Moral Intuitionism

Edited by Christopher Michael Cloos (University of California at Santa Barbara)
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  1. added 2020-05-28
    Laura Snyder, Reforming philosophy. [REVIEW]Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2009 - Rivista di Filosofia 100 (2):324-325.
    In this book the analysis of the relationship between Whewell and Mill is extended from the theme of induction, the topic the author starts with, to the comparison between the two projects of an overall reform of knowledge. These programmes announce themselves to the general public as proclamations of war for or against the academic, political and religious establishment; however, when viewed from the inside, they more or less consciously share very similar objectives. This applies both to the scientific method (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-14
    Sidgwick, Henry, I metodi dell'etica, ed. by Maurizio Mori. [REVIEW]Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - unknown - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 88 (1):175-176.
    A short presentation of the first Italian translation of a classic of Modern Ethics ignored by Italian philosophers for morethan a century.
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  3. added 2020-04-16
    Logical Revision Re-Revisited: On the Wright/Salerno Case for Intuitionism. [REVIEW]Jon Cogburn - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):231--248.
    In ``Revising the Logic of LogicalRevision'' J. Salerno attempts to undermineCrispin Wright 's recent arguments forintuitionism, and to replace Wright andDummett's arguments with a revisionary argumentof his own. I show that Salerno's criticismsof Wright involve both attributing an inferenceto Wright that no intuitionist would make andfallaciously treating a negative universal asan existential negative. Then I show how verygeneral considerations about the nature ofwarrant undermine both Wright and Salerno'sarguments, when these arguments are applied todiscourses with defeasible warrants. WhileSalerno explicitly restricts his (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-08
    Cooperative Intuitionism.Stephen Ingram - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to pluralistic intuitionist theories, some of our moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified, and these beliefs come in both an a priori and an a posteriori variety. In this paper I present new support for this pluralistic form of intuitionism by examining the deeply social nature of moral inquiry. This is something that intuitionists have tended to neglect. It does play an important role in an intuitionist theory offered by Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau (forth), but whilst they invoke the social (...)
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  5. added 2020-03-10
    Trusting Moral Intuitions.John Bengson, Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer‐Landau - forthcoming - Noûs.
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  6. added 2020-03-03
    Analyzing Debunking Arguments in Moral Psychology: Beyond the Counterfactual Analysis of Influence by Irrelevant Factors.Joanna Demaree-Cotton - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 (e151):15-17.
    May assumes that if moral beliefs are counterfactually dependent on irrelevant factors, then those moral beliefs are based on defective belief-forming processes. This assumption is false. Whether influence by irrelevant factors is debunking depends on the mechanisms through which this influence occurs. This raises the empirical bar for debunkers and helps May avoid an objection to his Debunker’s Dilemma.
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  7. added 2019-12-11
    Sidgwick's Dualism of Practical Reason, Evolutionary Debunking, and Moral Psychology.Peter Andes - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):361-377.
    Sidgwick's seminal text The Methods of Ethics left off with an unresolved problem that Sidgwick referred to as the dualism of practical reason. The problem is that employing Sidgwick's methodology of rational intuitionism appears to show that there are reasons to favour both egoism and utilitarianism. Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer offer a solution in the form of an evolutionary debunking argument: the appeal of egoism is explainable in terms of evolutionary theory. I argue that like rational prudence, rational (...)
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  8. added 2019-11-05
    Evolution and the Possibility of Moral Knowledge.Silvan Wittwer - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    This PhD thesis provides an extended evaluation of evolutionary debunking arguments in meta-ethics. Such arguments attempt to show that evolutionary theory, together with a commitment to robust moral objectivity, lead to moral scepticism: the implausible view that we lack moral knowledge or that our moral beliefs are never justified. To establish that, these arguments rely on certain epistemic principles. But most of the epistemic principles appealed to in the literature on evolutionary debunking arguments are imprecise, confused or simply implausible. My (...)
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  9. added 2019-10-18
    Verdade e Normatividade.Ricardo Tavares Da Silva - 2017 - Anatomia Do Crime/Anatomy of Crime 2017 (6):209-232.
  10. added 2019-10-13
    Verteidigung oder Verabschiedung des Intuitionismus? [REVIEW]Bert Heinrichs - 2014 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 62 (5).
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  11. added 2019-09-22
    Moral Intuition.Matthew Bedke - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    This chapter articulates a standard practice in moral theory: eliciting intuitions and adjusting one’s moral theory to accommodate them. It then critically discusses different views about the nature of moral intuitions, and different views about the epistemic role of moral intuitions. Along the way, it examines various philosophical and empirical concerns that inform the current debates.
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  12. added 2019-08-26
    Do Psychological Defeaters Undermine Foundationalism in Moral Epistemology? - a Critique of Sinnott-Armstrong’s Argument Against Ethical Intuitionism.Philipp Schwind - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):941-952.
    Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to foundationalism, some moral beliefs can be known without inferential justification; instead, all that is required is a proper understanding of the beliefs in question. In an influential criticism against this view, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that certain psychological facts undermine the reliability of moral intuitions. He claims that foundationalists would have to show that non-inferentially justified beliefs are not subject to those defeaters, but this would already constitute (...)
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  13. added 2019-08-15
    Nishida Kitarō’s Kōiteki Chokkan: Active Intuition and Contemporary Metaethics.Laura Specker Sullivan - forthcoming - In Colin Marshall (ed.), Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality. Routledge.
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  14. added 2019-07-11
    Moral Perception and Morally Relevant Perception.Jacob Sparks - 2018 - ASEBL Journal 13:19-27.
    You might bear witness to some injustice, but can you witness the injustice itself? At first glance, it’s tempting to say “yes.” Sometimes we see things that provoke an immediate judgement that some act is wrong just as we sometimes see things that provoke the immediate judgement that e.g. the book is red or that our friend is angry. It seems like we perceive the injustice just as we perceive the redness or the anger. Natural as that position is, I (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-24
    The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism.Terence Cuneo & Andrew Reisner - manuscript
    We argue that contrary to received wisdom, non-naturalist moral realism has an advantage over its naturalist rivals with respect to at least one thorny problem in moral epistemology. We call this problem 'the projectability challenge'. It is the challenge of explaining how it is possible for individuals to apply their moral knowledge to a variety of kinds of new (to them) cases and also how it is possible for individuals to learn from moral experience. By developing an account of and (...)
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  16. added 2019-06-06
    Comments on "Synthetic Concerns About Intuitionism": Ethical Intuitionism and the Problem of "I Promise".Julie Kuhlken - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (2):25-29.
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  17. added 2019-06-06
    It is Ethical Intuitionism, and Not Another Thing: A Reply to Eggleston.Michael W. Austin - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):155-157.
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  18. added 2019-06-06
    On the Alleged Irrationality of Ethical Intuitionism: Are Ethical Intuitions Epistemically Suspect?Michael W. Austin - 2003 - Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):205-213.
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  19. added 2019-06-06
    A Defense of Intuitions: Their Role in Moral Knowledge.Gary Atkinson - 1990 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64:107.
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  20. added 2019-06-06
    Ethical Intuitionism II: PHILOSOPHY.J. R. Lucas - 1971 - Philosophy 46 (175):1-11.
    South. So we have agreed to bury intuitionism. Well, I dare say it is right. But we ought to bury some of the grave-diggers too. Some of the things that Ross said are no doubt wrong, or at least misleading: but they are a lot less wrong than most of the things said since the war.
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  21. added 2019-06-05
    Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception.Robert Cowan - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject's perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception's epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically 'downgrades' their experience. On the (...)
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  22. added 2019-06-05
    David Ross, Ideal Utilitarianism, and the Intrinsic Value of Acts.Francesco Orsi - 2012 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (2).
    The denial of the intrinsic value of acts apart from both motives and consequences lies at the heart of Ross’s deontology and his opposition to ideal utilitarianism. Moreover, the claim that acts can have intrinsic value is a staple element of early and contemporary attempts to “consequentialise” all of morality. I first show why Ross’s denial is relevant both for his philosophy and for current debates. Then I consider and reject as inconclusive some of Ross’s explicit and implicit motivations for (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-05
    Book ReviewsPhilip Stratton‐Lake,, Ed. Ethical Intuitionism: Re‐Evaluations.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. Viii+305. $70.00 ; $18.95. [REVIEW]Thomas Carson - 2004 - Ethics 115 (1):175-177.
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  24. added 2019-05-26
    Transcendental Sentimentalism.Aaron Franklin - manuscript
    Broadly construed, moral sentimentalism is the position that human emotions or sentiments play a crucial role in our best normative or descriptive accounts of moral value or judgments thereof. In this paper, I introduce and sketch a defense of a new form of moral sentimentalism I call “Transcendental Sentimentalism”. According to transcendental sentimentalism, having a sentimental response to an object is a necessary condition of the possibility of a subject counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge about that object. In unpacking (...)
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  25. added 2019-05-04
    Which Societies Are Liberal Democracies?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Political philosophers sometimes write of liberal democracies, but which societies, if any, are liberal democracies? John Rawls says that in the public political culture of a liberal democracy, we find the principle that this society should be a fair system of cooperation between free and equal individuals. In this paper, I draw attention to how, if we grant Rawls’s definition, a society can easily be mistaken for a liberal democracy when it is not. I then argue that Andrew March, Gabrielle (...)
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  26. added 2019-05-02
    A Critical Discussion of Jonathan Dancy's Moral Particularism.Philipp Schwind - manuscript
    'Moral Particularism' is a view that questions the role of principles in ethics. Jonathan Dancy, the most eminent particularist, argues that principles which claim that it is right or wrong to do a certain thing in all situations cannot adequately account for the role context plays in moral deliberation. The aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate the theory of Moral Particularism. The first section discusses various positions opposed to particularism. It considers the emergence of particularism as a response (...)
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  27. added 2019-03-31
    Sidgwick E Il Progetto di Un’Etica Scientifica.Sergio Cremaschi - 2006 - Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 8 (1):1-36.
    In this paper I discuss the role played by the ideas of ‘common sense’ and ‘common sense morality’ in Sidgwick’s system of ideas. I argue that, far from aiming at overcoming common sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at grounding a consist code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the example provided by the natural sciences, in order to reach also in the moral field some body of ‘mature’ knowledge similar to that provided by the natural sciences. His whole polemics (...)
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  28. added 2019-03-31
    Sidgwick e il progetto di un’etica scientifica: risposte a Greco e Pellegrino.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2006 - Etica and Politica \ Ethics & Politics 8 (1):1-4.
    I clarify that Sidgwick was not a moral relativist; on the contrary he was heavily conditioned by ethnocentric prejudice: I add that Sidgwick did not believe a reform of common-sense morality to be viable; on the contrary he concluded that it was impossible and, besides, that there were important utilitarian reasons against the viability of any reform strategy.
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  29. added 2019-03-30
    The Mill-Whewell Controversy on Ethics and its Bequest to Analytic Philosophy.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2006 - In Elvio Baccarini & Snežana Prijic Samaržja (eds.), Rationality in Belief and Action. Rijeka, Croatia: University of Rijeka - Croatian Society for Analytic Philosophy. pp. 45-62.
    In this paper I intend to reconstruct the weight of rational and non rational factors in ethical controversies and to highlight the mixed bequest this controversy left to 20th century analytic ethics. I argue that the structure of the controversy includes ‘Kuhnian’ factors, rhetoric and pragmatic dimensions, and that a consistent self-criticism of his own previous views may be detected in Mill’s writings published after the controversy. I argue that the controversy’s bequest for analytic ethics includes: (i) anti-empiricist elements, which (...)
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  30. added 2019-03-26
    Utilitarianism and its British Nineteenth-Century Critics.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2008 - Notizie di Politeia. Rivista di Etica E Scelte Pubbliche 24 (90):31-49.
    I try to reconstruct the hidden agenda of nineteenth-century British controversy between Utilitarianism and Intuitionism, going beyond the image, successfully created by the two Mills, of a battle between Prejudice and Reason. When examined in depth, competing philosophical outlooks turn out to be more research programs than self-contained doctrinal bodies, and such programs appear to be implemented, and indeed radically transformed while in progress thanks to their enemies no less than to their supporters. Controversies, the propelling devices of research programs, (...)
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  31. added 2019-03-18
    Sidgwick’s Coherentist Moral Epistemology.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2012 - The Scientific Annals of Andquot;Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iasi (New Series). Philosophy 59:36-50.
    I discuss the ideas of common sense and common-sense morality in Sidgwick. I argue that, far from aiming at overcoming common-sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at grounding a consist code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the natural sciences, in order to reach also in the domain of morality the same kind of “mature” knowledge as in the natural sciences. His whole polemics with intuitionism was vitiated by the apriori assumption that the widespread ethos of the educated part of (...)
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  32. added 2019-03-10
    Chances, Problems, and Limits of Experimental Ethics.Christoph Luetge - 2014 - In Experimental Ethics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 26-37.
    Throughout its age-old tradition, philosophy has continuously been presented with new challenges. The latest one in this series comes from the experimental disciplines and their methodology: experimental philosophy has, during the last 10 to 15 years, increasingly gained reputation, and it has certainly been a controversial issue. Within this movement, the field of ethics deserves more attention. This article aims to give not a complete overview of, but at least an introduction to, the newly rising field of ‘Experimental Ethics’, the (...)
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  33. added 2019-02-28
    Neo-Confucianism, Experimental Philosophy and the Trouble with Intuitive Methods.Hagop Sarkissian - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):812-828.
    ABSTRACTThe proper role of intuitions in philosophy has been debated throughout its history, and especially since the turn of the twenty-first century. The context of this recent debate within analytic philosophy has been the heightened interest in intuitions as data points that need to be accommodated or explained away by philosophical theories. This, in turn, has given rise to a sceptical movement called experimental philosophy, whose advocates seek to understand the nature and reliability of such intuitions. Yet such scepticism of (...)
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  34. added 2019-02-25
    “Nothing to Invite or to Reward a Separate Examination”: Sidgwick and Whewell.Sergio Cremaschi - 2008 - Etica E Politica 10 (2):137-184.
    In this paper I discuss Sidgwick’s reaction to Whewell’s moral philosophy. I show how, to Sidgwick’s eyes, Whewell’s philosophy looked as an emblem of the set of beliefs, primarily religious, into which he had been socialised, and that his reaction was over-determined by both his own ambivalent feelings to his own Anglican upbringing and his subtle rhetorical strategy practised by presenting new shocking ideas hidden between an amount of platitudes and playing the neutral observer or the ‘philosopher of morality’ instead (...)
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  35. added 2019-02-07
    Feeling Good: Integrating the Psychology and Epistemology of Moral Intuition and Emotion.Hossein Dabbagh - 2019 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (5):1-30.
    Is the epistemology of moral intuitions compatible with admitting a role for emotion? I argue in this paper that moral intuitions and emotions can be partners without creating an epistemic threat. I start off by offering some empirical findings to weaken Singer’s (and Greene’s and Haidt’s) debunking argument against moral intuition, which treat emotions as a distorting factor. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the standard contrast between intuition and emotion is a mistake. Moral intuitions and (...)
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  36. added 2018-10-24
    The Problem of Explanation and Reason-Giving Account of Pro Tanto Duties in the Rossian Ethical Framework.Hossein Dabbagh - 2018 - Public Reason 10 (1):69-80.
    Critics often argue that Ross’s metaphysical and epistemological accounts of all-things-considered duties suffer from the problem of explanation. For Ross did not give us any clear explanation of the combination of pro tanto duties, i.e. how principles of pro tanto duties can combine. Following from this, he did not explain how we could arrive at overall justified moral judgements. In this paper, I will argue that the problem of explanation is not compelling. First of all, it is based on the (...)
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  37. added 2018-10-22
    Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-27.
    Various studies have reported that moral intuitions about the permissibility of acts are subject to framing effects. This paper reports the results of a series of experiments which further examine the susceptibility of moral intuitions to framing effects. The main aim was to test recent speculation that intuitions about the moral relevance of certain properties of cases might be relatively resistent to framing effects. If correct, this would provide a certain type of moral intuitionist with the resources to resist challenges (...)
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  38. added 2018-10-14
    Sinnott‐Armstrong Meets Modest Epistemological Intuitionism.Hossein Dabbagh - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (2):175-199.
    Sinnott-Armstrong has attacked the epistemology of moral intuitionism on the grounds that it is not justified to have some moral beliefs without needing them to be inferred from other beliefs. He believes that our moral judgments are inferentially justified because the “framing effects” which are mostly discussed in the empirical psychology cast doubt on any non-inferential justification. In this paper, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument is question begging against intuitionists and his description of epistemological intuitionism is a diluted version that (...)
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  39. added 2018-10-10
    Intuiting Intuition: The Seeming Account of Moral Intuition.Hossein Dabbagh - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):117-132.
    In this paper, I introduce and elucidate what seems to me the best understanding of moral intuition with reference to the intellectual seeming account. First, I will explain Bengson’s quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuition in terms of intellectual seeming. I then shift from philosophical intuition to moral intuition and will delineate Audi’s doxastic account of moral intuition to argue that the intellectual seeming account of intuition is superior to the doxastic account of intuition. Next, I argue that we can apply (...)
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  40. added 2018-10-08
    The Seeming Account of Self-Evidence: An Alternative to Audian Account.Hossein Dabbagh - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):261-284.
    In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. Next, I criticise his account on the basis of the idea of “adequate understanding”. I shall then present my alternative account of self-evidence which (...)
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  41. added 2018-08-11
    Amerikas ungerechter Krieg gegen die Drogen.Michael Huemer - 2015 - In Thomas Leske (ed.), Wider die Anmaßung der Politik. Gäufelden, Germany: Thomas Leske. pp. 85–102.
    Soll der Freizeitkonsum von Drogen wie Marihuana, Kokain, Heroin und LSD einem gesetzlichen Verbot unterliegen? Drogengegner sagen ja. Sie behaupten für gewöhnlich, Drogenkonsum sei sowohl für den Nutzer als auch für die Gesellschaft allgemein äußerst schädlich – vielleicht sogar unmoralisch, und sie glauben, diese Tatsachen seien als Verbotsgrund ausreichend. Freigabebefürworter sagen nein und berufen sich dabei für gewöhnlich auf eines oder mehrere von drei Argumenten: Erstens behaupten einige, Drogenkonsum sei nicht so schädlich, wie Drogengegner meinen, und sei gelegentlich sogar nützlich. (...)
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  42. added 2018-06-15
    Consequentialist Demands, Intuitions and Experimental Methodology (with Joe Sweetman).Attila Tanyi - manuscript
    Can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. We take the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness Objection – as a given and are also not concerned with finding the best response to the Objection. Instead, our main aim is to explicate the intuitive background of the Objection and to see how this background could be investigated. This double aim (...)
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  43. added 2018-06-13
    Imaginative Value Sensitive Design: How Moral Imagination Exceeds Moral Law Theories in Informing Responsible Innovation.Steven Umbrello - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Safe-by-Design (SBD) frameworks for the development of emerging technologies have become an ever more popular means by which scholars argue that transformative emerging technologies can safely incorporate human values. One such popular SBD methodology is called Value Sensitive Design (VSD). A central tenet of this design methodology is to investigate stakeholder values and design those values into technologies during early stage research and development (R&D). To accomplish this, the VSD framework mandates that designers consult the philosophical and ethical literature to (...)
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  44. added 2018-05-13
    Liao’s Moral Intuitionism.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2018 - In Tzu-wei Hung & Duen-Min Deng (eds.), Enlightenment and Rebellion: 100 Years of Taiwanese Philosophy. Taipei, Taiwan: National Taiwan University Press. pp. 155-184.
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  45. added 2018-03-17
    Moral Perception, Cognition, and Dialogue.Vojko Strahovnik - 2016 - Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija 24 (1):14-23.
    The aim of the paper is to analyse the concept of moral perception. Moral perception gets characterized as a distinctive, non-inferential moral response to concrete situations. In order to relate moral perception with a suitable model of moral cognition the position labelled morphological rationalism is elaborated. Moral judgment follows a dynamical model of reasons, according to which reasons are situated in an agent’s structured morphological background, chromatically illuminating the judgment. The key claim is that such a model is particularly well-suited (...)
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  46. added 2018-03-17
    Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value.Vojko Strahovnik - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15:583-589.
    A review article: In his recent book The Good in the Right Robert Audi presents one of the most complete contemporary arguments for moral intuitionism. By clearing-out of unnecessary and out-of-date posits and commitments of traditional intuitionist accounts he manages to establish a moderate (and in a sense also minimal) version of intuitionism that can be further developed metaethically (e.g. Kantian intuitionism, value-based intuitionism) as well as normatively (e.g. by varying the list of prima facie duties). Central posits of his (...)
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  47. added 2018-03-08
    Moral Perception, Inference, and Intuition.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1495-1512.
    Sarah McGrath argues that moral perception has an advantage over its rivals in its ability to explain ordinary moral knowledge. I disagree. After clarifying what the moral perceptualist is and is not committed to, I argue that rival views are both more numerous and more plausible than McGrath suggests: specifically, I argue that inferentialism can be defended against McGrath’s objections; if her arguments against inferentialism succeed, we should accept a different rival that she neglects, intuitionism; and, reductive epistemologists can appeal (...)
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  48. added 2018-03-02
    Intuitionism in Moral Epistemology.Elizabeth Tropman - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 472-483.
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  49. added 2018-02-17
    The Mystery of Moral Perception.Daniel Crow - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2):187-210.
    _ Source: _Page Count 24 Accounts of non-naturalist moral perception have been advertised as an empiricist-friendly epistemological alternative to moral rationalism. I argue that these accounts of moral perception conceal a core commitment of rationalism—to substantive a priori justification—and embody its most objectionable feature—namely, “mysteriousness.” Thus, accounts of non-naturalist moral perception do not amount to an interesting alternative to moral rationalism.
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  50. added 2018-02-17
    On Sinnott-Armstrong’s Case Against Moral Intuitionism.Jonathan Smith - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):75-88.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued against moral intuitionism, according to which some of our moral beliefs are justified without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferred moral beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of our moral beliefs are formed in circumstances where either (1) we are partial, (2) others disagree with us and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgement to theirs, (3) we are emotional in a (...)
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