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1 — 50 / 109
  1. added 2018-11-02
    Conceptual Role Accounts of Meaning in Metaethics.Matthew Chrisman - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 260-274.
    This paper explains three ways to develop a conceptual role view of meaning in metaethics. First, it suggests that there’s a way to combine inspiration from noncognitivism with a particular form of the conceptual role view to form a noncognitivist view with distinctive advantages over other noncognitivist views. Second, it suggests that there’s also a way to combine a strong commitment to cognitivism with a different form of the conceptual role view to form a version of cognitivism with distinctive advantages (...)
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  2. added 2018-09-26
    Through Thick and Thin: Good and its Determinates.Christine Tappolet - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (2):207-221.
    What is the relation between the concept good and more specific or ‘thick’ concepts such as admirable or courageous? I argue that good or more precisely good pro tanto is a general concept, but that the relation between good pro tanto and the more specific concepts is not that of a genus to its species. The relation of an important class of specific evaluative concepts, which I call ‘affective concepts’, to good pro tanto is better understood as one between a (...)
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  3. added 2018-09-06
    Između Nekognitivizma I Realizma U Etici: Trostruki Model.Olga Ramírez Calle - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (1):101-112.
    The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell’s non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the relation (...)
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  4. added 2018-08-19
    Review of James Doyle, No Morality, No Self: Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism. [REVIEW]John Schwenkler - forthcoming - Journal of the History of Philosophy.
  5. added 2018-04-22
    Social Constraints On Moral Address.Vanessa Carbonell - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The moral community is a social community, and as such it is vulnerable to social problems and pathologies. In this essay I identify a particular way in which participation in the moral community can be constrained by social factors. I argue that features of the social world—including power imbalances, oppression, intergroup conflict, communication barriers, and stereotyping—can make it nearly impossible for some members of the moral community to hold others responsible for wrongdoing. Specifically, social circumstances prevent some marginalized people from (...)
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  6. added 2018-04-13
    Deontic Modality. [REVIEW]Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):354-363.
    This is a critical notice of Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman's (eds.) edited collection of articles entitled Deontic Modality. It begins from a brief overview of Angelika Kratzer's standard ordering semantic model for understanding deontic modals such as 'ought', 'must', and 'may' and some of the problems of this model. The focus is then on how many of the articles of this collection reach to these problems by either developing the standard model further or by formulating alternatives to it. This (...)
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  7. added 2018-03-06
    Universalisierbarkeit und öffentliche Rechtfertigung.Fabian Wendt - 2013 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 67 (4):587ß609.
    Das Prinzip öffentlicher Rechtfertigung ist ein Kernprinzip einer Hauptströmung des zeitgenössischen Liberalismus. Es besagt, in einer von Gerald Gaus vertretenen Variante, dass Regeln der Sozialmoral ebenso wie staatliche Institutionen und Gesetze gegenüber allen betroffenen Personen mit ihren je verschiedenen evaluativen Standards rechtfertigbar sein müssen. Die Regeln, Institutionen oder Gesetze sind rechtfertigbar, wenn alle betroffenen Personen vor dem Hintergrund ihrer je verschiedenen evaluativen Standards einen hinreichenden Grund haben, sie zu akzeptieren. Das Universalisierbarkeitsprinzip dagegen ist kein normatives Prinzip der politischen Philosophie, sondern (...)
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  8. added 2017-11-05
    Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory.Jack Woods & Barry Maguire - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4:419-440.
    It is regrettably common for theorists to attempt to characterize the Humean dictum that one can’t get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ just in broadly logical terms. We here address an important new class of such approaches which appeal to model-theoretic machinery. Our complaint about these recent attempts is that they interfere with substantive debates about the nature of the ethical. This problem, developed in detail for Daniel Singer’s and Gillian Russell and Greg Restall’s accounts of Hume’s dictum, is of (...)
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  9. added 2017-09-21
    Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - forthcoming - In Kevin Toh, David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press.
    This paper investigates whether different philosophers’ claims about “normativity” are about the same subject or (as recently argued by Derek Parfit) theorists who appear to disagree are really using the term with different meanings, in order to cast disambiguating light on the debates over at least the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of normativity. While I suggest the term may be multiply ambiguous, I also find reasons for optimism about a common subject-matter for metanormative theory. This is supported partly by (...)
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  10. added 2017-08-18
    Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language, by Stephen Finlay.J. L. Dowell - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):585-593.
  11. added 2017-08-17
    What Metalinguistic Negotiations Can't Do.Teresa Marques - 2017 - Phenomenology and Mind (12):40-48.
    Philosophers of language and metaethicists are concerned with persistent normative and evaluative disagreements – how can we explain persistent intelligible disagreements in spite of agreement over the described facts? Tim Sundell recently argued that evaluative aesthetic and personal taste disputes could be explained as metalinguistic negotiations – conversations where interlocutors negotiate how best to use a word relative to a context. I argue here that metalinguistic negotiations are neither necessary nor sufficient for genuine evaluative and normative disputes to occur. A (...)
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  12. added 2017-04-13
    The Grammars of 'Power': Between Contestation and Mediation.Mark Rigstad - 2006 - Theoria 53 (111):108-141.
    In light of the pragmatic aspirations of ordinary language philosophy, this essay critically examines the competing grammatical strictures that are often set forth within the theoretical discourse of 'power'. It repudiates both categorically appraisive employments of 'power' and the antithetical urge to fully operationalize the concept. It offers an attenuated defense of the thesis that 'power' is an essentially contestable concept, but rejects the notion that this linguistic fact stems from conflict between antipodal ideological paradigms. Careful attention to the ordinary (...)
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  13. added 2017-02-13
    A New Account of Thick Concepts.Andrew Payne - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1):89-103.
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  14. added 2017-01-26
    The Pragmatics of Slurs.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):439-462.
    I argue that the offense generation pattern of slurring terms parallels that of impoliteness behaviors, and is best explained by appeal to similar purely pragmatic mechanisms. In choosing to use a slurring term rather than its neutral counterpart, the speaker signals that she endorses the term. Such an endorsement warrants offense, and consequently slurs generate offense whenever a speaker's use demonstrates a contrastive preference for the slurring term. Since this explanation comes at low theoretical cost and imposes few constraints on (...)
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  15. added 2017-01-10
    Perspective-Neutral Intrinsic Value.Justin Klocksiem - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):323-337.
    Is it possible to do a good thing, or to make the world a better place? Some argue that it is not possible, because perspective-neutral value does not exist. Some argue that ‘good’ does not play the right grammatical role; or that all good things are good ‘in a way’; or that goodness is inherently perspective-dependent. I argue that the logical and semantic properties of ‘good’ are what we should expect of an evaluative predicate; that the many ways of being (...)
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  16. added 2017-01-10
    Hume, the BAD Paradox, and Value Realism.Graham Oddie - 2001 - Philo 4 (2):109-122.
    A recent slew of arguments, if sound, would demonstrate that realism about value involves a kind of paradox-I call it the BAD paradox.More precisely, they show that if there are genuine propositions about the good, then one could maintain harmony between one’s desires and one’s beliefs about the good only on pain of violating fundamental principles of decision theory. I show. however, the BAD paradox turns out to be a version of Newcomb’s problem, and that the cognitivist about value can (...)
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  17. added 2016-12-21
    Thick Concepts.Brent G. Kyle - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A term expresses a thick concept if it expresses a specific evaluative concept that is also substantially descriptive. It is a matter of debate how this rough account should be unpacked, but examples can help to convey the basic idea. Thick concepts are often illustrated with virtue concepts like courageous and generous, action concepts like murder and betray, epistemic concepts like dogmatic and wise, and aesthetic concepts like gaudy and brilliant. These concepts seem to be evaluative, unlike purely descriptive concepts (...)
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  18. added 2016-12-12
    Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment.John Mikhail - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    Is the science of moral cognition usefully modelled on aspects of Universal Grammar? Are human beings born with an innate 'moral grammar' that causes them to analyse human action in terms of its moral structure, with just as little awareness as they analyse human speech in terms of its grammatical structure? Questions like these have been at the forefront of moral psychology ever since John Mikhail revived them in his influential work on the linguistic analogy and its implications for jurisprudence (...)
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  19. added 2016-12-08
    Moral “Ought”-Judgments and “Morally Ought”-Judgments.J. Jocelyn Trueblood - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):39-54.
    In this paper I distinguish moral “ought”-judgments, meaning “ought”- judgments that qualify as moral judgments, from “morally ought”-judgments, meaning “ought”-judgments whose “ought” is either prefaced (or followed) by the word “morally” or construable as so prefaced. Specifically, I argue that the former class of judgments is wider than the second. (As I show in section 3, this is not to argue for the already familiar distinction, or putative distinction, between a broad and a narrow sense of “moral.”) I also speculate (...)
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  20. added 2016-12-05
    Imperatives and Contradiction.Lars Bergstrom - 1970 - Mind 79 (315):421-424.
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  21. added 2016-10-03
    Terence Cuneo. Speech and Morality. On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2015 - Ethical Perspectives 22 (2):345-350.
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  22. added 2016-09-12
    Review of Michael Ridge Impassioned Belief. [REVIEW]Andrew Alwood - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.
    A critical review of Michael Ridge's book Impassioned Belief.
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  23. added 2016-09-05
    Contours and Barriers: What is It to Draw the Limits of Moral Language?Reshef Agam-Segal - 2009 - Philosophy 84 (4):549-570.
    I explore the idea of language reaching its limits by distinguishing two kinds of limits language may have: The first are “Boundaries” which lie on the edges of language, and distinguish what makes sense from what does not. These, I claim, are suitable in making theoretical generalizations. The second are “Contours,” which lie within language, and allow for contrasting and comparing meanings and shades of meanings that we capture in language. These are more suitable for characterizations of particulars, and for (...)
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  24. added 2016-09-02
    Walter Reese-Schäfer, "Karl-Otto Apel: Zur Einführung".H. G. Callaway - 1993 - Journal of Value Inquiry 27 (3/4):543.
    Walter Reese-Schäfer, Karl-Otto Apel, Zur Einführung (with an Afterword by Jürgen Habermas), Junis Verlag GmbH, Hamburg 1990, 176pp. DM 17.80 -/- The author, presently a freelance writer published in the newspaper “Die Zeit” and the magazine “Stern,” pro­vides in this small book a clear and concise introduction to sources, themes and conclusions in the philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel. Apel, Emeritus Pro­fessor at Frank­furt, and close colleague of Habermas, characterizes his viewpoint as a “transcen­dental pragmatism” in which a Kantian concern for (...)
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  25. added 2016-08-30
    Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties.Luis R. G. Oliveira & Timothy Perrine - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):1021-1038.
    The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we (...)
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  26. added 2016-08-15
    Semantics, Moral.Mark Schroeder - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley.
    Semantics is the investigation of meaning, and semantic theories, including semantic theories about moral language, come in two very different kinds. Descriptive semantic theories are theories about what words mean. So descriptive moral semantic theories are theories about what moral words mean: words like ‘good’, ‘better’, ‘right’, ‘must’, ‘ought’, ‘reason’, and ‘rational’. In contrast, foundational semantic theories are theories about why words mean what they do, or more specifically, about what makes it the case that words mean what they do. (...)
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  27. added 2016-08-01
    Discourse Contextualism: A Framework for Contextualist Semantics and Pragmatics.Alex Silk - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This book investigates context-sensitivity in natural language by examining the meaning and use of a target class of theoretically recalcitrant expressions. These expressions-including epistemic vocabulary, normative and evaluative vocabulary, and vague language -exhibit systematic differences from paradigm context-sensitive expressions in their discourse dynamics and embedding properties. Many researchers have responded by rethinking the nature of linguistic meaning and communication. Drawing on general insights about the role of context in interpretation and collaborative action, Silk develops an improved contextualist theory of CR-expressions (...)
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  28. added 2016-07-20
    The Significance of Ethical Disagreement for Theories of Ethical Thought and Talk.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 275-291.
    This chapter has two sections, each focusing on a distinct way in which ethical disagreement and variations in ethical judgment matter for theories of ethical thought and talk. In the first section, we look at how the variation poses problems for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist ways of specifying the nature of ethical judgments. In the second, we look at how disagreement phenomena have been taken to undermine cognitivist accounts, but also at how the seeming variation in cognitive and non-cognitive contents (...)
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  29. added 2016-06-13
    Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language, by Stephen Finlay. [REVIEW]Daniel Fogal - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):281-288.
    Stephen Finlay’s Confusion of Tongues is a bold and sophisticated book. The overarching goal is metaphysical: to reductively analyze normative facts, properties, and relations in terms of non-normative facts, properties, and relations. But the method is linguistic: to first provide a reductive analysis of the corresponding bits of normative language, with a particular focus on ‘good’, ‘ought’, and ‘reason’. The gap between language and reality is then bridged by taking linguistic analysis as a guide to conceptual analysis, and conceptual analysis (...)
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  30. added 2016-05-10
    Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics1.Alex Silk - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):197-211.
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  31. added 2016-05-02
    Contrastive Reasons and Promotion.Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):39-63,.
    A promising but underexplored view about normative reasons is contrastivism, which holds that considerations are fundamentally reasons for things only relative to sets of alternatives. Contrastivism gains an advantage over non-contrastive theories by holding that reasons relative to different sets of alternatives can be independent of one another. But this feature also raises a serious problem: we need some way of constraining this independence. I develop a version of contrastivism that provides the needed constraints, and that is independently motivated by (...)
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  32. added 2016-04-28
    A Defence of Emotivism.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    As a non-cognitivist analysis of moral language, Charles Stevenson's sophisticated emotivism is widely regarded by moral philosophers as a substantial improvement over its historical antecedent, radical emotivism. None the less, it has come in for its share of criticism. In this essay, Leslie Allan responds to the key philosophical objections to Stevenson's thesis, arguing that the criticisms levelled against his meta-ethical theory rest largely on a too hasty reading of his works.
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  33. added 2016-04-08
    Contextualism About Deontic Conditionals.Aaron Bronfman & Janice Dowell, J. L. - manuscript
  34. added 2016-03-10
    The Theory-Theory of Moral Concepts.John Jung Park - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (2).
    There are many views about the structure of concepts, a plausible one of which is the theory-theory. Though this view is plausible for concrete concepts, it is unclear that it would work for abstract concepts, and then for moral concepts. The goal of this paper is to provide a plausible theory-theory account for moral concepts and show that it is supported by results in the moral psychology literature. Such studies in moral psychology do not explicitly contend for the theory-theory of (...)
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  35. added 2016-03-09
    L'attention aux récits sur soi. Paul Ricoeur et Carol Gilligan autour du tragique freudien.Marjolaine Deschênes - 2015 - Logoi.Ph (En Ligne: Http://Logoi.Ph) 1 (2):322-338.
    This article shows that Paul Ricoeur and Carol Gilligan develop their theories of the self by borrowing critically from Freudian aesthetics, adding an ethical dimension missing in it. Ricoeur critiques, completes and endorses the Freudian interpretation of the Oedipus, while Gilligan rejects it, since she considers it distorted by patriarchal ideology. Both are reclaiming the Freudian theory of culture by focusing on what Freud called the «life drive» as opposed to the «death drive». But Ricoeur does not pay the same (...)
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  36. added 2016-02-28
    Ought.Stephen Finlay - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Encyclopedia article on the meaning of 'ought'.
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  37. added 2016-01-12
    O Jezičko-Ekspresivnom Paternalizmu: Replika Mihailu Markoviću.Aleksandar Prnjat - 2009 - Filozofija I Društvo 20 (3):247-250.
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  38. added 2015-11-19
    On Aquinas on Evil.Pierre Baumann - 2015 - Fenomenologia. Diálogos Possíveis Campinas: Alínea/Goiânia: Editora da Puc Goiás 97:7-22.
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  39. added 2015-10-26
    Imperative Clauses and the Frege–Geach Problem.Andrew Alwood - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):105-117.
  40. added 2015-09-14
    Motivational Internalism: Contemporary Debates.Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund - 2015 - In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 1–20.
    Motivational internalism—the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically or necessarily connected to motivation—has played a central role in metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, internalism has provided a challenge for theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality, and versions of internalism have been seen as having implications for moral absolutism, realism, and rationalism. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism (...)
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  41. added 2015-09-14
    Contrastivism About Reasons and Ought.Justin Snedegar - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (6):379-388.
    Contrastivism about some concept says that the concept is relativized to sets of alternatives. Relative to some alternatives, the concept may apply, but relative to others, it may not. This article explores contrastivism about the central normative concepts of reasons and ought. Contrastivism about reasons says that a consideration may be a reason for an action A rather than one alternative, B, but may not be a reason for A rather than some other alternative, C. Likewise, contrastivism about ought says (...)
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  42. added 2015-09-04
    Do Moral Questions Ask for Answers?Benjamin De Mesel - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):43-61.
    It is often assumed that moral questions ask for answers in the way other questions do. In this article, moral and non-moral versions of the question ‘Should I do x or y?’ are compared. While non-moral questions of that form typically ask for answers of the form ‘You should do x/y’, so-called ‘narrow answers’, moral questions often do not ask for such narrow answers. Rather, they ask for answers recognizing their delicacy, the need for a deeper understanding of the meaning (...)
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  43. added 2015-08-31
    Ethics and Contrastivism.Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A contrastive theory of some concept holds that the concept in question only applies or fails to apply relative to a set of alternatives. Contrastivism has been applied to a wide range of philosophically important topics, including several topics in ethics. Contrastivism about reasons, for example, holds that whether some consideration is […].
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  44. added 2015-08-31
    Negative Reason Existentials.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):108-116.
    (Schroeder 2007) presents a puzzle about negative reason existentials—claims like ‘There's no reason to cry over spilled milk’. Some of these claims are intuitively true, but we also seem to be committed to the existence of the very reasons that are said not to exist. I argue that Schroeder's own pragmatic solution to this puzzle is unsatisfactory, and propose my own based on a contrastive account of reasons, according to which reasons are fundamentally reasons for one thing rather than another, (...)
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  45. added 2015-08-24
    On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic.Jarek Gryz - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):493-501.
    There are two fundamental classes of terms traditionally distinguished within moral vocabulary: the deontic and the aretaic. The terms from the first set serve in the prescriptive function of a moral code. The second class contains terms used for a moral evaluation of an action. The problem of the relationship between the aretaic and the deontic has not been discussed often by philosophers. It is, however, a very important and interesting issue: any normative ethical theory which takes as basic one (...)
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  46. added 2015-05-11
    Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression, and Implicature.Guy Fletcher - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher & Mike Ridge (eds.), Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    This paper examines implicaturist hybrid theories by examining how closely attitude expression by moral utterances fits with the varieties of implicature (conventional, particular conversational, generalized conversational) using five standard criteria for implicature: indeterminacy (§3), reinforceability (§4), non-detachability (§5), cancellability (§6), and calculability (§7). I argue (1) that conventional implicature is a clear non-starter as a model of attitude expression by moral utterances (2) that generalised conversational implicature yields the most plausible implicaturist hybrid but (3) that a non-implicaturist, and non-hybrid, alternative (...)
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  47. added 2015-03-23
    Disagreeing in Context.Teresa Marques - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:1-12.
    This paper argues for contextualism about predicates of personal taste and evaluative predicates in general, and offers a proposal of how apparently resilient disagreements are to be explained. The present proposal is complementary to others that have been made in the recent literature. Several authors, for instance (López de Sa, 2008; Sundell, 2011; Huvenes, 2012; Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014; Marques, 2014a), have recently defended semantic contextualism for those kinds of predicates from the accusation that it faces the problem of lost (...)
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  48. added 2015-03-12
    From Meaning to Morality in Kovesi and Harrison.Alan Tapper - 2014 - In Patricia Hanna (ed.), Reality and Culture: Essays on the Philosophy of Bernard Harrison. Rodopi Press. pp. 97-112.
    The paper shows that Bernard Harrison and Julius Kovesi are complementary thinkers, interested in similar questions, and arriving at closely comparable answers. It summarizes the theory of concepts and meaning that they shared and the way they have used this theory to make sense of morality.
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  49. added 2015-03-02
    Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language.Stephen Finlay - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    Can normative words like "good," "ought," and "reason" be defined in non-normative terms? Stephen Finlay argues that they can, advancing a new theory of the meaning of this language and providing pragmatic explanations of the specially problematic features of its moral and deliberative uses which comprise the puzzles of metaethics.
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  50. added 2015-03-02
    Legal Statements and Normative Language.Duarte D'Almeida Luís - 2011 - Law and Philosophy 30 (2):167-199.
    Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this paper I defend (...)
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1 — 50 / 109