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  1. Is Morality Subjective? – A Reply to Critics.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Leslie Allan defends his thesis that ethics is objective in the sense of requiring moral agents to offer impartial reasons for acting. Radical subjectivists have attacked this requirement for impartiality on a number of grounds. Some critics make the charge that Allan's thesis is simply a version of subjectivism in disguise. He responds by showing how a broadly naturalist view of ethics accommodates objective moral constraints. Allan also counters cases in which impartiality is purportedly not morally required and considers the (...)
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  2. Moral Objectivity and Responsibility in Ethics: A Socratic Response to Hume's Legacy in the 20th Century.Owen Anderson - 2010 - Heythrop Journal 51 (2):178-191.
  3. Review of Derek Parfit, On What Matters. [REVIEW]Jonny Anomaly - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3):358-360.
  4. The Debunking Challenge to Realism: How Evolution (Ultimately) Matters.Levy Arnon & Yair Levy - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-8.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) have attracted extensive attention in meta-ethics, as they pose an important challenge to moral realism. Mogensen (2015) suggests that EDAs contain a fallacy, by confusing two distinct forms of biological explanation – ultimate and proximate. If correct, the point is of considerable importance: evolutionary genealogies of human morality are simply irrelevant for debunking. But we argue that the actual situation is subtler: while ultimate claims do not strictly entail proximate ones, there are important evidential connections between (...)
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  5. Objectivity. Polity Press, 2015. Introduction and T. Of Contents.Guy Axtell - 2015 - Polity; Wiley.
    “Objectivity” is an important theoretical concept with diverse applications in our collective practices of inquiry. It is also a concept attended in recent decades by vigorous debate, debate that includes but is not restricted to scientists and philosophers. The special authority of science as a source of knowledge of the natural and social world has been a matter of much controversy. In part because the authority of science is supposed to result from the objectivity of its methods and results, objectivity (...)
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  6. Introduction.Carla Bagnoli - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):311-316.
    This volume collects articles in realism, anti-realism, and constructivism.
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  7. Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical Reason.Carla Bagnoli - 2001 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):307-329.
    This article argues that Rawls’ history of ethics importantly contributes to the advancement of ethical theory, in that it correctly situates Kantian constructivism as an alternative to both sentimentalism and rational Intuitionism, and calls attention to the standards of objectivity in ethics. The author shows that by suggesting that both Intuitionist and Humean doctrines face the charge of heteronomy, Rawls appearsto adopt a Kantian conception of practical reason. Furthermore, Rawls follows Kant in assuming that ethical objectivity can be vindicated only (...)
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  8. La Pretesa di Oggettività in Etica.Carla Bagnoli - 2000 - In Gabriele Usberti (ed.), Modelli di oggettività. Bompiani.
    Sembra esserci almeno un punto di accordo tra i filosofi morali: i giudizi etici, così come li usiamo nelle nostre conversazioni quotidiane, condividono una certa aspirazione all’oggettività. Vi è invece un disaccordo piuttosto acerbo rispetto alla questione se questa aspirazione sia giustificata o non sia invece una mera pretesa. Il disaccordo filosofico riguarda, cioè, la questione se i giudizi etici debbano e possano aspirare all’oggettività. Ma ancor più fondamentale è il disaccordo rispetto ai criteri con cui valutare se questa aspirazione (...)
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  9. Joyce as a Moral Anatomist.Robert Bass - manuscript
    The cover illustration for Richard Joyce’s elegant and powerful recent work, The Evolution of Morality, is a reproduction of an oddly fascinating and disturbing sixteenth-century engraving, the Anatomia del corpo humano. One has to examine the image for a minute to realize that the standing human figure, stripped of skin, and with muscles, tendons and joints revealed, holds the anatomist’s knife in his left hand and that, with his right, he holds up the single piece of skin, from bearded face (...)
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  10. Whose Metaethical Minimalism?Noell Birondo - forthcoming - Southwest Philosophy Review.
    T. M. Scanlon’s ‘Reasons Fundamentalism’ rejects any naturalistic reduction of normative truths and it also rejects the type of non-naturalism that invokes a ‘special metaphysical reality.’ Here I argue that this still does not commit Scanlon—as some have thought—to an extreme ‘metaethical minimalism’ according to which there are no ‘truth makers’ at all for normative truths. I emphasize that the issue here is not just about understanding Scanlon, since the actual position defended by Scanlon might, more significantly, point the way (...)
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  11. The Significance of Ethical Disagreement for Theories of Ethical Thought and Talk.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 275-291.
    This chapter has two sections, each focusing on a distinct way in which ethical disagreement and variations in ethical judgment matter for theories of ethical thought and talk. In the first section, we look at how the variation poses problems for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist ways of specifying the nature of ethical judgments. In the second, we look at how disagreement phenomena have been taken to undermine cognitivist accounts, but also at how the seeming variation in cognitive and non-cognitive contents (...)
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  12. Do 'Objectivist' Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
    Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and ad hoc. After explaining why this (...)
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  13. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):195-198.
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  14. Review of Terence Cuneo's Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking. [REVIEW]Spencer Case - 2015 - Tradition and Discovery 42 (1):59-62.
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  15. What About Suicide Bombers? A Terse Response to a Terse Objection.Marc Champagne - 2011 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 11 (2):233–236.
    Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up.".
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  16. Review of Shafer-Landau's Moral Realism. [REVIEW]Matthew Chrisman - 2005 - Ethics 116 (1):250-255.
    G. E. Moore famously argued on the basis of semantic intuitions that moral properties are not reducible to natural properties, and therefore that moral predicates refer to nonnatural properties. This clearly represents a version of “moral realism,” but it is a testament to the strength of naturalist intuitions in contemporary philosophical debate that, insofar as one accepts Moore’s arguments, this is typically seen as a boon for antirealists rather than realists. For many philosophers worry that putative nonnatural properties would be (...)
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  17. Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity : The Development of Nietzsche's Metaethics.Maudemarie Clark & David Dudrick - 2007 - In Brian Leiter & Neil Sinhababu (eds.), Nietzsche and Morality. Oxford University Press. pp. 192--226.
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  18. Sens commun et objectivisme moral : Objectivisme "global" ou objectivisme "local" ? Une introduction par l'exemple à la philosophie expérimentale.Florian Cova & Jérôme Ravat - 2008 - Klesis 9:180-202.
    Dans cet article, nous proposons de montrer expérimentalement que le "sens commun" n'est en matière moral ni complètement objectiviste ni complètement relativiste, mais qu'un même individu peut être tantôt objectiviste tantôt relativiste. De même, nous montrons que les jugements de goût portant sur le prédicat "dégoûtant" ne sont pas toujours relativiste mais peuvent varier selon le contexte entre objectivisme et relativisme.
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  19. Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Objectivity.Sem de Maagt - 2017 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (5):443-465.
    Ever since the introduction of reflective equilibrium in ethics, it has been argued that reflective equilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms, reflective equilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method of reflective equilibrium against these objections. Defenders of reflective equilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying (...)
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  20. Moral Objectivity.John P. Dreher - 1966 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):137-148.
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  21. Moral Objectivity: Husserl's Sentiments of the Understanding.John J. Drummond - 1995 - Husserl Studies 12 (2):165-183.
    This paper explores two perspectives in Husserl's recently published writings on ethics and axiology in order to sketch anew a phenomenological account of practical reason. The paper aims a) to show that a phenomenological account of moral intentionality i) transcends the disputes between intellectualist-emotivist and intellectualist-voluntarist disputes and ii) points toward a position in which practical reason has an emotive content or, conversely, the emotions have a cognitive content, and the paper aims b) to show that a phenomenological ethics identifies (...)
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  22. Moral Objectivity.Robert R. Ehman - 1967 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (2):175-187.
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  23. The Relativity of Fact and the Objectivity of Value.Catherine Elgin - 1996 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 6 (1):4-15.
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  24. Reviewed Work: Objectivity and Cultural Divergence by S. C. Brown. [REVIEW]Anthony Ellis - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (236):274-276.
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  25. Truth and Acceptance Conditions for Moral Statements Can Be Identical: Further Support for Subjective Consequentialism.Scott Forschler - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):337-346.
    Two meanings of "subjective consequentialism" are distinguished: conscious deliberation with the aim of producing maximally-good consequences, versus acting in ways that, given one's evidence set and reasoning capabilities, is subjectively most likely to maximize expected consequences. The latter is opposed to "objective consequentialism," which demands that we act in ways that actually produce the best total consequences. Peter Railton's arguments for a version of objective consequentialism confuse the two subjective forms, and are only effective against the first. After reviewing the (...)
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  26. Critical Notice: Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Margaret Gilbert - 1999 - Noûs 33 (2):295–303.
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  27. Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson's Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Margaret P. Gilbert - manuscript
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  28. Discussion – Truth, Disquotation, and Expression: On McGinn's Theory of Truth. [REVIEW]Michael Glanzberg - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (3):413-423.
    In Logical Properties, Colin McGinn offers a new theory of truth, which he describes as “thick disquotationalism.” In keeping with wider theme of the book, truth emerges as conceptually primitive. Echoing Moore, it is simple and unanalyzable. Though truth cannot be analyzed, in the sense of giving a conceptual decomposition, McGinn argues that truth can be defined. A non-circular statement of its application conditions can be given. This makes truth a singularly remarkable property. Indeed, by McGinn’s lights, it is the (...)
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  29. The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy. [REVIEW]Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):161-188.
    Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively (...)
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  30. A Priori Refutations of Disagreement Arguments Against Moral Objectivity: Why Experience Matters. [REVIEW]Christopher W. Gowans - 2004 - Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2):141-157.
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  31. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity by Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996, X+225pp. £40.00, £12.99. [REVIEW]Gordon Graham - 1996 - Philosophy 71 (278):622-.
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  32. Moral Objectivity and the Cold War.Germain G. Grisez - 1959 - Ethics 70 (4):291-305.
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  33. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1996 - Blackwell.
    Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism.
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  34. Why Insights in Evolutionary Moral Psychology Help Resolve Long-Standing Meta-Ethical Questions.Uri Harris - manuscript
    In this brief paper, I present some basic arguments for why insights in moral psychology, especially the work of Jonathan Haidt and others in Moral Foundations Theory, points towards a resolution of long-standing meta-ethical questions.
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  35. Subjective Commitment and the Problem of Moral Objectivity.Joseph P. R. Hester - 1975 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (4):534-539.
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  36. Grundfragen zum Problem der objektiven Werte.Joh Erich Heyde - 1926 - Kant-Studien 31 (1-3):46-52.
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  37. Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: From Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance.Jeroen Hopster - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):763-780.
    How should we understand the notion of moral objectivity? Metaethical positions that vindicate morality’s objective appearance are often associated with moral realism. On a realist construal, moral objectivity is understood in terms of mind-, stance-, or attitude-independence. But realism is not the only game in town for moral objectivists. On an antirealist construal, morality’s objective features are understood in virtue of our attitudes. In this paper I aim to develop this antirealist construal of moral objectivity in further detail, and to (...)
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  38. What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us About Moral Objectivity?Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):267-300.
    Moral phenomenology is concerned with the elements of one's moral experiences that are generally available to introspection. Some philosophers argue that one's moral experiences, such as experiencing oneself as being morally obligated to perform some action on some occasion, contain elements that (1) are available to introspection and (2) carry ontological objectivist purportargument from phenomenological introspection.neutrality thesisthe phenomenological data regarding one's moral experiences that is available to introspection is neutral with respect to the issue of whether such experiences carry ontological (...)
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  39. Metaethical Quietism.Douglas Kremm & Karl Schafer - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 643-658.
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  40. Moral Objectivity and Reasonable Agreement: Can Realism Be Reconciled with Kantian Constructivism?Cristina Lafont - 2004 - Ratio Juris 17 (1):27-51.
    In this paper I analyze the tension between realism and antirealism at the basis of Kantian constructivism. This tension generates a conflictive account of the source of the validity of social norms. On the one hand, the claim to moral objectivity characteristic of Kantian moral theories makes the validity of norms depend on realist assumptions concerning the existence of shared fundamental interests among all rational human beings. I illustrate this claim through a comparison of the approaches of Rawls, Habermas and (...)
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  41. A Precise Meaning for Objective and Subjective in Value Theory.Harold N. Lee - 1940 - Journal of Philosophy 37 (23):626-637.
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  42. Companions in Guilt: Entailment, Analogy and Absorption.Hallvard Lillehammer - forthcoming - In Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
    In this paper, I do three things. First, I say what I mean by a ‘companions in guilt’ argument in meta-ethics. Second, I distinguish between two kinds of argument within this family, which I call ‘arguments by entailment’ and ‘arguments by analogy’. Third, I explore the prospects for companions in guilt arguments by analogy. During the course of this discussion, I identify a distinctive variety of argument, which I call ‘arguments by absorption’. I argue that this variety of argument (at (...)
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  43. Constructivism and the Error Theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2011 - In Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum.
    This paper presents a comparative evaluation of constructivist and error theoretic accounts of moral claims. It is argued that constructivism has distinct advantages over error theory.
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  44. Mr. Walhout's "Objectivity and Value".T. Foster Lindley - 1954 - Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):190-192.
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  45. Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions?Christian Miller - 2009 - In Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.
    Due largely to the work of Mark Murphy and Philip Quinn, divine will theory has emerged as a legitimate alternative to divine command theory in recent years. As an initial characterization, divine will theory is a view of deontological properties according to which, for instance, an agent S‟s obligation to perform action A in circumstances C is grounded in God‟s will that S A in C. Characterized this abstractly, divine will theory does not specify which kind of mental state is (...)
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  46. Three Versions of Objectivity: Aesthetic, Moral, and Scientific.Richard W. Miller - 1998 - In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Cambridge University Press. pp. 26--58.
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  47. Three Versions of Objectivity: Moral, Aesthetic and Scientific.Richard W. Miller - 1997 - In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Cambridge University Press.
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  48. A Realist Sexual Ethics.Micah Newman - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):223-240.
    A very liberal sexual ethics now holds sway in Western culture, such that mutual consent alone is widely seen as morally legitimizing almost any sexual activity between adults. It is further commonly assumed by both philosophers and nonphilosophers that arguing for some alternative to liberal sexual ethics requires appeal to ethical commands specific to some religious tradition or other. The purpose of this paper is to challenge that assumption by suggesting some purely naturalistic and independently-plausible premises that can be used (...)
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  49. Review of Sabina Lovibond:Realism and Imagination in Ethics. [REVIEW]Charles Pigden - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):313-315.
    A critique of a kind of 'moral realism' that is in fact a rather thinly disguised version of global historicist idealism. If you don't like the idea that facts are hard and values are soft, you can pump up the values to make them as hard as the facts or soften down the facts to make them as soggy as the values. Lovibond prefers the latter strategy. After some critical remarks about Lovibond's book (including its implicit authoritarianism) I conclude with (...)
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  50. Further Problems with Projectivism.Thomas Pölzler - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):92-102.
    From David Hume onwards, many philosophers have argued that moral thinking is characterized by a tendency to “project” our own mental states onto the world. This metaphor of projection may be understood as involving two empirical claims: the claim that humans experience morality as a realm of objective facts (the experiential hypothesis), and the claim that this moral experience is immediately caused by affective attitudes (the causal hypothesis). Elsewhere I argued in detail against one form of the experiential hypothesis. My (...)
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