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  1. added 2020-06-01
    Reconsidering the Meta‐Ethical Implications of Motivational Internalism and Externalism.Ragnar Francén - forthcoming - Theoria.
    Motivational internalism and externalism – that is, theories about moral motivation – have played central roles in meta‐ethical debate mainly because they have been thought to have implications for the constitutive nature of moral judgements. Thus, internalism and externalism have been adduced in favour of and against various versions of cognitivism and non‐cognitivism. This article aims to question a fundamental presupposition behind such arguments. It has standardly been assumed (i) that if motivational internalism is true then moral judgements must consist (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-11
    Direzioni di adattamento. La critica al non-cognitivismo etico nella Logica di Hegel.Armando Manchisi - 2019 - Teoria 39 (2):259-271.
    One of the strongest arguments that ethical non-cognitivism uses in its own defense is that according to which knowledge and will structure themselves as different “directions of fit”: while knowledge, in order to be correct, implies that the mind has to fit the world, the will, in order to be effective, requires that the world has to fit the mind. Non-cognitivists thus believe that moral judgments are expression of will alone, and not of knowledge, and cannot therefore be considered true (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-13
    Moral Testimony: Once More with Feeling.Guy Fletcher - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:45-73..
    It is commonly claimed that reliance upon moral testimony is problematic in a way not common to reliance upon non-moral testimony. This chapter provides a new explanation of what the problem consists in—one that enjoys advantages over the most widely accepted explanation in the extant literature. The main theses of the chapter are as follows: that many forms of normative deference beyond the moral are problematic, that there is a common explanation of the problem with all of these forms of (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-02
    The Semantic Uniformity of Morality: On a Presupposition in Contemporary Metaethics.Benjamin De Mesel - 2016 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 78 (1):121-153.
    Michael Gill has argued that contemporary metaethics proceeds on the assumption that morality is uniform. I apply Gill’s diagnosis to the debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. I argue, on the basis of examples, that there is good reason to question the assumption that morality is semantically uniform. I describe the assumption as a symptom of what Wittgenstein has called the philosopher’s “craving for generality‘. I discuss several recent metaethical positions in which the question “Cognitivism or non-cognitivism?‘ appears as a false (...)
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  5. added 2020-03-10
    Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism.Matthew Bedke - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 292-307.
    This chapter discusses the difference between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in metaethics. It considers the main arguments for and against each view, as well as arguments that the distinction cannot survive critical scrutiny.
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  6. added 2020-02-04
    Internalism and the Frege-Geach Problem.Caj Strandberg - 2019 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 32:68-91.
    According to the established understanding of the Frege-Geach problem, it is a challenge exclusively for metaethical expressivism. In this paper, I argue that it is much wider in scope: The problem applies generally to views according to which moral sentences express moral judgments entailing that one is for or against something, irrespective of what mental states the judgments consist in. In particular, it applies to motivational internalism about moral judgments. Most noteworthy, it applies to cognitivist internalism according to which moral (...)
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  7. added 2020-01-17
    What Can We Learn From Pleasure?Christiana Megan Meyvis Olfert - 2013 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (1):35-53.
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  8. added 2019-10-17
    Fallibility for Expressivists.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
    Quasi-realists face the challenge of providing a plausible analysis of acknowledgments of moral fallibility (e.g., "I believe that lying is wrong, but I might be mistaken"). This paper develops a new analysis of these acknowledgments, according to which they express moral uncertainty. After advertising the advantages of this analysis, I take up the question of how to understand moral uncertainty in expressivist terms.
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  9. added 2019-10-16
    Goblet Words and Moral Knack: Non-Cognitive Moral Realism in the Zhuangzi?Christopher Kirby - 2019 - In Colin Marshall (ed.), Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality. New York: Routledge. pp. 159-178.
    This chapter focuses on Daoist praxeology and language in order to build something of a moral realist position (the contours of which may differ from most western versions insofar as it need not commit to moral cognitivism) that hinges on the seemingly paradoxical notions of ineffable moral truths and non-transferable moral skill.
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  10. added 2019-10-15
    Reid on Moral Sentimentalism.Camil Golub - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):431-444.
    In the Essays on the Active Powers of Man V. 7, Thomas Reid seeks to show “[t]hat moral approbation implies a real judgment,” contrasting this thesis with the view that moral approbation is no more than a feeling. Unfortunately, his criticism of moral sentimentalism systematically conflates two different metaethical views: non-cognitivism about moral thought and subjectivism about moral properties. However, if we properly disentangle the various parts of Reid's discussion, we can isolate pertinent arguments against each of these views. Some (...)
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  11. added 2019-10-12
    A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great effort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the problem of (...)
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  12. added 2019-10-09
    The Meaning of 'Good'.Donald C. Williams - 1937 - Philosophical Review 46 (4):416-423.
    Argues against G.E. Moore's thesis that "good" is unanalysable. Consulting the dictionary ("more illuminating than many volumes of rational axiology"), Williams concludes that the fundamental meaning of "good" is being in accord with my purposes. That does not rule out a search for some highest good that will unify my purposes.
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  13. added 2019-09-30
    Che Fare? Nuove prospettive filosofiche sull’azione.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - Roma: Carocci.
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  14. added 2019-09-22
    Non-Descriptive Relativism: Adding Options to the Expressivist Marketplace.Matthew Bedke - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:48-70.
    This chapter identifies a novel family of metaethical theories that are non-descriptive and that aim to explain the action-guiding qualities of normative thought and language. The general strategy is to consider different relations language might bear to a given content, where we locate descriptivity (or lack of it) in these relations, rather than locating it in a theory that begins with the expression of states of mind, or locating it in a special kind of content that is not way-things-might-be content. (...)
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  15. added 2019-09-16
    Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology.Benjamin Lennertz - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper makes explicit the way in which many theorists of the epistemology of uncertainty, or formal epistemologists, are committed to a version of noncognitivism—one about thoughts that something is likely. It does so by drawing an analogy with metaethical noncognitivism. I explore the degree to which the motivations for both views are similar and how both views have to grapple with the Frege‐Geach Problem about complex thoughts. The major upshot of recognizing this noncognitivism is that it presents challenges and (...)
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  16. added 2019-09-12
    Indignation, Practical Rationality and Our Moral Life: A Grammatical Investigation.Jônadas Techio - 2016 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 15 (2):260-278.
    This paper offers a grammatical investigation of some important aspects of our moral life taking a scene from the movie Mr. Deeds Goes to Town as a test case. The main question I try to answer is whether there are situations in our moral discussions in which the proper and rational attitude is to show disagreement, as opposed to continuing the dialogue. Many philosophers seem committed to a conception of moral reasoning that takes as its end rational agreement among agents; (...)
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  17. added 2019-07-03
    Negation, Expressivism, and Intentionality.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):246-267.
    Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-18
    Inferential Expressivism and the Negation Problem.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 16.
    We develop a novel solution to the negation version of the Frege-Geach problem by taking up recent insights from the bilateral programme in logic. Bilateralists derive the meaning of negation from a primitive *B-type* inconsistency involving the attitudes of assent and dissent. Some may demand an explanation of this inconsistency in simpler terms, but we argue that bilateralism’s assumptions are no less explanatory than those of *A-type* semantics that only require a single primitive attitude, but must stipulate inconsistency elsewhere. Based (...)
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  19. added 2019-06-06
    Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism About Rules.Denis Robinson - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):131-156.
    Part 1 of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement—in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism—and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a purely cognitivist account of moral (...)
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  20. added 2019-06-06
    Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. [REVIEW]Abraham Edel - 1992 - International Studies in Philosophy 24 (3):143-144.
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  21. added 2019-06-06
    Ayer's Ethical Theory: Emotivism or Subjectivism?*: David Wiggins.David Wiggins - 1991 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30:181-196.
    In 1936, in a chapter of Language, Truth and Logic clearly influenced by Hume and influenced also by Ogden's and Richards's The Meaning of Meaning, Ayer claimed that judgments of value, in so far as they are not scientific statements, are not in the literal sense significant but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false. To say ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’ is not to state any more than one would have stated by (...)
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  22. added 2019-06-05
    XIV—Moral Non‐Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality.Michael Blome‐Tillmann - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):279-309.
    This paper investigates the linguistic basis for moral non-cognitivism, the view that sentences containing moral predicates do not have truth conditions. It offers a new argument against this view by pointing out that the view is incompatible with our best empirical theories about the grammatical encoding of illocutionary force potentials. Given that my arguments are based on very general assumptions about the relations between the grammar of natural languages and a sentence's illocutionary function, my arguments are broader in scope than (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-05
    Book ReviewsAllan Gibbard,. Thinking How to Live.Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. Pp. 302. $45.00.Matthew Chrisman - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):406-412.
    I imagine that people will complain that the account of normative concepts defended in Gibbard’s new book makes the metaethical waters even muddier because it blurs the line between cognitivism and noncognitivism and between realism and antirealism. However, these labels are philosophic tools, and in the wake of Gibbard’s new book, one might rightly conclude that there are new and better philosophical tools emerging on the metaethical scene. The uptake of views about practical reasoning—as exhibited by planning—into debates about the (...)
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  24. added 2019-04-12
    How Ecumenical Expressivism Confuses the Trivial and the Substantive.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):666-674.
    I argue that there are cases in which ecumenical expressivism cannot distinguish between endorsement of certain trivial and substantive normative judgments. I consider the extent to which this problem generalizes across different formulations of the ecumenical view. I suggest that we may not be able to escape the problem if we hope to retain the ability to solve the Frege-Geach problem in the way promised by ecumenical expressivism.
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  25. added 2019-03-26
    Dislodging Butterflies From the Supervenient.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:103-112.
    Applied to evaluative properties the supervenience thesis is customarily understood as expressing two intuitions: the idea that there is some kind of dependence between the value of an object and some of the natural properties of the object; the idea that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. It is argued that the influential (...)
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  26. added 2019-03-18
    Streumer on Non-Cognitivism and Reductivism About Normative Judgement.Daan Evers - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6):707-724.
    Bart Streumer believes that the following principle is true of all normative judgements: When two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of them is correct. Streumer argues that noncognitivists are unable to explain why is true, or our acceptance of it. I argue that his arguments are inconclusive. I also argue that our acceptance of is limited in the case of instrumental and epistemic normative judgements, and that the extent to which we do accept for such judgements can (...)
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  27. added 2019-03-16
    Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations.Bob Beddor - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    This paper develops a new challenge for moral noncognitivism. In brief, the challenge is this: Beliefs — both moral and non-moral — are epistemically evaluable, whereas desires are not. It is tempting to explain this difference in terms of differences in the functional roles of beliefs and desires. However, this explanation stands in tension with noncognitivism, which maintains that moral beliefs have a desire-like functional role. After critically reviewing some initial responses to the challenge, I suggest a solution, which involves (...)
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  28. added 2019-03-11
    Are All Normative Judgments Desire-Like?Alex Gregory - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):29-55.
    In this paper I first argue against one attractive formulation of the motivation argument, and against one attractive formulation of noncognitivism. I do so by example: I suggest that other-regarding normative judgments do not seem to have motivational powers and do not seem to be desires. After defending these two claims, I argue that other views can accommodate the motivational role of normative judgment without facing this objection. For example, desire-as-belief theories do so, since such theories only say that some (...)
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  29. added 2019-02-19
    Supervenience, Repeatability, & Expressivism.Emad H. Atiq - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Expressivists traditionally explain normative supervenience by saying it is a conceptual truth. I argue against this tradition in two steps. First, I show the modal claim that stands in need of explanation has been stated imprecisely. Classic arguments in metaethics for normative supervenience and those that rely on it as a premise presuppose a constraint on the supervenience base that is rarely (if ever) made explicit: the repeatability of the non-normative properties on which the normative supervenes. Non-normative properties are repeatable (...)
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  30. added 2019-01-30
    Noncognitivism in Ethics. [REVIEW]Daan Evers - 2011 - Disputatio 4 (31):295-303.
    Review of Mark Schroeder's book Noncognitivism in Ethics.
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  31. added 2019-01-20
    Forgetting Your Scruples.Adam Bugeja - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2889-2911.
    It can sound absurd to report that you have forgotten a moral truth. Described cases in which people who have lost moral beliefs exhibit the behavioural and phenomenological symptoms of forgetting can seem similarly absurd. I examine these phenomena, and evaluate a range of hypotheses that might be offered to explain them. These include the following proposals: that it is hard to forget moral truths because they are believed on the basis of intuition; that moral forgetting seems puzzling for the (...)
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  32. added 2019-01-08
    Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment.Brendan Cline - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    A central source of support for expressivist accounts of normative discourse is the intimate relationship between normative judgment and motivation. Expressivists argue that normative judgments must be noncognitive, desire-like states in order to be so tightly linked with motivation. Normative statements are then construed as expressions of these noncognitive states. In this paper, I draw on dual-process models in cognitive psychology to respond to this argument. According to my proposal, normative judgments are ordinary beliefs that are typically produced by two (...)
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  33. added 2018-09-24
    Hybrid Speech Acts: A Theory of Normative Thought and Language That ‘Has It Both Ways’.Andrew Morgan - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):785-807.
    In this essay, I propose a novel hybrid metanormative theory. According to this theory, speakers making normative claims express both cognitive and motivational attitudes in virtue of the constitutive norms of the particular speech acts they perform. This view has four principal virtues: it is consistent with traditional semantic theories, it supports a form of motivational judgment internalism that does justice to externalist intuitions, it illuminates the connection between normative language and normative thought, and it explains how speakers can express (...)
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  34. added 2018-09-24
    Ett problem för Hares supervenienstes.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2004 - SATS 5 (2):47-58.
    The supervenience thesis about value customarily expresses two intuitions: (i) that there is some kind of dependence between the value and the natural properties of the value bearer; (ii) that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. R M Hare’s account of supervenience is problematic since it only expresses (ii) but not (i). A (...)
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  35. added 2018-09-18
    Il desiderio: precedenti storici e concettualizzazione platonica.Antonio Malo - 1996 - Acta Philosophica 5 (2).
    Beyond the terms used by the various pre-Socratic thinkers (thymós, kardia, eros, etc.) and beyond also the different settings adopted in their discussion,it is possible to find the reference to a reality which is susceptiblebut to be described in the three essential characteristics of desire:1) The change of a previous situation, which is almost always understood as an exit from one reality to another.2) The push, placed at the origin of this exit, which appears as opposition or attraction about another (...)
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  36. added 2018-07-19
    Ambivalence: A Philosophical Exploration.Hili Razinsky - 2016 - Rowman & Littlefield International.
    Ambivalence (as in practical conflicts, moral dilemmas, conflicting beliefs, and mixed feelings) is a central phenomenon of human life. Yet ambivalence is incompatible with entrenched philosophical conceptions of personhood, judgement, and action, and is denied or marginalised by thinkers of diverse concerns. This book takes a radical new stance, bringing the study of core philosophical issues together with that of ambivalence. The book proposes new accounts in several areas – including subjectivity, consciousness, rationality, and value – while elucidating a wide (...)
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  37. added 2018-07-14
    The Ought‐Is Gap: Trouble For Hybrid Semantics.Matthew S. Bedke - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):657-670.
    When it comes to the meanings of normative expressions, descriptivist theories and expressivist theories have distinct explanatory virtues. Noting this, and with the hope of not compromising on explanatory resources, hybrid semantic theories refuse to choose. Here, I examine how well the strategy works for Moorean open questions and associated is‐ought gaps. Though hybrid theorists typically rely on their expressivist resources for this explanandum, there is a type of open question that unadulterated expressivist theories can handle but hybrid theories cannot (...)
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  38. added 2018-06-10
    Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.
    In this paper we introduce a distinct metaethical position, fictionalism about morality. We clarify and defend the position, showing that it is a way to save the 'moral phenomena' while agreeing that there is no genuine objective prescriptivity to be described by moral terms. In particular, we distinguish moral fictionalism from moral quasi-realism, and we show that fictionalism possesses the virtues of quasi-realism about morality, but avoids its vices.
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  39. added 2018-05-31
    Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    I argue that in order to account for normative uncertainty, an expressivist theory of normative language and thought must accomplish two things: Firstly, it needs to find room in its framework for a gradable conative attitude, degrees of which can be interpreted as representing normative uncertainty. Secondly, it needs to defend appropriate rationality constraints pertaining to those graded attitudes. The first task – finding an appropriate graded attitude that can represent uncertainty – is not particularly problematic. I tackle the second (...)
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  40. added 2018-04-20
    Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking. [REVIEW]James Mahon - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 5.
    In this review I examine Cuneo's comparison of the non-normative, perlocutionary-intention theory of speech acts (Grice) with the normative theory of speech acts (Searle and Alston) and the moral theory of speech acts (Wolterstorff, Cuneo) in his transcendental argument for moral realism (since moral facts are among the necessary conditions for the possibility of speech acts, and since there are speech acts (asserting, promising, asking questions, issuing commands, etc.), it follows that moral facts exist). I argue that Cuneo does not (...)
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  41. added 2018-04-04
    The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation.Adam Lerner - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:123-144.
    People engage in pure moral inquiry whenever they inquire into the moral features of some act, agent, or state of affairs without inquiring into the non-moral features of that act, agent, or state of affairs. This chapter argues that ordinary people act rationally when they engage in pure moral inquiry, and so any adequate view in metaethics ought to be able to explain this fact. The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation is to provide such an explanation. This chapter argues that (...)
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  42. added 2018-02-27
    Moral Skepticism: An Introduction and Overview.Diego E. Machuca - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-31.
    In this introductory chapter, I not only present the essays that make up this volume but also I offer an extensive critical overview of moral skepticism with the hope that it will turn out to be useful particularly to the uninitiated reader. I first provide a taxonomy of varieties of moral skepticism, then discuss the main arguments advanced in their favor, and finally summarize the ten essays here collected, which deal with one or more of those skeptical stances and arguments.
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  43. added 2018-02-19
    The Wishful Thinking Problem for Non-Cognitivism: Does It Really Make Sense?Chengying Guan - 2014 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):30-44.
    This paper concerns the Wishful Thinking Problem for non-cognitivism, which has recently been raised by Cian Dorr. Contrary to Dorr’s claim that the Wishful Thinking Problem is a new crucial objection to non-cognitivism in addition to the well-known Frege-Geach Problem, I argue that recent research has shown that the Wishful Thinking Problem is not independent of the Frege-Geach Problem and therefore it is not lethal to non-cognitivism. However, the Wishful Thinking Problem is still a problem for non-cognitivism, for it reveals (...)
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  44. added 2018-02-18
    The Intelligibility of Moral Intransigence: A Dilemma for Cognitivism About Moral Judgment.Richard Rowland - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):266-275.
    Many have argued that various features of moral disagreements create problems for cognitivism about moral judgment, but these arguments have been shown to fail. In this paper, I articulate a new problem for cognitivism that derives from features of our responses to moral disagreement. I argue that cognitivism entails that one of the following two claims is false: a mental state is a belief only if it tracks changes in perceived evidence; it is intelligible to make moral judgments that do (...)
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  45. added 2018-02-17
    What Kind of Theory is the Humean Theory of Motivation?Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):322-342.
    I consider an underappreciated problem for proponents of the Humean theory of motivation. Namely, it is unclear whether is it to be understood as a largely psychological or largely metaphysical theory. I show that the psychological interpretation of HTM will need to be modified in order to be a tenable view and, as it will turn out, the modifications required render it virtually philosophically empty. I then argue that the largely metaphysical interpretation is the only a plausible interpretation of HTM's (...)
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  46. added 2018-02-17
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 4.Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a periodical publication devoted to original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics and includes study being carried out at the intersections ...
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  47. added 2018-02-17
    Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. He maintains that we cannot get clear about ethics until we get clear about human nature. So these are the sorts of questions he addresses: Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers in an exploration of guilt, shame, disgust, and other moral emotions; he draws (...)
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  48. added 2018-02-16
    Moral Fictionalism, the Frege-Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):133-143.
    CHANGE SLIDE Go through outline of talk CHANGE SLIDE It is my sincerest hope that if there is one thing that people take away from Moral Fictionalism, it is the recognition that standard noncognitivism involves a syndrome of three, logically distinct claims. Standard noncognitivists claim that moral judgment is not belief or any other cognitive attitude but is, rather, a noncognitive attitude more akin to desire; that this noncognitive attitude is expressed by our public moral utterances; and, hence, that our (...)
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  49. added 2018-02-12
    The Unity of Moral Attitudes: Recipe Semantics and Credal Exaptation.Derek Shiller - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):425-446.
    This paper offers a noncognitivist characterization of moral attitudes, according to which moral attitudes count as such because of their inclusion of moral concepts. Moral concepts are distinguished by their contribution to the functional roles of some of the attitudes in which they can occur. They have no particular functional role in other attitudes, and should instead be viewed as evolutionary spandrels. In order to make the counter-intuitive implications of the view more palatable, the paper ends with an account of (...)
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  50. added 2018-01-04
    Solving the Problem of Creeping Minimalism.Matthew Simpson - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):510-531.
    In this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar concepts. I argue that Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of meaning more generally.
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