Moral Judgment

In this chapter, I defend a novel metanormative view called non-ardent non-naturalism. The central claim of this view is that moral facts (and normative facts more generally) are non-natural but not authoritatively prescriptive. My main argument for this view is cumulative: I formulate five attractive metanormative claims and argue that while non-ardent non-naturalism accommodates all these claims, its main rivals fail to do so. These claims are: (i) the Moorean intuition, (ii) the Just-Too-Different intuition, (iii) the Frege-Geach insight, (iv) the (...) obscurity of—and lack of sufficient evidence for—ontological lightness, and (v) the Mackiean intuition. Along the way, I discuss various related issues, such as how the notions of ardent normative realism and authoritative prescriptivity can be understood. (shrink)

Joseph Raz devotes one section of “The Truth in Particularism” to explaining the irrelevance of supervenience to the debate between generalists and particularists. Really, however, his claim is that supervenience is irrelevant to metaethics in general. If there is a true supervenience thesis, he argues, it is not one that we now have access to; moreover, it is not one that we are ever likely to have access to. Raz’s discussion of supervenience has been largely neglected. The chief aim of (...) this chapter is to bring it to light, for it is an argument that merits serious consideration. The secondary aim is to defend it. First, it reconstructs the argument before responding to objections. These objections concern the explanatory role of the general supervenience thesis, the inconceivability of its falsity, the claim that supervenience is a deep feature of our evaluative discourse, and the claim that supervenience of the evaluative on the nonevaluative must hold because the evaluative is grounded in the nonevaluative. The key move in Raz’s argument against supervenience concerns observations that he makes about ordinary evaluative practice. As they stand, these observations are suggestive but brief; however, these observations, supplemented by considerations about thick evaluation, give Raz the resources to respond to all of the above objections. (shrink)

Slow codes—insincere attempts at resuscitation—are widely regarded in medicine and medical ethics as morally impermissible. My goal here is to enrich this special issue on the slow code with an argument for the permissibility of slow codes that is rooted in moral psychology. Specifically, if we take seriously the results from moral psychology, the slow code is not only permissible, it is often the best option. The context of the decision about whether to perform a slow code is analogous to (...) thoroughly investigated moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem. In particular, when the trolley problem is framed as a trilemma, it becomes clear that the decisional context of the slow code is analogous to the famous moral dilemma. Since in the trolley problem the choice analogous to the slow code is the best choice, the slow code may be the best choice when facing patient or family requests for futile CPR. In establishing this claim, I address a range of objections to the slow code. I conclude with an empirically supported explanation of the conventional wisdom. Resistance to the slow code doesn't sprout from the act's moral properties, but from moral judgments influenced by other factors, such as emotion, physical distance, and personal force. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how a pragmatist stance may address the problem of the resolvability of moral conflicts. Pragmatism challenges skeptical and relativist views by arguing that moral conflict resolution is possible via inquiry and exchange of reasons. From a normative standpoint, pragmatism also differs from utilitarian and deontological views, according to which a specific moral theory is correct in every context. From a pragmatist point of view, both utilitarian and deontological responses can be justified, depending on contextual conditions (...) and reasons, on the people to whom reasons are offered, and on constraints of inclusivity, publicity, empirical accuracy, and coherence. Pragmatism’s empiricist method for solving conflicts and making normative adjustments can be seen as a form of reflective equilibrium, where moral beliefs and commitments are adjusted in light of new non-moral knowledge, such as evidence about the reliability of decision processes. Recent empirical research also supports pragmatism’s pluralist and flexible approach more than monistic and generalist normative views like deontology and utilitarianism. (shrink)

Some ethicists try to settle moral disagreement by ruling out particular types of moral reasoning on the basis of cognitive scientific evidence. We argue that the cognitive science of reasoning is not well-suited to this Archimedean role. Through discussion of several influential research programs, we show that such attempts tend to either fail to be Archimedean (by assuming controversial moral views) or fail to settle disagreement (by getting caught up in unsettled debates about rationality). We speculate that these outcomes reflect (...) a fundamental sort of normative disagreement, which can be reshuffled to the domains of morality or rationality, but cannot be avoided. (shrink)

This paper explores moral judgments as conscious phenomena, highlighting the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach to achieve a comprehensive scientific understanding. Integrating insights from neuroscience, moral psychology, and philosophy of science, it adopts a mechanistic framework to analyze moral judgments through three dimensions: informational diversity, functional dynamics, and intentionality. While the mechanistic approach provides a robust foundation for decomposing moral judgments into their constitutive elements, it faces limitations in establishing causal relationships across neural levels and integrating complex cognitive processes. To (...) address these challenges, it evaluates neuroscientific theories of consciousness, identifying Global Workspace Theory (GWT) as the most suitable framework for unifying distributed neural processes into coherent conscious experiences. By synthesizing mechanistic philosophy with GWT, this paper offers a novel explanatory model for understanding moral judgments as multidimensional, integrative, and conscious phenomena. (shrink)

This paper examines two prominent frameworks in moral psychology that aim to explain the foundations of moral judgments: the Universal Moral Grammar (UMG) and the Emotional Moral Sentimentalist (EMS) frameworks. UMG theorists propose that moral judgments are guided by innate, unconscious principles analogous to linguistic grammar, whereas EMS advocates emphasize the role of automatic emotional responses, such as anger or guilt, in shaping moral decisions. By reviewing recent neuroscientific evidence, this paper evaluates the strengths and limitations of each approach and (...) argues that neither framework is fully substantiated by current empirical findings. Instead, it advocates for an integrative perspective that treats UMG principles and emotional processes as complementary, hypothetical models for understanding moral cognition. This approach offers a pathway for more comprehensive investigations into the neural mechanisms underlying moral judgments, addressing the limitations of the ongoing UMG-EMS debate. (shrink)

The article explores the question of temporal factors of moral luck. The author demonstrates that there are cases where changes in morality can be a factor leading to moral luck. As an illustration, an example is analyzed related to a change in ideas about the morally acceptable and about the necessary grounds for holding one morally responsible. It is concluded that the resultant luck is accompanied by a temporal factor, because not only the result is important, but also how its (...) moral assessment has changed by the time it was achieved. (shrink)

This work offers the first comprehensive comparison between the philosophy of Adam Smith and that of his successor, Thomas Reid. It looks at Reid’s and Smith’s remarkably similar accounts of human perception and judgement, and at their different moral and economic theories. In this way, this paper offers not only a new perspective on Reid’s critique of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, but also new insights into the intellectual roots of the genuinely Scottish debates about sense perception and the (...) task of scientific philosophy. “Reiding” Smith can thus offer a unique vantage point from which to understand the connections between epistemological and economic issues in Smith’s work. With a focus that is at once historical and philosophical, this undertaking serves three purposes: a) to familiarise economists with the philosophical and economic works of Thomas Reid, b) to sharpen our understanding of Adam Smith’s intellectual context in the Scottish Enlightenment, and c) to better understand the paradoxical role that individual human judgement plays in Adam Smith’s analysis of the economy. (shrink)

The problem of alterity can be posed in two areas: a) that of absolute alterity, which Descartes develops in the Third Meditation when the ego discovers himself as a negation of infinite and an aspiration to the infinite; b) that of relative alterity that distinguishes me from my fellow man. Firstly, we risk a synthesis of the ways in which the alter ego loses his otherness when conceived as an object of representation or desire. Secondly, we propose that Descartes thinks (...) of alterity in a purely ethical sense, as a capacity for good and evil. Our thesis is, first: pure love (without desire) is parental love —the only one addressed to others themselves for themselves, the only one that opens the possibility of self-giving, sacrifice. Second, we propose that Descartes’ texts acquire all their meaning if they are compared with the ethical notion of alterity in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. -/- El problema de la alteridad puede plantearse en dos ámbitos: a) el de la alteridad absoluta, que Descartes desarrolla en la Tercera Meditación cuando el ego descubre su finitud como una negación y una aspiración de infinito; b) el de la alteridad relativa que me distingue de mi semejante. En primer lugar, arriesgamos una síntesis de los modos en que el alter ego pierde su alteridad al ser concebido como objeto de representación o de deseo. En segundo lugar, proponemos que Descartes piensa la alteridad en sentido puramente ético, como capacidad de bien y de mal. Nuestra tesis es, primero: el amor puro (sin deseo) es el amor paterno —el único dirigido al otro sí mismo por sí mismo y que abre la posibilidad de la donación de sí, el sacrificio; segundo: los textos de Descartes adquieren todo su sentido si se los compara con la noción ética de alteridad en la filosofía de Emmanuel Levinas. (shrink)

Though courage is widely regarded as a core virtue there is controversy over what kinds of acts are courageous. Moreover, some see courageous acts as necessarily good, whereas others believe that some acts can be both courageous and bad. We examine this disagreement and argue that it largely rests on two sorts of confusion or misunderstanding. We examine this disagreement and argue that it largely rests on two sorts of confusion or misunderstanding. One regards differences in the descriptor under which (...) the act is seen: acts can be comprehended under several different descriptors, all of which may be appropriate but support different courage evaluations. The other involves differences in uses of the term courage: the term serves two fundamentally different functions and involves two different concepts. One, process courage, is the use of the term to refer to the psychological mechanisms or processes whereby people act in the face of risk for perceived good. The other, accolade courage, is a form of acknowledgment - the use of the term to draw attention to the action or the actor and commend one or the other. We identify various sorts of support for this process/accolade distinction. We then conclude by outlining several important contributions these distinctions offer for research and social debate. Attention to differences in descriptors and functions of the term courage will improve both research and social discourse on the virtue of courage. (shrink)

Despite the tremendous growth of interest in both emotion and character in recent years, little has been said about the relation between the two. I argue that emotions have a proximal and fundamental role in determining character. The proximal role consists in the effects of emotion on the way that a person perceives and ensuingly cognizes the object of emotion. This plays a significant part in determining character-relevant actions. The fundamental role consists in the function that emotions have in sustaining (...) values on which character traits are based. Emotions enable character traits to persist by maintaining the importance of these values and thus countering “axiological entropy,” which is the diminution over time of the tacit sense of importance of such values. Emotions are thus essential to the possession of character traits, and character development involves developing an appropriate emotional repertoire. (shrink)

Pe tradición filosófica umi enfoque moral rehegua oñemopyenda predominantemente umi concepto ha teoría metafísica ha teológica-pe. Umi concepto tradicional ética rehegua apytépe, ojehecharamovéva ha’e Teoría de Comando Divino (TCD). TCD he’iháicha, Ñandejára ome’ẽ pyenda moral yvypórape ojejapo guive ha umi revelación rupive. Péicha, pe moralidad ha divinidad ndojeseparái va’erãmo’ã pe civilización mombyryvéva guive. Ko'ã concepto oime sumergido peteî estructura teológica ha oasepta principalmente mayoría umi omoirûva mbohapy tradición abrahámica: judaísmo, cristianismo ha islam, oimehápe parte considerable población humana. Oñongatúvo jerovia ha (...) Apocalipsis ifundamento ramo, umi Teorías de Mando Divino noĩri estrictamente sujeto mba’eveichagua tipo de demostración-pe. Umi opositor concepción moral Comando Divino rehegua, oñemopyendáva imposibilidad ohechauka haĝua umi suposición metafísica ha religiosa orekóva, oñeha’ã heta siglo aja odevalorávo importancia orekóva. Oipytyvõ hikuái argumento teoría ndohechaukái evidencia material ha coherencia lógica ha, péva rehe, ndikatúi ojeguereko en cuenta propósito científico térã filosófico. Pe entendimiento moral oikotevẽ peteĩ percepción ha acuerdo tuichavéva umi filósofo apytépe, araka’eve ndohupytýiva hikuái. Universo ha atmósfera ojeréva ko estudio rehe ha'e umi dominio opavave ko'ã conflicto conceptual, ojehecháva punto de vista objetivo ha evolutivo. Taha'e ha'éva ko circunstancia ha importancia intrínseca orekóva, ko'ã porandu mombyry eterei enfoque metodológico peteî discusión analítica moralidad objetiva rehe, ha'éva, añetehápe, objetivo ha alcance ko tembiapo. Jahecha jeyva’erã mbykymi ko’ã teoría tradicional iñimportánteva, ko investigación ha’égui peteĩ estudio comparativo, ha umi suposición orekóva por lo menos tuicha iñambue opaite teoría tradicional-gui. Upévare oñeikotevê oñeikuave'ê moñe'êhárape, ko texto-pe, elemento directo ha específico ombojojáva crítica válida-pe guarã, odispensávo investigación interruptiva. Ha katu, jepe jahecha jey umi teoría tradicional, upevarã exposición comparativa ha crítica, oñeñongatúta ñande preocupación principal ykére, ha'eháicha "aliena materia". Hembipotápe ore estudio ohechauka ha ohustifika existencia ha significado arquetipo moral prehistórico heñóiva directamente principio fundamental, tekotevê social ha ñeha'ã sobrevivencia rehe. Ko'ã arquetipo ha'e definición fundamento esencial ética, agregación orekóva organización lógica colectiva inconsciente ha correspondiente ha transmisión umi etapa evolutiva genoma humano ha umi relación espacio-tiempo iñambuéva, independientemente oimeraê experiencia contemporánea umi tapicha. Ko sistema odefiníva ko'ã arquetipo omoheñói modelo social humano evolutivo. Ko razonamiento he'ise pe moralidad ha'eha peteî atributo primario "homo sapiens" rehegua; ndaha’éi peteĩ mba’e ni peteĩ accidente: ombojoaju yvypóra esencia ha oike yvypóra identidad ontológica reino-pe. Pe fenómeno yvypóra ha’e peteĩ proceso continuo, omboguatáva ifunción determinación aleatoria ha libre albedrío apytépe, ha tekotevẽ ñacuestiona mba’éichapa oñepyrũ pe moralidad ha mba’éichapa ou ñandéve ko’áĝa. -/- A tradição filosófica das abordagens da moral tem predominantemente como base conceitos e teorias metafísicas e teológicas. Entre os conceitos tradicionais de ética, o mais proeminente é a Teoria do Comando Divino (TCD). De acordo com a TCD, Deus dá fundamentos morais à humanidade desde sua criação e por meio de revelações. Assim, moralidade e divindade seriam inseparáveis desde a civilização mais remota. Esses conceitos submergem em uma estrutura teológica e são principalmente aceitos pela maioria dos seguidores das três tradições Abraâmicas: judaísmo, cristianismo e islamismo, abrangendo a parte mais considerável da população humana. Mantendo a fé e a Revelação como seus fundamentos, as Teorias do Comando Divino não estão estritamente sujeitas a qualquer tipo de demonstração. Os oponentes da concepção moral do Comando Divino, fundamentados na impossibilidade de demonstrar suas suposições metafísicas e religiosas, tentam há muitos séculos (embora sem sucesso) desvalorizar sua importância. Eles sustentam o argumento de que a teoria não mostra evidências materiais e coerência lógica e, por esse motivo, não pode ser levada em consideração para fins científicos ou filosóficos. É apenas uma crença e, como tal, deve ser entendida. Além dessas oposições extremas, muitos outros conceitos atacam as teorias do Comando Divino, de uma ou de outra maneira, em parte ou na totalidade. Muitos filósofos e cientistas sociais, da clássica filosofia grega até a presente data, por exemplo, sustentam que a moralidade é apenas uma construção e, portanto, culturalmente relativa e culturalmente determinada. No entanto, isso traz muitas outras discussões e impõe o desafio de determinar qual é o significado da cultura, quais elementos da cultura são moralmente determinantes e, finalmente, quais são os limites dessa relatividade. Os deterministas morais, por sua vez, afirmam que tudo relacionado ao comportamento humano, incluindo a moralidade, é determinado em suas causas, uma vez que o livre-arbítrio não existe. Mais recentemente, os pensadores modernos argumentaram que existe uma rigorosa ciência da moralidade. No entanto, o método científico por si só, apesar de explicar vários fatos e evidências, não pode esclarecer todo o conteúdo e todo o significado da ética. A compreensão moral exige uma percepção mais ampla e um acordo entre os filósofos, que eles nunca alcançaram. Todas essas perguntas têm muitas configurações diferentes, dependendo de cada linha filosófica, e iniciam análises complexas e debates intermináveis, uma vez que muitas delas são reciprocamente conflitantes. O universo e a atmosfera envolvendo esta estudo são os domínios de todos esses conflitos conceptuais, observados de um ponto de vista objetivo e evolutivo. Independentemente dessa circunstância e de sua importância intrínseca, essas questões estão muito distantes da abordagem metodológica de uma discussão analítica sobre a moral objetiva, a qual é, de fato, o objetivo e o escopo deste trabalho. Devemos revisitar brevemente essas importantes teorias tradicionais, porque esta pesquisa abriga um estudo comparativo, e suas suposições pelo menos diferem profundamente de todas as teorias tradicionais. Portanto, torna-se necessário oferecer ao leitor, neste texto, elementos diretos e específicos de comparação para críticas válidas, dispensando pesquisas interruptivas. No entanto, mesmo revisitando as teorias tradicionais, para esse objetivo de exposição comparativa e crítica, elas serão mantidas ao lado de nossas principais preocupações, como " aliena materia ". Independentemente da validade de qualquer um ou de todos os elementos dessa discussão e de seu significado como universo filosófico deste trabalho, o objetivo do nosso estudo é demonstrar e justificar a existência e o significado de arquétipos morais pré-históricos surgidos diretamente dos princípios fundamentais, necessidades sociais e esforços para a sobrevivência. (shrink)

Este artículo discute los aspectos normativos del know-how. Nuestro propósito es doble. Primero, examinamos ciertos enfoques del saber-cómo que, influidos por teorías fenomenológicas y de la cognición encarnada, utilizan un vocabulario “experiencialista”. Argumentamos que este vocabulario no logra captar aspectos cruciales de la normatividad del saber-cómo: la agencia que involucra, la generalidad característica de las interacciones normativas y el ajuste entre las acciones y los estándares sociales. Segundo, recomendamos el vocabulario de las actitudes normativas para dar cuenta de estos aspectos (...) y señalamos su complementariedad con el enfoque de la normatividad situada. Defendemos, con espíritu pragmatista, que los agentes competentes establecen relaciones normativas con el entorno al evaluarlo a través de sus acciones. (shrink)

This book is the first to introduce readers to contemporary philosophical works on moral judgement stemming from France, Germany and the Anglo-American world – many of which remain untranslated. By integrating Kantian and Aristotelian reflections on this subject, the author combines historiography and critical reflection to offer a rich picture of what it means to make good moral decisions. As both Kantians and Aristotelians argue, moral judgements are ultimately grounded in the normativity of practical identities. Thus, it is by identifying (...) the obligations tied to the multiple dimensions of our identities (e.g., friend, teacher, romantic partner, citizen) that we can ultimately understand how we ought to act. Yet, Aristotle and Kant also remind us that doing so requires the acquisition of moral virtues which allow us to better discern practical reasons in concrete situations. (shrink)

Given the reality of legal orders collapsing or breaking, this paper argues that a good explanation is needed to understand this phenomenon. It adopts a Hartian account of positivism and considers law as part of a larger set of social facts and orders. The paper analyzes the relationship between evil moral commitments and the law. It concludes by showing that it might be more conducive to analyzing the loss of faith in a legal system as an explanation for its collapse (...) rather than thinking about problematic commitments to evil moral attitudes. (shrink)

Moral revolutions are rightly coming to be recognised as a philosophically interesting and historically important mode of moral change. What is less often acknowledged is that the very characteristics that make a moral change revolutionary pose a fundamental challenge to the possibility of moral progress. This is because moral revolutions are characterised by a diachronic form of deep moral disagreement: moral agents on either side of a moral revolution adopt different standards for assessing the merits of a moral argument, and (...) according to the standards they adopt, agents on neither side of the revolution ought to accept the arguments being put forward by those on the other. This threatens to undermine the progressive status of many of our most celebrated historical examples of moral revolutions: if a moral revolution only looks progressive in light of a change in evaluative standards it itself brought about, then moral progress seems relative to a particular historical perspective; if prior to a moral revolution taking place the moral arguments in its favour fall short of the relevant standards, moral revolutions can never be the outcome of rational argumentation. This apparent relativism and irrationality sits uncomfortably alongside our common-sense intuition that the moral revolutions upon which our contemporary moral worldview rests count as genuine moral progress. In this paper, I deepen currently popular Kuhnian-inspired accounts of moral revolution by incorporating Wittgensteinian ideas from _Philosophical Investigations_ and _On Certainty_. The result is an original way of thinking about deep moral disagreements, moral revolutions, and moral progress. (shrink)

Contentful Moral Perceptualists such as Audi (2013), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2014, 2015), and Werner (2016, 2018) claim that moral propositions can serve as the content of perception for moral subjects. However, in my original interpretation, recent critics of moral perceptualism, such as Faraci (2015), Väyrynen (2018), and Chudnoff (2015), subtly suggest that it is more reasonable to claim that moral propositions are the content of cognition rather than perception. Faraci, Väyrynen, and Chudnoff argue that the (...) so-called "moral perception" posited by Contentful Moral Perceptualists is actually dominated by dominative moral principles, representing a psychological state inferred from principles. Therefore, these critics believe that the so-called "moral perception" lacks the non-inferential characteristic of genuine perceptual experience and is not true perception. This paper will evaluate whether the "contentful moral perceptual model" can respond to the challenges posed by these critics. I will provide a preliminary defense for an affirmative answer. -/- Keywords: Moral Perception, Phenomenal Contrast Method, Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Experience, Non-Inferential Characteristics of Perception . (shrink)

道德感知主義（moral perceptualism）主張「（至少有一些）道德性質（moral properties）可以是主體感知內容（perceptual content）的一部分」，其中的支持者包含了Audi （2013, 2015）; Lord （2018）; McNaughton （1988）; McBrayer （2010a, 2010b）; Cowan （2015）; Werner （2016, 2020b）。其中，Werner （2016）認為他所提出的「現象對比論證（Phenomenal Contrast Arguments, PCAs）」可以用來證立道德感知主義。此論證強調了某些道德情境中有「跨主體的現象對比」（inter-subjective phenomenal contrast）的存在；換句話說，兩個主體面對同一場景時，其經驗各別顯現出不同的現象特性/現象特徵（phenomenal character）。此論證認為對於「跨主體間的現象對比（inter-subjective phenomenal contrast）」的最佳解釋說明是兩個不同主體在道德感知經驗上有所差異(contrast in moral perceptual experience)。簡言之，根據此論證，跨主體的現象對比的最佳解釋是：某個主體感知到了道德性質，但另一個主體則缺乏這種感知。若此解釋成立，則其蘊含，主體的確可以感知到道德性質 （至少其中一個主體的確感知到了道德性質），也因此，道德感知主義就可以被證立。然而，Werner （2016）所擁護的現象對比論證與道德感知主義，卻遭受許多哲學家的質疑與抨擊，尤以Väyrynen（2018）; Reiland（2021）; Chudnoff（2015）等人為代表。他們也分別提供了各自對於「跨主體間的現象對比」的相競替代解釋方案，並嘗試論證他們的說法相較於Werner （2016）的道德感知主義解釋方案來得更有解釋效力、且更為合理。本篇論文的主要目標是，剖析與回應以下兩個問題：（I）上述質疑者的替代解釋方案是否說得通？它們是否較之道德感知主義的解釋方案來得更好呢？（ II）道德感知主義者是否能恰當回應質疑者的挑戰呢？倘若Werner （2016, 2020b）的說法不足以回應質疑者的話，道德感知主義者是否能夠有其他的解套方案呢？針對問題（I），筆者將論證，Väyrynen（2018）; Reiland（2021）; Chudnoff（2015）等人對於道德感知主義的質疑大致上言之成理，可和Werner （2016）的理論成為具有同等解釋力的相競解釋方案。但針對問題（II），筆者將指出Väyrynen（2018）; Reiland（2021）; Chudnoff（2015）等人頂多只能說明「對錯好壞」這類的整體道德性質（overall moral properties）無法作為感知的內容，但並未排除掉道德主體仍舊可以感知到「道德顯著性」（moral salience）這類初步確定道德性質（pro-tanto moral properties）的可能性。也因此，這並未排除一種本論文所擁護的改良版本的道德感知主義。根據此改良版本的道德感知主義，雖然對錯好壞這類的整體道德性質本身也許無法做為感知的內容，然而道德顯著性仍然可 以是感知內容。筆者將此改良版本稱之為「道德顯著性感知主義」(moral salience perceptualism)。為了突顯此版本的優點，筆者將進一步論述，此改良版的道德感知主義可以恰當地解釋跨主體間的現象對比（inter-subjective phenomenal contrast），並可規避原來Werner （2016）版本所招來的質疑。 -/- 關鍵詞：道德感知主義、現象對比論證、道德顯著性、道德經驗與道德判斷、道德教育 .

My dissertation, Reasons, Norms, and Moral Progress (2020), shows that, contrary to the Enlightenment narrative, the parochial and conformist tendencies of "we"-groups, far from obstructing, can advance moral progress. Reconstructing from the history of moral progress (e.g., British abolitionism), I articulate how "we" can reason to revise "our" norms in alignment with universally valid moral norms.

This paper argues that moral judgment is suffering at the hands of instrumental rationality and identity thinking, concepts from the tradition of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory that help explain degradations in human relations. These concepts are not new, but they are realized in novel ways, and the implications continue to be significant, contributing to human suffering and prominent anti-intellectual sentiment. Working through the shared intellectual ground of Adorno, Edmundson, Stivers, and Ellul, the paper takes a critical look at (...) our culture through the objectification of genuine human relations that comes with techno-rational prioritization. The endpoint of such a culture is the compromise of human subjectivity in the service of efficiency, objectivity, and measurability. Extending the analysis to educational practice, Joas’s notion of situational creativity and Dewey’s aesthetics are proposed as possible points of resistance, highlighting positive actions to be taken to remediate these narrow and dehumanizing phenomena. (shrink)

Since the 1970’s there has been a major increase in adventure sports participation but it seems that engagement in such sports comes with a stigma: adventure sports participants are often regarded as reckless ‘daredevils’. We approach the questions about people’s perception of risk and recklessness in adventure sports by combining empirical research with philosophical analysis. First, we provide empirical evidence that suggests that laypeople tend to assess the danger of adventure sports as greater than more mundane sports and judge adventure (...) sports participants as more reckless than participants in non-adventure sports. We contextualise these findings within existing psychological risk perception paradigms and outline new philosophical explanations of the identified pattern in laypeople’s risk perception. (shrink)

Loyalty is considered central to people’s moral life, yet little is known about how people think about what it means to be loyal. We used a prototype approach to understand how loyalty is represented in Colombia and the United States and how these representations mediate attributions of loyalty and moral judgments of loyalty violations. Across 7 studies (N = 1,984), we found cross-cultural similarities in the associative meaning of loyalty (Study 1) but found differences in the centrality of features associated (...) with loyalty (Study 2) and the latent structure of loyalty representations (Study 3). Colombians represent loyalty in terms of more general moral characteristics, while US participants represent loyalty in terms of interpersonal commitment, both in contrast with current approaches to loyalty. By comparing representations of loyalty and honesty, we establish that difference in loyalty conceptualizations reflect a different way of thinking about loyalty rather than morality more generally (Study 4). Further, Colombians attributed greater loyalty to individuals with general moral characteristics compared to participants from the United States sample (Study 5) and were more likely to classify non-loyal values as loyalty-related (Study 6). While the centrality of prototypical features predicts categorizing norm violations as loyalty-related, differences in prototypical structure account for differences in the severity of moral judgment for such violations (Study 7), which suggests that loyalty representations have similar functions even though these representations differ in structural characteristics. (shrink)

By spelling out the affective dimension of admiration, this paper challenges the view of admiration as a trustworthy means of detecting morally desirable qualities in exemplars. Such a view of admiration, foundational for the current debate on exemplars in moral education, holds that admiration is a self-motivating emotion essentially oriented toward the good and the excellent. I demonstrate that this view ignores the affective aspects of admiration explored widely in the history of philosophy on which the debate on moral exemplars (...) substantially draws. Focusing on Spinoza, Smith, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, I bring to light their largely skeptical views of the moral value of admiration. These thinkers indicate that admiration can be influenced by, and is often conflated with, other emotions, and can arise in us through behavioral mimicry; moreover, admiration is often oriented toward the mediocre and corrupt, is contagious, self-referential, collective, and has limited motivational power. Their remarks on the affective dimension of admiration call into question admiration’s applicability and usefulness in moral exemplarity. (shrink)

One desideratum for contemporary theories of emotion both in philosophy and affective science is an explanation of the relation between emotions and objects that illicit them. According to one research tradition in emotion theory, the Evaluative Tradition, the explanation is simple: emotions just are evaluative judgments about their objects. Growing research in affective science supports this claim suggesting that emotions constitute (or contribute to) evaluative judgments such as moral judgments about right and wrong. By contrast, recent scholarship in two historical (...) emotion theories, Augustinian and Thomistic, emphasize their sharp distinction between cognitive judgments and affectivity or between reason and emotion. For these historical models, reason, not emotion, is responsible for moral judgment. Are the evaluative and historical models at irreconcilable odds? Should we discard old models that fail to satisfy intuitions about the intricate role of emotions in moral judgment? This paper compares these research programs and suggests a roadmap for collaboration. (shrink)

In biomedical ethics, there is widespread acceptance of moral realism, the view that moral claims express a proposition and that at least some of these propositions are true. Biomedical ethics is also in the business of attributing moral obligations, such as “S should do X.” The problem, as we argue, is that against the background of moral realism, most of these attributions are erroneous or inaccurate. The typical obligation attribution issued by a biomedical ethicist fails to truly capture the person's (...) actual obligations. We offer a novel argument for rife error in obligation attribution. The argument starts with the idea of an epistemic burden. Epistemic burdens are all of those epistemic obstacles one must surmount in order to achieve some aim. Epistemic burdens shape decision-making such that given two otherwise equal options, a person will choose the option that has the lesser of epistemic burdens. Epistemic burdens determine one's potential obligations and, conversely, their non-obligations. The problem for biomedical ethics is that ethicists have little to no access to others' epistemic burdens. Given this lack of access and the fact that epistemic burdens determine potential obligations, biomedical ethicists often can only attribute accurate obligations out of luck. This suggests that the practice of attributing obligations in biomedical ethics is rife with error. To resolve this widespread error, we argue that this practice should be abolished from the discourse of biomedical ethics. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Hume’s account of moral judgment is best understood if it is read in light of Hume’s explanatory project. I first lay out the textual support to show that Hume’s account of justice in the Treatise includes both approval of a motive that gives rise to the virtue of justice, and approval of a system of conduct, irrespective of a motive. I then argue that we can allow for such plurality in Hume’s theory of moral (...) judgment if we view it in light of his explanatory project: finding unifying causes for disparate phenomena. Hume offers a unified theory of moral judgment because he can show that the different approvals are explained by the same causes. Finally, I argue that viewing Hume’s account of moral judgment in light of his explanatory project allows us to appreciate a further distinction between the moral judgment of the natural and the artificial virtues: while judgments of the former are fully explained by the causes of a certain motive, the latter are only fully explained by the causes of the motive in the context of a convention, which in turn is partially constituted by non-approved motives. (shrink)

Martin Scorsese’s 1976 film Taxi Driver is widely considered a cinematic masterpiece. Existing scholarly deconstructions focus on prevalent themes of masculinity, violence, and exploitation. This work reinterprets the central narrative as a revenge story in three parts, using cinematic context; the occurrences and actions of the protagonist – the eponymous taxi driver Travis Bickle - to answer the question of whether revenge is ever morally justifiable.

Moral nihilism is the view that there are no moral facts or moral truths. It is the ontological component of moral error theory, which is the best-known and most comprehensive metaethical theory that involves moral nihilism. My main aim is to discuss some consequences of endorsing moral error theory or believing to some degree that moral error theory is true. In §2, I consider the implications for ordinary moral thought and discourse and the epistemological consequences for moral theorizing. In §3, (...) I consider a recent challenge, according to which moral judgments do not have the epistemic profile that moral error theory alleges. I shall argue in §3–5 that the challenge can be met and that there is evidence that moral error theory is in fact correct about the epistemic profile of moral judgments. (shrink)

The two competing camps of theorists in moral psychology share one common view on the disagreement between their theories: moral foundations theory presupposes basic emotion theory, while dyadic morality theory presupposes constructionist theory of emotion. The paper challenges this common view. First, it reviews the four theories. Second, it clarifies the issue about the relation between the moral contents and emotions on which the two camps of moral-psychological theorists dispute. Third, it identifies the explananda for the moral-psychological theories, and examines (...) the two distinctive types of explanations that each of the two theories offers to them. Finally, it concludes that the deepest disagreement between the two morality theories consists in the role that the theories give to emotions in explaining moral judgments. (shrink)

Despite the plethora of freedom of religion literature (under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), the corresponding literature on the freedom of conscience is minimal. To further the discussion on the freedom of conscience, I rely heavily on the philosophical literature to make an important distinction; the difference between individual- based and communal-based conceptions of conscience. Whereas the former is plagued with subjectivity, making it difficult to conceptualize a working framework for the Charter right, the latter (...) offers a promising foothold to rise above subjectivity and find a firm footing based on communal relations. In emphasizing the importance of the dialogical nature of human beings and the relational necessity undergirding moral judgements, I argue that the concept of conscience should be understood and practiced in community, rather than individually. (shrink)

Business ethics can be taught as a stand-alone course or be woven throughout a curriculum. There is a debate over whether to teach ethics in the form of theory or real-world connectedness or both. A moral-judgment gap exists, and many believe Business education should promote knowledge and skills that enable ethical intentions to be followed with ethical behaviors. This conceptual paper diagrams where the gap exists in Business Ethics education and theorizes how multi-modal, learning-centered ethics teaching can bridge this shortfall. (...) Literature from the field of Education is drawn upon for pedagogies that promote learning and application. Case studies, constructed narratives, and simulations function as several key components useful for developing complex skills needed for applying ethical reasoning. Additional components and strategies that undergird and reinforce the case studies and other active learning components are laid out in pyramid form toward an overall best-practices approach to developing principled moral reasoning in Business Ethics. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the psychology of moral judgment and its implications for normative ethics and metaethics. Recent empirical findings in moral psychology, such as the impact of emotions, intuitions, and situational factors on moral judgments, have sparked a debate about whether ordinary moral judgments are systematically error-prone. Some philosophers, such as Peter Singer and Joshua Greene, argue that these findings challenge the reliability of moral intuitions and support more "reasoned", consequentialist approaches over deontological ones. The first part of the dissertation (...) reviews these provocative findings and the philosophical reactions to them, which often invoke the notion of 'moral relevance' - the idea that some factors shaping moral judgments are morally irrelevant. The second part develops a psychological account of moral relevance, drawing on theories of the moral domain, the role of emotions, and models of moral cognition. This account reveals the complex interplay of intuitive and reasoned processes in generating impressions of moral relevance. The final part reevaluates the philosophical discussions in light of this psychological understanding. It contends that the evolutionary background of moral intuitions does not necessarily render them inadequate, and that both deontological and consequentialist judgments likely depend on evolved intuitions to a significant degree. Furthermore, the tendency to dismiss certain influences on moral judgment as irrelevant can itself be explained psychologically. Considering the psychological account presented, mind-independent accounts of morality become less plausible. The dissertation concludes that while empirical moral psychology reveals important constraints on normative theorizing, it does not decisively favor consequentialism over deontology. To assess the significance of empirical-scientific findings for ethics, a nuanced understanding of the origins of moral judgments is nevertheless indispensable. (shrink)

Current research on morality is divided into rationalist and intuitionist theories. This study shows that when individuals make rational choices, they are inevitably guided by the moral foundation of intuitionism. Especially to pursue self-interest, individuals must agree with others in society. They must keep their opinions constant to agree with others. To maintain a constant opinion, the individual assigns an opinion that can improve the utility of the other person and place both of them in the same situation. The actions (...) taken by an individual must be altruistic to enhance the utility of the other person . The individual’s opinion is subsequently guided by the golden rule of morality, “Treat others as you would like to be treated,” which facilitates moral foundations. (shrink)

People can be uncertain in their moral judgments. Philosophers have argued that such uncertainty can either refer to the underlying empirical facts (empirical uncertainty) or to the normative evaluation of these facts itself (normative uncertainty). Psychological investigations of this distinction, however, are rare. In this paper, we combined factor-analytical and experimental approaches to show that empirical and normative uncertainty describe two related but different psychological states. In Study 1, we asked N = 265 participants to describe a case of moral (...) uncertainty and to rate different aspects of their uncertainty about this case. Across this wide range of moral scenarios, our items loaded onto three reliable factors: lack of information, unclear consequences, and normative uncertainty. In Study 2, we confirmed this factor structure using predefined stimulus material. N = 402 participants each rated eight scenarios that systematically varied in their degree of uncertainty regarding the consequences of the described actions and in the value conflict that was inherent to them. The empirical uncertainty factors were mainly affected by the introduction of uncertainty regarding consequences, and the normative uncertainty factor was mainly affected by the introduction of value conflict. Our studies provide evidence that the distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty accurately describes a psychological reality. We discuss the relevance of our findings for research on moral judgments and decision-making, and folk metaethics. (shrink)

It is astonishing that we humans are able to have, act on and express moral beliefs. This dissertation aims to provide a better philosophical understanding of why and how this is possible especially when we assume metaethical expressivism. Metaethical expressivism is the combination of expressivism and noncognitivism. Expressivism is the view that the meaning of a sentence is explained by the mental state it is conventionally used to express. Noncognitivism is the view that the mental state expressed by a moral (...) sentence is a noncognitive, desire-like state. The central question of this dissertation is this: "How can metaethical expressivists explain that we are able to express moral beliefs?" The shortest answer this dissertation will give is the following: "by becoming `dispositional expressivists´." Dispositional expressivists hold that moral beliefs are dispositions to be in certain mental states that resemble desires. More precisely, a central thesis of this study is that to hold a moral belief is to be disposed to be in a desire-like, noncognitive state where this state has some specific structure. This dissertation arrives at and justifies this thesis by making a number of steps. It starts with preparing the ground by developing a general theory of what it is for a sentence to express a mental state. Roughly, this theory states that for a sentence to express a mental state is for that sentence to be conventionally used to perform a speech act which counts as sincere only if the user or speaker is in that mental state. This theory of expressing satisfies all the constraints that must be satisfied for it to be compatible with the purposes of metaethical expressivism. The next step is to provide a solution to the most notorious semantic problem confronting metaethical expressivism, the problem of explaining how sentences containing moral words can have compositional meaning and stand in logical relations also known as the Frege-Geach or embedding problem. Building on the research of Mark Schroeder, a new expressivist semantics, called `Attitude Semantics´, will be developed for a first-order language. The motivating idea underlying attitude semantics is that expressivists can avoid the problematic feature of so-called `biforcation´ if they treat the structures of the mental states expressed by moral sentences as well as that expressed by non-moral sentences as being isomorphic. In order to give those structures a philosophically interesting interpretation, it will be suggested that we treat sentences as expressing dispositional states. As a toy example we will treat the sentence `murder is wrong´ as expressing the disposition to be for blaming for murder. After dealing with the Frege-Geach problem, I turn to the metaethical expressivists' project of quasi-realism. Two major goals of this project are to explain how moral sentence can be truth-apt and how the states expressed by them can be regarded as moral beliefs. In order to establish those goals I critically examine a number of theories of truth-aptness by providing counterexamples to them. I then present my own theory which says that a sentence is truth-apt iff and because there is a conventional way to use it to express a belief. What is new about this theory is that it treats expressing a belief as being explanatorily more basic than being truth-apt. Belief, according to this theory, explains truth-aptness, not vice versa. This has the important consequence that it shows that what I call the `orthodox strategy´ of quasi-realists is mistaken and needs to be inverted: expressivists must `earn the right´ to moral belief before they can establish that moral sentences are truth-apt, and not the other way round. The second part of this dissertation is then concerned with the question of what it is to hold a moral belief and how they can figure in rational reasoning. In short: it is concerned with earning the right to moral belief. After discussing the major problems confronting a noncognitivist theory of belief, most importantly what I call the `tightrope problem´, I argue for a dispositional form of noncognitivism about moral belief that combines elements from Eric Schwitzgebel's dispositionalism about belief and Sebastian Köhler's `conceptual role expressivism´. This dispositional noncognitivism perfectly matches and justifies the dispositionalist interpretation of the expressivist semantics developed before. In order to fully earn the right to moral belief, however, metaethical expressivists must also deal with several epistemological objections concerning the rationality of moral belief. The first objection I deal with comes from Derek Baker and is directed against Mark Schroeder's specific development of expressivism. I deal with this objection because my own theory bears close resemblance to Schroeder's theory and so it might be worried that it confronts the same issues. Fortunately, we will see that Baker's objection rest on a number of mistaken assumptions and so neither applies to Schroeder's expressivism nor to the version which I defend in this study. The other epistemological objection to metaethical expressivism I deal with is Cian Dorr's famous wishful-thinking objection. In contrast to previous replies to this objection I attack it by directly questioning the central assumption on which it rests, namely that reasoners can never be justified in basing a factual belief on a desire-like state. I argue that this is false, and that under certain conditions reasoning from desire-like mental states to factual beliefs is justified. My argument shows that even if holding a moral belief is being in a desire-like noncognitive state, basing factual belief on a moral belief can give one an epistemic reason for the factual belief. Hence, even if moral thoughts are wishes, moral thinking is not wishful thinking. I take my arguments to earn the dispositional expressivist the right to moral belief. By the previously defended theory of truth-aptness in terms of belief, this allows the dispositional expressivists to conclude that moral sentences are also truth-apt. This finishes the quasi-realist project of this dissertation. In the last part of this dissertation I switch gears and present two unnoted problems for metaethical expressivists having to do with explaining moral motivation. Both arguments are surprisingly simple. The first one is this: if motivation requires a belief as well as a desire (Humeanism), and moral judgments motivate by themselves (internalism), then moral judgments cannot be desires only. If this argument is sound, it shows that the famous `motivation argument´ not only entails the falsity of cognitivism, but also the falsity of noncognitivism. The second argument is the following: moral judgments when combined with suitable external desires motivate to act (externalism), but if motivation requires belief as well as desire (Humeanism), then moral judgments cannot be desires only. I discuss several ways in which noncognitivists might want to deal with those problems, but leave it as an open question whether those solutions will ultimately be viable. Overall, this dissertation makes serious contributions to the research program of metaethical expressivism. It makes proposals for how to solve a number of notorious problems, such as the Frege-Geach problem in semantics and the wishful-thinking problem in epistemology. Besides this, however, it also raises two new problems for metaethical expressivism in the philosophy of action. For those reasons this dissertation will be of interest for anyone who wants to defend or criticize expressivism in metaethics, and more generally, anyone who wants to better understand our astonishing ability to express moral beliefs. (shrink)

Recent work supports the role of reasoning in third-party moral judgment of harm transgressions. The dynamics of the underlying cognitive processes supporting moral judgment is however poorly understood. In two preregistered experiments, we addressed this issue using a two-response paradigm. Participants were presented with moral scenarios twice: they had to provide their first judgment about an agent under both time pressure and interfering load, and were then asked to respond a second time at their own pace. In Experiment 1, participants (...) were harsher toward a malevolent agent at the second response, assigning more moral wrongness and punishment to an agent who either attempted to harm or harmed intentionally. Experiment 2 replicated the effect of intention on response change in a paradigm contrasting accidental to intentional harm scenarios. Participants were not only harsher toward intentional transgressors at the second response, but they were also less harsh toward accidental transgressors at the second response. We discuss the possibility that decoding overall intent and assigning moral judgment based on the presence or absence of a malevolent intent may be a relatively costly process. (shrink)

Groups have committed historical wrongs (e.g., genocide, slavery). We investigated why people blame current groups who were not involved in the original historical wrong for the actions of their predecessors who committed these wrongs and are no longer alive. Current models of individual and group blame overlook the dimension of time and therefore have difficulty explaining this phenomenon using their existing criteria like causality, intentionality, or preventability. We hypothesized that factors that help psychologically bridge the past and present, like perceiving (...) higher (a) connectedness between past and present perpetrator groups, (b) continued privilege of perpetrator groups, (c) continued harm of victim groups, and (d) unfulfilled forward obligations of perpetrator groups would facilitate higher blame judgments against current groups for the past. In two repeated-measures surveys using real events (N1 = 518, N2 = 495) and two conjoint experiments using hypothetical events (N3 = 598, N4 = 605), we find correlational and causal evidence for our hypotheses. These factors link present groups to their past and cause more historical blame and support for compensation policies. This work brings the dimension of time into theories of blame, uncovers overlooked criteria for blame judgments, and questions the assumptions of existing blame models. Additionally, it helps us understand the psychological processes undergirding intergroup relations and historical narratives mired in historical conflict. Our work provides psychological insight into the debates on intergenerational justice by suggesting methods people can use to ameliorate the psychological legacies of historical wrongs and atrocities. (shrink)

Should people get vaccinated for the sake of others? What could ground—and limit—the normative claim that people ought to do so? In this paper, we propose a reasons-based consequentialist account of vaccination for the benefit of others. We outline eight harm-based and probabilistic factors that, we argue, give people moral reasons to get vaccinated. Instead of understanding other-directed vaccination in terms of binary moral duties (i.e., where people either have or do not have a moral duty to get vaccinated), we (...) develop a scalar approach according to which people can have stronger or weaker moral reasons to get vaccinated in view of the moral good of vaccination. One advantage of our approach is that it can capture why a person might have strong moral reasons to get vaccinated with Vaccine A, but only weak moral reasons to get vaccinated with Vaccine B. We discuss theoretical strengths of our approach and provide a case study of vaccination against COVID-19 to demonstrate its practical significance. (shrink)

How does character information inform judgments of blame? Some argue that character information is indirectly relevant to blame because it enriches judgments about the mental states of a wrongdoer. Others argue that character information is directly relevant to blame, even when character traits are causally irrelevant to the wrongdoing. We propose an empirical synthesis of these views: a Two Channel Model of blame. The model predicts that character information directly affects blame when this information is relevant to the wrongdoing that (...) elicits blame. Further, the effect of character information on blame depends on judgments about the true self that are independent of judgments of intentionality. Across three pre-registered studies (N = 662), we found support for all three predictions of the Two Channel Model. We propose that this reflects two distinct functions of blame: a social regulatory function that encourages norm compliance and a pedagogical function that encourages personal improvement. (shrink)

이 글은 의료 행위의 중요한 경우에서 합리적인 의사결정을 내리기 위해서는 법적 판단과 함께 도덕적 판단 또한 반드시 고려되어야 하는 이유를 논증한다. 이러한 목적을 이루기 위해 먼저 한 사고실험을 통해 의료 행위에서 초래될 수 있는 업무상 과실치사상죄 적용에 대한 법적 판단을 분석함으로써 행위자의 법적 책임을 최소화할 수 있는 결정이 무엇인지 논증한다. 다음으로 도덕의 관점에서 그 문제를 분석할 경우 법적 판단과 다른 결론을 도출할 수 있음을 논증함으로써 중요한 의료적 결정을 내릴 때 법적 판단과 함께 도덕적 판단을 함께 고찰해야 하는 이유를 논증한다. 우리가 (...) 가진 도덕 감정은 일반적으로 도덕적으로 선하거나 옳은 행위를 권장하고 도덕적으로 악하거나 그른 행위를 금지한다. 하지만 우리가 몸담고 있는 현실 세계에서 일어나는 다양한 사건들 중에는 도덕적으로 최선의 행위를 선택하는 것이 아닌, 도덕적인 ‘차악’의 행위를 선택해야 할 처지에 놓이기도 한다. 이러한 경우는 ‘나를 보호하기 위한 실천적 선택’의 기로에 놓인 경우로 나타난다. 즉 우리는 그러한 순간에 자신의 현실적인 이익에는 부합하지만 도덕적인 부담을 감수해야 하는 선택을 하거나, 반대로 도덕적인 부담으로부터 벗어나기 위해 자신의 현실적인 이익을 포기해야 할 수 있다. 그리고 행위자가 행한 행위를 오직 법과 도덕에 의해서만 평가한다면, 그 행위자가 중대한 결정을 내려야 하는 경우는 법적 판단과 도덕적 판단이 충돌하는 경우라고 할 수 있다. 즉 그 행위자는 도덕적으로 문제될 것은 없지만 법적으로 처벌을 받을 수 있는 경우, 반대로 도덕적으로 비난받을 수 있지만 법적으로 문제가 없는 경우 중에서 한 행위를 선택해야 할 경우 중대한 결정을 내려야 한다. 법적 책임을 최소화하는 결정이 도덕적으로는 정당화될 수 없는 비판적인 사례를 분석함으로써 의료 행위에서 윤리적 분석과 숙고가 요청되는 이유를 강조할 수 있다. (shrink)

The simulation hypothesis can reinforce a cynical dismissal of human potential. This attitude can allow online platform designers to rationalize employing manipulative neuromarketing techniques to control user decisions. We point to cognitive boosting techniques at both user and designer levels to build critical reflection and mindfulness.

We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire-like attitudes as opposed to belief-like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a completely satisfactory account. Here, we argue that noncognitivists should exploit the formal analogy between (...) moral uncertainty and moral multi-objective decision problems. Our ‘multi-objective story’ enables noncognitivists to save our moral uncertainty thought and talk by explaining how the underlying phenomenon could be noncognitive. (shrink)

The imminent deployment of autonomous vehicles requires algorithms capable of making moral decisions in relevant traffic situations. Some scholars in the ethics of autonomous vehicles hope to align such intelligent systems with human moral judgment. For this purpose, studies like the Moral Machine Experiment have collected data about human decision-making in trolley-like traffic dilemmas. This paper first argues that the trolley dilemma is an inadequate experimental paradigm for investigating traffic moral judgments because it does not include agents’ character-based considerations and (...) is incapable of facilitating the investigation of low-stakes mundane traffic scenarios. In light of the limitations of the trolley paradigm, this paper presents an alternative experimental framework that addresses these issues. The proposed solution combines the creation of mundane traffic moral scenarios using virtual reality and the Agent-Deed-Consequences (ADC) model of moral judgment as a moral-psychological framework. This paradigm shift potentially increases the ecological validity of future studies by providing more realism and incorporating character considerations into traffic actions. (shrink)