1952 - Mind 61 (241):93-101.
  10. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1996 - Blackwell.
  11. Why You Cannot Make People Better by Telling Them What is Good.Ulf Hlobil - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):986-996.
    So-called optimists about moral testimony argue, against pessimists, that, ceteris paribus, we ought to accept and act in accordance with trustworthy, pure moral testimony. I argue that even if we grant this, we need to explain why moral testimony cannot make us more virtuous. I offer an explanation that appeals to the fact that we cannot share inferential abilities via testimony. This explanation is compatible with the core commitments of optimism, but it also allows us to see what is right (...)
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  12. Evolution and Moral Common Sense.Regina Rini - 2020 - In Rik Peels, Jeroen De Ridder & René Van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientific Challenges to Common Sense Philosophy.
    A short response to Michael Ruse's essay 'Commons Sense Morality and Its Evolutionary Underpinnings'. Argues that an evolutionary approach to ethics has difficulty accounting for the first-personal and existential aspects of moral deliberation.
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  13. Perceptualism and the Epistemology of Normative Reasons.Jean Moritz Müller - forthcoming - Synthese:1-30.
    According to much recent work in metaethics, we have a perceptual access to normative properties and relations. On a common approach, this access has a presentational character. Here, ‘presentational’ specifies a characteristic feature of the way aspects of the environment are apprehended in sensory experience. While many authors have argued that we enjoy presentations of value properties, thus far comparatively less effort has been invested into developing a presentational view of the apprehension of normative reasons. Since it appears that this (...)
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  14. Moral Realism and the Existence of God: Improving Parfit's Metaethics.Martin Jakobsen - 2020 - Leuven, Belgia: Peeters.
    Can there be an objective morality without God? Derek Parfit argues that it can and offers a theory of morality that is neither theistic nor naturalistic. This book provides a critical assessment of Parfit's metaethical theory. Jakobsen identifies some problems in Parfit’s theory – problems concerning moral normativity, the ontological status of morality, and evolutionary influence on our moral beliefs – and argues that theological resources can help solve them. -/- By showing how Parfit’s theory may be improved by the (...)
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  15. Defusing the Regress Challenge to Debunking Arguments.Shang Long Yeo - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):785-800.
    A debunking argument contends that some target moral judgments were produced by unreliable processes and concludes that such judgments are unjustified. Debunking arguments face a regress challenge: to show that a process is unreliable at tracking the moral truth, we need to rely on other moral judgments. But we must show that these relied-upon judgments are also reliable, which requires yet a further set of judgments, whose reliability needs to be confirmed too, and so on. Some argue that the debunker (...)
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  16. Sentimental Perceptualism and the Challenge From Cognitive Bases.Michael Milona & Hichem Naar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3071-3096.
    According to a historically popular view, emotions are normative experiences that ground moral knowledge much as perceptual experiences ground empirical knowledge. Given the analogy it draws between emotion and perception, sentimental perceptualism constitutes a promising, naturalist-friendly alternative to classical rationalist accounts of moral knowledge. In this paper, we consider an important but underappreciated objection to the view, namely that in contrast with perception, emotions depend for their occurrence on prior representational states, with the result that emotions cannot give perceptual-like access (...)
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  17. Ética de la conciencia, la imitación reflexiva como enfoque alternativo en el debate por una justificación plausible de los juicios morales.Jose David Bombiela Sepúlveda - 2018 - Dissertation, Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira
    La aclaración de la importancia de la conciencia fue crucial en el debate histórico entre los partidarios de la ética derivada de los movimientos racionalistas y los defensores de la ética derivada de las concepciones empiristas. Esta propuesta intenta considerar esta cuestión, demostrando a partir de los textos de Tugendhat la necesidad de una justificación plausible de los juicios morales. Esta forma de justificación se propone en esta monografía a través de una definición propia de la conciencia moral, con unas (...)
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  18. Unscrutable Morality: Could Anyone Know Every Moral Truth?Marcus Hunt - 2020 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 59 (20):215-227.
    To begin to answer the question of whether every moral truth could be known by any one individual, this paper examines David Chalmers’ views on the scrutability of moral truths in Constructing the World. Chalmers deals with the question of the scrutability of moral truths ecumenically, claiming that moral truths are scrutable on all plausible metaethical views. I raise two objections to Chalmers’ approach. The first objection is that he confl ates the claim that moral truths are scrutable from PQTI (...)
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  19. Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker.Sebastian Hengst - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-14.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Derek Baker (Erkenntnis 83(4):829–852, 2018) raises an objection to expressivism as it has been developed by Mark Schroeder (Being for, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Baker argues that Schroeder’s expressivist (1) is committed to certain sentences expressing rationally incoherent states of mind, and he objects (2) that the expressivist cannot explain why these states would be rationally incoherent. The aim of this paper is to show that Baker’s argument for (1) is unsound, and (...)
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  20. Carl Rogers and Karl Rahner.Thomas F. O'Meara - 2019 - Philosophy and Theology 31 (1):167-173.
    Bernhard Deister’s book Anthropologie im Dialog is a comparison of aspects of Karl Rahner’s theology with the psychology of Carl Rogers. Here the dialogue partner of the German philosophical theologian is an American psychologist of influence. The author begins: “These pages present two exemplary pictures of the human person, from theology and psychology. They unfold their approaches in an interdisciplinary dialogue.” The following pages summarize this comparison. Both thinkers see the human being as an active subject living in the tensions (...)
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  21. Adam Smith and the Stoic Principle of Suicide.Getty L. Lustila - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):350-363.
    A substantial portion of Adam Smith's discussion of Stoicism in TMS VII is dedicated to the Stoic “principle of suicide,” according to which suicide is sometimes morally required. While scholars agree that Stoicism exercised considerable influence over Smith, no recent work has explored his views on suicide, despite the central role it plays in his treatment of Stoicism. I argue that Smith opposes the principle of suicide on both epistemic and moral grounds, providing an important critique of Stoicism. I also (...)
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  22. Bad Bootstrapping: The Problem with Third-Factor Replies to the Darwinian Dilemma for Moral Realism.Michelle M. Dyke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2115-2128.
    Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma” is a well-known epistemological objection to moral realism. In this paper, I argue that “third-factor” replies to this argument on behalf of the moral realist, as popularized by Enoch :413–438, 2010, Taking morality seriously: a defense of robust realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011), Skarsaune :229–243, 2011) and Wielenberg :441–464, 2010, Robust ethics: the metaphysics and epistemology of godless normative realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), cannot succeed. This is because they are instances of the illegitimate form (...)
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  23. Foundations of Moral Philosophy: Readings in Metaethics.Steven M. Cahn & Andrew Forcehimes (eds.) - 2017 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Foundations of Moral Philosophy: Readings in Metaethics is a comprehensive collection of fifty-six contemporary readings and historical sources on major issues in metaethics. It focuses on the meaning of moral terms, the nature of moral psychology, whether we can know moral truths (if there are any), and the role of moral reasons. The book features unparalleled representation of women philosophers, with one-third of the contemporary articles authored or coauthored by women. Wherever appropriate, the articles have been carefully edited to ensure (...)
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  24. Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for Perceptual Awareness?Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3):290-319.
    Moral perception has made something of a comeback in recent work on moral epistemology. Many traditional objections to the view have been argued to fail upon closer inspection. But it remains an open question just how far moral perception might extend. In this paper, I provide the beginnings of an answer to this question by assessing the relationship between the metaphysical structure of different normative properties and a plausible constraint on which properties are eligible for perceptual awareness which I call (...)
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  25. Autonome Vernunft Oder Moralische Sehkraft. Das Epistemische Fundament der Ethik Bei Immanuel Kant Und Iris Murdoch.Andreas Trampota - 2003 - Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
    Das Buch ist ein Beitrag zur aktuellen philosophischen Debatte über das anthropologisch-epistemologische Fundament moralischer Normen. Es werden zwei unterschiedliche Modelle vorgestellt: zum einen die Autonomie-Konzeption Kants, die auf dem Begriff des freien Willens gründet, der sich selbst dem Vernunftgesetz unterstellt; zum anderen die von Platon inspirierte Moralphilosophie Iris Murdochs, in der die moralische Sehkraft, die sich an der aufmerksamen Wahrnehmung des konkreten Einzelnen orientiert, im Mittelpunkt des guten Lebens steht. In der Auseinandersetzung mit den beiden Entwürfen werden deren Stärken und (...)
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  26. The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment: Empirical and Philosophical Developments.Joshua May, Clifford I. Workman, Julia Haas & Hyemin Han - forthcoming - In Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Neuroscience and Philosophy. Cambridge, USA: MIT Press.
    We chart how neuroscience and philosophy have together advanced our understanding of moral judgment with implications for when it goes well or poorly. The field initially focused on brain areas associated with reason versus emotion in the moral evaluations of sacrificial dilemmas. But new threads of research have studied a wider range of moral evaluations and how they relate to models of brain development and learning. By weaving these threads together, we are developing a better understanding of the neurobiology of (...)
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  27. Editor’s Introduction.Ross D. Inman - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (2):251-251.
  28. Review of Michael Austin, Humility and Human Flourishing: A Study in Analytic Moral Theology, Oxford Univ. Press, 2018. [REVIEW]Jeanine Grenberg - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1):205.
  29. Wile E. Coyote and the Craggy Rocks Below.Tyler Dalton McNabb - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (2):339-346.
    William Lane Craig has defended the following two contentions: If theism is true, we have a sound foundation for morality, and, If theism is false, we do not have a sound foundation for morality. Erik Wielenberg rejects. Specifically, Wielenberg argues that naturalists have resources to make sense of objective moral values, moral duties, and moral knowledge. In response to Wielenberg, I defend Craig’s second contention by arguing that Wielenberg’s theory fails to robustly capture our moral phenomenology as well as make (...)
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  30. Introduction to the American Academy of Religion Panel Forum on Erik Wielenberg’s Robust Ethics.Adam Lloyd Johnson - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (2):331-332.
    Erik Wielenberg is the most important contemporary critic of theistic metaethics. Wielenberg maintains that God is unnecessary for objective morality because moral truths exist as brute facts of the universe that have no, and need no, foundation. At times his description of these brute facts make them sound like abstract objects or Platonic forms. At the American Academy of Religion’s annual meeting in Boston in November of 2017, we organized an Evangelical Philosophical Society panel to discuss Erik Wielenberg’s book Robust (...)
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  31. Reply to Craig, Murphy, McNabb, and Johnson.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (2):365-375.
    In Robust Ethics, I defend a nontheistic version of moral realism according to which moral properties are sui generis, not reducible to other kinds of properties and objective morality requires no foundation external to itself. I seek to provide a plausible account of the metaphysics and epistemology of the robust brand of moral realism I favor that draws on both analytic philosophy and contemporary empirical moral psychology. In this paper, I respond to some objections to my view advanced by William (...)
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  32. A Dilemma for Non-Naturalists: Irrationality or Immorality?Matthew S. Bedke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1027-1042.
    Either 1. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as relevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters, or 2. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as irrelevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters. The first state of mind is morally objectionable, for one should (...)
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  33. Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind. By Joshua May. Pp. Ix, 264, Oxford University Press, 2018, £45.00. [REVIEW]Agneta Sutton - 2020 - Heythrop Journal 61 (2):359-359.
    he burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary moral thought and action, we're told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and ultimately driven by unreasoned feelings. This book counters the current orthodoxy on its own terms by carefully engaging with the empirical literature. The resulting view, optimistic rationalism, shows the pervasive role played by reason our moral minds, and ultimately defuses sweeping debunking arguments in ethics. The science does suggest that moral knowledge and virtue don't come (...)
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  34. Remembering What is Right.Casey Doyle - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):49-64.
    According to Pessimism about moral testimony, it is objectionable to form moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates Pessimism about another source of moral knowledge: propositional memory. Drawing on a discussion of Gilbert Ryle’s on forgetting the difference between right and wrong, it argues that Internalism about moral motivation offers a satisfying explanation of Pessimism about memory. A central claim of the paper is that Pessimism about memory (and by extension, testimony) is an issue in moral psychology rather (...)
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  35. Desiring Under the Proper Guise.Michael Milona & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:121-143.
    According to the thesis of the guise of the normative, all desires are associated with normative appearances or judgments. But guise of the normative theories differ sharply over the content of the normative representation, with the two main versions being the guise of reasons and the guise of the good. Chapter 6 defends the comparative thesis that the guise of reasons thesis is more promising than the guise of the good. The central idea is that observations from the theory of (...)
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  36. The Ethics–Mathematics Analogy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).
    Ethics and mathematics have long invited comparisons. On the one hand, both ethical and mathematical propositions can appear to be knowable a priori, if knowable at all. On the other hand, mathematical propositions seem to admit of proof, and to enter into empirical scientific theories, in a way that ethical propositions do not. In this article, I discuss apparent similarities and differences between ethical (i.e., moral) and mathematical knowledge, realistically construed -- i.e., construed as independent of human mind and languages. (...)
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  37. How It All Relates : Exploring the Space of Value Comparisons.Henrik Andersson - 2017 - Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis explores whether the three standard value relations, “better than”, “worse than” and “equally as good”, exhaust the possibilities in which things can relate with respect to their value. Or more precisely, whether there are examples in which one of these relations is not instantiated. There are cases in which it is not obvious that one of these relations does obtain; these are referred to as “hard cases of comparison”. These hard cases of comparison become interesting, since if it (...)
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  38. The Hard Problem for Soft Moral Realism.Lei Zhong - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (10):555-576.
    Several leading moral philosophers have recently proposed a soft version of moral realism, according to which moral facts—though it is reasonable to postulate them—cannot metaphysically explain other facts (Dworkin 2011; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014). However, soft moral realism is faced with what I call the “Hard Problem”, namely, the problem of how this soft version of moral metaphysics could accommodate moral knowledge. This paper reconstructs three approaches to solving the Hard Problem on behalf of the soft realist: the autonomy approach, (...)
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  39. The Dynamics of Moral Progress.Julia Hermann - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):300-311.
    Assuming that there is moral progress, and assuming that the abolition of slavery is an example of it, how does moral progress occur? Is it mainly driven by specific individuals who have gained new moral insights, or by changes in the socio‐economic and epistemic conditions in which agents morally judge the norms and practices of their society, and act upon these judgements? In this paper, I argue that moral progress is a complex process in which changes at the level of (...)
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  40. Objectivist Conditions for Defeat and Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Michael Klenk - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):246-259.
    I make a case for distinguishing clearly between subjective and objective accounts of undercutting defeat and for rejecting a hybrid view that takes both subjective and objective elements to be relevant for whether or not a belief is defeated. Moderate subjectivists claim that taking a belief to be defeated is sufficient for the belief to be defeated; subjectivist idealists add that if an idealised agent takes a belief to be defeated then the belief is defeated. Subjectivist idealism evades some of (...)
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  41. Epistemic Burdens and the Incentives of Surrogate Decision-Makers.Parker Crutchfield & Scott Scheall - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (4):613-621.
    We aim to establish the following claim: other factors held constant, the relative weights of the epistemic burdens of competing treatment options serve to determine the options that patient surrogates pursue. Simply put, surrogates confront an incentive, ceteris paribus, to pursue treatment options with respect to which their knowledge is most adequate to the requirements of the case. Regardless of what the patient would choose, options that require more knowledge than the surrogate possesses (or is likely to learn) will either (...)
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  42. Hanno Sauer, Debunking Arguments in Ethics , Pp. Xi + 244. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2019 - Utilitas 8 (4):1-5.
  43. Ideological Surpassing Of Philosophy / Идеологическое Превосхождение Философии.Pavel Simashenkov - 2019 - Modern European Researches 4 (31):54-62.
    The article is devoted to the study of ideological and philosophical components correlation in the worldview formation. According to the author, it is fundamentally important to take for understanding Russian history and culture not speculative, but ideological coordinates as the basis. Ideology as a professed philosophy is incomparably higher than any palliative abstraction. It is necessary not to lower culture to the level of the masses, but to elevate a person to the level of culture, impossible without a cult.
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  44. Moral Testimony as Higher Order Evidence.Marcus Lee, Jon Robson & Neil Sinclair - forthcoming - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    Are the circumstances in which moral testimony serves as evidence that our judgement-forming processes are unreliable the same circumstances in which mundane testimony serves as evidence that our mundane judgement-forming processes are unreliable? In answering this question, we distinguish two possible roles for testimony: (i) providing a legitimate basis for a judgement, (ii) providing (‘higher-order’) evidence that a judgement-forming process is unreliable. We explore the possibilities for a view according to which moral testimony does not, in contrast to mundane testimony (...)
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  45. Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality.Colin Marshall (ed.) - 2019 - Routledge.
    This collection of new essays focuses on metaethical views from outside the mainstream European tradition. The guiding motivation is that important discussions about the ultimate nature of morality can be found far beyond ancient Greece and modern Europe. The volume’s aim is to show how rich the possibilities are for comparative metaethics, and how much these comparisons can add to contemporary discussions of the foundations of morality. Representing five continents, the thinkers discussed range from ancient Egyptian, ancient Chinese, and the (...)
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  46. Levinas and Analytic Philosophy: An Ethical Metaphysics of Reasons.Kevin Houser - 2018 - In Michael L. Morgan (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Levinas. pp. 587-614.
    Recent analytic philosophy often explains our responsibility to one another in terms of normative reasons. Emmanuel Levinas thinks this is backwards. We are not responsible to one another because we have reasons to be. For reasons are themselves something we are responsible to one another to have; and it is only because we are responsible to one another for them that we are able to have our own reasons. Put broadly: Reasons-responsiveness is a form of responsiveness to persons. Standard reasons-first (...)
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  47. Testing for Intrinsic Value, for Us as We Are.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-26.
    Philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Brentano, Moore, and Chisholm suggest marks of intrinsic value. Contemporary philosophers such as Christine Korsgaard have insightful discussions of intrinsic value. But how do we verify that some specific thing really is intrinsically valuable? I propose a natural way to test for intrinsic value: first, strip the candidate bare of all considerations of good consequences; and, second, see if what remains is still a good thing. I argue that we, as ordinary human beings, have (...)
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  48. Grounding the Good.Troy Catterson - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (1):85-102.
    I argue that moral goodness is necessarily self-predicating. That is to say, the property of being morally good is morally good. I then argue that reductions of moral goodness to natural properties, particularly utilitarian specifications, are not necessarily self-predicating. Therefore, such reductions are not successful. Finally, I consider the possibility of defining the good as “fulfilling God’s design plan.” I show that, under an Aristotelian construal of property existence this property is provably self-predicating.
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  49. Nuno Venturinha: Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology. [REVIEW]Jakub Mácha - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
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  50. Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion.Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):355-364.
    It is popular to hold that our primary epistemic access to specific response-dependent properties like the fearsome or admirable (or so-called ‘affective properties’) is constituted by the corresponding emotion. I argue that this view is incompatible with a widely held meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More specifically, I argue that this view cannot accommodate for the requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the formation of the corresponding emotion, our primary (...)
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