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  1. added 2020-05-15
    Prescriptions and Universalizability: A Defence of Harean Ethical Theory.Daniel Y. Elstein - 2014 - Dissertation, Cambridge University
    R.M. Hare had an ambitious scheme of providing a unified account of meta-ethics and normative ethics by combining expressivism with Kantianism and utilitarianism. The project of this thesis is to defend Hare’s theory in its most ambitious form. This means not just showing how the expressivist, Kantian and utilitarian elements are consistent, or that the three are each correct, but also that they are interdependent. The only defensible form of expressivism is Kantian; the only defensible Kantian theory is both expressivist (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-13
    On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege–Geach to Illuminate Expressivism’s Problem with Objectivity.David Faraci - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12:244-264.
    In print, the central objection to expressivism has been the Frege–Geach problem. Yet most cognitivists seem to be motivated by “deeper” worries, ones they have spent comparatively little time pursuing in print. Part of the explanation for this mismatch between motivation and rhetoric is likely that those deeper worries are largely metaphysical. Since expressivism is not a metaphysical view, it can be hard to see how to mount a relevant attack. The strategy in this chapter is to introduce claims about (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-08
    Epistemology Shmepistemology: Moral Error Theory and Epistemic Expressivism.Stephen Ingram - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):649-669.
    Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-02
    Wittgenstein and Objectivity in Ethics. A Reply to Brandhorst.Benjamin De Mesel - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 40 (1):40-63.
    In “Correspondence to Reality in Ethics”, Mario Brandhorst examines the view of ethics that Wittgenstein took in his later years. According to Brandhorst, Wittgenstein leaves room for truth and falsity, facts, correspondence and reality in ethics. Wittgenstein's target, argues Brandhorst, is objectivity. I argue that Brandhorst's arguments in favour of truth, facts, reality and correspondence in ethics invite similar arguments in favour of objectivity, that Brandhorst does not recognise this because his conception of objectivity is distorted by a Platonist picture (...)
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  5. added 2020-04-02
    Are Moral Judgements Semantically Uniform? A Wittgensteinian Approach to the Cognitivism - Non-Cognitivism Debate.Benjamin De Mesel - 2015 - In Benjamin De Mesel & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein. New York: Routledge. pp. 126-148.
    Cognitivists and non-cognitivists in contemporary meta-ethics tend to assume that moral judgments are semantically uniform. That is, they share the assumption that either all moral judgments express beliefs, or they all express non-beliefs. But what if some moral judgments express beliefs and others do not? Then moral judgments are not semantically uniform and the question “Cognitivist or non-cognitivist?” poses a false dilemma. I will question the assumption that moral judgments are semantically uniform. First, I will explain what I mean by (...)
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  6. added 2020-03-13
    Thick Evaluation, by Simon Kirchin. [REVIEW]Brent G. Kyle - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):954-962.
    Thick Evaluation, by KirchinSimon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xi + 198.
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  7. added 2020-03-13
    The Significance of Sense: Meaning, Modality, and Morality.Roger Wertheimer - 1972 - Ithaca: Ithaca [N.Y.]Cornell University Press.
    Univocalist analyses of the modal auxiliary verbs ('ought'/'must'/'can') and the adjective 'right'/'wrong'.
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  8. added 2020-03-10
    Can Expressivism Have It All?Terence Cuneo - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):219-241.
    Quasi-realist expressivists set themselves the task of developing a metaethical theory that at once captures what they call the “realist-sounding” elements of ordinary moral thought and discourse but is also distinctively antirealist. Its critics have long suspected that the position cannot have what it wants. In this essay, I develop this suspicion. I do so by distinguishing two paradigmatic versions of the view—what I call Thin and Thick expressivism respectively. I contend that there is a metaethical datum regarding our epistemic (...)
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  9. added 2020-03-10
    Can Expressivism Have It All?Terence Cuneo - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):219-241.
    Quasi-realist expressivists set themselves the task of developing a metaethical theory that at once captures what they call the “realist-sounding” elements of ordinary moral thought and discourse but is also distinctively antirealist. Its critics have long suspected that the position cannot have what it wants. In this essay, I develop this suspicion. I do so by distinguishing two paradigmatic versions of the view—what I call Thin and Thick expressivism respectively. I contend that there is a metaethical datum regarding our epistemic (...)
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  10. added 2020-03-10
    Quasi-Realism.Terence Cuneo - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 626-642.
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  11. added 2020-02-23
    Metaethical Intentionalism and the Intersubjectivity of Morals.Kyle Ferguson - 2020 - Dissertation, The Graduate Center, City University of New York
    I defend a thesis called metaethical intentionalism, according to which deontic moral judgments (“ought” judgments) are intersubjective intentions or verbal expressions of intersubjective intentions. They have the form, “We shall any of us do A in C,” or are derivable from such practical commitments. They are universalizable by virtue of their content (“… any of us …”) and sharable by virtue of their form (“We …”). My account of the moral “ought” is inspired by the moral writings of Wilfrid Sellars (...)
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  12. added 2020-02-12
    Impersonality, Character, and Moral Expressivism.Richard Moran - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (11):578-595.
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  13. added 2020-02-04
    Internalism and the Frege-Geach Problem.Caj Strandberg - 2019 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 32:68-91.
    According to the established understanding of the Frege-Geach problem, it is a challenge exclusively for metaethical expressivism. In this paper, I argue that it is much wider in scope: The problem applies generally to views according to which moral sentences express moral judgments entailing that one is for or against something, irrespective of what mental states the judgments consist in. In particular, it applies to motivational internalism about moral judgments. Most noteworthy, it applies to cognitivist internalism according to which moral (...)
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  14. added 2020-01-24
    Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):334-358.
    This paper addresses the “creeping minimalism” challenge to quasi-realist forms of expressivism by arguing that the solution suggested by Dreier doesn’t work and proposing an alternative solution based on the different inferential roles of ethical and descriptive judgments.
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  15. added 2020-01-20
    Logical Expressivism and Carroll’s Regress.Corine Besson - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86:35-62.
    In this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towards drawing certain types of conclusions from certain types of premises. The argument is that logical expressivism is the only view that can take us out of Lewis Carroll's Regress – which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible. I show that the argument does not hold scrutiny and (...)
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  16. added 2019-11-27
    Classical Emotivism: Charles L. Stevenson.Alberto Oya - 2019 - Bajo Palabra 22:309-326.
    The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Charles L. Stevenson’s metaethical view. Since his metaethical view is a form of emotivism, I will start by explaining what the core claims of emotivism are. I will then explore and comment on the specific claims of Stevenson’s proposal. Last, I will offer an overview of the objections that have traditionally been raised against emotivism.
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  17. added 2019-11-05
    Metasemantics, Moral Realism and Moral Doctrines.Christine Tiefensee - manuscript
    In this paper, I consider the relationship between Matthew Kramer’s moral realism as a moral doctrine and expressivism, understood as a distinctly non-representationalist metasemantics of moral vocabulary. More precisely, I argue that Kramer is right in stating that moral realism as a moral doctrine does not stand in conflict with expressivism. But I will also go further, submitting that advocates of moral realism as a moral doctrine must be expressivists in some shape or form. Accordingly, if you do not want (...)
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  18. added 2019-11-05
    Expressivism, Minimalism and Moral Doctrines.Christine Tiefensee - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Cambridge
    Quasi-realist expressivists have developed a growing liking for minimalism about truth. It has gone almost unnoticed, though, that minimalism also drives an anti-Archimedean movement which launches a direct attack on expressivists’ non-moral self-image by proclaiming that all metaethical positions are built on moral grounds. This interplay between expressivism, minimalism and anti-Archimedeanism makes for an intriguing metaethical encounter. As such, the first part of this dissertation examines expressivism’s marriage to minimalism and defends it against its critics. The second part then turns (...)
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  19. added 2019-10-17
    Fallibility for Expressivists.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
    Quasi-realists face the challenge of providing a plausible analysis of acknowledgments of moral fallibility (e.g., "I believe that lying is wrong, but I might be mistaken"). This paper develops a new analysis of these acknowledgments, according to which they express moral uncertainty. After advertising the advantages of this analysis, I take up the question of how to understand moral uncertainty in expressivist terms.
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  20. added 2019-10-12
    A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great effort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the problem of (...)
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  21. added 2019-09-30
    Che Fare? Nuove prospettive filosofiche sull’azione.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - Roma: Carocci.
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  22. added 2019-09-26
    Good and Good For.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2017 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.
  23. added 2019-09-12
    Indignation, Practical Rationality and Our Moral Life: A Grammatical Investigation.Jônadas Techio - 2016 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 15 (2):260-278.
    This paper offers a grammatical investigation of some important aspects of our moral life taking a scene from the movie Mr. Deeds Goes to Town as a test case. The main question I try to answer is whether there are situations in our moral discussions in which the proper and rational attitude is to show disagreement, as opposed to continuing the dialogue. Many philosophers seem committed to a conception of moral reasoning that takes as its end rational agreement among agents; (...)
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  24. added 2019-09-12
    The Limits of Expressivism.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2015 - In Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 224-242.
    In his recent book, Meaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard argues at length that meta-ethical expressivism can be profitably extended to semantic and intentional language: meta-linguistic discourse about meaning, reference, content, and the like. This chapter argues that the extension of expressivism to semantic discourse is unprofitable and—worse still—in a certain sense selfundermining. It is unprofitable because it sheds no light on the problem of intentionality; and it undermines itself because many of the sentences that make up the expressivist’s theory are (...)
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  25. added 2019-08-23
    A User’s Guide to Hybrid Tools.Caleb Perl - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):129-158.
    Hybrid metaethical theories have significant promise; they would have important upshots if they were true. But they also face severe problems. The problems are severe enough to make many philosophers doubt that they could be true. My ambition is to show that the problems are just instances of a highly general problem: a problem about what are sometimes called ‘intensional anaphora'. I'll also show that any adequate explanation of intensional anaphora immediately solves all the problems for the hybrid theorist. We (...)
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  26. added 2019-08-03
    Relativism and Expressivism.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - In Martin Kusch (ed.), Routledge Handbook to Relativism. Routledge.
    Relativism and expressivism offer two different semantic frameworks for grappling with a similar cluster of issues. What is the difference between these two frameworks? Should they be viewed as rivals? If so, how should we choose between them? This chapter sheds light on these questions. After providing an overview of relativism and expressivism, I discuss three potential choice points: their relation to truth conditional semantics, their pictures of belief and communication, and their explanations of disagreement.
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  27. added 2019-07-14
    Second Thoughts About "Wishful Thinking".Mark van Roojen - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):269-288.
    Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivists must think of reasoning from moral premises to empirical conclusions as akin to wishful thinking. Defenders of non-cognitivism have responded that an adequate solution to the Frege-Geach problem would explain relations of entailment and implication between moral and nonmoral claims and thereby also handle Dorr’s objection. This paper offers a new, more specific, interpretation of Dorr’s objection and one that makes it distinct from worries about Frege-Geach. The paper also explains why non-cognitivists might still (...)
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  28. added 2019-07-03
    Negation, Expressivism, and Intentionality.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):246-267.
    Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, (...)
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  29. added 2019-06-18
    Inferential Expressivism and the Negation Problem.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 16.
    We develop a novel solution to the negation version of the Frege-Geach problem by taking up recent insights from the bilateral programme in logic. Bilateralists derive the meaning of negation from a primitive *B-type* inconsistency involving the attitudes of assent and dissent. Some may demand an explanation of this inconsistency in simpler terms, but we argue that bilateralism’s assumptions are no less explanatory than those of *A-type* semantics that only require a single primitive attitude, but must stipulate inconsistency elsewhere. Based (...)
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  30. added 2019-06-13
    Moral Realism, Speech Act Diversity, and Expressivism.Nicholas Laskowski - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):166-174.
    In his highly engaging book, Speech and Morality, Terence Cuneo advances a transcendental argument for moral realism from the fact that we speak. After summarizing the major moves in the book, I argue that its master argument is not as friendly to non-naturalist versions of moral realism as Cuneo advertises and relies on a diet of insufficient types of speech acts. I also argue that expressivists have compelling replies to each of Cuneo's objections individually, but taken together, Cuneo's objections provide (...)
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  31. added 2019-06-06
    Allan Gibbard, Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics. [REVIEW]Daniel Star - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):259-263.
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  32. added 2019-06-06
    Why an Expressivist Should Not Commit to Commitment-Semantics 1.Jorn Sonderholm - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):403-409.
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  33. added 2019-06-06
    Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn Out of Frege’s Abyss?Bob Hale - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):144-149.
    An early objection to Simon Blackburn’s first attempts to breathe new life into expressivism—by solving the Frege-Geach problem—was that whilst viewing compound sentences featuring moral components as expressive of attitudes towards combinations of attitudes might enable one to make out that a thinker who, to take the usual example, asserts the premisses but will not accept the conclusion of a moral modus ponens is at fault because they are involved in a “clash of attitudes”, this does no justice to the (...)
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  34. added 2019-06-06
    Review of R. M. Hare, Sorting Out Ethics.Anthony Skelton - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):583-584.
    This is a short review of R.M. Hare's Sorting Out Ethics. It critically evaluates Hare's universal prescriptivism.
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  35. added 2019-06-06
    Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. [REVIEW]Abraham Edel - 1992 - International Studies in Philosophy 24 (3):143-144.
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  36. added 2019-06-06
    Geach Again.Simon Blackburn - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):160-160.
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  37. added 2019-06-06
    Reply to Geach.Simon Blackburn & Alonso Church - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):206.
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  38. added 2019-06-05
    Chrisman, Matthew. The Meaning of ‘Ought’: Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 280. $65.00. [REVIEW]Jack Woods - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):272-277.
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  39. added 2019-06-05
    VIII-Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth.Stephen J. Barker - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199.
    I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context (...)
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  40. added 2019-06-05
    Why Not Moral Realism?1.Ruth Anna Putnam - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (1):17-29.
    This paper argues for the view that moral realism is irrelevant to ethics. It recalls Aristotle's claim that the Platonic Form of the Good is irrelevant because it is not the sort of thing we can desire or pursue. Moore's account of ethics in relation to conduct and of the Ideal is woefully inadequate as a morality to live by. Peter Railton's moral realism also involves a very weak first-order moral theory. These failures are due, I claim, to the fact (...)
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  41. added 2019-06-05
    Book ReviewsAllan Gibbard,. Thinking How to Live.Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. Pp. 302. $45.00.Matthew Chrisman - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):406-412.
    I imagine that people will complain that the account of normative concepts defended in Gibbard’s new book makes the metaethical waters even muddier because it blurs the line between cognitivism and noncognitivism and between realism and antirealism. However, these labels are philosophic tools, and in the wake of Gibbard’s new book, one might rightly conclude that there are new and better philosophical tools emerging on the metaethical scene. The uptake of views about practical reasoning—as exhibited by planning—into debates about the (...)
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  42. added 2019-06-03
    Peter Geach's Ethics.Katharina Nieswandt - forthcoming - In Hähnel Martin (ed.), Aristotelian Naturalism: A Research Companion. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Geach is best known for his contributions to theoretical philosophy: Most of his more than one hundred papers and a dozen books are on logic, philosophy of language and metaphysics. But he also made significant contributions to ethics. Particularly influential were a series of short metaethics papers, which are small masterpieces, both in terms of philosophical content and style. In usually less than ten pages, Geach delivers sharp analyses and powerful objections against influential schools. His arguments are always so clear (...)
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  43. added 2019-05-31
    Expressivism and the Limits of Moral Disagreement.David Merli - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (1):25-55.
    This paper argues that expressivism faces serious difficulties giving an adequate account of univocal moral disagreements. Expressivist accounts of moral discourse understand moral judgments in terms of various noncognitive mental states, and they interpret moral disagreements as clashes between competing attitudes. I argue that, for various reasons, expressivists must specify just what mental states are involved in moral judgment. If they do not, we lack a way of distinguishing moral judgments from other sorts of assessment and thus for identifying narrowly (...)
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  44. added 2019-04-20
    The Expansion View of Thick Concepts.Brent G. Kyle - forthcoming - Noûs.
    This paper proposes a new Separabilist account of thick concepts, called the Expansion View (or EV). According to EV, thick concepts are expanded contents of thin terms. An expanded content is, roughly, the semantic content of a predicate along with modifiers. Although EV is a form of Separabilism, it is distinct from the only kind of Separabilism discussed in the literature, and it has many features that Inseparabilists want from an account of thick concepts. EV can also give non-cognitivists a (...)
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  45. added 2019-04-12
    How Ecumenical Expressivism Confuses the Trivial and the Substantive.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):666-674.
    I argue that there are cases in which ecumenical expressivism cannot distinguish between endorsement of certain trivial and substantive normative judgments. I consider the extent to which this problem generalizes across different formulations of the ecumenical view. I suggest that we may not be able to escape the problem if we hope to retain the ability to solve the Frege-Geach problem in the way promised by ecumenical expressivism.
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  46. added 2019-03-16
    Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations.Bob Beddor - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    This paper develops a new challenge for moral noncognitivism. In brief, the challenge is this: Beliefs — both moral and non-moral — are epistemically evaluable, whereas desires are not. It is tempting to explain this difference in terms of differences in the functional roles of beliefs and desires. However, this explanation stands in tension with noncognitivism, which maintains that moral beliefs have a desire-like functional role. After critically reviewing some initial responses to the challenge, I suggest a solution, which involves (...)
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  47. added 2019-02-11
    Is Epistemology Autonomous?Daniel Greco - 2019 - In John McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  48. added 2019-02-05
    Saving Which Differences? Creeping Minimalism and Disagreement.Christine Tiefensee - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1905-1921.
    Much thought has been devoted to how metaethical disagreement between moral realism and expressivism can be saved once minimalism starts creeping. Very little thought has been given to how creeping minimalism affects error-theories’ disagreement with their metaethical competitors. The reason for this omission, I suspect, is found in the belief that whilst locating distinctive moral realist and expressivist positions within a minimalist landscape poses a severe challenge, no such difficulties are encountered when differentiating error-theories from moral realism and expressivism. In (...)
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  49. added 2019-02-05
    Quasi-Realismus.Christine Tiefensee - 2016 - In Markus Rüther (ed.), Grundkurs Metaethik. Münster: Mentis. pp. 81-90.
    This chapter provides an introductory overview of quasi-realism and its key challenges.
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  50. added 2019-01-31
    Impassioned Belief, by Michael Ridge: Oxford: Routledge, 2014, Pp. Xii + 264, £30. [REVIEW]Jack Woods - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):199-202.
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1 — 50 / 543