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  1. added 2020-05-21
    A Genealogy of Emancipatory Values.Nick Smyth - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Analytic moral philosophers have generally failed to engage in any substantial way with the cultural history of morality. This is a shame, because a genealogy of morals can help us accomplish two important tasks. First, a genealogy can form the basis of an epistemological project, one that seeks to establish the epistemic status of our beliefs or values. Second, a genealogy can provide us with functional understanding, since a history of our beliefs, values or institutions can reveal some inherent dynamic (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-18
    Jurgen Habermas, Fatti e norme. [REVIEW]Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1999 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 91 (1):142-150.
    The evolution of Habermas follows that of Rawls in Political Liberalism, where the principles of justice are traced back to a historical background and no longer derived from an original position as in A Theory of Justice; and even Rawls, curiously enough, while he made his own the criticism in a broad sense Hegelian, of opponents such as Walzer,continued not to recognize the debt he now owed them. Appropriations of the opponents' objections, withdrawals disguised as victories, ad hoc distinctions and (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-01
    Moral Perception.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175.
    : In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non‐moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties couldn't operate in much the same way that our perception of these complex non‐moral properties operates. I then defend the moral perception view from two challenging objections that have yet to be adequately (...)
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  4. added 2020-02-24
    Epistemologia morale.Michel Croce - 2020 - Aphex 21.
    This paper offers a critical introduction to moral epistemology, that is, one of the emerging disciplines within metaethics and epistemology. The main sections of this contribution are devoted to addressing the three following issues: first, whether it is possible to acquire moral knowledge; second, how – viz., through which sources – we can acquire moral knowledge; and third, which implications moral epistemology draws from empirical sciences.
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  5. added 2020-02-12
    The Predicament of Moral Epistemology.Sushruth Ravish - 2019 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 36 (2):265-279.
    Moral epistemology has been spoken of as a subject matter in its own right by philosophers in the last few decades and yet the delineation of ME as a sub-discipline remains uncharted. Many eminent scholars with rich contributions have not explicitly defined the scope or demarcation of this emerging field. Drawing from their writings, the paper tries to show that philosophers working on ME either conceptualise it as an application of epistemology to moral beliefs or as encompassing issues of epistemic (...)
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  6. added 2020-02-10
    Di chi posso fidarmi. Autorità ed esperti nella filosofia analitica contemporanea.Michel Croce - 2019 - Bologna: Il Mulino.
    Molte questioni aperte che interessano la nostra società e ci fanno preoccupare per il futuro ruotano intorno a un problema fondamentale: capire chi sia davvero esperto in un determinato ambito e, di conseguenza, decidere di chi possiamo fidarci. È inevitabile che ognuno di noi debba riporre la propria fiducia in altri individui quando si tratta di questioni quali il riscaldamento globale e la tutela dell’ambiente, le terapie mediche a cui sottoporsi, la sicurezza informatica e l’istruzione dei propri figli. Ma come (...)
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  7. added 2019-12-27
    Moral Consistency Reasoning Reconsidered.Norbert Paulo - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):107-123.
    Many contemporary ethicists use case-based reasoning to reach consistent beliefs about ethical matters. The idea is that particular cases elicit moral intuitions, which provide defeasible reasons to believe in their content. However, most proponents of case-based moral reasoning are not very explicit about how they resolve inconsistencies and how they abstract principles from judgments about particular cases. The aim of this article is to outline a methodology—called Consistency Reasoning Casuistry—for case-based reasoning in ethics. This methodology draws on Richmond Campbell and (...)
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  8. added 2019-12-10
    Moral Understanding, Testimony, and Moral Exemplarity.Michel Croce - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
    While possessing moral understanding is agreed to be a core epistemic and moral value, it remains a matter of dispute whether it can be acquired via testimony and whether it involves an ability to engage in moral reasoning. This paper addresses both issues with the aim of contributing to the current debates on moral understanding in moral epistemology and virtue ethics. It is argued that moral epistemologists should stop appealing to the argument from the transmissibility of moral understanding to make (...)
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  9. added 2019-12-09
    Explaining historical moral convergence: the empirical case against realist intuitionism.Jeroen Hopster - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1255-1273.
    Over the course of human history there appears to have been a global shift in moral values towards a broadly ‘liberal’ orientation. Huemer argues that this shift better accords with a realist than an antirealist metaethics: it is best explained by the discovery of mind-independent truths through intuition. In this article I argue, contra Huemer, that the historical data are better explained assuming the truth of moral antirealism. Realism does not fit the data as well as Huemer suggests, whereas antirealists (...)
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  10. added 2019-12-09
    Striking Coincidences: How Realists Should Reason About Them.Jeroen Hopster - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):260-274.
    Many metaethicists assume that our normative judgments are both by and large true, and the product of causal forces. In other words, many metaethicists assume that the set of normative judgments that causal forces have led us to make largely coincides with the set of true normative judgments. How should we explain this coincidence? This is what Sharon Street (2006) calls the practical/theoretical puzzle. Some metaethicists can easily solve this puzzle, but not all of them can, Street argues; she takes (...)
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  11. added 2019-11-01
    A Debunking Explanation for Moral Progress.Nathan Cofnas - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    According to “debunking arguments,” our moral beliefs are explained by evolutionary and cultural processes that do not track objective, mind-independent moral truth. Therefore (the debunkers say) we ought to be skeptics about moral realism. Huemer counters that “moral progress”—the cross-cultural convergence on liberalism—cannot be explained by debunking arguments. According to him, the best explanation for this phenomenon is that people have come to recognize the objective correctness of liberalism. Although Huemer may be the first philosopher to make this explicit empirical (...)
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  12. added 2019-10-29
    Testimony, Understanding, and Art Criticism.Allan Hazlett - forthcoming - In Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Philosophy and Art: New Essays at the Intersection. Oxford University Press.
    I present a puzzle – the “puzzle of aesthetic testimony” – along with a solution to it that appeals to the impossibility of testimonial understanding. I'll criticize this solution by defending the possibility of testimonial understanding, including testimonial aesthetic understanding.
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  13. added 2019-10-05
    Higher-Order Defeat in Realist Moral Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett - 2020 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: pp. 117-135.
    On an optimistic version of realist moral epistemology, a significant range of ordinary moral beliefs, construed in realist terms, constitute knowledge—or at least some weaker positive epistemic status, such as epistemic justification. The “debunking challenge” to this view grants prima facie justification but claims that it is “debunked” (i.e., defeated), yielding the final verdict that moral beliefs are ultima facie unjustified. Notable candidate “debunkers” (i.e., defeaters) include the so-called “evolutionary debunking arguments,” the “Benacerraf-Field Challenge,” and persistent moral disagreement among epistemic (...)
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  14. added 2019-09-26
    Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    I explain why, from the perspective of knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology, objective act consequentialist theories of ethics imply skepticism about the moral status of our prospective actions and also tend to be self-defeating, undermining the justification of consequentialist theories themselves. For according to knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology there are modal anti-luck demands on both knowledge and justification, and it turns out that our beliefs about the moral status of our prospective actions are almost never able to satisfy these demands if objective act (...)
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  15. added 2019-09-16
    Towards a New Epistemology of Moral Progress.Patrick Stokes - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1824-1843.
    Awareness that moral beliefs and practices have changed across time threatens our confidence in our current moral beliefs: if past moral beliefs turned out to be wrong, how can we be sure ours aren't likewise mistaken? In this paper, I set up four desiderata for a successful theory of moral progress: it must allow us to judge that progress has occurred, avoid the image of increasing correspondence towards ahistorical truthmakers, allow for revision in belief, and yet not be disobligating. Rorty's (...)
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  16. added 2019-09-13
    Moral Understanding and Cooperative Testimony.Kenneth Boyd - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):18-33.
    It is has been argued that there is a problem with moral testimony: testimony is deferential, and basing judgments and actions on deferentially acquired knowledge prevents them from having moral worth. What morality perhaps requires of us, then, is that we understand why a proposition is true, but this is something that cannot be acquired through testimony. I argue here that testimony can be both deferential as well as cooperative, and that one can acquire moral understanding through cooperative testimony. The (...)
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  17. added 2019-08-18
    The Perception of Virtue.Jennifer J. Matey - forthcoming - In Berit Brogaard & D. Gratzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I put forward an argument for the view that emotional responses of esteem to perceived demonstrations of good character represent the perceived character traits as valuable, and hence, as virtues. These esteeming experiences are analogous to perceptual representations in other modalities in their epistemic role as causing, providing content for and justifying beliefs regarding the value of the traits they represent. I also discuss the role that the perceiver’s own character plays in their ability to recognize and (...)
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  18. added 2019-07-19
    Modal Security.Justin Clarke‐Doane & Dan Baras - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Modal Security is an increasingly discussed proposed necessary condition on undermining defeat. Modal Security says, roughly, that if evidence undermines (rather than rebuts) one’s belief, then one gets reason to doubt the belief's safety or sensitivity. The primary interest of the principle is that it seems to entail that influential epistemological arguments, including Evolutionary Debunking Arguments against moral realism and the Benacerraf-Field Challenge for mathematical realism, are unsound. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine Modal Security in detail. (...)
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  19. added 2019-06-24
    The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism.Terence Cuneo & Andrew Reisner - manuscript
    We argue that contrary to received wisdom, non-naturalist moral realism has an advantage over its naturalist rivals with respect to at least one thorny problem in moral epistemology. We call this problem 'the projectability challenge'. It is the challenge of explaining how it is possible for individuals to apply their moral knowledge to a variety of kinds of new (to them) cases and also how it is possible for individuals to learn from moral experience. By developing an account of and (...)
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  20. added 2019-06-24
    Can Theists Avoid Epistemological Objections to Moral (and Normative) Realism?Justin Morton - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (3):291-312.
    Epistemological objections to moral realism allege that realism entails moral skepticism. Many philosophers have assumed that theistic moral realists can easily avoid such objections. In this article, I argue that things are not so easy: theists run the risk of violating an important constraint on replies to epistemological objections, according to which replies to such objections may not rely on substantive moral claims of a certain kind. Yet after presenting this challenge, I then argue that theists can meet it, successfully (...)
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  21. added 2019-06-17
    Internalism and Pessimism.Casey Doyle - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (2):189-209.
    Motivational Internalism is the thesis that, necessarily, moral beliefs are accompanied by motivational states. It is plausible to suppose that while another’s testimony might transmit information and justification, it can’t transmit motivational states such as moral emotions. Thus, Internalism provides a compelling explanation of “Pessimism”, the view that there is something illicit about forming moral beliefs by testimony. This paper presents a nonconstitutive reading of the Internalist thesis and then argues that it supports Pessimism in the form of a defeasible (...)
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  22. added 2019-06-15
    The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Cham, Schweiz: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, I conceive of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-06
    Robert Audi, Moral Perception , Xii+180 Pp., $35.Max Harris Siegel - 2014 - Ratio 27 (2):238-244.
  24. added 2019-06-06
    On Katherine Dimitriou’s “Drowning Man”.Joseph Ulatowski - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):25-28.
    Ms. Dimitriou's motivist view has a simple upshot: for at least some cases, our moral assessment of an action should depend on the motives behind it (Dimitriou, passim). This may be contrasted with the antimotivist position, the view that argues motives should not figure into our moral assessment of an action. She presents two provocative cases where an agent’s motive “infects” the concomitant action. One example involves racist thinking and the other a form of sexual self-gratification. Given that we would (...)
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  25. added 2019-06-06
    How to Know the Good: The Moral Epistemology of Plato's Republic.Jyl Gentzler - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):469-496.
    John Mackie famously dismissed the rational tenability of moral objectivism with two quick arguments. The second, the so-called “argument from queerness,” proceeds as follows. A commitment to moral objectivism brings with it a commitment to the existence of moral properties as “queer” as Platonic Forms that are apprehended only through occult faculties like so-called “moral intuition” (Mackie 1977, 38). Since we have no reason to believe that there is any faculty such as moral intuition that serves as a reliable Form (...)
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  26. added 2019-06-06
    Truth, Justification and the Inescapability of Epistemology: Comments on Copp.Bruce Russell - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):211-215.
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  27. added 2019-06-06
    Hume’s Moral Epistemology. [REVIEW]T. K. J. - 1978 - Review of Metaphysics 31 (4):677-677.
    A commentary on the arguments whereby Hume endeavored to delimit the role of reason in morality. Harrison’s procedure is largely one of logical analysis: he identifies individual arguments, examines inferences, asks whether there are reasons to believe premises. Throughout, he displays a balanced, appreciative approach, and when obliged to draw attention to Hume’s mistakes, he does so only reluctantly. Over half of the book is taken up in a careful examination of the text which, in terms of clarity and penetration, (...)
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  28. added 2019-06-05
    Profound Intellectual Disability and the Bestowment View of Moral Status.Simo Vehmas & Benjamin Curtis - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (3):505-516.
    This article engages with debates concerning the moral worth of human beings with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities (PIMDs). Some argue that those with such disabilities are morally less valuable than so-called normal human beings, whereas others argue that all human beings have equal moral value and so each group of humans ought to be treated with equal concern. We will argue in favor of a reconciliatory view that takes points from opposing camps in the debates about the moral worth (...)
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  29. added 2019-06-05
    Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception.Robert Cowan - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject's perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception's epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically 'downgrades' their experience. On the (...)
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  30. added 2019-06-05
    Review: Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. [REVIEW]Darlei Dall'Agnol - 2000 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (2):317-322.
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  31. added 2019-05-31
    Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
    Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and ad hoc. After explaining why this (...)
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  32. added 2019-05-27
    Whence the Demand for Ethical Theory?Matthieu Queloz & Damian Cueni - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Where does the impetus towards ethical theory come from? What drives humans to make values explicit, consistent, and discursively justifiable? This paper situates the demand for ethical theory in human life by identifying the practical needs that give rise to it. Such a practical derivation puts the demand in its place: while finding a place for it in the public decision-making of modern societies, it also imposes limitations on the demand by presenting it as scalable and context-sensitive. This differentiates strong (...)
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  33. added 2019-05-03
    God and Morality.Anne Jeffrey - 2019 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This Element has two aims. The first is to discuss arguments philosophers have made about the difference God's existence might make to questions of general interest in metaethics. The second is to argue that it is a mistake to think we can get very far in answering these questions by assuming a thin conception of God, and to suggest that exploring the implications of thick theisms for metaethics would be more fruitful.
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  34. added 2019-04-19
    Recent Work on Reflective Equilibrium and Method in Ethics.Folke Tersman - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12493.
    The idea of reflective equilibrium remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of criticism it has been faced with over the years. Is this due to the availability of compelling responses to the criticisms or rather to factors that are independent of its reasonableness? The aim of this paper is to provide support for the first answer. I particularly focus on the recent discussion. Some recent objections are related to general arguments against the (...)
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  35. added 2019-04-12
    Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):261-284.
    Many philosophers believe that there exist distinctive obstacles to relying on moral testimony. In this paper, I criticize previous attempts to identify these obstacles and offer a new theory. I argue that the problems associated with moral deference can't be explained in terms of the value of moral understanding, nor in terms of aretaic considerations related to subjective integration. Instead, our uneasiness with moral testimony is best explained by our attachment to an ideal of authenticity that places special demands on (...)
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  36. added 2019-04-12
    Do Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Rest on a Mistake About Evolutionary Explanations?Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1799-1817.
    Many moral philosophers accept the Debunking Thesis, according to which facts about natural selection provide debunking explanations for certain of our moral beliefs. I argue that philosophers who accept the Debunking Thesis beg important questions in the philosophy of biology. They assume that past selection can explain why you or I hold certain of the moral beliefs we do. A position advanced by many prominent philosophers of biology implies that this assumption is false. According to the Negative View, natural selection (...)
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  37. added 2019-04-12
    Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Proximate/Ultimate Distinction.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):196-203.
    Many philosophers believe that natural selection explanations debunk our moral beliefs or would do so if moral realism were true, relying on the assumption that explanations of this kind show that moral facts play no role in explaining human moral beliefs. Here I argue that this assumption rests on a confusion of proximate and ultimate explanatory factors. Insofar as evolutionary debunking arguments hinge on the assumption that moral facts play no role in explaining human moral beliefs, these arguments fall short.
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  38. added 2019-04-06
    Freedom and the Fact of Reason.Richard Galvin - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (1):27-51.
    The focus of my argument is whether, and in what sense, freedom is “revealed” by the fact of reason in Kant’s second Critique. I examine the passages in which Kant refers to the fact of reason and conclude that he uses the term to refer to our taking morality as authoritative, and to our apprehending the content of the moral law. I then point out how various commentators have claimed each to be the fact of reason. Next I address how (...)
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  39. added 2019-03-27
    Il relativismo etico fra antropologia culturale e filosofia analitica.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2007 - In I. Tolomio (ed.), Rileggere l'etica tra contingenza e principi. Padova, Italy: CLUEP. pp. 15-46.
    I intend to: a) clarify the origins and de facto meanings of the term relativism; b) reconstruct the reasons for the birth of the thesis named “cultural relativism”; d) reconstruct ethical implications of the above thesis; c) revisit the recent discussion between universalists and particularists in the light of the idea of cultural relativism.. -/- 1.Prescriptive Moral Relativism: “everybody is justified in acting in the way imposed by criteria accepted by the group he belongs to”. Universalism: there are at least (...)
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  40. added 2019-03-26
    The World is Not Enough.Nathan Robert Howard & N. G. Laskowski - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Throughout his career, Derek Parfit made the bold suggestion, at various times under the heading of the "Normativity Objection," that anyone in possession of normative concepts is in a position to know, on the basis of their competence with such concepts alone, that reductive realism in ethics is not even possible. Despite the prominent role that the Normativity Objection plays in Parfit's non-reductive account of the nature of normativity, when the objection hasn't been ignored, it's been criticized and even derided. (...)
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  41. added 2019-03-18
    Sidgwick’s Coherentist Moral Epistemology.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2012 - The Scientific Annals of Andquot;Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iasi (New Series). Philosophy 59:36-50.
    I discuss the ideas of common sense and common-sense morality in Sidgwick. I argue that, far from aiming at overcoming common-sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at grounding a consist code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the natural sciences, in order to reach also in the domain of morality the same kind of “mature” knowledge as in the natural sciences. His whole polemics with intuitionism was vitiated by the apriori assumption that the widespread ethos of the educated part of (...)
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  42. added 2019-03-08
    Belief Pills and the Possibility of Moral Epistemology.Neil Sinclair - 2018 - In Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    I argue that evolutionary debunking arguments are dialectically ineffective against a range of plausible positions regarding moral truth. I first distinguish debunking arguments which target the truth of moral judgements from those which target their justification. I take the latter to rest on the premise that such judgements can be given evolutionary explanations which do not invoke their truth. The challenge for the debunker is to bridge the gap between this premise and the conclusion that moral judgements are unjustified. After (...)
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  43. added 2019-03-01
    Reply to King.Sarah McGrath - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:235-241.
    In “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise”, I offer an argument for the conclusion that our controversial moral beliefs do not amount to knowledge. In this paper, I defend that argument against the criticisms put forth by Nathan King in his “McGrath on Moral Knowledge.”.
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  44. added 2019-02-07
    Feeling Good: Integrating the Psychology and Epistemology of Moral Intuition and Emotion.Hossein Dabbagh - 2019 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (5):1-30.
    Is the epistemology of moral intuitions compatible with admitting a role for emotion? I argue in this paper that moral intuitions and emotions can be partners without creating an epistemic threat. I start off by offering some empirical findings to weaken Singer’s (and Greene’s and Haidt’s) debunking argument against moral intuition, which treat emotions as a distorting factor. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the standard contrast between intuition and emotion is a mistake. Moral intuitions and (...)
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  45. added 2019-01-10
    The Dark Side of Morality: Group Polarization and Moral Epistemology.Marcus Arvan - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (1):87-115.
    This article argues that philosophers and laypeople commonly conceptualize moral truths or justified moral beliefs as discoverable through intuition, argument, or some other purely cognitive or affective process. It then contends that three empirically well-supported theories all predict that this ‘Discovery Model’ of morality plays a substantial role in causing social polarization. The same three theories are then used to argue that an alternative ‘Negotiation Model’ of morality—according to which moral truths are not discovered but instead created by actively negotiating (...)
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  46. added 2018-12-07
    What Is Sentimentalism? What Is Rationalism? Commentary on Joshua May.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    In Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, Joshua May argues successfully that many claims about the causal influence of affect on moral judgment are overblown. But the findings he cites are compatible with many of the key arguments of philosophical sentimentalists. His account of rationalism, in turn, relies on an overly broad notion of inference, and leaves open crucial questions about how we reason to moral conclusions.
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  47. added 2018-11-30
    The Nature of Normativity: Reply to Holton, Railton, and Lenman.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):479-491.
    In this article, I reply to the comments that Richard Holton, Peter Railton, and James Lenman have made on my 2007 book "The Nature of Normativity".
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  48. added 2018-10-26
    L'aritmetica della morale.Andrea Bucci - manuscript
    Un primo tentativo di dare unìinterpretazione morale dell'aritmetica.
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  49. added 2018-10-24
    Putnam, Hilary. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. [REVIEW]Roderick Long - 2006 - Reason Papers 28:125-131.
  50. added 2018-10-24
    Review of Review of Leland Yeager, Ethics as Social Science. [REVIEW]Roderick Long - 2003 - Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 6:89-98.
    Like feuding relatives at a family barbecue, economists and moral philosophers often like to pretend they have nothing to do with each other. Economists pose as value-neutral scientists who have no need for airy-fairy moral theory; yet they regularly dispense the sorts of prescription and advice that cry out for ethical analysis. Philosophers likewise view themselves as having loftier concerns than vulgar economics; but by conducting their ethical and political theorizing in ignorance of economic principles, they are unable to avoid (...)
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