About this topic
Summary

Moral error theory is roughly the view that morality is a (perhaps biologically-useful) illusion. More precisely, error theory combines a cognitivist, representationalist view of moral judgments with an antirealist view of the moral domain. Error theorists typically reason as follows: moral judgments aim to represent the world as being a certain way, morally speaking, and are thus capable of being either true or false depending on whether the world has the moral features one takes it to have. However, the world is morally void in that there are no moral facts, properties, or values ‘out there in the world’ to be discovered. Thus, our moral judgments are typically false. When we judge, for example, that slavery is immoral, we are (perhaps unknowingly) projecting our feelings, wants and demands onto the world and mistakenly thinking that we’ve come into cognitive contact with objective moral facts.  While error theorists widely agree about the nature of morality and moral judgment, they disagree about what to do with moral discourse. Some error theorists contend that morality is a useful fiction that, with some qualifications, should be retained. Adherents of this approach are called moral fictionalists. It should be noted, however, that some fictionalists are not error theorists. Mark Kalderon, for example, rejects the view that moral judgments aim to represent the world as being a certain way, morally speaking. He contends, instead, that propositions (including moral ones) aim to describe the world, but that people use these descriptive propositions to express non-representational mental states.

Key works

The most prominent defense of error theory in the 20th century is arguably Mackie 1977Joyce 2001 provides a more detailed defense of error theory. Joyce 2005 defends error theory on both philosophical and scientific grounds. Other noteworthy defenses of error theory include Streumer 2017, Olson 2014, Garner 2007, and Burgess 2007.  Core readings in moral fictionalism include  Nolan et al 2005 , Joyce 2005 , and Kalderon 2005.

Introductions Joyce 2013 is an introductory article on error theory.  Eklund 2010 is an introductory article on fictionalism as presented and defended in various areas of philosophy, including general metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics.
Related categories

216 found
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1 — 50 / 216
  1. added 2020-05-08
    Mackie Was Not an Error Theorist.Selim Berker - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
  2. added 2020-04-08
    Epistemology Shmepistemology: Moral Error Theory and Epistemic Expressivism.Stephen Ingram - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):649-669.
    Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be (...)
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  3. added 2020-02-11
    The Myth of Morality.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.
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  4. added 2020-01-26
    A Dilemma for Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Uri D. Leibowitz - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Evolutionary debunkers claim that evolutionary explanations of moral phenomena lead to sceptical conclusions. The aim of this paper is to show that even if we grant debunkers the speculative claims that evolution provides the best explanation of moral phenomena and that there are no other moral phenomena for which moral facts/properties are indispensable, the sceptical conclusions debunkers seek to establish still do not follow. The problem for debunkers is to link the empirical explanatory claim to the normative conclusion that moral (...)
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  5. added 2019-12-10
    Moral Error Theory, Explanatory Dispensability and the Limits of Guilt.Silvan Wittwer - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Recently, companions in guilt strategies have garnered significant philosophical attention as a response to arguments for moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and that our moral beliefs are thus systematically mistaken. According to Cuneo (The normative web: an argument for moral realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), Das (Philos Q 66:152–160, 2016; Australas J Philos 95(1):58–69, 2017), Rowland (J Ethics Soc Philos 7(1):1–24, 2012; Philos Q 66:161–171, 2016) and others, epistemic facts would be just as (...)
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  6. added 2019-11-05
    "Ought" and Error.Christine Tiefensee - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (2):96-114.
    The moral error theory generally does not receive good press in metaethics. This paper adds to the bad news. In contrast to other critics, though, I do not attack error theorists’ characteristic thesis that no moral assertion is ever true. Instead, I develop a new counter-argument which questions error theorists’ ability to defend their claim that moral utterances are meaningful assertions. More precisely: Moral error theorists lack a convincing account of the meaning of deontic moral assertions, or so I will (...)
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  7. added 2019-11-04
    Error-Theory, Relaxation and Inferentialism.Christine Tiefensee - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 49-70.
    This contribution considers whether or not it is possible to devise a coherent form of external skepticism about the normative if we ‘relax’ about normative ontology by regarding claims about the existence of normative truths and properties themselves as normative. I answer this question in the positive: A coherent form of non-normative error-theories can be developed even against a relaxed background. However, this form no longer makes any reference to the alleged falsity of normative judgments, nor the non-existence of normative (...)
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  8. added 2019-09-28
    “Putting the Linguistic Method in its Place”: Mackie’s Distinction Between Conceptual and Factual Analysis.Tammo Lossau - 2019 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 22 (1):92-105.
    Early in his career and in critical engagement with ordinary language philosophy, John Mackie developed the roots of a methodology that would be fundamental to his thinking: Mackie argues that we need to clearly separate the conceptual analysis which determines the meaning of an ordinary term and the factual analysis which is concerned with the question what, if anything, our language corresponds to in the world. I discuss how Mackie came to develop this distinction and how central ideas of his (...)
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  9. added 2019-09-19
    Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox.David Faraci - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):751-755.
    In “The possibility of morality,” Phil Brown considers whether moral error theory is best understood as a necessary or contingent thesis. Among other things, Brown contends that the argument from relativity, offered by John Mackie—error theory’s progenitor—supports a stronger modal reading of error theory. His argument is as follows: Mackie’s is an abductive argument that error theory is the best explanation for divergence in moral practices. Since error theory will likewise be the best explanation for similar divergences in possible worlds (...)
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  10. added 2019-09-09
    Reactionary Moral Fictionalism.Jason Dockstader - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):519-534.
    There is a debate among moral error theorists. It concerns what is to be done with moral discourse once it is believed to be systematically false or untrue. It has been called the ‘now what’ problem. Should error theorists abolish morality or insulate themselves in some way from this nihilistic consequence of belief in error theory? Assertive moral abolitionism aims to have error theorists avoid any insulation and abolish morality altogether. Revolutionary moral fictionalism aims for insulation by having error theorists (...)
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  11. added 2019-09-09
    Daoist Metaethics.Jason Dockstader - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (2):309-324.
    This paper seeks to show how classical Chinese Daoist philosophy (道家) contributes to contemporary metaethics. Daoism offers an early form of moral error theory and provides unique suggestions for what one can do with a false discourse like morality. Recent error theorists have disagreed about whether they should conserve moral discourse (moral conservationism), retain it only as a useful fiction (revolutionary moral fictionalism), substitute it with a discourse concerned with subjective normative attitudes (moral substitutionism), or abolish it altogether (assertive moral (...)
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  12. added 2019-09-09
    Nonassertive Moral Abolitionism.Jason Dockstader - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (4):481-502.
    Proponents of moral abolitionism, like Richard Garner, qualify their view as an â assertiveâ version of the position. They counsel moral realists and anti-realists alike to accept moral error theory, abolish morality, and encourage others to abolish morality. In response, this paper argues that moral error theorists should abolish morality, but become quiet about such abolition. It offers a quietist or nonassertive version of moral abolitionism. It does so by first clarifying and addressing the arguments for and against assertive moral (...)
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  13. added 2019-08-23
    Attributing Error Without Taking a Stand.Caleb Perl & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1453-1471.
    Moral error theory is the doctrine that our first-order moral commitments are pervaded by systematic error. It has been objected that this makes the error theory itself a position in first-order moral theory that should be judged by the standards of competing first-order moral theories :87–139, 1996) and Kramer. Kramer: “the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. It is not something that can adequately be contested or confirmed through non-ethical reasoning” [2009, 1]). (...)
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  14. added 2019-08-06
    Moral Fictionalism.Daniel Nolan - 2012 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Moral fictionalism is the doctrine that the moral claims we accept should be treated as convenient fictions. One standard kind of moral fictionalism maintains that many of the moral claims we ordinarily accept are in fact false, but these claims are still useful to produce and accept, despite this falsehood. -/- Moral fictionalists claim they can recover many of the benefits of the use of moral concepts and moral language, without the theoretical costs incurred by rivals such as moral realism (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    Moral Relativism, Error Theory, and Ascriptions of Mistakes.Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (10):564-580.
    Moral error-theorists and relativists agree that there are no absolute moral facts, but disagree whether that makes all moral judgments false. Who is right? This paper examines a type of objection used by moral error-theorists against relativists, and vice versa: objections from implausible ascriptions of mistakes. Relativists (and others) object to error-theory that it implausibly implies that people, in having moral beliefs, are systematically mistaken about what exists. Error-theorists (and others) object to relativism that it implausibly implies that people are (...)
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  16. added 2019-06-05
    Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jeff Wisdom - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):217-220.
    © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com...Jonas Olson's Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence has four aims. First, the book aims to provide a historical background to the development of moral error theory prior to its appearance in Mackie's article, ‘A Refutation of Morals.’ Secondly, it provides a critical look at four different versions of the queerness argument. (...)
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  17. added 2019-03-10
    Conceptual Entailment Error Theory.Wouter Floris Kalf - 2018 - In Wouter Kalf (ed.), Moral Error Theory. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 27-79.
    This book provides a novel formulation and defence of moral error theory. It also provides a novel solution to the so-called now what question; viz., the question what we should do with our moral thought and talk after moral error theory. The novel formulation of moral error theory uses pragmatic presupposition rather than conceptual entailment to argue that moral judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to categorical moral reasons. The new answer to the now what question is pragmatic presupposition substitutionism: we (...)
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  18. added 2019-02-05
    What’s Wrong with Relaxing?Christine Tiefensee - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6):725-742.
    In his new book Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer argues that there is no way around the result that all metaethical views other than the error theory either fail for the same reasons as metaphysical normative realism, or for the same reasons as expressivism. In this contribution, I seek to show that this is false: We can eschew this result by ‘relaxing’ about normative truths. Even if Streumer were right about the fate of metaphysical normative realism and expressivism, then, relaxed realists (...)
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  19. added 2019-02-05
    Saving Which Differences? Creeping Minimalism and Disagreement.Christine Tiefensee - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1905-1921.
    Much thought has been devoted to how metaethical disagreement between moral realism and expressivism can be saved once minimalism starts creeping. Very little thought has been given to how creeping minimalism affects error-theories’ disagreement with their metaethical competitors. The reason for this omission, I suspect, is found in the belief that whilst locating distinctive moral realist and expressivist positions within a minimalist landscape poses a severe challenge, no such difficulties are encountered when differentiating error-theories from moral realism and expressivism. In (...)
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  20. added 2019-01-30
    Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, by Jonas Olson: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. Viii + 214 , £35.00. [REVIEW]Emma Wood - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):410-411.
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  21. added 2018-12-06
    Mistaken Morality? : An Essay on Moral Error Theory.Emma Beckman - 2018 - Dissertation, Umeå University
    This dissertation explores arguments and questions related to moral error theory – the idea that morality inevitably involves a fundamental and serious error such that moral judgments and statements never come out true. It is suggested that the truth of error theory remains a non-negligible possibility, and that we for this reason should take a version of moral fictionalism seriously. I begin by defining error theory as the claim that moral judgments are beliefs with moral propositions as content, moral utterances (...)
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  22. added 2018-11-05
    Nietzsche and Contemporary Metaethics.Alex Silk - 2018 - In Paul Katsafanas (ed.), Routledge Philosophical Minds: The Nietzschean Mind. Routledge.
    Recent decades have witnessed a flurry of interest in Nietzsche's metaethics — his views, if any, on metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological issues about normativity and normative language and judgment. Various authors have highlighted a tension between Nietzsche's metaethical views about value and his ardent endorsement of a particular evaluative perspective: Although Nietzsche makes apparently "antirealist" claims to the effect that there are no evaluative facts, he vehemently engages in evaluative discourse and enjoins the "free spirits" to create values. Nearly (...)
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  23. added 2018-10-15
    Reductivism, Nonreductivism and Incredulity About Streumer’s Error Theory.N. G. Laskowski - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):766-776.
    In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer argues via elimination for a global error theory, according to which all normative judgments ascribe properties that do not exist. Streumer also argues that it is not possible to believe his view, which is a claim he uses in defending his view against several objections. I argue that reductivists and nonreductivists have compelling responses to Streumer's elimination argument – responses constituting strong reason to reject Streumer’s diagnosis of any alleged incredulity about his error theory.
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  24. added 2018-07-12
    Moral Skepticism: An Introduction and Overview.Diego E. Machuca - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-31.
    In this introductory chapter, I not only present the essays that make up this volume but also I offer an extensive critical overview of moral skepticism with the hope that it will turn out to be useful particularly to the uninitiated reader. I first provide a taxonomy of varieties of moral skepticism, then discuss the main arguments advanced in their favor, and finally summarize the ten essays here collected, which deal with one or more of those skeptical stances and arguments.
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  25. added 2018-07-02
    The Origins of Emotivism, Expressivism and the Error Theory: Marty, Scheler, Russell, Ogden & Richards.Kevin Mulligan - 2017 - In Hamid Taieb & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Mind and Language – on the Philosophy of Anton Marty. De Gruyter. pp. 149-168.
  26. added 2018-06-05
    Evolutionary Skepticism About Morality and Prudential Normativity.Peter Königs - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):911-928.
    SEE BELOW ("EXTERNAL LINKS") FOR A FREELY AVAILABLE PDF OF THIS ARTICLE /// ABSTRACT: Debunking arguments aim at defeating the justification of a belief by revealing the belief to have a dubious genealogy. One prominent example of such a debunking argument is Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking explanation of morality. Joyce’s argument targets only our belief in moral facts, while our belief in prudential facts is exempt from his evolutionary critique. In this paper, I suggest that our belief in prudential facts (...)
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  27. added 2018-03-14
    Are Moral Error Theorists Intellectually Vicious?Stephen Ingram - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):80-89.
    Christos Kyriacou has recently proposed charging moral error theorists with intellectual vice. He does this in response to an objection that Ingram makes against the 'moral fixed points view' developed by Cuneo and Shafer-Landau. This brief paper shows that Kyriacou's proposed vice-charge fails to vindicate the moral fixed points view. I argue that any attempt to make an epistemic vice-charge against error theorists will face major obstacles, and that it is highly unlikely that such a charge could receive the evidential (...)
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  28. added 2018-02-27
    Moral Skepticism, Fictionalism, and Insulation.Diego E. Machuca - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge. pp. 213-234.
    It has been claimed that a key difference between ancient and contemporary skepticism is that, unlike the ancient skeptics, contemporary skeptics consider ordinary beliefs to be insulated from skeptical doubt. In the case of metaethics, this issue is related to the following question: what attitude towards ordinary moral thought and discourse should one adopt if one is a moral skeptic? Whereas moral abolitionists claim that one should do away with ordinary moral thought and discourse altogether, moral fictionalists maintain that, given (...)
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  29. added 2018-02-17
    How to Prove That Some Acts Are Wrong.Christian Coons - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):83-98.
    I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: x-ing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain why the following conditional-type is true: If x-ing would be morally required, if anything is, then x-ing is actually morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive moral claim; I use (...)
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  30. added 2018-02-16
    Moral Fictionalism, the Frege-Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):133-143.
    CHANGE SLIDE Go through outline of talk CHANGE SLIDE It is my sincerest hope that if there is one thing that people take away from Moral Fictionalism, it is the recognition that standard noncognitivism involves a syndrome of three, logically distinct claims. Standard noncognitivists claim that moral judgment is not belief or any other cognitive attitude but is, rather, a noncognitive attitude more akin to desire; that this noncognitive attitude is expressed by our public moral utterances; and, hence, that our (...)
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  31. added 2017-12-21
    Why Queerness is Not Enough.Kretz David - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (1):32-43.
    Moral error theorists often claim to be strongly anti‑metaphysical in their moral scepticism and atheistic naturalists. This paper argues that pre‑ cisely this becomes a problem for them, when their metaethical and ontologi‑ cal commitments clash. I first outline how the known arguments against error theory face a problematic, yet rarely considered trade‑off : either they are very strong, then they are also very demanding in their assumptions or they are less demanding in their assumptions but rather weak in their (...)
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  32. added 2017-10-26
    Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgments.Bart Streumer - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. -/- Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory. (...)
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  33. added 2017-07-19
    Moral Nihilism and its Implications.Marc Krellenstein - 2017 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 38 (1):75-90.
    Philosophers have identified a number of principles that characterize morality and underlie moral judgments. However, philosophy has failed to establish any widely agreed-upon justification for these judgments, and an “error theory” that views moral judgments as without justification has not been successfully refuted. Evolutionary psychologists have had success in explaining the likely origins and mechanisms of morality but have also not established any justification for adopting particular values. As a result, we are left with moral nihilism -- the absence of (...)
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  34. added 2017-07-12
    Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory.Bart Streumer - forthcoming - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. Routledge.
    According to the error theory, normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but these properties do not exist. I have argued elsewhere (in "Can We Believe the Error Theory?") that we cannot believe this theory. Several philosophers have replied to this argument. In this chapter, I respond to their replies.
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  35. added 2017-01-30
    Hard Atheism and the Ethics of Desire: An Alternative to Morality.Marks Joel - 2016 - New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book challenges the widespread assumption that the ethical life and society must be moral in any objective sense. In his previous works, Marks has rejected both the existence of such a morality and the need to maintain verbal, attitudinal, practical, and institutional remnants of belief in it. This book develops these ideas further, with emphasis on constructing a positive alternative. Calling it “desirism”, Marks illustrates what life and the world would be like if we lived in accordance with our (...)
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  36. added 2017-01-23
    Moralność I Obiektywizm (Ted Honderich, (Ed.), Morality and Objectivity. A Tribute to J. L. Mackie).Marek Witkowski - 1990 - Etyka 25.
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  37. added 2017-01-19
    Wright’s Argument Against Error-Theories.Alexander Miller - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):98–103.
  38. added 2017-01-19
    Irrealism and Error in Ethics.Mark Timmons - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (3-4):373-406.
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  39. added 2017-01-17
    Projection, Indeterminacy and Moral Skepticism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2017 - In Diego Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York, USA: Routledge.
    According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that are sometimes associated with moral skepticism. (...)
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  40. added 2017-01-17
    Moral Error: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2017 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
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  41. added 2017-01-17
    No, We Cannot.Bart Streumer - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):537-546.
    Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini argues that we can believe the error theory. In this reply, I explain why I still think we cannot.
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  42. added 2017-01-17
    Destabilizing the Error Theory.Terence Cuneo - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 71-94.
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  43. added 2017-01-17
    Values and Beliefs: A Pragmatist Critique of Moral Nihilism.J. P. Weismuller - unknown
    Moral nihilism maintains that value judgments cannot be justified. In this paper I argue against two prominent nihilistic theories: error theory and expressivism. First I present a meta-valuation thesis, which holds that it would be more valuable if at least some value judgments were justified. Second I argue for a value-justification thesis, which holds that the greater value of value-justifying theories warrants a rejection of nihilistic theories. This latter thesis requires a pragmatist premise: justified beliefs are the most valuable of (...)
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  44. added 2017-01-16
    Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Written by Jonas Olson. [REVIEW]Hallvard Lillehammer - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):57-61.
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  45. added 2017-01-16
    Moral Discourse: Categorical or Institutional?Calvin H. Warner - unknown
    Error theory turns on a particular presupposition about the conceptual commitments of moral realism, namely that the moral facts posited by realists need to be categorical. True moral propositions are said to have an absolute authority in their prescriptions in the sense that an agent, regardless of her own ends, needs or desires, is categorically obligated and has reason to act in accordance with their prescriptions. But, nothing in the world has such a queer property as categoricity, and therefore we (...)
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  46. added 2017-01-16
    Moral Fictionalism and Moral Reasons.Patrick Clipsham - unknown
    One major problem with moral discourse is that we tend treat moral utterances as if they represent propositions. But complex metaphysical problems arise when we try to describe the nature of the moral facts that correspond to these propositions. If moral facts do not exist, how can moralizers justify engagement in moral practice? One possibility is abolitionism; abandoning morality and growing out of our old habits. Another option that has been suggested is that morality be preserved as a useful fiction. (...)
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  47. added 2017-01-16
    V—Moral Nihilism.Neil Cooper - 1974 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1):75-90.
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  48. added 2017-01-15
    A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory. [REVIEW]Folke Tersman - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4).
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  49. added 2017-01-15
    Morality and Objectivity : A Tribute to J. L. Mackie.Ted Honderich (ed.) - 2011 - Routledge.
    The late J. L. Mackie and his work were a focus for much of the best philosophical thinking in the Oxford tradition. His moral thought centres on that most fundamental issue in moral philosophy – the issue of whether our moral judgements are in some way objective. The contributors to this volume, first published in 1985, are among the most distinguished figures in moral philosophy, and their essays in tribute to John Mackie present views at the forefront of the subject. (...)
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  50. added 2017-01-15
    The Philosopher’s Projective Error.Bernard W. Kobes - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):581-593.
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