Related categories

230 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 230
  1. added 2019-01-10
    The Dark Side of Morality: Group Polarization and Moral Epistemology.Marcus Arvan - forthcoming - Philosophical Forum.
    This article argues that philosophers and laypeople commonly conceptualize moral truths or justified moral beliefs as discoverable through intuition, argument, or some other purely cognitive or affective process. It then contends that three empirically well-supported theories all predict that this ‘Discovery Model’ of morality plays a substantial role in causing social polarization. The same three theories are then used to argue that an alternative ‘Negotiation Model’ of morality—according to which moral truths are not discovered but instead created by actively negotiating (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-01-06
    The Predicament of Moral Epistemology.Sushruth Ravish - forthcoming - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research:1-15.
    Moral epistemology (henceforth ME) has been spoken of as a subject matter in its own right by philosophers in the last few decades and yet the delineation of ME as a sub-discipline remains uncharted. Many eminent scholars with rich contributions have not explicitly defined the scope or demarcation of this emerging field. Drawing from their writings, the paper tries to show that philosophers working on ME either conceptualise it as an application of epistemology to moral beliefs or as encompassing issues (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2018-12-07
    What Is Sentimentalism? What Is Rationalism? Commentary on Joshua May.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    In Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, Joshua May argues successfully that many claims about the causal influence of affect on moral judgment are overblown. But the findings he cites are compatible with many of the key arguments of philosophical sentimentalists. His account of rationalism, in turn, relies on an overly broad notion of inference, and leaves open crucial questions about how we reason to moral conclusions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2018-11-30
    The Nature of Normativity: Reply to Holton, Railton, and Lenman.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):479-491.
    In this article, I reply to the comments that Richard Holton, Peter Railton, and James Lenman have made on my 2007 book "The Nature of Normativity".
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. added 2018-10-26
    L'aritmetica della morale.Andrea Bucci - manuscript
    Un primo tentativo di dare unìinterpretazione morale dell'aritmetica.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2018-10-24
    Putnam, Hilary. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. [REVIEW]Roderick Long - 2006 - Reason Papers 28:125-131.
  7. added 2018-10-24
    Review of Review of Leland Yeager, Ethics as Social Science. [REVIEW]Roderick Long - 2003 - Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 6:89-98.
    Like feuding relatives at a family barbecue, economists and moral philosophers often like to pretend they have nothing to do with each other. Economists pose as value-neutral scientists who have no need for airy-fairy moral theory; yet they regularly dispense the sorts of prescription and advice that cry out for ethical analysis. Philosophers likewise view themselves as having loftier concerns than vulgar economics; but by conducting their ethical and political theorizing in ignorance of economic principles, they are unable to avoid (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2018-10-22
    Reason and Value: Aristotle Versus Rand.Roderick Long - 2000 - Poughkeepsie, NY, USA: Objectivist Center.
  9. added 2018-09-06
    Između Nekognitivizma I Realizma U Etici: Trostruki Model.Olga Ramírez Calle - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (1):101-112.
    The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell’s non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the relation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2018-08-05
    Skepticism About Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.John W. Robison - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):555-577.
    This article rejects Gideon Rosen's skeptical argument that attributions of blameworthiness are never epistemically justified. Granting Rosen's controversial claim that an act is blameworthy only if it is either akratic or the causal upshot of some akratic act, I show that we can and should resist his skeptical conclusion. I show, first, that Rosen's argument is, at best, hostage to a much more global skepticism about attributions of praiseworthiness, doxastic justification, and other phenomena which essentially involve causal‐historical facts about mental (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2018-08-01
    Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science.Arnon Levy & Yair Levy - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments appeal to selective etiologies of human morality in an attempt to undermine moral realism. But is morality actually the product of evolution by natural selection? Although debunking arguments have attracted considerable attention in recent years, little of it has been devoted to whether the underlying evolutionary assumptions are credible. In this paper, we take a closer look at the evolutionary hypotheses put forward by two leading debunkers, namely Sharon Street and Richard Joyce. We raise a battery of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2018-07-02
    Moral Realism and the Incompletability of Morality.Melis Erdur - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (2):227-237.
    If what we want from moral inquiry were the obtainment of objective moral truths, as moral realism claims it is, then there would be nothing morally unsatisfactory or lacking in a situation, in which we somehow had access to all moral truths, and were fundamentally finished with morality. In fact, that seems to be the realists’ conception of moral heaven. In this essay, however, I argue that some sort of moral wakefulness – that is, always paying attention to the subtleties (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2018-06-24
    How to Solve Moral Conundrums with Computability Theory.Jongmin Jerome Baek - 2018 - arXiv.
    Various moral conundrums plague population ethics: The Non-Identity Problem, The Procreation Asymmetry, The Repugnant Conclusion, and more. I argue that the aforementioned moral conundrums have a structure neatly accounted for, and solved by, some ideas in computability theory. I introduce a mathematical model based on computability theory and show how previous arguments pertaining to these conundrums fit into the model. This paper proceeds as follows. First, I do a very brief survey of the history of computability theory in moral philosophy. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2018-06-22
    Love’s Luck Knot.Carla Bagnoli - forthcoming - Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 25 (1).
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2018-06-20
    Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology.Alison M. Jaggar & Theresa W. Tobin - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):383-408.
    This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16. added 2018-06-20
    Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology.Theresa W. Tobin & Alison M. Jaggar - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):409-439.
    The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all-purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2018-06-15
    Consequentialist Demands, Intuitions and Experimental Methodology (with Joe Sweetman).Attila Tanyi - manuscript
    Can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. We take the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness Objection – as a given and are also not concerned with finding the best response to the Objection. Instead, our main aim is to explicate the intuitive background of the Objection and to see how this background could be investigated. This double aim (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2018-05-29
    Emotional Insight by Michael S. Brady. [REVIEW]John M. Monteleone - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 13:1-5.
    This review considers Michael Brady's account of the positive epistemic role of emotions. Brady claims that emotions can facilitate evaluative understanding because they "capture and consume" a person's attention. This review claims that there is a difference between emotions that are intrinsically productive of evaluative understanding and those are productive of evaluative understanding only because of the contribution of other, non-emotional states. Accordingly, Brady has not yet established that emotions fall in the former category, rather than the latter, and thus (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2018-03-05
    Are Emotions Evaluative Modes?Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):271-292.
    Following Meinong, many philosophers have been attracted by the view that emotions have intrinsically evaluative correctness conditions. On one version of this view, emotions have evaluative contents. On another version, emotions are evaluative attitudes; they are evaluative at the level of intentional mode rather than content. We raise objections against the latter version, showing that the only two ways of implementing it are hopeless. Either emotions are manifestly evaluative or they are not. In the former case, the Attitudinal View threatens (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  20. added 2018-03-05
    Emotion, Perception, and the Self in Moral Epistemology.Michael Lacewing - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):335-355.
    In this paper, I argue against a perceptual model of moral epistemology. We should not reject the claim that there is a sense in which, on some occasions, emotions may be said to be perceptions of values or reasons. But going further than this, and taking perception as a model for moral epistemology is unhelpful and unilluminating. By focusing on the importance of the dispositions and structures of the self to moral knowledge, I bring out important disanalogies between moral epistemology (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2018-03-03
    When Do Replies to the Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism Beg the Question?Justin Morton - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Some proponents of the evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism believe that replies that assume substantive moral claims beg the question. In this paper, I give a new account of what’s wrong with such replies. On this account, many realists beg the question when they rely on substantive moral claims in their replies to the argument, but naturalists do not. While this account generalizes to some other domains, it allows perceptual and inductive realism to go un-debunked.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. added 2018-02-24
    Epistemic Problems of Utilitarian Practical Reasoning.John Dilworth - 1998-9 - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 19.
    Utilitarian (U.) theories must be capable of being applied in practical reasoning, or they would have no value as a guide to rational conduct. However, I show that epistemic extensions to U. theories produce logical confusion. Basic questions about what one needs to know in order to apply a U. analysis embroil one in an infinite regress. And attempts to incrementally apply U. either are no help at all (leaving one entirely 'in the dark'), or in general constitute arbitrary gambles (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2018-02-19
    Moral Realism and Reliance on Moral Testimony.Joshua Blanchard - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    Moral realism and some of its constitutive theses, e.g., cognitivism, face the following challenge. If they are true, then it seems that we should predict that deference to moral testimony is appropriate under the same conditions as deference to non-moral testimony. Yet, many philosophers intuit that deference to moral testimony is not appropriate, even in otherwise ordinary conditions. In this paper I show that the challenge is cogent only if the appropriateness in question is disambiguated in a particular way. To (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2018-02-17
    The Mystery of Moral Perception.Daniel Crow - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2):187-210.
    _ Source: _Page Count 24 Accounts of non-naturalist moral perception have been advertised as an empiricist-friendly epistemological alternative to moral rationalism. I argue that these accounts of moral perception conceal a core commitment of rationalism—to substantive a priori justification—and embody its most objectionable feature—namely, “mysteriousness.” Thus, accounts of non-naturalist moral perception do not amount to an interesting alternative to moral rationalism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25. added 2018-02-17
    Pierre Duhem’s Virtue Epistemology.David J. Stump - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):149-159.
    Duhem’s concept of “good sense” is central to his philosophy of science, given that it is what allows scientist to decide between competing theories. Scientists must use good sense and have intellectual and moral virtues in order to be neutral arbiters of scientific theories, especially when choosing between empirically adequate theories. I discuss the parallels in Duhem’s views to those of virtue epistemologists, who understand justified belief as that arrived at by a cognitive agent with intellectual and moral virtues, showing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  26. added 2018-02-17
    Natural Inclinations and Moral Absolutes: A Mediated Correspondence for Aquinas.R. Mary Hayden - 1990 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64:130-150.
    Aquinas does not argue that natural inclinations per se suffice for moral absolutes, but rather that they suffice to make their objects known as self-evidently good for persons. Acting for the contrary of a natural inclination thereby harms persons and is contrary to the Bonum Precept (Good is to be done and pursued; evil is to be avoided). Acting for a self-evident good, however, becomes morally obligatory only when indispensable.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2018-02-16
    Dimensions of Moral Theory: An Introduction to Metaethics and Moral Psychology.Jonathan Jacobs - 2002 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    A study of fundamental issues in metaethics and in moral psychology, surveying important approaches with an emphasis on the disputed status of moral value and the roles of cognition and sensibility. Coverage of the issues includes discussion of significant thinkers from antiquity to the present.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. added 2018-01-23
    Cognitive Islands and Runaway Echo Chambers: Problems for Epistemic Dependence on Experts.C. Thi Nguyen - forthcoming - Synthese.
    I propose to study one problem for epistemic dependence on experts: how to locate experts on what I will call cognitive islands. Cognitive islands are those domains for knowledge in which expertise is required to evaluate other experts. They exist under two conditions: first, that there is no test for expertise available to the inexpert; and second, that the domain is not linked to another domain with such a test. Cognitive islands are the places where we have the fewest resources (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. added 2017-12-19
    Moral Testimony: A Re-Conceived Understanding Explanation.Laura Frances Callahan - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):437-459.
    Why is there a felt asymmetry between cases in which agents defer to testifiers for certain moral beliefs, and cases in which agents defer on many other matters? One explanation influential in the literature is that having understanding of a proposition is both in tension with acquiring belief in the proposition by deferring to another's testimony and distinctively important when it comes to moral propositions, as compared with what we might think of as many ‘garden variety’ facts. My project in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2017-10-30
    Naturalistic Moral Realism, Moral Rationalism, and Non-Fundamental Epistemology.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - In Karen Jones & Francois Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford University Press.
    This paper takes up an important epistemological challenge to the naturalistic moral realist: that her metaphysical commitments are difficult to square with a plausible rationalist view about the epistemology of morality.The paper begins by clarifying and generalizing this challenge. It then illustrates how the generalized challenge can be answered by a form of naturalistic moral realism that I dub joint-carving moral realism. Both my framing of this challenge and my answer advertise the methodological significance of non-fundamental epistemological theorizing, which defends (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2017-09-12
    Reasoning with Comparative Moral Judgements: An Argument for Moral Bayesianism.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2017 - In Rafal Urbaniak & Gillman Payette (eds.), Applications of Formal Philosophy - The Road Less Travelled. Cham: Springer. pp. 113-136.
    The paper discusses the notion of reasoning with comparative moral judgements (i.e judgements of the form “act a is morally superior to act b”) from the point of view of several meta-ethical positions. Using a simple formal result, it is argued that only a version of moral cognitivism that is committed to the claim that moral beliefs come in degrees can give a normatively plausible account of such reasoning. Some implications of accepting such a version of moral cognitivism are discussed.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2017-09-11
    Moral Perception and Moral Realism: An "Intuitive" Account of Epistemic Justification.Kevin DeLapp - 2007 - Review Journal of Political Philosophy 5:43-64.
    This essay examines the relationship between ethical intuitionism and moral perception, and leverages a hybrid account of those two positions to defend moral realism against objections.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2017-09-05
    Expressivism and the Reliability Challenge.Camil Golub - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):797-811.
    Suppose that there are objective normative facts and our beliefs about such facts are by-and-large true. How did this come to happen? This is the reliability challenge to normative realism. As has been recently noted, the challenge also applies to expressivist “quasi-realism”. I argue that expressivism is useful in the face of this challenge, in a way that has not been yet properly articulated. In dealing with epistemological issues, quasi-realists typically invoke the desire-like nature of normative judgments. However, this is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. added 2017-07-27
    In Defence of the Epistemological Objection to Divine Command Theory.John Danaher - forthcoming - Sophia:1-20.
    Divine Command Theories (DCTs) comes in several different forms but at their core all of these theories claims that certain moral statuses (most typically the status of being obligatory) exist in virtue of the fact that God has commanded them to exist. Several authors argue that this core version of the DCT is vulnerable to an epistemological objection. According to this objection, DCT is deficient because certain groups of moral agents lack epistemic access to God’s commands. But there is confusion (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2017-06-19
    The Real Problem with Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Louise Hanson - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268):508-33.
    There is a substantial literature on evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) in metaethics. According to these arguments, evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs pose a significant problem for moral realism, specifically by committing the realist to an unattractive pessimism about the prospects of our having moral knowledge. In this paper, I argue that EDAs exploit an equivocation between two distinct readings of their central claim. One is plausibly true but has no epistemic relevance, and the other would have epistemic consequences for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2017-05-25
    Practical Knowledge and Perception.Evgenia Mylonaki - 2016 - In Mark Alznauer & Jose Torralba (eds.), Theories of Action and Morality: Perspectives from Philosophy and Social Theory. Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlag. pp. 241-265.
    In this paper I examine the relation between intentional action and morality from the perspective of practical epistemology. In other words I study the relation between Elizabeth Anscombe's knowledge of one’s own intentional actions (knowledge in action) and Iris Murdoch's knowledge of what is good to do or what one ought to do in particular circumstances (knowledge in the circumstances). If practical knowledge in the former sense (knowledge in action) and practical knowledge in the latter sense (knowledge in the circumstances) (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. added 2017-05-15
    Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness.Robert Cowan - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Epistemic Sentimentalism is the view that emotional experiences such as fear and guilt are a source of immediate justification for evaluative beliefs. For example, guilt can sometimes immediately justify a subject’s belief that they have done something wrong. In this paper I focus on a family of objections to Epistemic Sentimentalism that all take as a premise the claim that emotions possess a normative property that is apparently antithetical to it: epistemic reason-responsiveness, i.e., emotions have evidential bases and justifications can (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2017-05-15
    Evaluative Perception: Introduction.Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford University Press.
    In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences ever justify evaluative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2017-05-12
    Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience.Preston J. Werner - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):294-317.
    I defend the thesis that at least some moral properties can be part of the contents of experience. I argue for this claim using a _contrast argument_, a type of argument commonly found in the literature on the philosophy of perception. I first appeal to psychological research on what I call emotionally empathetic dysfunctional individuals to establish a phenomenal contrast between EEDI s and normal individuals in some moral situations. I then argue that the best explanation for this contrast, assuming (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. added 2017-04-21
    LET'S FAKE MORALITY and ETHICS (the Pretence of Ethics and Morality in Philosophy and Life).de Balbian Ulrich - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    Download FREE book here Fake Morality and Ethics (in philosophy and Life) https://www.academia.edu/32532069/LETS_FAKE_MORALITY_and_ETHICS_the_pretence_of_ethics_and_morality_ in_philosophy_and_life_ -/- Institutionalized and internalized,‭ ‬competence intersubjectivity contain many user-illusions and an imaginary or manifest image of reality,‭ ‬including of themselves‭ (‬Dennett and Sellars‭)‬,.‭ ‬This can be contrasted we a comprehension or comprehensive,‭ ‬understanding intersubjectivity.‭ ‬It is possible and perhaps even necessary to transform or replace the competence intersubjectivity to a comprehension or understanding‭ (‬scientific,‭ ‬Dennett and Sellars‭) ‬image of reality and themselves.Ethics and morality and studies of ethics (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. added 2017-04-18
    Michael Brady,. Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 204. $45.00. [REVIEW]Michael Milona - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):567-571.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. added 2017-03-23
    On Being ‘Rational’ About Norms.Rem B. Edwards - 1967 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):180-186.
    The theses of this paper i: I. that the attempt to found absolute norns on rationality presupposes the availability of a single universal absolute conception of rationality but that no such conception is available; and II. that any conception of rationality which might be available for justifying one's ultimate normative commitments is itself evaluative. “Rationality” itself is a value-laden concept, as are all its philosophical sub-divisions—logic, ethics, aesthetics, axiology, etc. Choosing ultimate value principles under conditions of freedom, enlightenment, and impartiality (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. added 2017-03-16
    Pro-Tanto Obligations and Ceteris-Paribus Rules.Danny Frederick - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):255-266.
    I summarize a conception of morality as containing a set of rules which hold ceteris paribus and which impose pro-tanto obligations. I explain two ways in which moral rules are ceteris-paribus, according to whether an exception is duty-voiding or duty-overriding. I defend the claim that moral rules are ceteris-paribus against two qualms suggested by Luke Robinson’s discussion of moral rules and against the worry that such rules are uninformative. I show that Robinson’s argument that moral rules cannot ground pro-tanto obligations (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. added 2017-03-03
    Postmodernism and the Dilemma of an Appropriate Christian Paradigm for Ethical Descision Making.Edvard Kristian Foshaugen - 2000 - Dissertation, Stellenbosch
    The Church is facing a dilemma in how to apply and live out its message in a postmodern world. For many in the Church an understanding and application of morals and ethics has become bewildering. This assignment attempts to develop a Christian vocabulary and conceptual framework for morality. This is done by firstly elucidating the milieu out of which postmodernism arose. Modernism, through universal claims of reason and instrumental rationality, believed in the ultimate mastery of the world. The failure of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2017-03-02
    Galen Strawson is a Closet Existentialist; or, the Ballistics of Nothingness.Cruz Cora - 2017 - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 9 (1).
    The subject of free will has suffered something of a renascence in recent popularized American philosophy. The issue is, of course, a Gordian knot of underlying metaphysical and ontological presupposition, in both the analytic and continental traditions. In this paper, I attempt a bit of an untangling, and in doing so, I find that the fundamental position of the contemporary champion of “no freedom” (Galen Strawson) is not only compatible with a radical Sartrean freedom, but that the two philosophers’ deeper (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2017-03-02
    Explaining Our Moral Reliability.Sinan Dogramaci - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):71-86.
    I critically examine an evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism. The key premise of the argument is that there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability. I search for the strongest version of the argument; this involves exploring how ‘adequate explanation’ could be understood such that the key premise comes out true. Finally, I give a reductio: in the sense in which there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability, there is equally no adequate explanation of our inductive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. added 2017-02-09
    Hume's Moral Epistemology.T. K. J. - 1978 - Review of Metaphysics 31 (4):677-677.
  48. added 2017-02-08
    Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge.William G. Lycan - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):79-94.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  49. added 2017-02-06
    Fanciful Examples.Ian Stoner & Jason Swartwood - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):325-344.
    This article defends the use of fanciful examples within the method of wide reflective equilibrium. First, it characterizes the general persuasive role of described cases within that method. Second, it suggests three criteria any example must meet in order to succeed in this persuasive role; fancifulness has little or nothing to do with whether an example is able to meet these criteria. Third, it discusses several general objections to fanciful examples and concludes that they are objections to the abuse of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. added 2017-01-22
    Epistemology and Moral Knowledge.Tibor R. Machan - 1982 - Review of Metaphysics 36 (1):23 - 49.
    It is argued that a wrongheaded model of what a theory of knowledge must satisfy has engendered unjustified skepticism about knowledge and moral knowledge in particular. A contextualist conception of knowledge is sketched and defended and it is then argued that in terms of such an idea of what it is to know something the prospects for moral and political knowledge are significantly improved.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 230