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  1. added 2020-06-02
    K.-O. Apel, Discorso, verità, responsabilità, a cura di V. Marzocchi. [REVIEW]Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1998 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 90 (1\2):317-318.
  2. added 2020-05-26
    Normativity, Human Nature and Practical Reason: A New Approach to an Old Problem.Max G. Parish - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Oklahoma
    Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism claims ethical goodness is a kind of human natural goodness, where natural goodness is a function of human nature. Call this the core thesis. The normativity objection claims the core thesis fails because ethical goodness is normative and natural goodness is not. In this study I aim to cast new light on this objection and propose a new strategy of response. My argument divides into two main moves. In the first, I side with critics in arguing that (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-08
    Morality and Practical Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
    As Socrates famously noted, there is perhaps no more important question than how we ought to live. And the answer to this question depends on how the reasons that we have for living in various different ways combine and compete. To illustrate, suppose that I’ve just received a substantial raise from my employer. What should I do with the extra money? It seems that I have most moral reason to donate it to effective charities but most self-interested reason to spend (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-30
    Immorality and Irrationality.Alex Worsnip* - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
    Does immorality necessarily involve irrationality? The question is often taken to be among the deepest in moral philosophy. But apparently deep questions sometimes admit of deflationary answers. In this case we can make way for a deflationary answer by appealing to dualism about rationality, according to which there are two fundamentally distinct notions of rationality: structural rationality and substantive rationality. I have defended dualism elsewhere. Here, I’ll argue that it allows us to embrace a sensible – I will not say (...)
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  5. added 2020-04-27
    Care, Social Practices and Normativity. Inner Struggle Versus Panglossian Rule-Following.Alexander Albert Jeuk - 2019 - Phenomenology and Mind 17:44-54.
    Contrary to the popular assumption that linguistically mediated social practices constitute the normativity of action (Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015; Rietveld, 2008a,b; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014), I argue that it is affective care for oneself and others that primarily constitutes this kind of normativity. I argue for my claim in two steps. First, using the method of cases I demonstrate that care accounts for the normativity of action, whereas social practices do not. Second, I show that a social practice account of (...)
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  6. added 2020-04-13
    Taking Prudence Seriously.Guy Fletcher - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:70-94.
    Philosophers have long theorized about which things make people’s lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. Yet little time has been spent on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation. Chapter 4 takes up two major meta-prudential questions. It first examines whether there is a set of prudential reasons, generated by (...)
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  7. added 2020-03-13
    Thick Evaluation, by Simon Kirchin. [REVIEW]Brent G. Kyle - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):954-962.
    Thick Evaluation, by KirchinSimon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xi + 198.
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  8. added 2020-03-10
    The Moral Nexus, by R. Jay Wallace. Princeton University Press, 2019. ISBN:9780691172170. 329 Pp. £34.00. [REVIEW]James H. P. Lewis - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):1093-1096.
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  9. added 2020-03-10
    Passing the Deontic Buck.Matt Bedke - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6. Oxford University Press. pp. 128.
    In this paper I explore buck passing analyses of deontic properties in terms of reasons. The preferred analysis is that the permissibility/impermissibility/optionality/requiredness/etc. of some agent's acting is to be couched in terms of reasons to respond in some way to that agent's action, or the prospect thereof. Along the way I try to accommodate supererogation, wrong kinds of reasons objections, and commonly accepted inferences in deontic logic.
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  10. added 2019-11-25
    Die Wiederkehr des Problems in Seiner Lösung. Zu Rahel Jaeggis Kritik von Lebensformen.Thomas Khurana - 2019 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 126 (1):117-132.
    Der Begriff der Lebensform spielt eine ebenso zentrale wie vielgestaltige Rolle in der Philosophie der Gegenwart. Er dient einerseits dazu, auf die menschliche Lebensform als den Grund und Horizont aller Normativität zu verweisen, wie er andererseits dazu verwendet wird, die Vielfalt möglicher besonderer Lebensweisen zu fassen. Bemerkenswerterweise kommen die beiden Extrempunkte des Verwendungsspektrums dabei in einer entscheidenden Hinsicht überein: Lebensformen scheinen sich der Kritik zu entziehen – entweder, weil sie zu fundamental sind, um begründet oder mit Gründen infrage gestellt zu (...)
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  11. added 2019-11-25
    Prekäre Polemik: Alain Badious Ethik. [REVIEW]Thomas Khurana - 2005 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 53 (5):822-825.
    Der Ton ist scharf und die Kritik beißend, mit der Alain Badiou in seinem Essay Ethik das belegt, was er eine „ethische Ideologie" nennt - eine die westlichen Gesellschaften dominierende Vorstellung vom Ethischen, als deren „philosophische Sub-Struktur" (116) er einen „durchschnittlichen" Kant (19) und eine lose mit Levinas verbundene Ethik der Differenz ausmacht. Dieser „Ideologie" will Badiou antithetisch eine eigene „Ethik der Wahrheiten" entgegensetzen. Die Härte der Kritik ist gewiss deijenige Zug des Essays, der ihm eine breite Aufmerksamkeit eingetragen hat; (...)
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  12. added 2019-11-03
    The Error Condition.Jeremy David Fix - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):34-48.
    The possibility of error conditions the possibility of normative principles. I argue that extant interpretations of this condition undermine the possibility of normative principles for our action because they implicitly treat error as a perfection of an action. I then explain how a constitutivist metaphysics of capacities explains why error is an imperfection of an action. Finally, I describe and defend the interpretation of the error condition which follows.
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  13. added 2019-10-30
    Two Sorts of Constitutivism.Jeremy David Fix - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Some things, but only some things, are by nature subject to standards. Why? I explain a constitutivist answer to this question in terms of certain genera possessing essential properties which their particulars can possess or lack. When something is by nature subject to a standard, it is so subject because it is a particular of a genus with such properties, and it is subject to a standard with respect to those very properties. I then explain the account of the nature (...)
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  14. added 2019-10-08
    Universalism Versus Contextualism in Bioethics.Dimitry Mentuz - 2017 - European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 3:75-81.
    The goal of this work is to analyse the paradigmatic concept of universal values important for bioethics such as autonomy, beneficence, justice and developing contextual approaches in resolving the moral questions on bioethics. It also aims to reveal and analyse the importance of universal approaches despite the basic non-liminality of a context and subjectivity. Keywords: autonomy, contextualism, subjectivity, universal values, metaethics, normativity.
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  15. added 2019-09-26
    Weil man das so macht?! Zur spezifischen Normativität sozialer Praxis.Hauke Behrendt - 2019 - Archiv Für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie – Beihefte 156:167-183.
  16. added 2019-09-26
    Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Rysiek Sliwinski - 2011 - Neither/nor-Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday 58:243 - 257.
    The much endorsed idea that reasons are facts, gives raise to several issues, not least when it is applied to the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. The paper distinguish in broad terms between two important views on the nature of facts. Given in particular a view that conceives of facts as abstract entities, the dichotomy is not particularly problematic. We might run into problems when it comes to identifying which facts are reasons and which are not, but the very (...)
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  17. added 2019-09-19
    Nature and the Best Life. Exploring the Natural Bases of Practical Normativity in Ancient Philosophy.Gabriela Rossi (ed.) - 2013 - Hildesheim - Zurich - New York: G. Olms.
    The papers included in this book explore various aspects of the relation between nature and practical normativity in Antiquity, from the Presocratic period to Neoplatonism. Leaving aside the question how much of contemporary naturalism is present in Ancient Philosophy, and whether that much is sufficient for finding traces of it in ancient naturalism, one may still ask the historical question of whether or not this is a feature that all ancient ethics share. To this effect, the following pages offer a (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-23
    On the Normative Consequences of Virtue and Utility Friendships in Aristotle.Daniel Simão Nascimento - 2017 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 43 (2):263-284.
    In this article, I use the expanded hohfeldian model presented by Wenar to argue that, according to Aristotle's theory of friendship, every bond of friendship that is based on utility or virtue creates duties and hohfeldian incidents between those who are friends. In section 1, I provide a quick presentation of Hohfeld's work and of Wenar's hohfeldian model. In section 2, I present my thesis about the creation of certain hohfeldian incidents and certain duties in virtue and utility friendships as (...)
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  19. added 2019-06-15
    NDPR: What Can Philosophy Contribute to Ethics? (By James Griffin). [REVIEW]Bradford Cokelet - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
    Summary of Griffin's book. Raises objections to his ought implies can principle and his negative assumptions about human nature.
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  20. added 2019-06-06
    Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem.Bagnoli Carla - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1229-1246.
    According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some progress in the debate (...)
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  21. added 2019-06-06
    Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons.Theo Van Willigenburg - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1):45-62.
    Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical reasoning (...)
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  22. added 2019-05-02
    Does Shared Decision Making Respect a Patient's Relational Autonomy?Jonathan Lewis - 2019 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 25 (6):1063-1069.
    According to many of its proponents, shared decision making ("SDM") is the right way to interpret the clinician-patient relationship because it respects patient autonomy in decision-making contexts. In particular, medical ethicists have claimed that SDM respects a patient's relational autonomy understood as a capacity that depends upon, and can only be sustained by, interpersonal relationships as well as broader health care and social conditions. This paper challenges that claim. By considering two primary approaches to relational autonomy, this paper argues that (...)
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  23. added 2019-04-10
    Kantian Constructivism and the Normativity of Practical Identities.Étienne Brown - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (3):571-590.
    Many neo-Aristotelians argue that practical identities are normative, that is, they provide us with reasons for action and create binding obligations. Kantian constructivists agree with this insight but argue that contemporary Aristotelians fail to fully justify it. Practical identities are normative, Kantian constructivists contend, but their normativity necessarily derives from the normativity of humanity. In this paper, I shed light on this underexplored similarity between neo-Aristotelian and Kantian constructivist accounts of the normativity of practical identities, and argue that both ultimately (...)
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  24. added 2019-04-03
    How to Cancel the Knobe Effect: The Role of Sufficiently Strong Moral Censure.Matthew Lindauer & Nicholas Southwood - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Empirical support is offered for the claim that the original Knobe effect, whereby our intentional action ascriptions exhibit certain asymmetries in light of our moral attitudes, can be successfully cancelled. This is predicted by the view that the Knobe effect can be explained in purely pragmatic terms (Adams and Steadman 2004a, 2004b, 2007). However, previous cancelling studies (Adams and Steadman 2007; Nichols and Ulatowski 2007) have failed to identify evidence of cancellability. The key to the successful cancelling strategy presented here (...)
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  25. added 2019-03-07
    Peter Singer , Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity. Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Fritz J. McDonald - 2018 - Philosophy in Review 38 (2):80-82.
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  26. added 2019-02-05
    Valuing Humanity: Kierkegaardian Worries About Korsgaardian Transcendental Arguments.Daniel Watts & Robert Stern - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 80 (4-5):424-442.
    This paper draws out from Kierkegaard’s work a distinctive critical perspective on an influential contemporary approach in moral philosophy: namely, Christine Korsgaard’s transcendental argument for the value of humanity. From Kierkegaard’s perspective, we argue, Korsgaard argument goes too far, in attributing absolute value to humanity – but also that she is required to make this claim if her transcendental argument is to work. From a Kierkegaardian perspective, to place this sort of value in humanity is problematic since it threatens to (...)
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  27. added 2019-01-31
    Impassioned Belief, by Michael Ridge: Oxford: Routledge, 2014, Pp. Xii + 264, £30. [REVIEW]Jack Woods - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):199-202.
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  28. added 2019-01-10
    African Metaphysics and Religious Ethics.Motsamai Molefe - 2018 - Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (3):19 - 37.
    Scholars of African moral thought reject the possibility of an African religious ethics by invoking at least three major reasons. The first objection to ‘ethical supernaturalism’ argues that it is part of those aspects of African culture that are ‘anachronistic’ insofar as they are superstitious rather than rational; as such, they should be jettisoned. The second objection points out that ethical supernaturalism is incompatible with the utilitarian approach to religion that typically characterises some African peoples’ orientation to it. The last (...)
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  29. added 2018-12-31
    The Consistency of Medical Conscience Clause in the Light of the Abortion Debate.Krzysztof Jaworski - 2016 - Diametros 47:84-97.
    The article describes the problem of the consistency of the medical conscience clause in the Polish legal system. In the first part of the paper, I outline an account of conscience as the ultimate norm of morality. In its second part, I discuss the meaning of conscience clause and its legal status. Part three examines some criticisms of the clause in its present form. The main criticism is that the clause is self-referential, which in some cases leads to absurdity.
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  30. added 2018-12-03
    An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons.Caj Strandberg - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (2):160-188.
    According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism about normative reasons, these theories confront us with a dilemma. Internalism is taken to involve a view about rationality which is considered less philosophically problematic than its competitors, whereas externalism is taken to suggest a more contentious view concerning this notion. However, the assumption that externalism involves a more demanding notion of rationality implies that it is able to account for categorical moral reasons, whereas internalism is unable (...)
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  31. added 2018-11-16
    Moralische Forderungen Und Relativismus: Zwei Probleme Für Peter Stemmers Theorie der Moral.Fabian Wendt - 2018 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 66 (5):653-668.
    Peter Stemmer has developed an elegant and impressive theory of normativity and morality. In this article, I try to show that he does not achieve two goals he set for himself. First, his theory does not capture the categorical bindingness of moral demands, even in Stemmer’s own interpretation of categorical bindingness: it does not show that we must follow moral demands no matter what our personal goals and desires are. Second, just because it would be rational to establish positive moralities (...)
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  32. added 2018-10-19
    Grounding Thick Normative Facts.Justin Morton - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):408-431.
    Many philosophers have been concerned with the nature of thick normative concepts. In this paper, I try to motivate a different project: understanding the nature of thick normative properties and facts. I propose a ground-theoretic approach to this project. I then argue that some of the simplest and most initially plausible ways of understanding thick facts fail, and that we are forced to accept some initially implausible views. I try to show how these views are not so implausible after all.
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  33. added 2018-10-07
    Grounding the Normative: A Problem for Structured Non-Naturalism.Justin Morton - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):173-196.
    Many non-naturalists about the normative want to endorse the view that some normative facts hold in virtue of both non-normative facts and normative principles. In this paper, I argue that non-naturalism is inconsistent with this thesis, due to the nature of normative principles and their grounds. I then consider two ways in which the nonnaturalist position could be modified or expanded to solve this problem. No solution, it turns out, is without its problems. I end by considering how the non-naturalist (...)
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  34. added 2018-08-30
    Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?Debbie Roberts - 2018 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 13. Oxford University Press.
    According to many, that the normative supervenes on the non-normative is a truism of normative discourse. This chapter argues that those committed to more specific moral, aesthetic, and epistemic supervenience theses should also hold (NS*): As a matter of conceptual necessity, whenever something has a normative property, it has a base property or collection of base properties that metaphysically necessitates the normative one. My main aim is to show that none of the available arguments establish (NS*), or indeed the relevant (...)
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  35. added 2018-07-18
    Whose Metaethical Minimalism?Noell Birondo - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2):37-43.
    T. M. Scanlon’s ‘Reasons Fundamentalism’ rejects any naturalistic reduction of normative truths and it also rejects the type of non-naturalism that invokes a ‘special metaphysical reality.’ Here I argue that this still does not commit Scanlon—as some have thought—to an extreme ‘metaethical minimalism’ according to which there are no ‘truth makers’ at all for normative truths. I emphasize that the issue here is not just about understanding Scanlon, since the actual position defended by Scanlon might, more significantly, point the way (...)
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  36. added 2018-06-07
    Constitutivism About Practical Reasons.Paul Katsafanas - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 367-394.
    This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of certain (...)
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  37. added 2018-05-30
    The Not So Golden Rule.Dan Flores - 2018 - Philosophy Now (125):32-34.
    The Golden Rule is (roughly) as follows: treat others as you would have others treat you. Philosophical reactions to it vary; it has both supporters and detractors. In any case, almost nobody who things critically about morality takes the literal version of the Golden Rule seriously, since there are just too many problems with it. To demonstrate this, I will look at a literal version of the Golden Rule espoused by John C. Maxwell, a well-known and influential motivational speaker, and (...)
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  38. added 2018-05-16
    Natura i emancypacja - o pewnych aspektach normatywności dobra.Piotr Machura - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 11 (1):51-74.
    Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zwrócenie uwagi na pewne, z rzadka jedynie podnoszone aspekty pojęcia dobra. Zadanie takie poprzedzić należy pewnymi wstępnymi założeniami, ponieważ pojęcie to, będąc kluczowym terminem filozofii moralnej od początku jej historii, obrosło wieloma konotacjami i stało się częścią wielu, często wzajemnie sprzecznych, koncepcji moralnych. Należy zatem zaznaczyć, że w opracowaniu poniższym chodzić zatem będzie o pojęcie dobra rozumiane na sposób arystotelesowski, a rozważania koncentrować się będą w głównej części na rozstrzygnięciach normatywnych wysuwanych w obrębie współczesnego anglosaskiego neoarystotelizmu. (...)
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  39. added 2018-05-08
    Constitutivism, Error, and Moral Responsibility in Bishop Butler's Ethics.David G. Dick - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4):415-438.
    In his writings on moral philosophy, Bishop Joseph Butler adopts an identifiably “constitutivist” strategy because he seeks to ground normativity in features of agency. Butler's constitutivist strategy deserves our attention both because he is an influential precursor to much modern moral philosophy and because it sheds light on current debates about constitutivism. For example, Butler's approach can easily satisfy the “error constraint” that is often thought to derail modern constitutivist approaches. It does this by defining actions relative to the kind (...)
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  40. added 2018-04-13
    Mere Formalities: Normative Fictions and Normative Authority.Daniel Wodak - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    It is commonly said that some standards, such as morality, are ‘normatively authoritative’ in a way that other standards, such as etiquette, are not; standards like etiquette are said to be ‘not really normative’. Skeptics deny the very possibility of normative authority, and take claims like ‘etiquette is not really normative’ to be either empty or confused. I offer a different route to defeat skeptics about authority: instead of focusing on what makes standards like morality special, we should focus on (...)
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  41. added 2018-04-10
    Footing the Cost (of Normative Subjectivism).Jack Woods - forthcoming - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge.
    I defend normative subjectivism against the charge that believing in it undermines the functional role of normative judgment. In particular, I defend it against the claim that believing that our reasons change from context to context is problematic for our use of normative judgments. To do so, I distinguish two senses of normative universality and normative reasons---evaluative universality and reasons and ontic universality and reasons. The former captures how even subjectivists can evaluate the actions of those subscribing to other conventions; (...)
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  42. added 2018-03-05
    Normative Accounts of Fundamentality.Kris McDaniel - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):167-183.
    I describe a number of views in which metaphysical fundamentality is accounted for in normative terms. After describing many different ways this key idea could be developed, I turn to developing the idea in one specific way. After all, the more detailed the proposal, the easier it is to assess whether it works. The rough idea is that what it is for a property to be fundamental is for it to be prima facie obligatory to theorize in terms of that (...)
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  43. added 2018-03-05
    De las normas como compromisos prácticos y de la locura como incumplimiento de tales compromisos.Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz - 2006 - Isegoría 34:243-259.
    Desde un punto de vista postmetafísico y a partir de los argumentos que nos proporciona un autor como Ludwig Wittgenstein, trataremos de defender la tesis de que las normas en general cobran su carácter normativo de la responsabilidad que se atribuye a cada agente cuando, al actuar en sociedad, se liga a los compromisos que sostienen la posibilidad de que esa acción sea común. Esos compromisos, ya que no pueden responder ante una instancia ajena a los agentes sociales , habrán (...)
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  44. added 2018-02-18
    Ethics as the Pursuit of Optimal Compatibility of Interests.John Dilworth - 1994 - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 18.
    I propose a new kind of meta-ethical theory, grounded in a theory of interests and of the modifications required in order to render interests compatible with each other. The theory hence is called "Interest Compatibilism" (IC). A basic account of the nature of interests, and of possible relations between them, is also included. Ethical values turn out to be those involved in optimally desirable forms of harmonization and control of interests and their associated values. -/- The theory is presented and (...)
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  45. added 2018-02-17
    Schmidtz on Moral Recognition Rules: A Critique.Thomas M. Besch - 2016 - Theoria 83 (2):138-153.
    David Schmidtz's reconstruction of morality advances Hart-type recognition rules for a “personal” and an “interpersonal” strand of morality. I argue that his view does not succeed for reasons owed both to the way in which Schmidtz construes of the task of reconstructing morality and the content of the moral recognition rules that he proposes. For Schmidtz, this task must be approached from a Hart-type “internal” perspective, but this leaves his reconstruction with an unresolved problem of parochiality. He reconstructs morality as (...)
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  46. added 2018-02-17
    Natural Inclinations and Moral Absolutes: A Mediated Correspondence for Aquinas.R. Mary Hayden - 1990 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64:130-150.
    Aquinas does not argue that natural inclinations per se suffice for moral absolutes, but rather that they suffice to make their objects known as self-evidently good for persons. Acting for the contrary of a natural inclination thereby harms persons and is contrary to the Bonum Precept (Good is to be done and pursued; evil is to be avoided). Acting for a self-evident good, however, becomes morally obligatory only when indispensable.
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  47. added 2018-01-12
    Is There a Distinctively Political Normativity?Jonathan Leader Maynard & Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Ethics 128 (4):756-787.
    A slew of recent political theorists—many taking their cue from the political writings of Bernard Williams—have recently contended that political normativity is its own kind of normativity, distinct from moral normativity. In this article, we first attempt to clarify what this claim amounts to and then reconstruct and interrogate five major arguments for it. We contend that all these arguments are unconvincing and fail to establish a sense in which political normativity is genuinely separate from morality.
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  48. added 2017-10-08
    Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Our Shared Hatred of Pain.Ben Bramble - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):94-101.
    This article responds to an argument from Katarzyna de Ladari-Radek and Peter Singer in their article, "The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason.".
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  49. added 2017-09-24
    The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
    Etiquette and other merely formal normative standards like legality, honor, and rules of games are taken less seriously than they should be. While these standards are not intrinsically reason-providing in the way morality is often taken to be, they also play an important role in our practical lives: we collectively treat them as important for assessing the behavior of ourselves and others and as licensing particular forms of sanction for violations. This chapter develops a novel account of the normativity of (...)
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  50. added 2017-09-23
    Review of Dale Dorsey, The Limits of Moral Authority. [REVIEW]Brian Berkey - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):235-240.
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