About this topic

The debate on moral generalizations predominantly focuses on their nature, scope and function. In this way it is partially parallel to discussion between moral generalism and moral particularism but also goes beyond this issue that debates plausibility of a principled approach to morality. The central topic is whether and how it is possible to capture morally relevant aspects of actions and situation into generalizations. Do moral generalizations cover the whole field of morality or merely a part of it. Can we then state such generalizations merely pro tanto or prima facie or are they exceptionless? Next issue is, what function such generalizations serve. Are they to be understood as regulative principles, a mere guides or do they play no significant role in moral decision-making?

Key works Dancy 1983 discusses the relationship between morally relevant features of situations and moral principles and argues against the possibility of moral generalizations. Lance 2004 develops the theory of defeasible moral generalizations, while Väyrynen 2008 argues for a model of hedged moral generalizations and in a similar vein Holton 2002 argues for "that’s it" model of moral principles. 
Introductions For a general introduction to the debate on moral generalizations see Hooker & Little 2000 and chapter I of McKeever & Ridge 2006.
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  1. Ethical Generality and Moral Judgment.Robert Audi - 2006 - In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell. pp. 6--285.
  2. Moral Argument.Jonathan Bennett - 1960 - Mind 69 (276):544-549.
    The thesis is advanced by R. M. Hare that a judgment on an action or state of affairs is a moral judgment only if the person who makes it accepts some universal moral principle which, together with some true statement about the non-moral characteristics of the situation originally judged, entails the original judgment.1 Instances of this thesis would take some such form as saying that someone who says ‘You ought not to have done what you did’ cannot be expressing a (...)
  3. Moral Conflict and its Structure.David O. Brink - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (2):215-247.
  4. Moral Truths and Moral Principles.Curtis Brown - manuscript
    In recent years, a number of moral philosophers have held both that there are particular moral truths, and also that there are no general moral principles which explain these particular moral truths--either because there simply are no moral principles, or because moral principles are themselves explained by or derived from particular moral truths rather than vice versa. Often this combination of doctrines is held by philosophers interested in reviving an Aristotelean approach..
  5. Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties.Jonathan Dancy - 1983 - Mind 92 (368):530-547.
  6. Applying Principles to Cases and the Problem of Judgment.John K. Davis - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):563 - 577.
    We sometimes decide what to do by applying moral principles to cases, but this is harder than it looks. Principles are more general than cases, and sometimes it is hard to tell whether and how a principle applies to a given case. Sometimes two conflicting principles seem to apply to the same case. To handle these problems, we use a kind of judgment to ascertain whether and how a principle applies to a given case, or which principle to follow when (...)
  7. A morál költségei – Kant nyomán számolva.Andreas Dorschel - 1991 - Magyar Filozofiai Szemle (4-5):678-708.
    Acting morally comes at a price. The fewer people act morally, the dearer moral acts will be to those who perform them. Even if it could be proven that a certain moral norm were valid, the question might still be open whether, under certain circumstances, the demand to follow it meant asking too much. The validity of a moral norm is independent from actual compliance. In that regard, moral norms differ from legal rules. A law that nobody obeys has eroded (...)
  8. Die Kosten der Moral. Nachgerechnet an Kant.Andreas Dorschel - 1990 - Concordia 18:2-25.
    Acting morally comes at a price. The fewer people act morally, the dearer moral acts will be to those who perform them. Even if it could be proven that a certain moral norm were valid, the question might still be open whether, under certain circumstances, the demand to follow it meant asking too much. The validity of a moral norm is independent from actual compliance. In that regard, moral norms differ from legal rules. A law that nobody obeys has eroded (...)
  9. On the Extensional Equivalence of Simple and General Utilitarianism.Fred Feldman - 1974 - Noûs 8 (2):185-194.
  10. The Not So Golden Rule.Dan Flores - 2018 - Philosophy Now (125):32-34.
    The Golden Rule is (roughly) as follows: treat others as you would have others treat you. Philosophical reactions to it vary; it has both supporters and detractors. In any case, almost nobody who things critically about morality takes the literal version of the Golden Rule seriously, since there are just too many problems with it. To demonstrate this, I will look at a literal version of the Golden Rule espoused by John C. Maxwell, a well-known and influential motivational speaker, and (...)
  11. Pro-Tanto Obligations and Ceteris-Paribus Rules.Danny Frederick - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):255-266.
    I summarize a conception of morality as containing a set of rules which hold ceteris paribus and which impose pro-tanto obligations. I explain two ways in which moral rules are ceteris-paribus, according to whether an exception is duty-voiding or duty-overriding. I defend the claim that moral rules are ceteris-paribus against two qualms suggested by Luke Robinson’s discussion of moral rules and against the worry that such rules are uninformative. I show that Robinson’s argument that moral rules cannot ground pro-tanto obligations (...)
  12. Die Idee der Verallgemeinerung in der Ethik.Viktor Friesen - 2013 - Königshausen & Neumann.
    Eine kritische Untersuchung der moralphilosophischen Entwürfe von 1. Kant, M. G. Singer und R. M. Hare -/- Der vorliegenden Untersuchung liegt die Überzeugung zugrunde, dass die Idee der Verallgemeinerung ein zentraler Bestandteil eines jeden an den Prinzipien der Vernunft orientierten Moralsystems ist. In theoretischer Hinsicht bildet ein morallogisches Verallgemeinerungspostulat unsere fundamentale Vorstellung von der Unparteilichkeit moralischer Vorschriften und der normativen Gesetzgebung beziehungsweise der Gleichheit aller Menschen bezüglich ihrer Rechte und Pflichten ab. Diese Vorstellung besagt im Kern, dass es ungerecht wäre, (...)
  13. Virtues and Moral Rules — a Reply.Bernard Gert - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (3-4):489-494.
    In his article, Are Virtues No More than Dispositions to Obey Moral Rules (Philosophia, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2 (July 1990), pp. 195-207), Walter E. Schaller lists three theses that he characterizes as the Standard View of the connection between the virtues and the moral rules and criticizes me for holding two of them. I show that this claim ignores my distinction between moral rules and moral ideals and involves a widespread misunderstanding of what is meant by moral rules.
  14. Moral Particularism and Transduction.Gilbert Harman - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):44–55.
    Can someone be reasonable or justified in accepting a specific moral judgment not based on the prior acceptance of a general exceptioness moral principle, where acceptance of a general principle might be tacit or implicit and might not be expressible in language? This issue is an instance of a wider issue about direct or transductive inference. Developments in statistical learning theory show that such an inference can be more effective than alternative methods using inductive generalization and so can be reasonable. (...)
  15. General Rules and the Moral Sentiments in Hume's "Treatise".Thomas K. Hearn - 1976 - Review of Metaphysics 30 (1):57-72.
  16. Moral Particularism and the Real World.Brad Hooker - 2008 - In Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism. Routledge. pp. 12--30.
    The term ‘moral particularism’ has been used to refer to different doctrines. The main body of this paper begins by identifying the most important doctrines associated with the term, at least as the term is used by Jonathan Dancy, on whose work I will focus. I then discuss whether holism in the theory of reasons supports moral particularism, and I call into question the thesis that particular judgements have epistemological priority over general principles. Dancy’s recent book Ethics without Principles (Dancy (...)
  17. What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us About Moral Normativity?Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):25-51.
    Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals (...)
  18. Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279-295.
    According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. (...)
  19. How Insensitive: Principles, Facts and Normative Grounds in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls.Daniel Kofman - 2012 - Socialist Studies 8 (1):246-268.
  20. Moral Particularism and Epistemic Contextualism: Comments on Lance and Little.Nikola Kompa - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):457-467.
    Do we need defeasible generalizations in epistemology, generalizations that are genuinely explanatory yet ineliminably exception-laden? Do we need them to endow our epistemology with a substantial explanatory structure? Mark Lance and Margaret Little argue for the claim that we do. I will argue that we can just as well do without them – at least in epistemology. So in the paper, I am trying to very briefly sketch an alternative contextualist picture. More specifically, the claim will be that although an (...)
  21. Where the Laws Are.Mark Lance & Margaret Little - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:149-171.
  22. Explaining Moral Knowledge.Uri D. Leibowitz - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):35-56.
    In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that when we are (...)
  23. Generality and Moral Justification.Don Loeb - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):79-96.
    Demands for generality sometimes exert a powerful influence on our thinking, pressing us to treat more general moral positions, such as consequentialism, as superior to more specific ones, like those which incorporate agent-centered restrictions or prerogatives. I articulate both foundationalist and coherentist versions of the demands for generality and argue that we can best understand these demands in terms of a certain underlying metaphysical commitment. I consider and reject various arguments which might be offered in support of this commitment, and (...)
  24. Defending "Restricted Particularism" From Jackson, Pettit & Smith.Dan López de Sa - 2008 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 62 (2):133–143.
    According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith , “restricted particularism” is not affected by their supervenience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this objection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive (...)
  25. Turning on Default Reasons.Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):55-76.
    Particularism takes an extremely ecumenical view of what considerations might count as reasons and thereby threatens to ‘flatten the moral landscape’ by making it seem that there is no deep difference between, for example, pain, and shoelace color. After all, particularists have claimed, either could provide a reason provided a suitable moral context. To avoid this result, some particularists draw a distinction between default and non-default reasons. The present paper argues that all but the most deflationary ways of drawing this (...)
  26. What Does Holism Have to Do with Moral Particularism?Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge - 2005 - Ratio 18 (1):93–103.
    Moral particularists are united in their opposition to the codification of morality, and their work poses an important challenge to traditional ways of thinking about moral philosophy. Defenders of moral particularism have, with near unanimity, sought support from a doctrine they call “holism in the theory of reasons.” We argue that this is all a mistake. There are two ways in which holism in the theory of reasons can be understood, but neither provides any support for moral particularism. Moral particularists (...)
  27. Moral Concepts: From Thickness to Response-Dependence. [REVIEW]Nenad Miscevic´ - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):3-32.
    The paper examines three tenets of Dancy’s meta-ethics, finds them incompatible, and proposes a response-dependentist (or response-dispositional) solution. The first tenet is the central importance of thick concepts and properties. The second is that such concepts essentially involve response(s) of observers, which Dancy interprets in a way that fits the pattern of context-dependent resultance: thick concepts are well suited for the particularist grounding of moral theory. However, and this is the third tenet, in his earlier paper (1986) Dancy forcefully argues (...)
  28. Executing the Second Best Option.Paul M. Pietroski - 1994 - Analysis 54 (4):201-207.
  29. Moral Dilemmas and Vagueness.Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):207-222.
    In this paper we point out some interesting structural similarities between vagueness and moral dilemmas as well as between some of the proposed solutions to both problems. Moral dilemma involves a situation with opposed obligations that cannot all be satisfied. Transvaluationism as an approach to vagueness makes three claims concerning the nature of vagueness: (1) it involves incompatibility between mutually unsatisfiable requirements, (2) the underlying requirements retain their normative power even when they happen to be overruled, and (3) this incompatibility (...)
  30. Challenging Moral Particularism.Matjaž Potrc, Vojko Strahovnik & Mark Lance (eds.) - 2007 - Routledge.
    Particularism is a justly popular ‘cutting-edge’ topic in contemporary ethics across the world. Many moral philosophers do not, in fact, support particularism, but nearly all would take it to be a position that continues to offer serious lessons and challenges that cannot be safely ignored. Given the high standard of the contributions, and that this is a subject where lively debate continues to flourish, _Challenging Moral Particularism_ will become required reading for professionals and advanced students working in the area.
  31. Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism About Rules.Denis Robinson - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):131-156.
    Part I of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement — in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism — and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a purely (...)
  32. Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions.Luke Robinson - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):1-34.
    Moral obligations rest on circumstances. But what are these obligating reasons and in virtue of what are they such reasons? Nomological conceptions define such reasons in terms of moral laws. I argue that one such conception cannot be correct and that others do not support the familiar and plausible view that obligating reasons are pro tanto reasons, either because they entail that this view is false or else because they cannot explain—or even help to explain—how it could be true. I (...)
  33. Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions.Luke Robinson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):289-309.
    What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if they exist) ground moral obligations or—at the very least—particular moral truths? I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of particular (...)
  34. Moral Principles Are Not Moral Laws.Luke Robinson - 2007 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (3):1-22.
    What are moral principles? The assumption underlying much of the generalism–particularism debate in ethics is that they are (or would be) moral laws: generalizations or some special class thereof, such as explanatory or counterfactual-supporting generalizations. I argue that this law conception of moral principles is mistaken. For moral principles do at least three things that moral laws cannot do, at least not in their own right: explain certain phenomena, provide particular kinds of support for counterfactuals, and ground moral necessities, “necessary (...)
  35. Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism.Luke Robinson - 2006 - Mind 115 (458):331-360.
    Moral principles play important roles in diverse areas of moral thought, practice, and theory. Many who think of themselves as ‘moral generalists’ believe that moral principles can play these roles—that they are capable of doing so. Moral generalism maintains that moral principles can and do play these roles because true moral principles are statements of general moral fact (i.e. statements of facts about the moral attributes of kinds of actions, kinds of states of affairs, etc.) and because general moral facts (...)
  36. Moral Metaphorics, or Kant After Blumenberg: Towards an Analysis of the Aesthetic Settings of Morality.Alison Ross - 2011 - Thesis Eleven 104 (1):40-58.
    This paper examines the role of formal, aesthetic elements in motivating moral action. It proposes that Blumenberg’s analysis of the existential settings of myth and metaphor provide a useful framework to consider the conception and function of the aesthetic symbol in Kantian moral philosophy. In particular, it explores the hypothesis that Blumenberg’s analysis of ‘pregnance’ and ‘rhetoric’ are useful for identifying and evaluating the processes involved in self-persuasion to the moral perspective.
  37. Particularism and Principles.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 1999 - Theoria 65 (2-3):114-126.
  38. Dancy Cartwright: Particularism in the Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW]Constantine Sandis - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (2):30-40.
    This paper aims to explore the space of possible particularistic approaches to Philosophy of Science by examining the differences and similarities between Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism—as expressed in both his earlier writings (e.g., Moral Reasons , 1993), and, more explicitly defended in his book Ethics without Principles (2004)—and Nancy Cartwright’s particularism in the philosophy of science, as defended in her early collection of essays, How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983), and her later book, The Dappled World: A Study of (...)
  39. Jonathan Dancy. Ethics Without Principles (Oxford University Press, 2004)Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge. Principled Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2006). [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):568-580.
  40. The Problem of Relevant Descriptions and the Scope of Moral Principles.Irina Schumski - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1588-1613.
    In her seminal attack on modern moral philosophy, G. E. M. Anscombe claims that Kant's ‘rule about universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it’. Although this so-called problem of relevant descriptions has received considerable attention in the literature, there is little agreement on how it should be understood or solved. My aim in this paper is, first, to clarify the problem (...)
  41. Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. By Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge.Ira Singer - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):170-177.
  42. Neither Generalism nor Particularism: Ethical Correctness is Located in General Ethical Theories.Jane Singleton - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):155-175.
    In this article I shall be supporting two main claims. The first is that the essence of the difference between particularism and generalism lies in where they locate ethical correctness. The second is that generalism, although to be preferred to particularism, is not the final resting place for ethical correctness. Ultimately, ethical correctness resides in ethical theories that provide the rationale for generalism. Particularism is presented as a theory that allows attention to be paid to specific cases and shows a (...)
  43. Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles.Rebecca Lynn Stangl - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):201-229.
    According to radical moral particularists such as Jonathan Dancy, there are no substantive moral principles. And yet, few particularists wish to deny that something very like moral principles do indeed play a significant role in our everyday moral practice. Loathe at dismissing this as mere error on the part of everyday moral agents, particularists have proposed a number of alternative accounts of the practice. The aim of all of these accounts is to make sense of our appeal to general moral (...)
  44. Defeasibility, Norms and Exceptions: Normalcy Model.Vojko Strahovnik - 2016 - Revus 29 (29).
    The paper discusses the notion of defeasibility and focuses specifically on defeasible norms. First, it delineates a robust notion of the phenomenon of defeasibility, which poses a serious problem for both moral and legal theory. It does this by laying out the conditions and desiderata that a model of defeasibility should be able to meet. It further focuses on a specific model of defeasibility that utilises the notion of normal conditions to expound the robust notion of defeasibility. It argues that (...)
  45. Practical Reasoning and Normative Relevance: A Reply to Ridge and McKeever.Alan Thomas - unknown
    The central concern of McKeever & Ridge’s paper is with whether or not the moral particularist can formulate a defensible distinction between default and non-default reasons. [McKeever & Ridge 2004] But that issue is only of concern to the particularist, they argue, because it allows him or her to avoid a deeper problem, an unacceptable “flattening of the normative landscape”. The particularist ought, McKeever & Ridge claim, to view this corollary of his or her position as a serious embarrassment. Unpacking (...)
  46. Another Particularism: Reasons, Status and Defaults. [REVIEW]Alan Thomas - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):151-167.
    This paper makes the non-monotonicity of a wide range of moral reasoning the basis of a case for particularism. Non-monotonicity threatens practical decision with an overwhelming informational complexity to which a form of ethical generalism seems the best response. It is argued that this impression is wholly misleading: the fact of non-monotonicity is best accommodated by the defence of four related theses in any theory of justification. First, the explanation of and defence of a default/challenge model of justification. Secondly, the (...)
  47. Review of Dancy's Moral Reasons. [REVIEW]Alan Thomas - 1995 - Mind 104 (415):628-632.
  48. Can the Canberrans’ Supervenience Argument Refute Shapeless Moral Particularism?Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):545-560.
    Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, and Philip Pettit contend in their 2000 paper that an argument from supervenience deals a fatal blow to shapeless moral particularism, the view that the moral is shapeless with respect to the natural. A decade has passed since the Canberrans advanced their highly influential supervenience argument. Yet, there has not been any compelling counter-argument against it, as far as I can see. My aim in this paper is to fill in this void and defend SMP against (...)
  49. How the Ceteris Paribus Principles of Morality Lie.Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2010 - Public Reason 2 (1):89-94.
  50. Book Note on Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. [REVIEW]Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):521-524.
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