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  1. A Defence of Metaphysical Ethical Naturalism.[author unknown] - unknown
    This dissertation is a defence of metaphysical ethical naturalism according to which there is a moral reality which is part of the natural world. The implication of this view is that moral properties, such as moral goodness, justice, compassion and so forth are part of the natural world, and inquiries concerning these moral entities are conducted in similar empirical ways of reasoning to that in which scientific inquiries are conducted. I defend metaphysical ethical naturalism by a variety of explanationist argument (...)
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  2. Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-View.E. M. Adams - 1960 - Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press.
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  3. Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-View By Arnulf Zweig. [REVIEW]E. M. Adams - 1960 - Ethics 71:303.
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  4. Non-Reductionist Naturalism: Nussbaum Between Aristotle and Hume.John M. Alexander - 2005 - Res Publica 11 (2):157-183.
    Martha Nussbaum proposes a universal list of human capabilities as the basis for fundamental political principles. She claims that the list, in an Aristotelian spirit, might be justified by an ongoing inquiry into valuable human functionings for the good life. Here I argue that the attractiveness of Nussbaum’s theory crucially depends on the philosophical possibility of a non-reductionist understanding of naturalism and on resolving the tensions between ethical and political aspects of the role of capabilities. Through a comparison of Nussbaum’s (...)
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  5. What the Biological Sciences Can and Cannot Contribute to Ethics.Francisco Ayala - 2010 - In Francisco José Ayala & Robert Arp (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology. Wiley-Blackwell.
    The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to the capacity for ethics (i.e., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moral norms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. I herein propose: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution. Humans exhibit ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup (...)
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  6. Moral Naturalism and the Normative Question.Susan Babbitt - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):139-173.
    (2000). Moral Naturalism and the Normative Question. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 30, Supplementary Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized, pp. 139-173.
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  7. Review of Christine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology[REVIEW]Carla Bagnoli - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
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  8. Naturalism and Ethics.Arthur James Balfour - 1894 - International Journal of Ethics 4 (4):415-429.
  9. Against a Posteriori Moral Naturalism.David Barnett - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):239 - 257.
    A posteriori Moral Naturalism posits a posteriorimoral/naturalistic identities. Versions of this view thatposit necessary identities purport to rely on theKripke/Putnam doctrine of scientific essentialism.Versions that posit only contingent identities requirethat moral terms are non-rigid designators. I argue thatmetaethics does not fall within the scope of scientificessentialism and that moral terms are not non-rigid designators.
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  10. Reconciling Economics with Naturalist Ethical Theory.Bana Bashour - 2016 - Review of Social Economy 74 (3).
    The exclusive use of evolutionary explanations and game theory to justify moral claims has led economists to an impasse. Our discussion of this problem is focused on arguments made by Kenneth Binmore and Herbert Gintis, two vocal and notable economists behind these efforts. We begin by pointing out the false dilemma they present between ethical theories involving dubious non-naturalist metaphysics and their versions of naturalized game-theoretic ethics. We do so by, first, discussing alternative naturalist accounts, namely, those of Peter Railton (...)
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  11. The Golden Age of the Campfire: Should We Take Our Ancestors Seriously?Michael Baurmann - 2012 - Analyse & Kritik 34 (1):39-50.
    In his book The Ethical Project Philip Kitcher presents an ‘analytical history’ of the development of human ethical practice. According to this history the first ethical norms were launched in the ancient world of the hunters and gatherers and their initial function was to remedy altruism failures. Kitcher wants to show that the emergence of ethical norms can in this case and in general be explained without referring to supernatural causes or philosophical revelation. Furthermore, he claims that the first manifestation (...)
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  12. Against Normative Naturalism.Matthew S. Bedke - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.
    This paper considers normative naturalism, understood as the view that (i) normative sentences are descriptive of the way things are, and (ii) their truth/falsity does not require ontology beyond the ontology of the natural world. Assuming (i) for the sake of argument, I here show that (ii) is false not only as applied to ethics, but more generally as applied to practical and epistemic normativity across the board. The argument is a descendant of Moore's Open Question Argument and Hume's Is-Ought (...)
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  13. Introduction.Matteo Bianchin & Italo Testa - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Issues – Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche:3-6.
    Introduction to a Forum on Michael's Thompson "Life and Action".
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  14. Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, but Trusting is Not.C. Bicchieri, E. Xiao & R. Muldoon - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2):170-187.
    Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding (...)
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  15. Virtue and Prejudice: Giving and Taking Reasons.Noell Birondo - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):212-223.
    The most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics in its traditional, eudaimonistic variety centers on its apparently foundational appeal to nature in order to provide a source of normativity. This paper argues that a failure to appreciate both the giving and taking of reasons in sustaining an ethical outlook can distort a proper understanding of the available options for this traditional version of virtue ethics. To insist only on giving reasons, without also taking (maybe even considering) the reasons provided by others, (...)
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  16. Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers to such questions in an exploration of the nature of moral emotions and the structures of human motivation. His theory is naturalistic: it integrates our understanding of ethics with the rest of our understanding of the world we (...)
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  17. Just Causes.Simon Blackburn & Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):3-42.
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  18. Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part I.Richard Boyd - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):505–553.
  19. Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part II.Richard Boyd - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):24–47.
  20. How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
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  21. Hedonic Naturalism.David Brax - manuscript
    Published (in Swedish) in the journal Filosofisk tidskrift as "Hedonistisk naturalism", 2011/3.
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  22. Hedonism as the Explanation of Value.David Brax - 2009 - Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis defends a hedonistic theory of value consisting of two main components. Part 1 offers a theory of pleasure. Pleasures are experiences distinguished by a distinct phenomenological quality. This quality is attitudinal in nature: it is the feeling of liking. The pleasure experience is also an object of this attitude: when feeling pleasure, we like what we feel, and part of how it feels is how this liking feels: Pleasures are Internally Liked Experiences. Pleasure plays a central role in (...)
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  23. Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays.Heiko Breit & Ingrid Plath - 2010 - Journal of Moral Education 39 (4):511-513.
  24. „The Autonomy of Ethics “.David O. Brink - 2007 - In Michael Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 149--65.
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  25. Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics.David O. Brink - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):154.
    The prospects for moral realism and ethical naturalism have been important parts of recent debates within metaethics. As a first approximation, moral realism is the claim that there are facts or truths about moral matters that are objective in the sense that they obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers. Ethical naturalism is the claim that moral properties of people, actions, and institutions are natural, rather than occult or supernatural, features of the world. Though these metaethical debates (...)
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  26. Externalist Moral Realism.David O. Brink - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41.
    SOME THINK THAT MORAL REALISTS CANNOT RECOGNIZE THE PRACTICAL OR ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY AND SO REJECT MORAL REALISM. THIS FORM OF ANTI-REALISM DEPENDS UPON AN INTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY. BUT AN EXTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY IS MORE PLAUSIBLE AND ALLOWS THE REALIST A SENSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY. CONSIDERATION OF THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF MORALITY, THEREFORE, DOES NOT UNDERMINE AND, INDEED, SUPPORTS MORAL REALISM.
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  27. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundation of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalistic world view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational life plan. In striking contrast to many traditional authors and to other recent writers in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of (...)
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  28. Natural Law, the Understanding of Principles, and Universal Good.Stephen Brock - 2011 - Nova et Vetera 9:671-706.
  29. Metafisica ed etica: la riapertura della questione dell'ontologia del bene.Stephen L. Brock - 2010 - Acta Philosophica 19 (1):37-58.
    Since Hume, there has been broad consensus that if the notion of the good has any intelligible foundation, it is not “ontological”, in the natures of things. Today however this view is being challenged. After a sketch of the positions of Kant and Hume, and a glance at some of the recent challenges, the paper examines a key element in Thomas Aquinas’s ontol- ogy of the good: the notion of nal causality. For Thomas nal causality presupposes formal and e cient (...)
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  30. Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and the Normativity Challenge.Étienne Brown - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (1):131-150.
    Aristotelian virtue theorists are currently engaged in a discussion with philosophers who use psychological findings to question some of their main assumptions. In this article, I present and argue against one of these psychological challenges—Jesse Prinz’s Normativity Challenge—which rests on the claim that findings in cultural psychology contradict the Aristotelian thesis that the normativity of virtues derives from nature. First, I demonstrate that the Normativity Challenge is based on three problematic assumptions about contemporary Aristotelianism. Second, I argue that it presupposes (...)
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  31. Rights in the Law: The Importance of God's Free Choices in the Thought of Francis Turretin.James E. Bruce - 2013 - Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
  32. The Reformation and Scholastic Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW]James E. Bruce - 2011 - Philosophical Forum 42 (3):290-290.
    Review of Terence Irwin, “The Reformation and Scholastic Moral Philosophy,” chapter 29 of The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, Volume I: From Socrates to the Reformation.
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  33. On What Matters. By Parfit. Oxford University Press, 2011, Pp. 1140, £30, ISBN: 9780199265923. [REVIEW]Richard Yetter Chappell - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (04):599-603.
  34. The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing.Mark J. Cherry (ed.) - 2009 - Springer.
    Perhaps nature is simply a challenge to be addressed, overcome, and set aside.This volume is a critical exploration of natural law theory.
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  35. The Normativity of the Natural : Can Philosophers Pull Morality Out of the Magic Hat of Human Nature?Mark J. Cherry - 2009 - In The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
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  36. Kitcher’s Revolutionary Reasoning Inversion in Ethics.Christine Clavien - 2012 - Analyse & Kritik 34 (1):117-128.
    This paper examines three specific issues raised by The Ethical Project. First, I discuss the varieties of altruism and spell out the differences between the definitions proposed by Kitcher and the ways altruism is usually conceived in biology, philosophy, psychology, and economics literature. Second, with the example of Kitcher’s account, I take a critical look at evolutionary stories of the emergence of human ethical practices. Third, I point to the revolutionary implications of the Darwinian methodology when it is thoughtfully applied (...)
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  37. Moral Explanations, Thick and Thin.Brendan Cline - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (2):1-20.
    Cornell realists maintain that irreducible moral properties have earned a place in our ontology in virtue of the indispensable role they play in a variety of explanations. These explanations can be divided into two groups: those that employ thin ethical concepts and those that employ thick ethical concepts. Recent work on thick concepts suggests that they are not inherently evaluative in their meaning. If correct, this creates problems for the moral explanations of Cornell realists, since the most persuasive moral explanations (...)
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  38. Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism.Cristian Constantinescu - 2014 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 9. Oxford University Press. pp. 152-185.
    In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘tall’, and ‘heap’ are said to be. I then argue that (...)
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  39. Varieties of Moral Naturalism.David Copp - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).
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  40. Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics.David Copp - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    The central philosophical challenge of metaethics is to account for the normativity of moral judgment without abandoning or seriously compromising moral realism. In Morality in a Natural World, David Copp defends a version of naturalistic moral realism that can accommodate the normativity of morality. Moral naturalism is often thought to face special metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic problems as well as the difficulty in accounting for normativity. In the ten essays included in this volume, Copp defends solutions to these problems. Three (...)
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  41. A Skeptical Challenge to Moral Non-Naturalism and a Defense of Constructivist Naturalism.David Copp - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):269-283.
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  42. Why Naturalism?David Copp - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):179-200.
    My goal in this paper is to explain what ethical naturalism is, to locate the pivotal issue between naturalists and non-naturalists, and to motivate taking naturalism seriously. I do not aim to establish the truth of naturalism nor to answer the various familiar objections to it. But I do aim to motivate naturalism sufficiently that the attempt to deal with the objections will seem worthwhile. I propose that naturalism is best understood as the view that the moral properties are natural (...)
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  43. Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism.David Copp - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):31-74.
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  44. Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective.David Copp - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (sup1):30-74.
    (2000). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 30, Supplementary Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized, pp. 30-74.
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  45. Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth.David Copp - 2000 - Synthese 124 (1-2):113-137.
  46. Morality, Normativity, and Society.David Copp - 1995 - Oxford University Press.
    Moral claims not only purport to be true, they also purport to guide our choices. This book presents a new theory of normative judgment, the "standard-based theory," which offers a schematic account of the truth conditions of normative propositions of all kinds, including moral propositions and propositions about reasons. The heart of Copp 's approach to moral propositions is a theory of the circumstances under which corresponding moral standards qualify as justified, the " society -centered theory." He argues that because (...)
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  47. Dewey's Theory of the Moral Good.Paul Crissman - 1928 - The Monist 38 (4):592-619.
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  48. Naturalism and Normativity.Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    Normativity concerns what we ought to think or do and the evaluations we make. For example, we say that we ought to think consistently, we ought to keep our promises, or that Mozart is a better composer than Salieri. Yet what philosophical moral can we draw from the apparent absence of normativity in the scientific image of the world? For scientific naturalists, the moral is that the normative must be reduced to the nonnormative, while for nonnaturalists, the moral is that (...)
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  49. How Not to Be a Metaethical Naturalist –Jesse Prinz on the Emotional Construction of Morals.Tanya de Villiers-Botha - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):145-154.
    Jesse Prinz develops a naturalistic metaethical theory with which he purports to sidestep ‘Hume's law’ by demonstrating how, on his theory, in describing what our moral beliefs commit us to we can determine what our moral obligations are. I aim to show that Prinz does not deliver on his prescriptive promise – he does not bridge the is–ought gap in any meaningful way. Given that Prinz goes on to argue that (1) his moral psychology highlights fundamental shortcomings in ‘traditional’ normative (...)
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  50. Kitcher, Philip., The Ethical Project.Philip E. Devine - 2013 - Review of Metaphysics 66 (3):579-581.
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