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  1. added 2019-01-08
    Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment.Brendan Cline - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    A central source of support for expressivist accounts of normative discourse is the intimate relationship between normative judgment and motivation. Expressivists argue that normative judgments must be noncognitive, desire-like states in order to be so tightly linked with motivation. Normative statements are then construed as expressions of these noncognitive states. In this paper, I draw on dual-process models in cognitive psychology to respond to this argument. According to my proposal, normative judgments are ordinary beliefs that are typically produced by two (...)
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  2. added 2018-10-22
    Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-27.
    Various studies have reported that moral intuitions about the permissibility of acts are subject to framing effects. This paper reports the results of a series of experiments which further examine the susceptibility of moral intuitions to framing effects. The main aim was to test recent speculation that intuitions about the moral relevance of certain properties of cases might be relatively resistent to framing effects. If correct, this would provide a certain type of moral intuitionist with the resources to resist challenges (...)
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  3. added 2018-10-10
    Intuiting Intuition: The Seeming Account of Moral Intuition.Hossein Dabbagh - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):117-132.
    In this paper, I introduce and elucidate what seems to me the best understanding of moral intuition with reference to the intellectual seeming account. First, I will explain Bengson’s quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuition in terms of intellectual seeming. I then shift from philosophical intuition to moral intuition and will delineate Audi’s doxastic account of moral intuition to argue that the intellectual seeming account of intuition is superior to the doxastic account of intuition. Next, I argue that we can apply (...)
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  4. added 2018-10-08
    The Seeming Account of Self-Evidence: An Alternative to Audian Account.Hossein Dabbagh - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):261-284.
    In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. Next, I criticise his account on the basis of the idea of “adequate understanding”. I shall then present my alternative account of self-evidence which (...)
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  5. added 2018-09-25
    Unity of Knowledge.Niels Bohr - 1958 - In Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge. Wiley. pp. 67--82.
  6. added 2018-09-24
    Die Irrelevanz personaler Identität für praktische Belange.Marc Andree Weber - 2013 - In Georg Gasser & Martina Schmidhuber (eds.), Personale Identität, Narrativität und Praktische Rationalität . Münster, Germany: pp. 313–335.
  7. added 2018-09-10
    Metamorality Without Moral Truth.Steven R. Kraaijeveld & Hanno Sauer - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-13.
    Recently, Joshua Greene has argued that we need a metamorality to solve moral problems for which evolution has not prepared us. The metamorality that he proposes is a utilitarian account that he calls deep pragmatism. Deep pragmatism is supposed to arbitrate when the values espoused by different groups clash. To date, no systematic appraisal of this argument for a metamorality exists. We reconstruct Greene’s case for deep pragmatism as a metamorality and consider three lines of objection to it. We argue (...)
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  8. added 2018-07-08
    Repugnance as Performance Error: The Role of Disgust in Bioethical Intuitions.Joshua May - 2016 - In Steve Clarke, Julian Savulescu, C. A. J. Coady, Alberto Giubilini & Sagar Sanyal (eds.), The Ethics of Human Enhancement: Understanding the Debate. Oxford University Press. pp. 43-57.
    An influential argument in bioethics involves appeal to disgust, calling on us to take it seriously as a moral guide (e.g. Kass, Miller, Kahan). Some argue, for example, that genetic enhancement, especially via human reproductive cloning, is repellant or grotesque. While objectors have argued that repugnance is morally irrelevant (e.g. Nussbaum, Kelly), I argue that the problem is more fundamental: it is psychologically irrelevant. Examining recent empirical data suggests that disgust’s influence on moral judgment may be like fatigue: an exogenous (...)
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  9. added 2018-06-10
    Psychological Mechanism of Corruption: A Comprehensive Review. [REVIEW]Juneman Abraham, Julia Suleeman & Bagus Takwin - forthcoming - Asian Journal of Scientific Research.
    Corruption prevention can be more effective if it does not rely merely on legal enforcement. This theoretical review aimed to propose a hypothetical psychological model capable of explaining the behavior of corruption. Moral disengagement is a variable that is considered ontologically closest in “distance” to the variable of corruption behavior. Counterfeit self, implicit self-theory, ethical mindset and moral emotion are taken into account as the pivotal factors of the corruption behavior and its mechanism of moral disengagement. Counterfeit self along with (...)
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  10. added 2018-02-13
    Moralische Intuition contra Menschenrecht?Harald Wohlrapp - 2006 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 54 (6):958-964.
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  11. added 2018-01-26
    ‘African Intuitions’ and Moral Theory.Douglas Farland - 2007 - South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):356-363.
    On Metz's view, the best interpretation of ubuntu is that it enjoins agents always to promote harmony in the community. However, while I endorse the claim that intuitions play a foundational role in moral thinking, I am less sanguine about two aspects of Metz's particular employment of the intuitions he focuses on. First, I doubt the intuitions from which he begins are of the right sort to play the role he would like them to play. Second, I doubt that the (...)
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  12. added 2018-01-26
    Intuition in Thomistic Moral Philosophy.Gerard Esser - 1957 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 31:165-177.
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  13. added 2018-01-26
    Problem : Intuition in Thomistic Moral Philosophy.Gerard Esser - 1957 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 31:165.
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  14. added 2017-12-30
    Moral Intuitions and the Expertise Defence.J. Ryberg - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):3-9.
    Are the moral intuitions of philosophers more reliable than the intuitions of people who are not philosophically trained? According to what has become known as ‘the expertise defence’, the answer is in the affirmative. This answer has been sustained by drawing on analogies to expertise in other fields. However, in this article it is argued that the analogies presuppose two assumptions – the causal assumption and the quality assumption – which are not satisfied in relation to philosophical expertise. Thus, it (...)
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  15. added 2017-12-30
    How Reliable Are Out Moral Intuitions?Singer Peter - 2002 - Free Inquiry 23 (1):19.
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  16. added 2017-12-29
    Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic.Matthew S. Bedke - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):144-177.
    Non-descriptivists in metaethics should say more about intuitions. For one popular theory has it that case-based intuitions are in the business of correctly categorizing or classifying merely by bringing to bear a semantic or conceptual competence. If so, then the fact that all normative predicates have case-based intuitions involving them shows that they too are in the business of categorizing or classifying things. This favors a descriptivist position in metaethics—normative predicates have descriptive content—and disfavors a purely non-descriptivist position, like pure (...)
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  17. added 2017-12-29
    Intuition. By Allegra Goodman. [REVIEW]David Charlton - 2009 - Teaching Ethics 10 (1):111-114.
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  18. added 2017-12-29
    Intuitions in Ethics.Michael D. Bayles - 1984 - Dialogue 23 (3):439-455.
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  19. added 2017-12-29
    Intuition, Induction, and the Middle Way.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1982 - The Monist 65 (3):287-301.
  20. added 2017-12-29
    Moral Intuition and the Principle of Self-Realization.Charles Arthur Campbell - 1948 - London: G. Cumberlege.
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  21. added 2017-12-28
    A Psychological View of Moral Intuition.Jonathan Baron - 1995 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 5 (1):36-40.
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  22. added 2017-12-28
    A Defense of Intuitions.Gary Atkinson - 1990 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64:107-117.
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  23. added 2017-11-17
    Intuition and Its Place in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):57--77.
    ABSTRACT ABSTRACT: This paper provides a multifaceted account of intuition. The paper integrates apparently disparate conceptions of intuition, shows how the notion has figured in epistemology as well as in intuitionistic ethics, and clarifies the relation between the intuitive and the self-evident. Ethical intuitionism is characterized in ways that, in phenomenology, epistemology, and ontology, represent an advance over the position of W. D. Ross while preserving its commonsense normative core and intuitionist character. This requires clarifying the sense in which intuitions (...)
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  24. added 2017-05-25
    Practical Knowledge and Perception.Evgenia Mylonaki - 2016 - In Mark Alznauer & Jose Torralba (eds.), Theories of Action and Morality: Perspectives from Philosophy and Social Theory. Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlag. pp. 241-265.
    In this paper I examine the relation between intentional action and morality from the perspective of practical epistemology. In other words I study the relation between Elizabeth Anscombe's knowledge of one’s own intentional actions (knowledge in action) and Iris Murdoch's knowledge of what is good to do or what one ought to do in particular circumstances (knowledge in the circumstances). If practical knowledge in the former sense (knowledge in action) and practical knowledge in the latter sense (knowledge in the circumstances) (...)
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  25. added 2017-05-01
    Good Moral Judgment and Decision‐Making Without Deliberation.Asia Ferrin - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):68-95.
    It is widely accepted in psychology and cognitive science that there are two “systems” in the mind: one system is characterized as quick, intuitive, perceptive, and perhaps more primitive, while the other is described as slower, more deliberative, and responsible for our higher-order cognition. I use the term “reflectivism” to capture the view that conscious reflection—in the “System 2” sense—is a necessary feature of good moral judgment and decision-making. This is not to suggest that System 2 must operate alone in (...)
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  26. added 2017-01-03
    Intuition, Self-Evidence,and Understanding.Stratton-Lake Philip - 2016 - In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studes in Meta Ethics. Oxford: OUP. pp. 28-44.
    Here I criticise Audi's account of self-evidece. I deny that understanding of a proposition can justify belief in it and offfer an account of intuition that can take the place of understanding in an account of self-evidence.
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  27. added 2016-12-08
    Reliable but Not Home Free? What Framing Effects Mean for Moral Intuitions.James Andow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):904-911.
    Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have an unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we (...)
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  28. added 2016-12-08
    Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475-492.
    This paper defends a moderate intuitionism by extending a version of that view previously put forward and responding to some significant objections to it that have been posed in recent years. The notion of intuition is clarified, and various kinds of intuition are distinguished and interconnected. These include doxastic intuitions and intuitive seemings. The concept of inference is also clarified. In that light, the possibility of non-inferential intuitive justification is explained in relation to both singular moral judgments, which intuitionists do (...)
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  29. added 2016-11-25
    Rationalism and Intuitionism.Christian Miller - forthcoming - In Mark Timmons, Karen Jones & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    One of the liveliest areas in moral psychology in recent years has been research on the extent to which conscious reasoning leads to the formation of moral judgments. The goal of this chapter is to review and briefly assess three of the leading positions today on this topic - traditional rationalism, social intuitionism, and morphological rationalism - each of which has significant implications for moral epistemology.
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  30. added 2016-10-18
    The Evolution of Retribution: Intuitions Undermined.Isaac Wiegman - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2):490-510.
    Recent empirical work suggests that emotions are responsible for anti-consequentialist intuitions. For instance, anger places value on actions of revenge and retribution, value not derived from the consequences of these actions. As a result, it contributes to the development of retributive intuitions. I argue that if anger evolved to produce these retributive intuitions because of their biological consequences, then these intuitions are not a good indicator that punishment has value apart from its consequences. This severs the evidential connection between retributive (...)
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  31. added 2016-07-28
    Do Framing Effects Make Moral Intuitions Unreliable?Joanna Demaree-Cotton - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):1-22.
    I address Sinnott-Armstrong's argument that evidence of framing effects in moral psychology shows that moral intuitions are unreliable and therefore not noninferentially justified. I begin by discussing what it is to be epistemically unreliable and clarify how framing effects render moral intuitions unreliable. This analysis calls for a modification of Sinnott-Armstrong's argument if it is to remain valid. In particular, he must claim that framing is sufficiently likely to determine the content of moral intuitions. I then re-examine the evidence which (...)
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  32. added 2016-07-12
    Evolutionary Debunking: Can Moral Realists Explain the Reliability of Our Moral Judgments?Matthew Braddock - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):844-857.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments, notably Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma (2006), allege that moral realists need to explain the reliability of our moral judgments, given their evolutionary sources. David Copp (2008) and David Enoch (2010) take up the challenge. I argue on empirical grounds that realists have not met the challenge and moreover cannot do so. The outcome is that there are empirically-motivated reasons for thinking moral realists cannot explain moral reliability, given our current empirical understanding.
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  33. added 2016-03-03
    How Outlandish Can Imaginary Cases Be?Jakob Elster - 2011 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (3):241-258.
    It is common in moral philosophy to test the validity of moral principles by proposing counter-examples in the form of cases where the application of the principle does not give the conclusion we intuitively find valid. These cases are often imaginary and sometimes rather ‘outlandish’, involving ray guns, non-existent creatures, etc. I discuss whether we can test moral principles with the help of outlandish cases, or if only realistic cases are admissible. I consider two types of argument against outlandish cases: (...)
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  34. added 2015-02-12
    Expecting Moral Philosophers to Be Reliable.James Andow - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (2):205-220.
    Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that (...)
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  35. added 2014-09-27
    Disgust and the Collection of Bovine Fetal Blood.Robert William Fischer - 2014 - In Elisa Aaltola & John Hadley (eds.), Animal Ethics and Philosophy: Questioning the Orthodoxy. Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 151-164.
    At many slaughterhouses, if a pregnant cow is killed, then medical companies pay to harvest the fetus's blood. When you communicate the details of this process to people, many of them are disgusted. I submit that those who are repulsed thereby acquire a reason to believe that this practice is morally wrong. However, it is controversial to maintain that disgust can provide moral guidance. So, I develop a theory of disgust’s moral salience that fits with the empirical work that’s been (...)
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  36. added 2014-09-27
    John Mikhail on Moral Intuitions.Florian Demont-Biaggi - 2013 - Kairos 7.
    John Mikhail's moral psychology is an interestin contribution to philosophical debates surrounding the nature of normativity and moral and legal judgement. The paper focuses on Mikhail's metaethical assumptions and how they are combined with the Chomskian framework of his moral theory. Particularly the computational processes which are supposed to generate oughts will be scrutinised. It is then argued that--apart from three other issues--Mikhail does not provide a satisfactory answer to the is-ought problem.
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  37. added 2014-09-26
    Perception and the Rational Force of Desire.Karl Schafer - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (5):258-281.
    [A]ny theory of practical rationality must explain— or explain away—the following: Rational: In many cases, what it is rational (in some sense) for one to do or intend to do depends on what one desires. [...] I argue that in order to capture the rational significance of desire, we need to consider both its content and its force, on analogy to the rational significance of both the force and content of beliefs and perceptual experiences. This will open up a new (...)
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  38. added 2014-07-18
    Ethical Intuitionism: A Structural Critique.Danny Frederick - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):631-47.
    Ethical intuitionists regard moral knowledge as deriving from moral intuition, moral observation, moral emotion and inference. However, moral intuitions, observations and emotions are cultural artefacts which often differ starkly between cultures. Intuitionists attribute uncongenial moral intuitions, observations or emotions to bias or to intellectual or moral failings; but that leads to sectarian ad hominen attacks. Intuitionists try to avoid that by restricting epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those which are widely agreed. That does not avoid the problem. It (...)
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  39. added 2014-07-04
    Les intuitions morales ont-elles un avenir ?Ruwen Ogien - 2012 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 7 (3):109-118.
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  40. added 2014-05-12
    Robert Audi, Moral Perception (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), Xii+180 Pp., $35. [REVIEW]Max Harris Siegel - 2014 - Ratio 27 (2):238-244.
  41. added 2014-04-02
    Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers.John Bengson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
  42. added 2014-04-01
    The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience.Selim Berker - 2009 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):293-329.
    It has been claimed that the recent wave of neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about cases. In this paper I demur. I argue that such attempts to extract normative conclusions from neuroscientific research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, (...)
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  43. added 2014-03-28
    The Armchair and the Trolley: An Argument for Experimental Ethics.Guy Kahane - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):421-445.
    Ethical theory often starts with our intuitions about particular cases and tries to uncover the principles that are implicit in them; work on the ‘trolley problem’ is a paradigmatic example of this approach. But ethicists are no longer the only ones chasing trolleys. In recent years, psychologists and neuroscientists have also turned to study our moral intuitions and what underlies them. The relation between these two inquiries, which investigate similar examples and intuitions, and sometimes produce parallel results, is puzzling. Does (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-16
    Revisionary Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
    I argue that, given evidence of the factors that tend to distort our intuitions, ethical intuitionists should disown a wide range of common moral intuitions, and that they should typically give preference to abstract, formal intuitions over more substantive ethical intuitions. In place of the common sense morality with which intuitionism has traditionally allied, the suggested approach may lead to a highly revisionary normative ethics.
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  45. added 2014-03-15
    Intuition and the Junctures of Judgment in Decision Procedures for Clinical Ethics.John K. Davis - 2007 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (1):1-30.
    Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However, intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or (...)
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  46. added 2014-03-09
    Adaptive Variation in Judgment and Philosophical Intuition.Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):356-358.
    Our theoretical understanding of individual differences can be used as a tool to test and refine theory. Individual differences are useful because judgments, including philosophically relevant intuitions, are the predictable products of the fit between adaptive psychological mechanisms (e.g., heuristics, traits, skills, capacities) and task constraints. As an illustration of this method and its potential implications, our target article used a canonical, representative, and affectively charged judgment task to reveal a relationship between the heritable personality trait extraversion and some compatabilist (...)
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  47. added 2014-03-07
    The Bleak Implications of Moral Psychology.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Neuroethics 3 (3):223-231.
    In this article, I focus on two claims made by Appiah in Experiments in Ethics: Doris’s and Harman’s criticism of virtue ethics fails, and moral psychology can be used to identify erroneous moral intuitions. I argue that both claims are erroneous.
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  48. added 2014-03-07
    Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics.Matthew S. Bedke - 1069-1083 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.
    Here I examine the major theories of ethical intuitions, focusing on the epistemic status of this class of intuitions. We cover self-evidence theory, seeming-state theory, and some of the recent contributions from experimental philosophy.
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  49. added 2014-03-06
    Folk Feminist Theory: An Experimental Approach.Peggy Desautels - 2008 - Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 240-244.
  50. added 2014-02-24
    Intuitions, Experiments, and Armchairs.Nikil Mukerji - 2014 - In Christoph Lütge, Hannes Rusch & Matthias Uhl (eds.), Experimental Ethics. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 227-243.
    Some ethicists believe that we should give no weight to low-level intuitions about cases. In this paper, three common arguments for this position are examined and rejected. All have an empirical basis. The first is the argument from disagreement. The second draws on framing effects. And the third employs debunking explanations. The discussion aims to make a substantive methodological point about ethical inquiry, viz. that low-level intuitions are not to be shunned. Above that, however, its aim is to illuminate, by (...)
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