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  1. Missing the Target: Jonathan Dancy’s Conception of a Principled Ethics.Maike Albertzart - 2011 - Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):49-58.
  2. McDowell's Moral Realism and the Secondary Quality Analogy.O. Tollefsen Christopher - 2000 - Disputatio 1 (8):30-42.
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  3. Ethics Without Reasons?Roger Crisp - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):40-49.
    This paper is a discussion of Jonathan Dancy's book Ethics Without Principles (2004). Holism about reasons is distinguished into a weak version, which allows for invariant reasons, and a strong, which doesn't. Four problems with Dancy's arguments for strong holism are identified. (1) A plausible particularism based on it will be close to generalism. (2) Dancy rests his case on common-sense morality, without justifying it. (3) His examples are of non-ultimate reasons. (4) There are certain universal principles it is hard (...)
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  4. Review: Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. [REVIEW]Dancy Jonathan - unknown
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  5. Review: Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. [REVIEW]Dancy Jonathan - unknown
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  6. Review: Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. [REVIEW]J. Dancy - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):462-467.
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  7. Review: Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. [REVIEW]Jonathan Dancy - unknown
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  8. Review: Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. [REVIEW]Jonathan Dancy - unknown
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  9. Review: Sean McKeever, Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. [REVIEW]Jonathan Dancy - unknown
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  10. Applying Principles to Cases and the Problem of Judgment.John K. Davis - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):563 - 577.
    We sometimes decide what to do by applying moral principles to cases, but this is harder than it looks. Principles are more general than cases, and sometimes it is hard to tell whether and how a principle applies to a given case. Sometimes two conflicting principles seem to apply to the same case. To handle these problems, we use a kind of judgment to ascertain whether and how a principle applies to a given case, or which principle to follow when (...)
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  11. Can Moral Principles Explain Supervenience?Aaron Elliott - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):629-659.
    The distribution of moral properties supervenes on the distribution of natural properties, and this provides a puzzle for non-naturalism: what could explain supervenience if moral properties are not natural properties? Enoch claims moral principles explain supervenience. But this solution is incomplete without an account of what moral principles and properties are, and what relation holds between them. This paper begins to develop such an account by exploring analogous issues for Realism about Laws of nature in philosophy of science. Appealing to (...)
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  12. Pro-Tanto Obligations and Ceteris-Paribus Rules.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):255-266.
    I summarize a conception of morality as containing a set of rules which hold ceteris paribus and which impose pro-tanto obligations. I explain two ways in which moral rules are ceteris-paribus, according to whether an exception is duty-voiding or duty-overriding. I defend the claim that moral rules are ceteris-paribus against two qualms suggested by Luke Robinson’s discussion of moral rules and against the worry that such rules are uninformative. I show that Robinson’s argument that moral rules cannot ground pro-tanto obligations (...)
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  13. Ethical Universalism and Particularism.Alan Gewirth - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (6):283-302.
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  14. Moral Case Classification and the Nonlocality of Reasons.Marcello Guarini - 2013 - Topoi 32 (2):267-289.
    This paper presents the results of training an artificial neural network (ANN) to classify moral situations. The ANN produces a similarity space in the process of solving its classification problem. The state space is subjected to analysis that suggests that holistic approaches to interpreting its functioning are problematic. The idea of a contributory or pro tanto standard, as discussed in debates between moral particularists and generalists, is used to understand the structure of the similarity space generated by the ANN. A (...)
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  15. Generalism Without Foundations.Manuel Hernández-Iglesias - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (2):71-86.
    This paper is a defence of a holistic version of the generalist view of moral reasoning based on prima facie principles. In Section 1 I summarise Dancy’s arguments for particularism. Then I argue that particularism goes against strong intuitions regarding reasoning in general (Section 2), fails to account for the asymmetry of reasons (Section 3) and to make sense of compunction and moral imbecility (Section 4). I conclude (Section 5) that a holistic generalism is the right view of moral reasoning. (...)
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  16. Particularism Doesn’T Flatten.Amelia Hicks - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):339-362.
    _ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 3, pp 339 - 362 Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge object that moral particularism ‘flattens the moral landscape’, that is, that particularism treats reasons of _different_ kinds as if they were reasons of the _same_ kind. This objection is misguided in two respects. First, particularists need not say that every feature can be a moral reason. Second, even if particularists _were_ committed to saying that every feature can be a moral reason, they would still not (...)
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  17. Theory Vs Anti-Theory.Brad Hooker - 2012 - In Ulrika Heuer Gerald Lang (ed.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press.
    Bernard Williams influentially attacked ethical theory. This paper assesses arguments for the ‘anti-theory’ position in ethics, including mainly arguments put forward by Williams but also arguments put forward by others. The paper begins by discussing what is supposed to be theory in ethics and what ethical intuitions are taken to be by those involved in the theory versus anti-theory debate. Then the paper responds to the objections that ethical theory is mistaken to prize principles, mistaken to prize rationalism, mistaken to (...)
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  18. The Armchair and the Trolley: An Argument for Experimental Ethics.Guy Kahane - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):421-445.
    Ethical theory often starts with our intuitions about particular cases and tries to uncover the principles that are implicit in them; work on the ‘trolley problem’ is a paradigmatic example of this approach. But ethicists are no longer the only ones chasing trolleys. In recent years, psychologists and neuroscientists have also turned to study our moral intuitions and what underlies them. The relation between these two inquiries, which investigate similar examples and intuitions, and sometimes produce parallel results, is puzzling. Does (...)
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  19. Zwischen Partikularismus und Generalismus: Ethische Probleme als Grammatische Spannungen.Matthias Kiesselbach - 2010 - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 35 (1):2010.
    This essay argues that there is room for a third position between moral particularism and moral generalism in their orthodox forms. The view proposed in this essay is inspired by the later Wittgenstein's conception of grammar and holds that formulations of ethical principles can be interpreted as grammatical statements, while ethical problems can be interpreted as instances of grammatical tension. On this reading, situations in which ethical principles turn out to conict come out as moments in the evolution of language. (...)
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  20. Particularism and Default Valency.Simon Kirchin - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):16-32.
    In this paper, I concentrate on the notion of default valency, drawing on some of the distinctions made and thoughts given in my Introduction. I motivate why the notion is important for particularists to have up their sleeves by outlining a recent debate between particularists and generalists. I then move to the main aim of the piece which is to discuss how anyone, particularist and generalist alike, might seek to distinguish reason-generating features into different types. My main aim is not (...)
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  21. Challenging Moral Particularism.Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik (eds.) - 2008 - Routledge.
    Given the high standard of the contributions, and that this is a subject where lively debate continues to flourish, Challenging Moral Particularism will become ...
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  22. Where the Laws Are.Mark Lance & Margaret Little - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:149-171.
  23. Do Particularists Have a Coherent Notion of a Reason for Action?Andrea Lechler - 2012 - Ethics 122 (4):763-772.
    Selim Berker argues that particularists do not have a coherent notion of reasons for action because they cannot show that contributory reasons always contribute to overall reason or moral judgments in accordance with their valence. I argue that Berker fails to demonstrate that particularists cannot show this to be the case. He also wrongly assumes that they need to know this to be the case to legitimately speak of reasons for action. Furthermore, Jonathan Dancy’s account of practical reasoning explains how (...)
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  24. Particularism in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.Uri D. Leibowitz - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):121-147.
    In this essay I offer a new particularist reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I argue that the interpretation I present not only helps us to resolve some puzzles about Aristotle’s goals and methods, but it also gives rise to a novel account of morality—an account that is both interesting and plausible in its own right. The goal of this paper is, in part, exegetical—that is, to figure out how to best understand the text of the Nicomachean Ethics. But this paper (...)
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  25. Scientific Explanation and Moral Explanation.Uri D. Leibowitz - 2010 - Noûs 45 (3):472-503.
    Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one’s views about the nature of moral explanation will influence the kinds of moral theories one is willing to countenance. Many moral philosophers are (explicitly or implicitly) committed to a deductive model of explanation. As I see it, this commitment lies at the heart of the current debate between moral particularists and moral generalists. In (...)
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  26. Moral Advice and Moral Theory.Uri D. Leibowitz - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):349 - 359.
    Monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about the structure of the best explanation of the rightness (wrongness) of actions. In this paper I argue that the availability of good moral advice gives us reason to prefer particularist theories and pluralist theories to monist theories. First, I identify two distinct roles of moral theorizing—explaining the rightness (wrongness) of actions, and providing moral advice—and I explain how these two roles are related. Next, I explain what monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about. Finally, I (...)
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  27. A Defense of a Particularist Research Program.Uri D. Leibowitz - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):181-199.
    What makes some acts morally right and others morally wrong? Traditionally, philosophers have thought that in order to answer this question we must find and formulate exceptionless moral principles—principles that capture all and only morally right actions. Utilitarianism and Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of such attempts. In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in a novel approach—Particularism—although its precise content is still a matter of controversy. In this paper I develop and motivate a new formulation of particularism (...)
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  28. Generics, Generalism, and Reflective Equilibrium: Implications for Moral Theorizing From the Study of Language.Adam Lerner & Sarah‐Jane Leslie - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):366-403.
  29. Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal.Sean D. McKeever & Michael R. Ridge - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. In Principled Ethics, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head-on, and defend a distinctive view they call "generalism as a regulative (...)
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  30. Directly Plausible Principles.Howard Nye - 2015 - In Christopher Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 610-636.
    In this chapter I defend a methodological view about how we should conduct substantive ethical inquiries in the fields of normative and practical ethics. I maintain that the direct plausibility and implausibility of general ethical principles – once fully clarified and understood – should be foundational in our substantive ethical reasoning. I argue that, in order to expose our ethical intuitions about particular cases to maximal critical scrutiny, we must determine whether they can be justified by directly plausible principles. To (...)
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  31. Care and Abstract Principles.Ornaith O'Dowd - 2012 - Hypatia 27 (2):407-422.
    Since Carol Gilligan's analysis of the “Heinz dilemma,” many philosophers working on care have articulated critiques of abstraction and principles in ethics. Their objections to abstraction and principles have not always been systematically set out. In this paper, I try to clarify the debate. I begin by distinguishing several aspects of the care critique. I then consider the strengths of each from a Kantian perspective. I conclude that, although some of these objections point out potential misuses of abstraction and principle, (...)
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  32. Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy.J. Olson - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):672-675.
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  33. The Confluence of Philosophy and Law in Applied Ethics.Norbert Paulo - 2016 - Palgrave.
    The law serves functions that are not often taken seriously enough by ethicists, namely feasibility and practicability. A consequence of feasibility is that most laws do not meet the demands of ideal ethical theory. A consequence of practicability is that law requires elaborated and explicit methodologies that determine how to do things with norms. These two consequences form the core idea behind this book, which employs methods from legal theory to inform and examine debates on methodology in applied ethics, particularly (...)
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  34. The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics.Adrian M. S. Piper - 2000 - In Naomi Zack (ed.), Women of Color and Philosophy, A Critical Reader. London: Blackwell. pp. 91-131.
    That human beings have the potential for rationality and the ability to cultivate it is a fact of human nature. But to value rationality and its subsidiary character dispositions - impartiality, intellectual discrimination, foresight, deliberation, prudence, self-reflection, self-control - is another matter entirely. -/- I am going to take it as a given that if a person's freedom to act on her impulses and gratify her desires is constrained by the existence of others' equal, or more powerful, conflicting impulses and (...)
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  35. Challenging Moral Particularism.Matjaž Potrc, Vojko Strahovnik & Mark Lance (eds.) - 2011 - Routledge.
    Particularism is a justly popular ‘cutting-edge’ topic in contemporary ethics across the world. Many moral philosophers do not, in fact, support particularism, but nearly all would take it to be a position that continues to offer serious lessons and challenges that cannot be safely ignored. Given the high standard of the contributions, and that this is a subject where lively debate continues to flourish, _Challenging Moral Particularism_ will become required reading for professionals and advanced students working in the area.
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  36. Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism.Michael Ridge & Sean McKeever - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  37. Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions.Luke Robinson - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):1-34.
    Moral obligations rest on circumstances. But what are these obligating reasons and in virtue of what are they such reasons? Nomological conceptions define such reasons in terms of moral laws. I argue that one such conception cannot be correct and that others do not support the familiar and plausible view that obligating reasons are pro tanto reasons, either because they entail that this view is false or else because they cannot explain—or even help to explain—how it could be true. I (...)
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  38. Exploring Alternatives to the Simple Model: Is There an Atomistic Option?Luke Robinson - 2012 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 2. Oxford University Press.
    The simple model maintains that morally relevant factors combine in a simple, additive way, like weights on a scale. Although intuitive and familiar, this model entails that certain plausible views about particular cases and how morally relevant factors combine and interact therein are false. Shelly Kagan suggests that we could accommodate the relevant views and interactions by rejecting either of two assumptions the simple model makes: that the moral status of an act is determined by the sum of the contributions (...)
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  39. Moral Principles Are Not Moral Laws.Luke Robinson - 2008 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (3):1-22.
    What are moral principles? The assumption underlying much of the generalism–particularism debate in ethics is that they are (or would be) moral laws: generalizations or some special class thereof, such as explanatory or counterfactual-supporting generalizations. I argue that this law conception of moral principles is mistaken. For moral principles do at least three things that moral laws cannot do, at least not in their own right: explain certain phenomena, provide particular kinds of support for counterfactuals, and ground moral necessities, “necessary (...)
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  40. Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism.Luke Robinson - 2006 - Mind 115 (458):331-360.
    Moral principles play important roles in diverse areas of moral thought, practice, and theory. Many who think of themselves as ‘moral generalists’ believe that moral principles can play these roles—that they are capable of doing so. Moral generalism maintains that moral principles can and do play these roles because true moral principles are statements of general moral fact (i.e. statements of facts about the moral attributes of kinds of actions, kinds of states of affairs, etc.) and because general moral facts (...)
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  41. Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal - by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge.Nancy E. Schauber - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (2):181-182.
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  42. Vom Allgemeinen zum Einzelfall Die orientierende Funktion moralischer Prinzipien.Thomas Schmidt - 2012 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 66 (4):513-538.
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  43. Jonathan Dancy. Ethics Without Principles (Oxford University Press, 2004)Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge. Principled Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2006). [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):568-580.
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  44. A Matter of Principle. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):568 - 580.
    This is an early draft of a joint critical notice I am writing of Jonathan Dancy’s Ethics Without Principles and Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge’s Principled Ethics, for Noûs.
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  45. Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. By Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge.Ira Singer - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):170-177.
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  46. Neither Generalism nor Particularism: Ethical Correctness is Located in General Ethical Theories.Jane Singleton - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):155-175.
    In this article I shall be supporting two main claims. The first is that the essence of the difference between particularism and generalism lies in where they locate ethical correctness. The second is that generalism, although to be preferred to particularism, is not the final resting place for ethical correctness. Ultimately, ethical correctness resides in ethical theories that provide the rationale for generalism. Particularism is presented as a theory that allows attention to be paid to specific cases and shows a (...)
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  47. Recipes for Moral Paradox.Andrew Sneddon - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):43-54.
    Saul Smilansky notes that, despite the famous role of paradoxes in philosophy, very few moral paradoxes have been developed and assessed. The present paper offers recipes for generating moral paradoxes as a tool to aid in filling this gap. The concluding section presents reflections on how to assess the depth of the paradoxes generated with these recipes. Special attention is paid to links between putative moral paradoxes and debate about ethical particularism and generalism.
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  48. Review of Sean McKeever, Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism As a Regulative Ideal[REVIEW]Daniel Star - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  49. Reasons Without Principles.Herman E. Stark - 2004 - Inquiry 47 (2):143 – 167.
    What is required for one thing to be a reason for another? Must the reason, more precisely, be or involve a principle? In this essay I target the idea that justification via reasons of one's beliefs (e.g., epistemic or moral) requires that the 'justifying reasons' be or involve (substantive and significant) principles. I identify and explore some potential sources of a principles requirement, and conclude that none of them (i.e., the normative function of reasons, the abstract structure of reasons, the (...)
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  50. Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. [REVIEW]Vojko Strahovnik - 2007 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (21):512-518.
    In their book Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal McKeever and Ridge address arguments in the debate between moral particularism and moral generalism. The first part of the book presents a systematic discussion of moral particularism, especially a critical evaluation of arguments in its favour. In the second part authors defend a version of generalism which they label generalism as a regulative ideal. The heart of the debate between particularism and generalism is the question of acceptability of a principled (...)
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