Moral Intuitionism

Edited by Christopher Michael Cloos (University of California, Santa Barbara)
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  1. The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism.John Bengson, Terence Cuneo & Andrew Reisner - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (5):471-498.
    The Projectability Challenge states that a metaethical view must explain how ordinary agents can, on the basis of moral experience and reflection, accurately and justifiably apply moral concepts to novel situations. In this paper, we argue for two primary claims. First, paradigm nonnaturalism can satisfactorily answer the projectability challenge. Second, it is unclear whether there is a version of moral naturalism that can satisfactorily answer the challenge. The conclusion we draw is that there is an important respect in which nonnaturalism (...)
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  2. Moral philosophy and psychoanalysis: a point of convergence.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    People make moral judgments in response to actual or hypothetical situations. But should they ignore moral judgments made in some states of mind, such as when they are hesitant, frightened, or under the influence of a drug? John Rawls thinks that moral philosophers should ignore judgments made in such states, but I introduce a proposal according to which, if certain conditions are met, they should not. The proposal is loosely inspired by psychoanalysis.
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  3. Which societies are liberal democracies?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Political philosophers sometimes write of liberal democracies, but which societies, if any, are liberal democracies? John Rawls says that in the public political culture of a liberal democracy, we find the principle that this society should be a fair system of cooperation between free and equal individuals. In this paper, I draw attention to how, if we grant Rawls’s definition, a society can easily be mistaken for a liberal democracy when it is not. I then argue that Andrew March, Gabrielle (...)
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  4. Transcendental Sentimentalism.Aaron Franklin - manuscript
    Broadly construed, moral sentimentalism is the position that human emotions or sentiments play a crucial role in our best normative or descriptive accounts of moral value or judgments thereof. In this paper, I introduce and sketch a defense of a new form of moral sentimentalism I call “Transcendental Sentimentalism”. According to transcendental sentimentalism, having a sentimental response to an object is a necessary condition of the possibility of a subject counting as having non-inferential evaluative knowledge about that object. In unpacking (...)
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  5. Consequentialist Demands, Intuitions and Experimental Methodology (with Joe Sweetman).Attila Tanyi - manuscript
    Can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. We take the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness Objection – as a given and are also not concerned with finding the best response to the Objection. Instead, our main aim is to explicate the intuitive background of the Objection and to see how this background could be investigated. This double aim (...)
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  6. Alperson, Philip, ed. Diversity and Community: An Interdisciplinary Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.£ 55.00;£ 16.99 pb. Audi, Robert. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, New York: Routledge, 2003. $22.95 pb. [REVIEW]Michael Barnhardt, F. Thomas Burke, D. Micah Hester, Robert B. Talisse & Allen Carlson - forthcoming - Philosophy Today.
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  7. Kristin Ross, May'68 and its Afterlives.D. Bensaid - forthcoming - Radical Philosophy.
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  8. Second Nature in Nishida and McDowell.Montserrat Crespin Perales - forthcoming - In Noe Keiichi & Wing-Keung Lam (eds.), Feeling, Rationality and Morality: A Transcultural Perspective. New York: Bloomsbury.
    What I propose here is to dialogue and check the confluences and divergences between McDowell’s relaxed naturalism and Nishida’s historical naturalism, and their strategies to surmount modern philosophy everlasting questions that pivot on a series of dualisms, among which that of reason and nature stands out. In what follows, in the first section, I will clarify some of the reasons why the division between nature and culture, or reason and nature, or minds and world, represents one of the facets of (...)
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  9. Emotion-enriched moral perception.James Hutton - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    This article provides a new account of how moral beliefs can be epistemically justified. I argue that we should take seriously the hypothesis that the human mind contains emotion-enriched moral perceptions, i.e. perceptual experiences as of moral properties, arising from cognitive penetration by emotions. Further, I argue that if this hypothesis is true, then such perceptual experiences can provide regress-stopping justification for moral beliefs. Emotion-enriched moral perceptions do exhibit a kind of epistemic dependence: they can only justify moral beliefs if (...)
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  10. (1 other version)Unreliable emotions and ethical knowledge.James Hutton - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    How is ethical knowledge possible? One promising answer is Moral Empiricism: we can acquire ethical knowledge through emotional experiences. But Moral Empiricism faces a serious problem. Our emotions are unreliable guides to ethics, frequently failing to fit the ethical status of their objects, so the habit of basing ethical beliefs on one's emotions seems too unreliable to yield knowledge. I develop a new, virtue-epistemic solution to this problem, with practical implications for how we approach ethical decision-making. By exploiting a frequently (...)
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  11. Aposterioryczny intuicjonizm etyczny a percepcja moralna.Ignacy Kłaput - forthcoming - Filozofia Nauki.
    A posteriori ethical intuitionism is a view according to which our ethical beliefs can be justified non-inferentially, and we acquire such justification through experience. To give credence to this view, one can refer to moral perception as an ability that allows us to perceive moral properties and thus provides perceptual justification for our ethical beliefs. In this paper, I analyze various approaches to moral perception and their possible application to the foundationalist project of a posteriori ethical intuitionism. The result of (...)
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  12. The reliability challenge to moral intuitions.Dario Cecchini - 2024 - Neuroethics 17 (2):1-13.
    In recent years, the epistemic reliability of moral intuitions has been undermined by substantial empirical data reporting the influence of cognitive biases. This paper discusses and elaborates upon a promising strategy in response to the reliability challenge to moral intuitions. The considered argument appeals to the fact that moral intuitions are experienced with different levels of strength and agents accept only strong intuitions, not vulnerable to bias under realistic circumstances. This essay aims to reconstruct this defense from the reliability challenge (...)
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  13. Euthanasia and End-of-Life Decisions: From the Empirical Turn to Moral Intuitionism.Marta Spranzi - 2024 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 67 (1):73-87.
    ABSTRACT:Most medical learned societies have endorsed both "equivalence" between all forms of withholding or withdrawing treatment and the "discontinuity" between euthanasia and practices to withhold or withdraw treatment. While the latter are morally acceptable insofar as they consist in letting the patient die, the former constitutes an illegitimate act of actively interfering with a patient's life. The moral distinction between killing and letting die has been hotly debated both conceptually and empirically, most notably by experimental philosophers, with inconclusive results. This (...)
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  14. Moral als Gebiet des objektiven Geistes. Überlegungen und Potenziale im Anschluss an Nicolai Hartmann.Moritz von Kalckreuth - 2024 - In Matthias Wunsch & Steffen Kluck (eds.), Geistige Allmende und objektiver Geist: Überindividuelle Phänomene menschlicher Lebenswelten. Brill. pp. 93-112.
  15. Socially conscious moral intuitionism.John Bengson, Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2023 - Noûs 57 (4):986-994.
    In “Trusting Moral Intuitions” we argued that moral intuitions are trustworthy due to their being the outputs of a cognitive practice, with social elements, in good working order. Backes, Eklund, and Michelson present several criticisms of our defense of a socially conscious moral intuitionism. We respond to these criticisms, defending our claim that social factors enhance the epistemic credentials of moral intuitions, answering worries pertaining to the reliability of the moral intuition practice, and addressing concerns about both the individuation of (...)
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  16. Moral intuition, strength, and metacognition.Dario Cecchini - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):4-28.
    Moral intuitions are generally understood as automatic strong responses to moral facts. In this paper, I offer a metacognitive account according to which the strength of moral intuitions denotes the level of confidence of a subject. Confidence is a metacognitive appraisal of the fluency with which a subject processes information from a morally salient stimulus. I show that this account is supported by some empirical evidence, explains the main features of moral intuition and is preferable to emotional or quasi-perceptual views (...)
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  17. Thought Experiments as Tools of Theory Clarification.Grace Helton - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.
    It is widely presumed that intuitions about thought experiments can help overturn philosophical theories. It is also widely presumed, albeit implicitly, that if thought experiments play any epistemic role in overturning philosophical theories, it is via intuition. In this paper, I argue for a different, neglected epistemic role of philosophical thought experiments, that of improving some reasoner’s appreciation both of what a theory’s predictions consist in and of how those predictions tie to elements of the theory. I call this role (...)
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  18. Socialisation approach to AI value acquisition: enabling flexible ethical navigation with built-in receptiveness to social influence.Joel Janhonen - 2023 - AI and Ethics.
    This article describes an alternative starting point for embedding human values into artificial intelligence (AI) systems. As applications of AI become more versatile and entwined with society, an ever-wider spectrum of considerations must be incorporated into their decision-making. However, formulating less-tangible human values into mathematical algorithms appears incredibly challenging. This difficulty is understandable from a viewpoint that perceives human moral decisions to primarily stem from intuition and emotional dispositions, rather than logic or reason. Our innate normative judgements promote prosocial behaviours (...)
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  19. Wisdom of the Established Pattern.Joel Janhonen - 2023 - Voices in Bioethics 9.
    This short essay explores the plausible wisdom of status quo bias and questions the attempt by Bostrom and Ord to negate its influence. Assuming that the standard role of reason in judgment-formation is only second to affect, I propose that attempts to study and counter cognitive biases should focus on the underlying emotional dispositions. With or without rational descriptions, such innate inclinations of our cognition likely contain some enduring adaptive value.
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  20. 道德感知與現象對比.Jr-Jiun Lian - 2023 - Dissertation, 國立中正大學 Translated by 祉鈞 連.
    道德感知主義(moral perceptualism)主張「(至少有一些)道德性質(moral properties)可以是主體感知內容(perceptual content)的一部分」,其中的支持者包含了Audi (2013, 2015); Lord (2018); McNaughton (1988); McBrayer (2010a, 2010b); Cowan (2015); Werner (2016, 2020b)。其中,Werner (2016)認為他所提出的「現象對比論證(Phenomenal Contrast Arguments, PCAs)」可以用來證立道德感知主義。此論證強調了某些道德情境中有「跨主體的現象對比」(inter-subjective phenomenal contrast)的存在;換句話說,兩個主體面對同一場景時,其經驗各別顯現出不同的現象特性/現象特徵(phenomenal character)。此論證認為對於「跨主體間的現象對比(inter-subjective phenomenal contrast)」的最佳解釋說明是兩個不同主體在道德感知經驗上有所差異(contrast in moral perceptual experience)。簡言之,根據此論證,跨主體的現象對比的最佳解釋是:某個主體感知到了道德性質,但另一個主體則缺乏這種感知。若此解釋成立,則其蘊含,主體的確可以感知到道德性質 (至少其中一個主體的確感知到了道德性質),也因此,道德感知主義就可以被證立。然而,Werner (2016)所擁護的現象對比論證與道德感知主義,卻遭受許多哲學家的質疑與抨擊,尤以Väyrynen(2018); Reiland(2021); Chudnoff(2015)等人為代表。他們也分別提供了各自對於「跨主體間的現象對比」的相競替代解釋方案,並嘗試論證他們的說法相較於Werner (2016)的道德感知主義解釋方案來得更有解釋效力、且更為合理。本篇論文的主要目標是,剖析與回應以下兩個問題:(I)上述質疑者的替代解釋方案是否說得通?它們是否較之道德感知主義的解釋方案來得更好呢?( II)道德感知主義者是否能恰當回應質疑者的挑戰呢?倘若Werner (2016, 2020b)的說法不足以回應質疑者的話,道德感知主義者是否能夠有其他的解套方案呢?針對問題(I),筆者將論證,Väyrynen(2018); Reiland(2021); Chudnoff(2015)等人對於道德感知主義的質疑大致上言之成理,可和Werner (2016)的理論成為具有同等解釋力的相競解釋方案。但針對問題(II),筆者將指出Väyrynen(2018); Reiland(2021); Chudnoff(2015)等人頂多只能說明「對錯好壞」這類的整體道德性質(overall moral properties)無法作為感知的內容,但並未排除掉道德主體仍舊可以感知到「道德顯著性」(moral salience)這類初步確定道德性質(pro-tanto moral properties)的可能性。也因此,這並未排除一種本論文所擁護的改良版本的道德感知主義。根據此改良版本的道德感知主義,雖然對錯好壞這類的整體道德性質本身也許無法做為感知的內容,然而道德顯著性仍然可 以是感知內容。筆者將此改良版本稱之為「道德顯著性感知主義」(moral salience perceptualism)。為了突顯此版本的優點,筆者將進一步論述,此改良版的道德感知主義可以恰當地解釋跨主體間的現象對比(inter-subjective phenomenal contrast),並可規避原來Werner (2016)版本所招來的質疑。 -/- 關鍵詞:道德感知主義、現象對比論證、道德顯著性、道德經驗與道德判斷、道德教育 .
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  21. Moral Perception and Phenomenal Contrast.Jr-Jiun Lian - 2023 - Dissertation, National Chung Cheng University Translated by Jr-Jiun Lian.
    This thesis is a defense of (a version of) moral perceptualism. Moral perceptualism (MP), as is generally understood, advocates the bold view that “moral properties can be perceptual content”; its supporters include Audi (2013, 2015), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2015), and Werner (2016, 2020b). In support of MP, Werner (2016) bolsters what he calls ‘phenomenal contrast arguments(PCAs)’. According to PCAs, the best explanation for inter-subjective phenomenal contrast between two subjects facing the same moral situation is that (...)
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  22. Hassen: Warum es so schwierig ist, damit aufzuhören.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2023 - In Konrad Paul Liessmann (ed.), Der Hass. Anatomie eines elementaren Gefühls. Zsolnay. pp. 94 - 112.
    In meinem Aufsatz möchte ich die Frage danach behandeln, warum es so schwierig ist, mit dem Hassen aufzuhören. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, werde ich zunächst auf die Struktur des Hasses eingehen: Ich werde für die These plädieren, dass der Hass als eine Gesinnung zu verstehen ist, die aus einem Prozess der Sedimentierung feinlicher Gefühle entsteht. Der Hass hat eine Geschichte. Diese Geschichte werde ich mich danach widmen, um die Hartnäckigkeit und Beharrung des Hasses besser zu verstehen. Denn seine Geschichte (...)
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  23. Moral Functionalism and Moral Nonnaturalism.Lei Zhong - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (1):131-147.
    In contemporary metaethics, functionalist theories of moral properties are dominantly naturalistic. This article, however, aims to develop a nonnaturalistic form of moral functionalism. Specifically, I propose a Holistic, Intuitional, and Second-order version of moral functionalism (call it 'HIS Moral Functionalism' for short). The major goal of this article is to show that HIS Moral Functionalism is more plausible than competing functionalist accounts. Moreover, I propose an epistemic formulation of moral naturalism/nonnaturalism, and then argue that HIS Moral Functionalism is a particular (...)
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  24. Should moral intuitionism go social?Marvin Backes, Matti Eklund & Eliot Michaelson - 2022 - Noûs 57 (4):973-985.
    In recent work, Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau (2020) develop a new social version of moral intuitionism that promises to explain why our moral intuitions are trustworthy. In this paper, we raise several worries for their account and present some general challenges for the broader class of views we call Social Moral Intuitionism. We close by reflecting on Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau's comparison between what they call the “perceptual practice” and the “moral intuition practice”, which we take to raise some difficult (...)
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  25. Conscientious Utilitarianism; or, the Utilitarians Who Walk Away from Omelas.Andrew Dennis Bassford - 2022 - Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 5.
    This essay offers a revisionist defense of classical utilitarianism from an infamous objection to it, which is derived from American science fiction writer, Ursula Le Guin’s, short story, “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas.” To that effect, the reply takes inspiration from Le Guin and John Stuart Mill in appealing to the natural law theoretical concept of conscience. I argue that a conscientious utilitarian ethic can escape Le Guin’s objection more satisfactorily than other popular utilitarian ethics. Along the way, (...)
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  26. The Golden Rule: A Naturalistic Perspective.Nathan Cofnas - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (3):262-274.
    A number of philosophers from Hobbes to Mill to Parfit have held some combination of the following views about the Golden Rule: (a) It is the cornerstone of morality across many if not all cultures. (b) It affirms the value of moral impartiality, and potentially the core idea of utilitarianism. (c) It is immune from evolutionary debunking, that is, there is no good naturalistic explanation for widespread acceptance of the Golden Rule, ergo the best explanation for its appearance in different (...)
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  27. Moral Experience: Perception or Emotion?James Hutton - 2022 - Ethics 132 (3):570-597.
    One solution to the problem of moral knowledge is to claim that we can acquire it a posteriori through moral experience. But what is a moral experience? When we examine the most compelling putative cases, we find features which, I argue, are best explained by the hypothesis that moral experiences are emotions. To preempt an objection, I argue that putative cases of emotionless moral experience can be explained away. Finally, I allay the worry that emotions are an unsuitable basis for (...)
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  28. Review of David Phillips, Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics: A Guide. [REVIEW]Anthony Skelton - 2022 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    This is a review of David Phillips, Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics: A Guide. The book is a pellucid guide to Sidgwick's masterpiece which will benefit all who read it.
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  29. William David Ross.Anthony Skelton - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  30. Intuitions about moral relevance—Good news for moral intuitionism.Hossein Dabbagh - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (7):1047-1072.
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  31. The Normative Implications of Recent Empirical Neuroethics Research on Moral Intuitions.Veljko Dubljević - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):449-457.
    Empirical neuroethics models have always had normative ambitions. Older models attempted to debunk traditional moral theories, whereas newer models attempt to fit their empirical and normative claims with them. The issue of normative significance as it pertains to the use of social science methodology on moral intuitions remains open. This paper analyzes the Is/Ought gap and the empirical underpinnings of influential constructivist approaches in order to argue that the normative ambitions of empirical neuroethics models are not necessarily always misguided. The (...)
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  32. Intuitions in 21st-Century Ethics: Why Ethical Intuitionism and Reflective Equilibrium Need Each Other.Ernesto V. Garcia - 2021 - In Discipline filosofiche XXXI 2 2021 ( L’intuizione e le sue forme. Prospettive e problemi dell’intuizionismo). pp. 275-296.
    In this paper, I attempt to synthesize the two most influential contemporary ethical approaches that appeal to moral intuitions, viz., Rawlsian reflective equilibrium and Audi’s moderate intuitionism. This paper has two parts. First, building upon the work of Audi and Gaut, I provide a more detailed and nuanced account of how these two approaches are compatible. Second, I show how this novel synthesis can both (1) fully address the main objections to reflective equilibrium, viz., that it provides neither necessary nor (...)
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  33. 道德命題是否能作為感知內容呢︖.Jr-Jiun Lian - 2021 - 台灣哲學學會2021年學術研討會「台灣哲學 與在台灣的哲學研究」.
    內容型道德感知主義者(Contentful Moral Perceptualists): Audi (2013), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2014, 2015), Werner (2016, 2018) 宣稱 道德命題(moral proposition)可以作為道德主體的感知內容(content of perception)。然而,在筆 者原創的詮釋下,晚近反駁道德感知主義的學者,如: Faraci (2015), Väyrynen (2018), Chudnoff (2015),則隱約透露出以下想法:「與其宣稱道德命題是感知內容,不如宣稱道德 命題是認知信念內容(content of cognition)〕更為合理」。Faraci、Väyrynen、Chudnoff 都認為 「內容型道德感知主義者所謂的道德感知」背後其實是受到宰制型的道德原則(dominative moral principles)所主導的,是一種從原則所推論產生的心理狀態; 也因此,上述反駁者認為 「內容型道德感知主義者所謂的〔道德感知〕」缺乏貨真價實的感知經驗所具有的「非推論 的」(non-inferential)特徵,並不是真正的感知。本文將評估:「內容型的道德感知模型」是 否有辦法回應上述反駁者所提出的挑戰呢? 筆者將為肯定的答案供提初步的辯護。 -/- 關鍵詞:道德感知、現象對比⽅法、感知內容、現象經驗、感知的非推論特徵.
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  34. (DRAFT) Can Moral Propositions Serve as Perceptual Content?Jr-Jiun Lian - 2021 - Taiwanese Philosophical Association Annual Conference 2021. Translated by Jr-Jiun Lian.
    Contentful Moral Perceptualists such as Audi (2013), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2014, 2015), and Werner (2016, 2018) claim that moral propositions can serve as the content of perception for moral subjects. However, in my original interpretation, recent critics of moral perceptualism, such as Faraci (2015), Väyrynen (2018), and Chudnoff (2015), subtly suggest that it is more reasonable to claim that moral propositions are the content of cognition rather than perception. Faraci, Väyrynen, and Chudnoff argue that the (...)
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  35. Seneca’s Argumentation and Moral Intuitionism.David Merry - 2021 - In Joseph Andrew Bjelde, David Merry & Christopher Roser (eds.), Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity. Cham: Springer. pp. 231-243.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral disagreement and widespread moral bias pose a serious problem for moral intuitionism. Seneca’s view that we just recognise the good could be criticised using a similar argument. His approach to argumentation offers a way out, one that may serve as a model for a revisionary intuitionism.
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  36. Sidgwick, Reflective Equilibrium and the Triviality Charge.Michael W. Schmidt - 2021 - In Michael Schefczyk & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Utility, Progress, and Technology: Proceedings of the 15th Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies. Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing. pp. 247-258.
    I argue against the claim that it is trivial to state that Sidgwick used the method of wide reflective equilibrium. This claim is based on what could be called the Triviality Charge, which is pressed against the method of wide reflective equilibrium by Peter Singer. According to this charge, there is no alternative to using the method if it is interpreted as involving all relevant philosophical background arguments. The main argument against the Triviality Charge is that although the method of (...)
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  37. Sarah McGrath, "Moral Knowledge.". [REVIEW]Eric Wilkinson - 2021 - Philosophy in Review 41 (4):253-255.
  38. Moral Lessons from Psychology: Contemporary Themes in Psychological Research and their relevance for Ethical Theory.Henrik Ahlenius - 2020 - Stockholm: Stockholm University.
    The thesis investigates the implications for moral philosophy of research in psychology. In addition to an introduction and concluding remarks, the thesis consists of four chapters, each exploring various more specific challenges or inputs to moral philosophy from cognitive, social, personality, developmental, and evolutionary psychology. Chapter 1 explores and clarifies the issue of whether or not morality is innate. The chapter’s general conclusion is that evolution has equipped us with a basic suite of emotions that shape our moral judgments in (...)
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  39. Trusting Moral Intuitions.John Bengson, Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):956-984.
    We develop an argument for a novel version of moral intuitionism centered on the claim that moral intuitions are trustworthy. Our argument employs an epistemic principle that we call the Trustworthiness Criterion, a distinctive feature of which is its emphasis on oft-neglected social dimensions of cognitive states, including non-doxastic attitudes such as intuition. Thus our argument is not that moral intuitions are trustworthy because they are regress-stoppers, or because they are innocent until proven guilty, or because denying their epistemic contribution (...)
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  40. Percezione Morale.Dario Cecchini - 2020 - Aphex 22.
    Recently, in metaethics, several authors have taken into account the view according to which moral knowledge can be based on perceptual or quasi-perceptual experience. This kind of knowledge is defined as moral perception. This paper aims to introduce the recent debate about moral perception. Specifically, the possibility of moral perception will be discussed, and many different views of moral perception will be compared.
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  41. Cooperative Intuitionism.Stephen Ingram - 2020 - The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):780-799.
    According to pluralistic intuitionist theories, some of our moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified, and these beliefs come in both an a priori and an a posteriori variety. In this paper I present new support for this pluralistic form of intuitionism by examining the deeply social nature of moral inquiry. This is something that intuitionists have tended to neglect. It does play an important role in an intuitionist theory offered by Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau (forth), but whilst they invoke the social (...)
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  42. Astrid Burgbacher: Moralische Intuition. [REVIEW]Cyrill Mamin - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Literatur 8:17-25.
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  43. A teoria hegeliana da justificação moral.Armando Manchisi - 2020 - Problemata 11 (4):134-160.
    The contribution pursues two interrelated aims: the first one is to interpret the transition from Morality to Ethical Life in the "Elements of the Philosophy of Right" as a theory of moral justification; the second one is to show the meaning of this theory for contemporary philosophy. The essay thus seeks to turn to Hegel’s conception in order to shed light on the limits of the current discussion in moral epistemology and then to present a possible alternative. To this end, (...)
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  44. Why Moral Epistemology is Not Just Epistemology Applied to Moral Beliefs.Sushruth Ravish & Chaitanya Joshi - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):71-92.
    The current discourse on moral epistemology (ME), has hardly paid any attention to the question concerning the demarcation of the domain of ME within epistemology. Neither is the subject matter of ME considered unique, nor is the methodology adopted in its investigations considered distinct. We attempt to show in this paper that this omission does not restrict itself to a mere taxonomical oversight but rather leads to certain deeper conceptual concerns. We argue that a casual and porous understanding of the (...)
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  45. Sidgwick's Dualism of Practical Reason, Evolutionary Debunking, and Moral Psychology.Peter Andes - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):361-377.
    Sidgwick's seminal textThe Methods of Ethicsleft off with an unresolved problem that Sidgwick referred to as the dualism of practical reason. The problem is that employing Sidgwick's methodology of rational intuitionism appears to show that there are reasons to favour both egoism and utilitarianism. Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer offer a solution in the form of an evolutionary debunking argument: the appeal of egoism is explainable in terms of evolutionary theory. I argue that like rational prudence, rational benevolence is (...)
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  46. El equlibrio reflexivo y la función de los ejemplos en la investigación moral.Santiago Truccone Borgogno - 2019 - Anuario Del Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales (Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba):687-709.
    Este trabajo pretende ser una reconstrucción de uno del equilibrio reflexivo. Proporcionaré un concepto, enunciaré sus elementos y describiré cada uno de sus pasos. Afirmaré que puede suscribirse al uso del equilibrio reflexivo no solo desde esquemas coherentistas sino también –contrariamente a lo tradicionalmente sostenido- fundacionalistas. Afirmaré también que ambos esquemas pueden ser sensibles a la experiencia moral humana y que, por tanto, ninguno de los dos representa, necesariamente, un modo viciado de hacer filosofía moral. Finalmente, dado que muchas investigaciones (...)
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  47. Feeling Good: Integrating the Psychology and Epistemology of Moral Intuition and Emotion.Hossein Dabbagh - 2019 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (5):1-30.
    Is the epistemology of moral intuitions compatible with admitting a role for emotion? I argue in this paper that moral intuitions and emotions can be partners without creating an epistemic threat. I start off by offering some empirical findings to weaken Singer’s (and Greene’s and Haidt’s) debunking argument against moral intuition, which treat emotions as a distorting factor. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the standard contrast between intuition and emotion is a mistake. Moral intuitions and (...)
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  48. Analyzing debunking arguments in moral psychology: Beyond the counterfactual analysis of influence by irrelevant factors.Joanna Demaree-Cotton - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 (e151):15-17.
    May assumes that if moral beliefs are counterfactually dependent on irrelevant factors, then those moral beliefs are based on defective belief-forming processes. This assumption is false. Whether influence by irrelevant factors is debunking depends on the mechanisms through which this influence occurs. This raises the empirical bar for debunkers and helps May avoid an objection to his Debunker’s Dilemma.
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  49. Do Psychological Defeaters Undermine Foundationalism in Moral Epistemology? - a Critique of Sinnott-Armstrong’s Argument against Ethical Intuitionism.Philipp Https://Orcidorg Schwind - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):941-952.
    Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to foundationalism, some moral beliefs can be known without inferential justification; instead, all that is required is a proper understanding of the beliefs in question. In an influential criticism against this view, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that certain psychological facts undermine the reliability of moral intuitions. He claims that foundationalists would have to show that non-inferentially justified beliefs are not subject to those defeaters, but this would already constitute (...)
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  50. Nishida Kitarō’s Kōiteki Chokkan: Active Intuition and Contemporary Metaethics.Laura Specker Sullivan - 2019 - In Colin Marshall (ed.), Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality. London: Routledge.
    I characterize Nishida Kitarō’s metaethical perspective throughout his work but focus especially on his later papers, most notably his writings on kōiteki chokkan, or active intuition. These include Kōiteki Chokkan no Tachiba (published in 1935), Kōiteki Chokkan (published in 1937), as well as Nothingness and the Religious Worldview (Bashoteki Ronri to Shūkyōteki Sekaikan, published in 1945, and widely available in translation). I explore affinities between Nishida’s approach to ethics and metaethical intuitionism and sensibility theory. I then use this analysis to (...)
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