Moral Motivation

Edited by Joshua May (University of Alabama, Birmingham)
About this topic
Summary Questions in moral motivation are broad, but often focus on the source and content of one's motivation to do what one judges to be right. For example, is the source of moral motivation more of a cognitive matter, involving reasoning or belief? Or is it primarily a matter of sentiment, desire, or emotion? Is the content of moral motivation, say, a desire to do whatever one believes is right. Or is it something more direct, such as empathy or a concern for features that make the action right? Related questions dealt with in other areas as well concern the apparently internal connection between moral judgments and moral motivation (internalism) and whether benevolent action is always ultimately self-interested (egoism).  The notion of "right" throughout may encompass more than morality, since often philosophers interested in moral motivation have a broader concern for what we might call "normative motivation." This involves, for example, motivation to do what one believes one has most reason to do, whether these reasons are moral or not. Familiar questions can then arise, such as whether it's possible for us to judge that following a strict diet is most prudent, yet lack any motivation to do it. 
Key works Many of the issues in moral motivation dealt with in contemporary literature spring from Hume & Macnabb 1738 and Kant 1785/2002. More recently, Nagel 1970, Korsgaard 1986, and Smith 1994 address the source and structure of moral motivation and have spurred much of the subsequent literature. Herman 1981 provides a key starting point for contemporary discussion of the content of moral motivation---there in connection with the motive of duty (see also Smith 1994, ch. 3).
Introductions The entry by Rosati 2006 provides a detailed introduction; Wallace 1998 is more brief but equally useful. Some of the relevant empirical work is summarized in May 2017 and Schroeder et al 2010Wallace 1990 provides a fairly lengthy but excellent introduction to key arguments for the role of desire in moral motivation.
Related categories

318 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 318
  1. added 2020-05-15
    Comparing the Effect of Rational and Emotional Appeals on Donation Behavior.Matthew Lindauer, Marcus Mayorga, Joshua D. Greene, Paul Slovic, Daniel Västfjäll & Peter Singer - 2020 - Judgment and Decision Making 15 (3):413-420.
    We present evidence from a pre-registered experiment indicating that a philosophical argument––a type of rational appeal––can persuade people to make charitable donations. The rational appeal we used follows Singer’s well-known “shallow pond” argument (1972), while incorporating an evolutionary debunking argument (Paxton, Ungar, & Greene 2012) against favoring nearby victims over distant ones. The effectiveness of this rational appeal did not differ significantly from that of a well-tested emotional appeal involving an image of a single child in need (Small, Loewenstein, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-05-15
    Capitalism After Covid: How the Pandemic Might Inspire a More Virtuous Economy.Julian Friedland - 2020 - The Philosophers' Magazine 2 (89):12-15.
    Today, dramatically increasing economic inequality, imminent climatological calamity, and a global pandemic now place the timeless debate over capitalism into stark relief. Though many seek to pin the blame on capitalism’s excesses, they would do well to recall the historical record of socialism’s deficiencies, namely, stifling innovation, lumbering inefficiency, and stagnation. Fortunately, our moral psychology affords a middle way between these two extremes. For while economic incentives have a tendency to let our civic and prosocial impulses atrophy from disuse, these (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2020-05-05
    Coetzee and Eros: A Critique of Moral Philosophy.Eileen John - 2017 - In Beyond the Ancient Quarrel: Literature, Philosophy, and J. M. Coetzee. Oxford, UK: pp. 107-22.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2020-03-23
    Uncovering the Moral Heuristics of Altruism: A Philosophical Scale.Julian Friedland, Kyle Emich & Benjamin M. Cole - 2020 - PLoS ONE 15 (3).
    Extant research suggests that individuals employ traditional moral heuristics to support their observed altruistic behavior; yet findings have largely been limited to inductive extrapolation and rely on relatively few traditional frames in so doing, namely, deontology in organizational behavior and virtue theory in law and economics. Given that these and competing moral frames such as utilitarianism can manifest as identical behavior, we develop a moral framing instrument—the Philosophical Moral-Framing Measure (PMFM)—to expand and distinguish traditional frames associated and disassociated with observed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2020-03-15
    Normative Uncertainty and the Dependence Problem.Abelard Podgorski - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):43-70.
    In this paper, I enter the debate between those who hold that our normative uncertainty matters for what we ought to do, and those who hold that only our descriptive uncertainty matters. I argue that existing views in both camps have unacceptable implications in cases where our descriptive beliefs depend on our normative beliefs. I go on to propose a fix which is available only to those who hold that normative uncertainty matters, ultimately leaving the challenge as a threat to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. added 2020-02-28
    Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind: By May, Joshua, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, Pp. Xv + 264, £45. [REVIEW]Jeanette Kennett - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):199-201.
    Volume 98, Issue 1, March 2020, Page 199-201.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2020-02-04
    Internalism and the Frege-Geach Problem.Caj Strandberg - 2019 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 32:68-91.
    According to the established understanding of the Frege-Geach problem, it is a challenge exclusively for metaethical expressivism. In this paper, I argue that it is much wider in scope: The problem applies generally to views according to which moral sentences express moral judgments entailing that one is for or against something, irrespective of what mental states the judgments consist in. In particular, it applies to motivational internalism about moral judgments. Most noteworthy, it applies to cognitivist internalism according to which moral (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2020-02-03
    Epistemic Judgment and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Is there an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism? The answer to this question has implications for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For example, some philosophers have argued from claims that epistemic judgment is not necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgment is not normative. This paper examines the options for spelling out an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism. It is argued that the most promising approach connects epistemic judgments to doxastic dispositions, which are related (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2020-01-30
    Pathological Moralizing: Is Moral Judgment a Commitment Device?Michael Prinzing - 2020 - Ethics 130 (2):228-236.
    Eric Campbell has argued that we should abolish moral discourse on the grounds that making moral judgments leads to “potentially severe practical pathologies”, including hypocrisy and self-delusion. However, his account of moral judgments only plausibly describes deontological judgments. Thus, his argument only supports deontological abolitionism. This view is certainly interesting. But it is not as extreme as moral abolitionism. Moreover, I argue that Campbell’s account, when reconstructed as an argument for deontological abolitionism can play only a very limited dialectical role.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2020-01-24
    Moral Motivation as a Dynamic Developmental Process: Toward an Integrative Synthesis.Ulas Kaplan - 2016 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 46 (4).
    The real-life complexity of moral motivation can be examined and explained by reintegrating time and development into moral inquiry. This article is one of the possible integrative steps in this direction. A dynamic developmental conception of moral motivation can be a useful bridge toward such integration. A comprehensive view of moral motivation is presented. Moral motivation is reconceptualized as a developmental process of self-organization and self-regulation out of which moral judgment and action emerge through the interplay of dynamically intertwined cognitive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. added 2020-01-24
    Plato, Forms, and Moral Motivation.Iakovos Vasiliou - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 49:37-70.
  12. added 2020-01-24
    What's Required for Motivation by Principle?Jeanette Kennett - unknown
    Kant claimed both that "moral feeling is the capacity to be affected by a moral judgment" and that moral motivation is motivation by principle. What are the psychological mechanism that could enable principles to motivate? This chapter develops in more detail a suggestion made elsewhere by the author that posits a connection between susceptibility to the discomfort of cognitive dissonance and moral motivation of a broadly Kantian kind. The chapter argues that the possession of principles is constitutively connected to one’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. added 2020-01-24
    Moral Motivation in Kant.Philip Stratton-Lake - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. added 2020-01-20
    Logical Expressivism and Carroll’s Regress.Corine Besson - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86:35-62.
    In this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towards drawing certain types of conclusions from certain types of premises. The argument is that logical expressivism is the only view that can take us out of Lewis Carroll's Regress – which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible. I show that the argument does not hold scrutiny and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2019-12-16
    "Shining Lights, Even in Death": What Metal Gear Can Teach Us About Morality.Ryan Wasser - 2019 - Digital Commons @ West Chester University.
    Morality has always been a pressing issue in video game scholarship, but became more contentious after “realistic” violence in games became possible. However, few studies concern themselves with how players experience moral dilemmas in games, choosing instead to focus on the way games affect postplay behavior. In my thesis I discuss the moral choices players encounter in the Metal Gear series of games; then, I analyze and compare the responses of players with and without martial career experiences. My argument is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2019-12-15
    From Homo-Economicus to Homo-Virtus: A System-Theoretic Model for Raising Moral Self-Awareness.Julian Friedland - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 155 (1):191-205.
    There is growing concern that a global economic system fueled predominately by financial incentives may not maximize human flourishing and social welfare externalities. If so, this presents a challenge of how to get economic actors to adopt a more virtuous motivational mindset. Relying on historical, psychological, and philosophical research, we show how such a mindset can be instilled. First, we demonstrate that historically, financial self-interest has never in fact been the only guiding motive behind free markets, but that markets themselves (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2019-12-02
    Kant’s Theory of Moral Motivation. [REVIEW]David Sussman - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):116-119.
    Kant’s Theory of Moral Motivation examines the uniquely moral motive of respect in light of Kant’s general metaphysics of agency. Kant refers to respect as a “sui generis” feeling that is both intrinsically cognitive and conative, but also denies that respect is any kind of feeling at all. Guevara convincingly argues that the feelings characteristic of respect are not psychological effects caused by our recognition of the authority of the moral law: rather, such feelings are just the affective aspect of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18. added 2019-11-25
    XI. Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency1: Karen Jones.Karen Jones - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:181-200.
    Empirical work on and common observation of the emotions tells us that our emotions sometimes key us to the presence of real and important reason-giving considerations without necessarily presenting that information to us in a way susceptible of conscious articulation and, sometimes, even despite our consciously held and internally justified judgment that the situation contains no such reasons. In this paper, I want to explore the implications of the fact that emotions show varying degrees of integration with our conscious agency—from (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  19. added 2019-11-14
    Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume’s Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW]Andrew Cunningham - 1997 - Review of Metaphysics 51 (1):140-140.
    The main line of argument in Bricke’s stimulating and well-written interpretation of Hume’s moral theory runs roughly as follows: Hume holds that, in practical reasoning, beliefs are subordinate to desires, and is therefore a “conativist” ; we must attribute to Hume the view that both desires and beliefs have representational content, so that they are essentially distinguished by their opposite “directions of fit”—otherwise we cannot forestall the cognitivist from simply insisting that intrinsically motivating beliefs are possible; moral sentiments are motivating (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2019-11-08
    Anscombe on the Philosophy of Psychology as Propaedeutic to Ethics.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2014 - In Matteo Galletti (ed.), La mente morale. Persone, ragioni, virtù. Rome, Italy: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura. pp. 17-62.
    The chapter reconstructs and criticizes one of Anscombe's famous three these, namely the claim that a ‘philosophy of psychology’ is a preliminary task to the construction of any possible ethical theory, or that moral philosophy ‘should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’. The claim is that Anscombe’s idea of a philosophy of psychology cannot be simply identified with that of moral psychology with which we are familiar (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2019-10-10
    Against the Fallacy of Education as a Source of Ethics.Spyridon Kakos - 2019 - MCDSARE 3:33-41.
    For centuries, the major story of enlightenment was that education is and should be the cornerstone of our society. We try to educate people to make them respectable members of society, something which we inherently relate to being "better persons", firmly believing that education makes humans less prone to evil. Today, modern research seems to validate that premise: statistics verify that more education results to less crime. But is this picture accurate and does this mean anything regarding morality per se? (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2019-09-23
    Epistemic Worth.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7.
    Actions can have, or lack, moral worth. When a person’s action is morally worthy, she not only acts rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for doing what is right. In this paper, I develop and defend an analogue of the notion of moral worth that applies to belief, which I call epistemic worth. When a person’s belief is epistemically worthy, she not only believes rightly, but (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2019-09-13
    The Motives for Moral Credit.Grant Rozeboom - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (3):1-30.
    To deserve credit for doing what is morally right, we must act from the right kinds of motives. Acting from the right kinds of motives involves responding both to the morally relevant reasons, by acting on these considerations, and to the morally relevant individuals, by being guided by appropriate attitudes of regard for them. Recent theories of the right kinds of motives have tended to prioritize responding to moral reasons. I develop a theory that instead prioritizes responding to individuals (through (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2019-08-31
    AI Can Help Us Live More Deliberately.Julian Friedland - 2019 - MIT Sloan Management Review 60 (4).
    Our rapidly increasing reliance on frictionless AI interactions may increase cognitive and emotional distance, thereby letting our adaptive resilience slacken and our ethical virtues atrophy from disuse. Many trends already well underway involve the offloading of cognitive, emotional, and ethical labor to AI software in myriad social, civil, personal, and professional contexts. Gradually, we may lose the inclination and capacity to engage in critically reflective thought, making us more cognitively and emotionally vulnerable and thus more anxious and prone to manipulation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2019-08-10
    Virtuous Motivation.Karen Stohr - 2018 - In Nancy Snow (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Virtue. New York, NY, USA: pp. 453-469.
    In this paper I describe and defend an account of virtuous motivation that differs from what we might call ordinary moral motivation. It is possible to be morally motivated without being virtuously motivated. In the first half of the essay, I explore different senses of moral motivation and the philosophical puzzles and problems it poses. In the second half, I give an account of virtuous motivation that, unlike ordinary moral motivation, requires the motivational structure characteristic of a fully virtuous person. (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. added 2019-07-31
    One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I defend the widely-held view that morally worthy action need not be motivated by a desire to promote rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck that their (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2019-07-17
    Links Between Moral Identity and Political Purpose During Emerging Adulthood.Hyemin Han, Parissa Jahromi Ballard & Youn-Jeng Choi - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Education:1-19.
    We examined the links between moral identity—the centrality of moral principles to identity—and political purpose during emerging adulthood. We analyzed data from two waves of a longitudinal study of civic purpose. T1 surveys were collected before high school graduation and T2 survey were collected two years later. We categorized people (N = 1,578 at T1 and N = 480 at T2) into political purpose groups based on the person-centered perspective and then performed multinomial logistic regression analysis to test whether moral (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2019-07-09
    Restoring Trustworthiness in the Financial System: Norms, Behaviour and Governance.Aisling Crean, Natalie Gold, David Vines & Annie Williamson - 2018 - Journal of the British Academy 6 (S1):131-155.
    Abstract: We examine how trustworthy behaviour can be achieved in the financial sector. The task is to ensure that firms are motivated to pursue long-term interests of customers rather than pursuing short-term profits. Firms’ self-interested pursuit of reputation, combined with regulation, is often not sufficient to ensure that this happens. We argue that trustworthy behaviour requires that at least some actors show a concern for the wellbeing of clients, or a respect for imposed standards, and that the behaviour of these (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2019-06-27
    Review - Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2019 - Metapsychology 23 (24).
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2019-06-26
    Moral Dilemmas and Collective Responsibilities.Jessica B. Payson - 2009 - Essays in Philosophy 10 (2):4.
    In this paper, I work within Ruth Marcus’s account of the source of moral dilemmas and articulate the implications of her theory for collective responsibility. As an extension to Marcus’s work, I explore what her account means for the moral emotions and responsibilities of those complicit in perpetuating unjust systems of a non-ideal world from which moral dilemmas arise. This move necessitates shifting away from the primacy of control. That one is born into unjust systems one had no hand in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2019-06-09
    Freedom, Gratitude, and Resentment: Olivi and Strawson.Daniel Coren - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (3):1-21.
    I argue that by attending to a distinction among perspectives on the root causes of our reactive attitudes, we can better understand the bases and limitations of long-standing debates about free will and moral responsibility. I characterize this distinction as “objectivism vs. subjectivism.” I bring out this distinction by, first, scrutinizing an especially sharp divergence between Peter Strawson and Peter John Olivi: for Olivi, our ordinary human attitudes make it obvious that we have free will, and our attitudes would be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2019-06-09
    Making Sense of the Sentence.Daniel Coren - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:205-222.
    Early on in his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that there must be a single end or good desired for its own sake, for the sake of which all of our other ends are desired. The argument includes the following conditional: “If we chose everything for the sake of something else so that the process went on forever, then our desire would be empty and futile.” This paper addresses that conditional. First, I explain why the conditional appears to be false. Second, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2019-06-06
    All for the Good.David S. Oderberg - unknown
    The Guise of the Good thesis has received much attention since Anscombe's brief defence in her book Intention. I approach it here from a less common perspective - indirectly, via a theory explaining how it is that moral behaviour is even possible. After setting out how morality requires the employment of a fundamental test, I argue that moral behaviour involves orientation toward the good. Immoral behaviour cannot, however, involve orientation to evil as such, given the theory of evil as privation. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. added 2019-06-06
    Kant’s Theory of Right as Aristotelian Phronesis.Sean Drysdale Walsh - 2012 - International Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):227-246.
    Many philosophers believe that a moral theory, given all the relevant facts, should be able to determine what is morally right and wrong. It is commonly argued that Aristotle’s ethical theory suffers from a fatal flaw: it places responsibility for determining right and wrong with the virtuous agent who has phronesis rather than with the theory itself. It is also commonly argued that Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory does provide a concept of right that is capable of determining right and wrong (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2019-06-06
    Ethical Experience and the Motives for Practical Rationality.Michael D. Barber - 2007 - International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):425-441.
    John McDowell’s ethical writings interpret ethical experience as intentional, socially-conditioned, virtuous responsiveness to situations and develop a modest account of practical rationality. His work converges with investigations of ethical experience by recent Kant scholars and Emmanuel Levinas. The Kantian interpreters and Levinas locate the categorical demands of ethical experience in rational agents’ demands for respect, while McDowell finds it in noble adherence to the demands of virtuous living. For McDowell, moral-practical rational efforts to justify ethics cannot transcend one’s form of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2019-06-06
    Motivation by Ideal.J. David Velleman - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):89-103.
    I offer an account of how ideals motivate us. My account suggests that although emulating an ideal is often rational, it can lead us to do irrational things.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  37. added 2019-06-06
    Can the Amorlist Only Be ‘Right’?: A Closer Look at the Inverted Commas Argument.Brook Jenkins Sadler - 2000 - Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (1):113-122.
  38. added 2019-06-06
    Cognitive and Conative Ethics. [REVIEW]G. M. - 1977 - Review of Metaphysics 31 (1):109-110.
    Professor Allen undertakes two tasks: first, to show that moral discriminations do not originate from a cognitive faculty; and, second, to establish that such discriminations originate from a non-cognitive faculty which determines which desires and emotions are appropriate on particular occasions. Some of his objections to cognitive ethics are that it can neither explain how knowledge can motivate action nor, since it holds that our moral obligations originate from an external source, justify moral toleration. When obligations originate from an external (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2019-06-05
    Humiliated Self, Bad Self or Bad Behavior? The Relations Between Moral Emotional Appraisals and Moral Motivation.Mia Silfver-Kuhalampi, Ana Figueiredo, Florencia Sortheix & Johnny Fontaine - 2015 - Journal of Moral Education 44 (2):213-231.
    It has often been found in the literature that guilt motivates reparative behavior and that shame elicits aggressive reactions. However, recent research suggests that it is not the experience of shame, but rather the experience of humiliation that triggers aggressive reactions. The present study focuses on the role of shame, guilt and humiliation appraisals in predicting the motivation to repair and be aggressive in four different countries, namely Argentina, Belgium, Finland and Portugal. Using multi-group structural equation modeling with situational-level assessments (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. added 2019-05-29
    Internalism and the Evidence From Psychopaths and "Acquired Sociopaths".Kennett Jeanette & Fine Cordelia - unknown
    Morally good action requires both sincere moral judgment and moral motivation. Internalists claim in one way or another that these two things are internally connected. Externalists, on the other hand, claim that the connection between moral judgment and action is forged by motives external to the judgment itself. First we will look at the evidence from psychopathy, then we will turn to cases of so-called acquired sociopathy.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. added 2019-04-06
    Admiring Animals.Amanda Cawston - 2019 - In Alfred Archer & Andre Grahlé (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Admiration. London: pp. 165-178.
    How can we ground the moral status of animals, or help to guide moral interactions with them? One strategy is to appeal to empathy, which has enjoyed a central place in animal ethics and is often cited as a useful alternative or supplement to rights theories. Empathy is thought to provide the means by which we perceive animals’ moral status (via their capacity for suffering) and the motivational profile that can prompt appropriate action. However, relying on empathy has also come (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. added 2019-03-11
    Are All Normative Judgments Desire-Like?Alex Gregory - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):29-55.
    In this paper I first argue against one attractive formulation of the motivation argument, and against one attractive formulation of noncognitivism. I do so by example: I suggest that other-regarding normative judgments do not seem to have motivational powers and do not seem to be desires. After defending these two claims, I argue that other views can accommodate the motivational role of normative judgment without facing this objection. For example, desire-as-belief theories do so, since such theories only say that some (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. added 2019-03-11
    What Goes Without Saying in Metaethics.Philip Clark - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):357-379.
    Reflection on the nature of practical thought has led some philosophers to hold that some beliefs have a necessary influence on the will. Reflection on the nature of motivational explanation has led other philosophers to say that no belief can motivate without the assistance of a background desire. An assumption common to both groups of philosophers is that these views cannot be combined. Agreement on this assumption is so deep that it is taken as going without saying. The only option (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. added 2019-02-21
    Three Accounts of Cognitivist Internalism Undermined.Anthony Skelton - 1997 - Dissertation, Dalhousie University
  45. added 2019-01-10
    Perpetual Struggle.Kathryn J. Norlock - 2018 - Hypatia 34 (1):6-19.
    Open Access: What if it doesn’t get better? Against more hopeful and optimistic views that it is not just ideal but possible to put an end to what John Rawls calls “the great evils of human history,” I aver that when it comes to evils caused by human beings, the situation is hopeless. We are better off with the heavy knowledge that evils recur than we are with idealizations of progress, perfection, and completeness; an appropriate ethic for living with such (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. added 2019-01-08
    Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment.Brendan Cline - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    A central source of support for expressivist accounts of normative discourse is the intimate relationship between normative judgment and motivation. Expressivists argue that normative judgments must be noncognitive, desire-like states in order to be so tightly linked with motivation. Normative statements are then construed as expressions of these noncognitive states. In this paper, I draw on dual-process models in cognitive psychology to respond to this argument. According to my proposal, normative judgments are ordinary beliefs that are typically produced by two (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. added 2019-01-08
    Smith’s Practicality Requirement Meets Dual-Process Models of Moral Judgment.Brendan Cline - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (8):1043-1063.
    In The Moral Problem, Michael Smith argues that only motivational internalists can offer an adequate explanation of why changes in moral judgment tend to be accompanied by changes in motivation in morally virtuous people. Smith argues that the failure of motivational externalism to account for this phenomenon amounts to a reductio of the view. In this paper, I draw on dual-process models of moral judgment to develop an externalist response to Smith’s argument. The key to my proposal is that motivationally (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. added 2018-12-07
    What Is Sentimentalism? What Is Rationalism? Commentary on Joshua May.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    In Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, Joshua May argues successfully that many claims about the causal influence of affect on moral judgment are overblown. But the findings he cites are compatible with many of the key arguments of philosophical sentimentalists. His account of rationalism, in turn, relies on an overly broad notion of inference, and leaves open crucial questions about how we reason to moral conclusions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. added 2018-09-26
    Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality.Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  50. added 2018-09-24
    Using Benevolent Affections to Learn Our Duty.Marina Folescu - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):467-489.
    The puzzle is this: I argue that for Reid, moral sense needs benevolent affections – i.e. some of our animal, non-cognitive principles of action – to apply the rules of duty. But he also thinks that duty can conflict with benevolent affections. So what happens in these conflict cases? I will argue that Reid takes moral psychology seriously and that he believes that our natural benevolent affections can be used as indicators of duty. Although creative, his account has a major (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 318