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  1. The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism.John Bengson, Terence Cuneo & Andrew Reisner - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (5):471-498.
    The Projectability Challenge states that a metaethical view must explain how ordinary agents can, on the basis of moral experience and reflection, accurately and justifiably apply moral concepts to novel situations. In this paper, we argue for two primary claims. First, paradigm nonnaturalism can satisfactorily answer the projectability challenge. Second, it is unclear whether there is a version of moral naturalism that can satisfactorily answer the challenge. The conclusion we draw is that there is an important respect in which nonnaturalism (...)
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  2. L'aritmetica della morale.Andrea Bucci - manuscript
    Un primo tentativo di dare un'interpretazione morale dell'aritmetica.
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  3. Consequentialist Demands, Intuitions and Experimental Methodology (with Joe Sweetman).Attila Tanyi - manuscript
    Can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. We take the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness Objection – as a given and are also not concerned with finding the best response to the Objection. Instead, our main aim is to explicate the intuitive background of the Objection and to see how this background could be investigated. This double aim (...)
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  4. Appreciation as an Epistemic Emotion.Dong An - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-16.
    In this paper, I develop an account of appreciation. I argue that appreciation is an epistemic emotion in which the subject grasps the object in an affective way. The “grasping” and “feeling” components implies that in appreciation, we make sense of the object by having cognitive control over it, are motivated to maintain the valuable epistemic state of understanding, and experience the “aha” or “eureka” moment. This account offers a unified account of the many types of appreciation, including the aesthetic, (...)
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  5. Equal Standing and Proper Reliance on Others.Carla Bagnoli - forthcoming - Theoria.
    According to a traditional account, moral cognition is an achievement gained over time by sharing a practice under the guidance and the example of the wise, in analogy with craft and apprenticeship. This model captures an important feature of practical reason, that is, its incompleteness, and highlights our dependence on others in obtaining moral knowledge, coherently with the socially extended mind agenda and recent findings in empirical psychology. Insofar as it accords to exemplars decisive authority to determine the standard of (...)
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  6. Debunking Arguments: Mathematics, Logic, and Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Robert Richards and Michael Ruse (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    I discuss the structure of genealogical debunking arguments. I argue that they undermine our mathematical beliefs if they undermine our moral beliefs. The contrary appearance stems from a confusion of arithmetic truths with (first-order) logical truths, or from a confusion of reliability with justification. I conclude with a discussion of the cogency of debunking arguments, in light of the above. Their cogency depends on whether information can undermine all of our beliefs of a kind, F, without giving us direct reason (...)
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  7. The Evolution of Moral Intuitions and Their Feeling of Rightness.Christine Clavien & Chloë FitzGerald - forthcoming - In Joyce R. (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Evolution and Philosophy.
    Despite the widespread use of the notion of moral intuition, its psychological features remain a matter of debate and it is unclear why the capacity to experience moral intuitions evolved in humans. We first survey standard accounts of moral intuition, pointing out their interesting and problematic aspects. Drawing lessons from this analysis, we propose a novel account of moral intuitions which captures their phenomenological, mechanistic, and evolutionary features. Moral intuitions are composed of two elements: an evaluative mental state and a (...)
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  8. The Golden Rule: A Naturalistic Perspective.Nathan Cofnas - forthcoming - Utilitas:1-13.
    A number of philosophers from Hobbes to Mill to Parfit have held some combination of the following views about the Golden Rule: (a) It is the cornerstone of morality across many if not all cultures. (b) It affirms the value of moral impartiality, and potentially the core idea of utilitarianism. (c) It is immune from evolutionary debunking, that is, there is no good naturalistic explanation for widespread acceptance of the Golden Rule, ergo the best explanation for its appearance in different (...)
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  9. Testimony, Understanding, and Art Criticism.Allan Hazlett - forthcoming - In Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Philosophy and Art: New Essays at the Intersection. Oxford University Press.
    I present a puzzle – the “puzzle of aesthetic testimony” – along with a solution to it that appeals to the impossibility of testimonial understanding. I'll criticize this solution by defending the possibility of testimonial understanding, including testimonial aesthetic understanding.
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  10. Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgments.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    According to the ‘expertise defence’, experimental findings suggesting that intuitive judgments about hypothetical cases are influenced by philosophically irrelevant factors do not undermine their evidential use in (moral) philosophy. This defence assumes that philosophical experts are unlikely to be influenced by irrelevant factors. We discuss relevant findings from experimental metaphilosophy that largely tell against this assumption. To advance the debate, we present the most comprehensive experimental study of intuitive expertise in ethics to date, which tests five well- known biases of (...)
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  11. Where Does Moral Knowledge Come From? [REVIEW]Hilary Kornblith - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Sarah McGrath offers an account of moral knowledge which, she says, is "economical," that is, it draws on no subject-matter specific mental faculty. In order to defend such a claim, I argue, more attention needs to be paid to the available psychological literature. That literature is far from definitive on this question, but, I suggest, there is some real reason to think that an extravagant account of moral knowledge, one which posits a subject-matter specific moral faculty, may account for the (...)
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  12. Debunking What?Hallvard Lillehammer - forthcoming - In Diego Machuca (ed.), Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mathematics, and Epistemology. Routledge.
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  13. The Perception of Virtue.Jennifer J. Matey - forthcoming - In Berit Brogaard & D. Gratzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I put forward an argument for the view that emotional responses of esteem to perceived demonstrations of good character represent the perceived character traits as valuable, and hence, as virtues. These esteeming experiences are analogous to perceptual representations in other modalities in their epistemic role as causing, providing content for and justifying beliefs regarding the value of the traits they represent. I also discuss the role that the perceiver’s own character plays in their ability to recognize and (...)
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  14. Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    I explain why, from the perspective of knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology, objective act consequentialist theories of ethics imply skepticism about the moral status of our prospective actions and also tend to be self-defeating, undermining the justification of consequentialist theories themselves. For according to knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology there are modal anti-luck demands on both knowledge and justification, and it turns out that our beliefs about the moral status of our prospective actions are almost never able to satisfy these demands if objective act (...)
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  15. Moral Knowledge By Deduction.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    How is moral knowledge possible? This paper defends the anti-Humean thesis that we can acquire moral knowledge by deduction from wholly non-moral premises. According to Hume’s Law, as it has become known, we cannot deduce an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, since it is “altogether inconceivable how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it” (Hume, 1739, 3.1.1). This paper explores the prospects for a deductive theory of moral knowledge that rejects Hume’s Law.
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  16. Causal Stability in Moral Contexts.Horia Tarnovanu - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-22.
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  17. Did Elitists Really Believe in Social Laws? Some Epistemological Challenges in the Work of Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto.Marco Di Giulio - 2022 - Topoi 41 (1):57-67.
    The epistemological standards of contemporary social sciences refute ‘functional’ and ‘law-like’ explanations, whereas mechanism-based causal explanations have become widely accepted in various fields of inquiry. The paper supports the hypothesis that authors Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, despite their deference to positivist epistemology, significantly anticipated these developments. Indeed, with their emphasis on history, contexts and agents, elitists ushered into the debate of their time some arguments that realist epistemology fully developed, emphasising the role of context-specific and, often, not directly observable (...)
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  18. Enactive Ethics: Difference Becoming Participation.Ezequiel A. Di Paolo & Hanne De Jaegher - 2022 - Topoi 41 (2):241-256.
    Enactive cognitive science combines questions in epistemology, ontology, and ethics by conceiving of bodies as open-ended and mutually transforming through activity. While enaction is not a theory of ethics, it can contribute to its foundations. We present a schematization of enactive ideas that underlie traditional distinctions between Being, Knowing, and Doing. Ethics in this scheme begins in the relation between knowing and becoming. Critical of dichotomous thinking, we approach the questions of alterity and ethical reality. Alterity is relevant to the (...)
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  19. Can the Subaltern Be Witnessed?: Nonhuman Witnessing and the Literary Staging of Singularity.Sourav Kargupta - 2022 - Angelaki 27 (2):57-71.
    Following Jacques Derrida’s reflections on witnessing and testimony, this article proposes a discontinuous economy between human witnessing and the nonhuman framing of any such instituted work...
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  20. Using and Abusing Moorean Arguments.M. Scarfone - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):52-71.
    Metaethical Mooreanism is the view that without being able to explain how we know certain moral claims we can nevertheless be sure that we do know them. In this paper I focus on the Moorean argument against moral error theory. I conclude that it fails. To show this failure, I first distinguish Moorean claims from Moorean arguments, and then so-called presumptive support from dialogical support. With these distinctions in place, I argue that the key Moorean claim requires dialogical support in (...)
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  21. Book in Focus: Quine on Ethics: The Gavagai of Moral Discourse.Necip Fikri Alican - 2021 - “Book in Focus”: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Discussion piece on a book of the same name: Quine on Ethics: The Gavagai of Moral Discourse. Published online as part of the “Book in Focus” program of Cambridge Scholars Publishing (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2021).
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  22. From Value to Rightness: Consequentialism, Action-Guidance, and the Perspective-Dependence of Moral Duties.Vuko Andric - 2021 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    This book develops an original version of act-consequentialism. It argues that act-consequentialists should adopt a subjective criterion of rightness. -/- The book develops new arguments which strongly suggest that, according to the best version of act-consequentialism, the rightness of actions depends on expected rather than actual value. Its findings go beyond the debate about consequentialism and touch on important debates in normative ethics and metaethics. The distinction between criterion of rightness and decision procedures addresses how, why, and in which sense (...)
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  23. Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane & Dan Baras - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):162-183.
    Modal Security is an increasingly discussed proposed necessary condition on undermining defeat. Modal Security says, roughly, that if evidence undermines (rather than rebuts) one’s belief, then one gets reason to doubt the belief's safety or sensitivity. The primary interest of the principle is that it seems to entail that influential epistemological arguments, including Evolutionary Debunking Arguments against moral realism and the Benacerraf-Field Challenge for mathematical realism, are unsound. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine Modal Security in detail. (...)
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  24. Whence the Demand for Ethical Theory?Damian Cueni & Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):135–46.
    Where does the impetus towards ethical theory come from? What drives humans to make values explicit, consistent, and discursively justifiable? This paper situates the demand for ethical theory in human life by identifying the practical needs that give rise to it. Such a practical derivation puts the demand in its place: while finding a home for it in the public decision-making of modern societies, it also imposes limitations on the demand by presenting it as scalable and context-sensitive. This differentiates strong (...)
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  25. Efficiency, Legitimacy, and the Administrative State.Samuel DeCanio - 2021 - Social Philosophy and Policy 38 (1):198-219.
    This essay examines certain epistemic problems facing administrative states’ efforts to draft efficient regulations for their societies. I argue that a basic feature of the administrative state’s authority, namely its monopoly over the production of legally binding rules for all members of a geographically defined society, creates epistemic problems that impede efficient rule-making. Specifically, the administrative state’s monopoly over the production of legally binding rules prevents multiple public policies from being simultaneously implemented and compared. The resulting singularity of administrative states’ (...)
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  26. Moral Disagreement Scepticism Leveled.Jonathan Dixon - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):203-216.
    While many have argued that moral disagreement poses a challenge to moral knowledge, the precise nature of this challenge is controversial. Indeed, in the moral epistemology literature, there are many different versions of ‘the’ argument from moral disagreement to moral scepticism. This paper contributes to this vast literature on moral disagreement by arguing for two theses: 1. All (or nearly all) moral disagreement arguments share an underlying structure; and, 2. All moral disagreement arguments that satisfy this underlying structure cannot establish (...)
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  27. Obligations of Conscience.Shane N. Glackin - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (1):1-24.
    In this paper, I outline and defend a commonly-held moral view which has received surprisingly little sustained philosophical attention. This view, which I call the ‘authority of conscience,’ states that believing ourselves to have moral obligations to act in a certain way does in fact create an obligation to act in that way. Although I do not provide a positive case for the principle of authoritative conscience, beyond its popularity and intuitive force, I defend it against several prima facie objections. (...)
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  28. The World is Not Enough.Nathan Robert Howard & N. G. Laskowski - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):86-101.
    Throughout his career, Derek Parfit made the bold suggestion, at various times under the heading of the "Normativity Objection," that anyone in possession of normative concepts is in a position to know, on the basis of their competence with such concepts alone, that reductive realism in ethics is not even possible. Despite the prominent role that the Normativity Objection plays in Parfit's non-reductive account of the nature of normativity, when the objection hasn't been ignored, it's been criticized and even derided. (...)
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  29. A Wise Person Proportions Their Beliefs With Humor.Chris A. Kramer - 2021 - The Philosophy of Humor Yearbook 2 (1):141-143.
    “Just as philosophy begins with doubt, so also a life that may be called human begins with irony” (Kierkegaard The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates, pg.6, thesis XV) What has proportion to do with humor or irony? And what do either of these have to do with being human? Jokes, laughter, and funniness connote excess, exaggeration, incongruity, dissonance, etc., the opposite of proportion--balance, symmetry, Aristotle’s golden mean. Yet, The Philosopher maintains, the wit has found the ideal moderate (...)
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  30. Future Selves and Present Moral Philosophers.Jakob Lohmar - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98:436-445.
    Moral expertise requires a level of reliability in moral matters that is significantly higher than that of the average person. The author argues that this requirement of epistemic superiority in moral matters is sometimes fulfilled by our future selves and generally fulfilled by present moral philosophers. Our future selves are more reliable in answering moral questions than we are, when they have been prepared to answer those questions by various epistemic activities. But if our future selves are our epistemic superiors (...)
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  31. Iris Murdoch and the Epistemic Significance of Love.Cathy Mason - 2021 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 39-62.
    Murdoch makes some ambitious claims about love’s epistemic significance which can initially seem puzzling in the light of its heterogeneous and messy everyday manifestations. I provide an interpretation of Murdochian love such that Murdoch’s claims about its epistemic significance can be understood. I argue that Murdoch conceives of love as a virtue, and as belonging at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of the virtues, and that this makes sense of the epistemic role Murdochian love fulfills. Moreover, I suggest that there (...)
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  32. How to Identify Moral Experts.Amber Riaz - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):123-136.
    Many philosophers think that we can identify, e.g., a weather expert by checking if she has a track record of making accurate weather predictions but that there isn’t an analogous way for laypeople to verify the judgement of a putative moral expert. The weather is an independent check for weather expertise but there is no independent check for moral expertise, and the only way for laypeople to identify moral experts is to engage in first-order moral reasoning of one’s own. But (...)
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  33. Christopher Cowie, Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy.R. A. Rowland - 2021 - Ethics 132 (2):526-532.
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  34. Sarah McGrath, "Moral Knowledge.". [REVIEW]Eric Wilkinson - 2021 - Philosophy in Review 41 (4):253-255.
  35. Moral Lessons From Psychology: Contemporary Themes in Psychological Research and Their Relevance for Ethical Theory.Henrik Ahlenius - 2020 - Stockholm: Stockholm University.
    The thesis investigates the implications for moral philosophy of research in psychology. In addition to an introduction and concluding remarks, the thesis consists of four chapters, each exploring various more specific challenges or inputs to moral philosophy from cognitive, social, personality, developmental, and evolutionary psychology. Chapter 1 explores and clarifies the issue of whether or not morality is innate. The chapter’s general conclusion is that evolution has equipped us with a basic suite of emotions that shape our moral judgments in (...)
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  36. Love’s Luck Knot.Carla Bagnoli - 2020 - Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 25 (1-2):195-208.
  37. Moral Understanding and Cooperative Testimony.Kenneth Boyd - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):18-33.
    It is has been argued that there is a problem with moral testimony: testimony is deferential, and basing judgments and actions on deferentially acquired knowledge prevents them from having moral worth. What morality perhaps requires of us, then, is that we understand why a proposition is true, but this is something that cannot be acquired through testimony. I argue here that testimony can be both deferential as well as cooperative, and that one can acquire moral understanding through cooperative testimony. The (...)
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  38. Moral Testimony.Laura Frances Callahan - 2020 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj J. Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge handbook of social epistemology. New York, NY, USA: pp. 123-134.
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  39. A Debunking Explanation for Moral Progress.Nathan Cofnas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3171-3191.
    According to “debunking arguments,” our moral beliefs are explained by evolutionary and cultural processes that do not track objective, mind-independent moral truth. Therefore (the debunkers say) we ought to be skeptics about moral realism. Huemer counters that “moral progress”—the cross-cultural convergence on liberalism—cannot be explained by debunking arguments. According to him, the best explanation for this phenomenon is that people have come to recognize the objective correctness of liberalism. Although Huemer may be the first philosopher to make this explicit empirical (...)
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  40. Moral Understanding, Testimony, and Moral Exemplarity.Michel Croce - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):373-389.
    While possessing moral understanding is agreed to be a core epistemic and moral value, it remains a matter of dispute whether it can be acquired via testimony and whether it involves an ability to engage in moral reasoning. This paper addresses both issues with the aim of contributing to the current debates on moral understanding in moral epistemology and virtue ethics. It is argued that moral epistemologists should stop appealing to the argument from the transmissibility of moral understanding to make (...)
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  41. Epistemologia morale.Michel Croce - 2020 - Aphex 21.
    This paper offers a critical introduction to moral epistemology, that is, one of the emerging disciplines within metaethics and epistemology. The main sections of this contribution are devoted to addressing the three following issues: first, whether it is possible to acquire moral knowledge; second, how – viz., through which sources – we can acquire moral knowledge; and third, which implications moral epistemology draws from empirical sciences.
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  42. Immediate Certainty and the Morally Good: Luther, Kierkegaard and Cognitive Psychology.Jörg Disse - 2020 - In Marius Timmann Mjaaland (ed.), The Reformation of Philosophy. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. pp. 109-118.
    I consider the relationship between the notion of certainty and the notion of a form of life. There are circumstances under which a feeling of certainty may become the ground for adopting a certain form of life. The forms of life I have in mind are those with a formal orientation towards the realization of the (morally) good for its own sake. The article proceeds in three steps: First I consider Luther’s certainty of salvation as a kind of inaugural (theological) (...)
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  43. Freedom, Indeterminism, and Fallibilism.Danny Frederick - 2020 - Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book uses the concepts of freedom, indeterminism, and fallibilism to solve, in a unified way, problems of free will, knowledge, reasoning, rationality, personhood, ethics and politics. Presenting an overarching theory of human freedom, Frederick argues for an account of free will as the capacity for undetermined acts. Knowledge, rationality, and reasoning, both theoretical and practical, as well as personhood, morality and political authority, are all shown to be dependent at their roots on indeterminism and fallibility, and to be connected (...)
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  44. Complex Akrasia and Blameworthiness.Anna Hartford - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Research 45:15-33.
    The idea that conscious control, or more specifically akratic wrongdoing, is a necessary condition for blameworthiness has durable appeal. This position has been explicitly championed by volitionist philosophers, and its tacit influence is broadly felt. Many responses have been offered to the akrasia requirement espoused by volitionists. These responses often take the form of counterexamples involving blameworthy ignorance: i.e., cases where an agent didn’t act akratically, but where they nevertheless seem blameworthy. These counterexamples have generally led to an impasse in (...)
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  45. Why You Cannot Make People Better by Telling Them What is Good.Ulf Hlobil - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):986-996.
    So-called optimists about moral testimony argue, against pessimists, that, ceteris paribus, we ought to accept and act in accordance with trustworthy, pure moral testimony. I argue that even if we grant this, we need to explain why moral testimony cannot make us more virtuous. I offer an explanation that appeals to the fact that we cannot share inferential abilities via testimony. This explanation is compatible with the core commitments of optimism, but it also allows us to see what is right (...)
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  46. Explaining historical moral convergence: the empirical case against realist intuitionism.Jeroen Hopster - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1255-1273.
    Over the course of human history there appears to have been a global shift in moral values towards a broadly ‘liberal’ orientation. Huemer argues that this shift better accords with a realist than an antirealist metaethics: it is best explained by the discovery of mind-independent truths through intuition. In this article I argue, contra Huemer, that the historical data are better explained assuming the truth of moral antirealism. Realism does not fit the data as well as Huemer suggests, whereas antirealists (...)
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  47. The Moral Tug: Conscience, Quiescence and Free Will.Rolfe King - 2020 - Theologica 4 (2).
    In this article I argue that if conscience, working properly, involves some form of ‘moral tug’, then this is incompatible with the state of ‘quiescence’ put forward as a central element of Eleonore Stump’s account of repentance. Quiescence is also a key notion for Stump’s theodicy in Wandering in the Darkness and Stump’s thesis in her book, Atonement. Quiescence is about an inactive, or neutral, or stationary, state of the will prior to turning to the good, or God, through receiving (...)
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  48. Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science.Arnon Levy & Yair Levy - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):491-509.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments appeal to selective etiologies of human morality in an attempt to undermine moral realism. But is morality actually the product of evolution by natural selection? Although debunking arguments have attracted considerable attention in recent years, little of it has been devoted to whether the underlying evolutionary assumptions are credible. In this paper, we take a closer look at the evolutionary hypotheses put forward by two leading debunkers, namely Sharon Street and Richard Joyce. We raise a battery of (...)
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  49. A teoria hegeliana da justificação moral.Armando Manchisi - 2020 - Problemata 11 (4):134-160.
    The contribution pursues two interrelated aims: the first one is to interpret the transition from Morality to Ethical Life in the "Elements of the Philosophy of Right" as a theory of moral justification; the second one is to show the meaning of this theory for contemporary philosophy. The essay thus seeks to turn to Hegel’s conception in order to shed light on the limits of the current discussion in moral epistemology and then to present a possible alternative. To this end, (...)
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  50. The Methodological Implications of Reference Magnetism on Moral Twin Earth.David Mokriski - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (5):702-726.
    The Moral Twin Earth challenge to ethical naturalism threatens to undermine an otherwise promising metaethical view by showing that typical, naturalist-friendly theories of reference determination predict diverging reference in Twin Earth scenarios, making it difficult to account for substantive moral disagreement. Several theorists have recently invoked David Lewis’s doctrine of reference magnetism as a solution, claiming that a highly elite moral property—a moral “joint in nature”—could secure shared reference between ourselves and our twins on Twin Earth, despite our diverging usages (...)
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1 — 50 / 318