Moral Intuitionism

Edited by Christopher Michael Cloos (University of California at Santa Barbara)
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  1. Ethical Value. [REVIEW]C. P. A. - 1957 - Review of Metaphysics 10 (3):539-540.
  2. Moral Writings.H. A. Prichard and Jim MacAdam - 2002 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This is the definitive collection of the ethical work of the great Oxford moral philosopher H. A. Prichard. Prichard is famous for his ethical intuitionism: he argued that moral obligation cannot be reduced to anything else, but is perceived by direct intuition. The essays previously included in the posthumous collection Moral Obligation are now augmented by a selection of previously unpublished writings from Prichard's manuscripts, allowing for the first time a full view of his distinctive contribution to moral philosophy, at (...)
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  3. The Logic of Ethical Intuitionism.Leo Abraham - 1933 - International Journal of Ethics 44 (1):37-55.
    Philosophers have in the past had difficulty in determining how to define ethical terms. here they are defined as open-context terms with a loosely limited range of substitution instances, in conformity with actual language usage. ethical terms are in themselves meaningless. it is a misuse to say, "x is wrong in itself." ethical terms then reduce to empirical terms concerning wants, likes, knowledge of cause and effect and consequences, knowledge of how ethical terms themselves work. ethical commands reduce to if-then (...)
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  4. The Logic of Ethical Intuitionism.Leo Abraham - 1933 - Ethics 44 (1):37.
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  5. The Logic of Ethical Intuitionism.Leo Abraham - 1933 - International Journal of Ethics 44 (1):37-55.
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  6. Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character. By Robert Audi. New York: Oxford.Thomas Aquinas & Arendt Ed Liliane Weissberg Trans Richard - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1).
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  7. Robert Audi, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.W. S. Armstrong - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2:191-193.
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  8. Chapter 5. Intuitionism in Normative Ethics.Robert Audi - 2009 - In The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton University Press. pp. 161-196.
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  9. Chapter 3. Kantian Intuitionism.Robert Audi - 2009 - In The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton University Press. pp. 80-120.
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  10. Chapter 2. Rossian Intuitionism as a Contemporary Ethical Theory.Robert Audi - 2009 - In The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton University Press. pp. 40-79.
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  11. Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475-492.
    This paper defends a moderate intuitionism by extending a version of that view previously put forward and responding to some significant objections to it that have been posed in recent years. The notion of intuition is clarified, and various kinds of intuition are distinguished and interconnected. These include doxastic intuitions and intuitive seemings. The concept of inference is also clarified. In that light, the possibility of non-inferential intuitive justification is explained in relation to both singular moral judgments, which intuitionists do (...)
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  12. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value.Robert Audi - 2004 - Princeton Up.
    "Robert Audi's magisterial "The Good in the Right" offers the most comprehensive and developed account of rational ethical intuitionism to date."--Roger Crisp, St. Anne's College, University of Oxford "This is an excellent book.
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  13. Prospects for a Value-Based Intuitionism.Robert Audi - 2002 - In Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Oxford University Press. pp. 29--55.
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  14. A Kantian Intuitionism.Robert Audi - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):601-635.
    Kant famously said that one could not do morality a worse disservice than to derive it from examples, and this pronouncement, taken together with his formulations and explanations of the categorical imperative, has led some critics to regard him as too abstract. Ross, by contrast, has been widely viewed as taking individual cases of duty to have a kind of epistemic priority over principles of duty, and some of his critics have thus considered him insufficiently systematic, or even dogmatically limited (...)
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  15. Moral Knowledge and Ethical Pluralism.Robert Audi - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 271-302.
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  16. Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment.Robert Audi - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.
    This paper outlines and defends a moderate intuitionism. The point of departure is the intuitionism of W. D. Ross (1930) in The Right and the Good, conceived as ethically pluralist and epistemologically rationalist. The paper articulates a conception of self-evidence – including mediate as well as immediate kinds – appropriate to a moderate intuitionism, explores some of the resources and varieties of that position, and considers some problems and prospects for a rationalist version of intuitionism. The final section addresses the (...)
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  17. It is Ethical Intuitionism, and Not Another Thing.Michael W. Austin - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):155-157.
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  18. On the Alleged Irrationality of Ethical Intuitionism.Michael W. Austin - 2003 - Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):205-213.
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  19. Moral Dilemmas and the Limits of Ethical Theory.Carla Bagnoli - 2000 - LED.
    In this book, I consider whether the hypothesis of moral dilemmas undermines ethics' pretensions to objectivity. I argue against the view that moral dilemmas challenge the very possibility of ethical theory, as a practical and theoretical enterprise. By examining Kantian, Intuitionist and Utilitarian arguments about moral dilemmas, I show that no ethical theory is capable of avoiding them. I further argue that an adequate ethical theory should admit dilemmas. Dilemmas do not reveal a logical or normative flaw in the theory (...)
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  20. The Three Phases of Intuitionism.Tom Baldwin - 2002 - In Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Clarendon Press.
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  21. Moral Intuitionism Defeated?Nathan Ballantyne & Joshua C. Thurow - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):411-422.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed and progressively refined an argument against moral intuitionism—the view on which some moral beliefs enjoy non-inferential justification. He has stated his argument in a few different forms, but the basic idea is straightforward. To start with, Sinnott-Armstrong highlights facts relevant to the truth of moral beliefs: such beliefs are sometimes biased, influenced by various irrelevant factors, and often subject to disagreement. Given these facts, Sinnott-Armstrong infers that many moral beliefs are false. What then shall we think (...)
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  22. Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 7, Edited by R. Shafer-Landau.Dan Baras - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):359-362.
    This review article focuses on David Copp's article 'Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory'. Copp argues that recent developments in moral psychology challenge the common method in ethics, which infers moral truths from moral intuitions, as these intuitions are shown to likely be unreliable. Copp responds to the worry by arguing that even if moral intuitions cannot be trusted to indicate objective moral truths, the common method remains valuable for other reasons. In this article I raise several (...)
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  23. Review - The New Intuitionism. [REVIEW]Dan Baras - 2012 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 16 (49).
    In this review article I focus on Walter-Sinnott-Armstrong's critique of moral intuitionism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that recent discoveries by empirical psychologists undermine the plausibility of moral intuitionism. In response, I list a number of potential ways in which moral intuitionists might defend their view.
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  24. Alperson, Philip, Ed. Diversity and Community: An Interdisciplinary Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.£ 55.00;£ 16.99 Pb. Audi, Robert. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, New York: Routledge, 2003. $22.95 Pb. [REVIEW]Michael Barnhardt, F. Thomas Burke, D. Micah Hester, Robert B. Talisse & Allen Carlson - forthcoming - Philosophy Today.
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  25. Towards an Intuitionist Account of Moral Development.Karen Bartsch & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):546-547.
    Sunstein's characterization of moral blunders jointly indicts an intuitive process and the structure of heuristics. But intuitions need not lead to error, and the problems with moral heuristics apply also to moral principles. Accordingly, moral development may well involve more, rather than less, intuitive responsiveness. This suggests a novel trajectory for future research into the development of appropriate moral judgments.
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  26. Book Review:The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Robert Audi. [REVIEW]Stanley Bates - 1997 - Ethics 107 (2):381-.
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  27. Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics.Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.
    Here I examine the major theories of ethical intuitions, focusing on the epistemic status of this class of intuitions. We cover self-evidence theory, seeming-state theory, and some of the recent contributions from experimental philosophy.
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  28. Intuitive Non-Naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence.Matthew S. Bedke - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):188-209.
    Having no recourse to ways of knowing about the natural world, ethical non-naturalists are in need of an epistemology that might apply to a normative breed of facts or properties, and intuitionism seems well suited to fill that bill. Here I argue that the metaphysical inspiration for ethical intuitionism undermines that very epistemology, for this pair of views generates what I call the defeater from cosmic coincidence. Unfortunately, we face not a happy union, but a difficult choice: either ethical intuitionism (...)
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  29. Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify.Matthew S. Bedke - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):253-270.
    There are ways that ethical intuitions might be, and the various possibilities have epistemic ramifications. This paper criticizes some extant accounts of what ethical intuitions are and how they justify, and it offers an alternative account. Roughly, an ethical intuition that p is a kind of seeming state constituted by a consideration whether p, attended by positive phenomenological qualities that count as evidence for p, and so a reason to believe that p. They are distinguished from other kinds of seemings, (...)
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  30. Cartesian Intuitionism and Psychologism.Y. Belaval - 1983 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 37 (146):319-325.
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  31. Kristin Ross, May'68 and its Afterlives.D. Bensaid - forthcoming - Radical Philosophy.
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  32. Moral Intuitionism and Disagreement.Brian Besong - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.
    According to moral intuitionism, at least some moral seeming states are justification-conferring. The primary defense of this view currently comes from advocates of the standard account, who take the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming to be determined by its phenomenological credentials alone. However, the standard account is vulnerable to a problem. In brief, the standard account implies that moral knowledge is seriously undermined by those commonplace moral disagreements in which both agents have equally good phenomenological credentials supporting their disputed (...)
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  33. The Prudent Conscience View.Brian Besong - 2014 - International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):127-141.
    Moral intuitionism, which claims that some moral seemings are justification-conferring, has become an increasingly popular account in moral epistemology. Defenses of the position have largely focused on the standard account, according to which the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming is determined by its phenomenal credentials alone. Unfortunately, the standard account is a less plausible version of moral intuitionism because it does not take etiology seriously. In this paper, I provide an outline and defense of a non-standard account of moral (...)
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  34. Intuitions and Objective Moral Knowledge.Baruch A. Brody - 1979 - The Monist 62 (4):446-456.
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  35. Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?Georg Brun - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):237-252.
    In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if (...)
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  36. Ethical Intuitionism. [REVIEW]L. H. C. - 1967 - Review of Metaphysics 21 (2):371-372.
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  37. The Relation of Intuitionism to the Ethical Doctrine of Self-Realization.Henry Calderwood - 1896 - Philosophical Review 5 (4):337-351.
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  38. Between Epistemology and Ethics. The Moderate Institutionalism of Robert Audi.Angelo Campodonico - 2003 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 95 (3-4):545-578.
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  39. Philip Stratton‐Lake, Ed., Ethical Intuitionism: Re‐Evaluations:Ethical Intuitionism: Re‐Evaluations.Thomas Carson - 2004 - Ethics 115 (1):175-177.
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  40. Moral Perception.Timothy Chappell - 2008 - Philosophy 83 (4):421-437.
    I develop an account of moral perception which is able to deal well with familiar naturalistic non-realist complaints about ontological extravagance and ‘queerness’. I show how this account can also ground a cogent response to familiar objections presented by Simon Blackburn and J.L. Mackie. The familiar realist's problem about relativism, however, remains.
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  41. The Evolution of Moral Intuitions and Their Feeling of Rightness.Christine Clavien & Chloë FitzGerald - forthcoming - In Joyce R. (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Evolution and Philosophy.
    Despite the widespread use of the notion of moral intuition, its psychological features remain a matter of debate and it is unclear why the capacity to experience moral intuitions evolved in humans. We first survey standard accounts of moral intuition, pointing out their interesting and problematic aspects. Drawing lessons from this analysis, we propose a novel account of moral intuitions which captures their phenomenological, mechanistic, and evolutionary features. Moral intuitions are composed of two elements: an evaluative mental state and a (...)
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  42. The Evidential Weight of Considered Moral Judgments.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2009 - Dissertation, San Jose State University
    The input objection to reflective equilibrium (RE) claims that the method fails as a method of moral justification. According to the objection considered moral judgments(CMJs) are not truth‐conducive. Because the method uses inputs that are not credible the method does not generate justified moral beliefs. I solve the input objection by reinterpreting RE using contemporary developments in ethical intuitionism. In the first half of the thesis I setup the input objection, explore potential responses to the objection and uncover the best (...)
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  43. Logical Revision Re-Revisited: The Wright/Salerno Argument for Intuitionism.J. Cogburn - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 60:5-12.
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  44. Intuitionism Reconsidered.Roy Cook - 2005 - In Stewart Shapiro (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 387--411.
    This chapter examines the debate between advocates of classical logic and advocates of intuitionistic logic. It examines the semantic and epistemic issues on which this debate is usually conducted. After introducing the idea that logic is a model of correct reasoning, the chapter explores the viability of a logic intermediate between classical and intuitionistic.
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  45. Ethics and the New Intuitionists.Harold P. Cooke - 1913 - Mind 22 (85):82-86.
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  46. Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked (...)
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  47. Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - unknown
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked (...)
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  48. Perceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
    In the recent metaethical literature there has been significant interest in the prospects for what I am denoting ‘Perceptual Intuitionism’: the view that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferential justification for first-order ethical beliefs by having ethical perceptual experiences, e.g., Cullison 2010, McBrayer 2010, Vayrynen 2008. If true, it promises to constitute an independent a posteriori intuitionist epistemology, providing an alternative to intuitionist accounts which posit a priori intuition and/or emotion as sources of non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs. As (...)
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  49. Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception.Robert Cowan - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject’s perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ their experience. On the (...)
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  50. Moral Perception, by Robert Audi.Robert Cowan - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):1167-1171.
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