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1 — 50 / 88
  1. added 2020-05-23
    Universalismo e Particularismo nas Discussões Modernas.Fernando Rodrigues - 2005 - Abstracta 2 (1):61-69.
    In this paper I will discuss the role of national identity in the light of modern political and moral theories. My strategy here is threefold: firstly, I will present an overview of pre-modern theories of rights and duties of individuals, and then show how they fail to make sense of the notions of freedom and equality ; secondly, I will introduce modern political and moral theories as an outstanding alternative to those ones, given the paradigm of values established by modern (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-22
    Misunderstanding Metaethics: Difficulties Measuring Folk Objectivism and Relativism.Lance S. Bush & David Moss - 2020 - Diametros 17 (64):6-21.
    Recent research on the metaethical beliefs of ordinary people appears to show that they are metaethical pluralists that adopt different metaethical standards for different moral judgments. Yet the methods used to evaluate folk metaethical belief rely on the assumption that participants interpret what they are asked in metaethical terms. We argue that most participants do not interpret questions designed to elicit metaethical beliefs in metaethical terms, or at least not in the way researchers intend. As a result, existing methods are (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-22
    Relativism and Moral Critique.Roger J. H. King - 1991 - Social Philosophy Today 5:145-163.
  4. added 2020-04-08
    I Can't Relax! You're Driving Me Quasi!Stephen Ingram - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
    Robust Realists think that there are irreducible, non-natural, and mind-independent moral properties. Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists think the same, but interpret these commitments differently. Robust Realists interpret them as metaphysical commitments, to be defended by metaphysical argument. Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists say that they can only be interpreted as moral commitments. These theories thus pose a serious threat to Robust Realism, for they apparently undermine the very possibility of articulating the robust metaphysical commitments of this theory. I clarify and respond (...)
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  5. added 2020-04-02
    Wittgenstein and Objectivity in Ethics. A Reply to Brandhorst.Benjamin De Mesel - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 40 (1):40-63.
    In “Correspondence to Reality in Ethics”, Mario Brandhorst examines the view of ethics that Wittgenstein took in his later years. According to Brandhorst, Wittgenstein leaves room for truth and falsity, facts, correspondence and reality in ethics. Wittgenstein's target, argues Brandhorst, is objectivity. I argue that Brandhorst's arguments in favour of truth, facts, reality and correspondence in ethics invite similar arguments in favour of objectivity, that Brandhorst does not recognise this because his conception of objectivity is distorted by a Platonist picture (...)
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  6. added 2020-03-22
    Partial Values: A Comparative Study in the Limits of Objectivity.Kevin DeLapp - 2018 - Rowman & Littlefield International.
    An examination of the tensions between different conceptions of objectivity and subjectivity, and impartiality and partiality, as they arise in epistemology, ethical theory, and metaethics. Resources from classical Chinese philosophy are leveraged throughout the work to showcase new alternative ways of resolving these tensions.
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  7. added 2020-03-13
    Mind-Independence Without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can’T Have It Both Ways.Sharon Street - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-32.
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  8. added 2019-12-09
    The Meta-Ethical Significance of Experiments About Folk Moral Objectivism.Jeroen Hopster - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):831-852.
    The meta-ethical commitments of folk respondents – specifically their commitment to the objectivity of moral claims – have recently become subject to empirical scrutiny. Experimental findings suggest that people are meta-ethical pluralists: There is both inter- and intrapersonal variation with regard to people’s objectivist commitments. What meta-ethical implications, if any, do these findings have? I point out that current research does not directly address traditional meta-ethical questions: The methods used and distinctions drawn by experimenters do not perfectly match those of (...)
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  9. added 2019-09-26
    On-Conditionalism: On the Verge of a New Metaethical Theory.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2016 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 11 (2-3):88-107.
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen | : This paper explores a novel metaethical theory according to which value judgments express conditional beliefs held by those who make them. Each value judgment expresses the belief that something is the case on condition that something else is the case. The paper aims to reach a better understanding of this view and to highlight some of the challenges that lie ahead. The most pressing of these revolves around the correct understanding of the nature of the relevant (...)
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  10. added 2019-09-15
    Matilal's Metaethics.Nicolas Bommarito & Alex King - forthcoming - In Colin Marshall (ed.), Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 139-156.
    Bimal Krishna Matilal (1935-1991) was a Harvard-educated Indian philosopher best known for his contributions to logic, but who also wrote on wide variety of topics, including metaethics. Unfortunately, the latter contributions have been overlooked. Engaging with Anglo-American figures such as Gilbert Harman and Bernard Williams, Matilal defends a view he dubs ‘pluralism.’ In defending this view he draws on a wide range of classical Indian sources: the Bhagavad-Gītā, Buddhist thinkers like Nāgārjuna, and classical Jaina concepts. This pluralist position is somewhere (...)
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  11. added 2019-07-07
    Empirical Research on Folk Moral Objectivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (5).
    Lay persons may have intuitions about morality's objectivity. What do these intuitions look like? And what are their causes and consequences? In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have begun to investigate these questions empirically. This article presents and assesses the resulting area of research as well as its potential philosophical implications. First, we introduce the methods of empirical research on folk moral objectivism. Second, we provide an overview of the findings that have so far been made. Third, we (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Review of Derek Parfit, On What Matters. [REVIEW]Jonathan Anomaly - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3):358-360.
  13. added 2019-06-06
    Evaluative Concepts and Objective Values: Rand on Moral Objectivity: Darryl F. Wright.Darryl F. Wright - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):149-181.
    Those familiar with Ayn Rand's ethical writings may know that she discusses issues in metaethics, and that she defended the objectivity of morality during the heyday of early non-cognitivism. But neither her metaethics, in general, nor her views on moral objectivity, in particular, have received wide study. This article elucidates some aspects of her thought in these areas, focusing on Rand's conception of the way in which moral values serve a biologically based human need, and on her account of moral (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-06
    Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Judith Thomson - 1996 - Wiley.
    Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism.
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  15. added 2019-06-05
    Moral Explanation and Moral ObjectivityMoral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Peter Railton, Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):175.
    What is the real issue at stake in discussions of "moral explanation"? There isn't one; there are many. The standing of purported moral properties and problems about our epistemic or semantic access to them are of concern both from within and without moral practice. An account of their potential contribution to explaining our values, beliefs, conduct, practices, etc. can help in these respects. By examining some claims made about moral explanation in Judith Thompson's and Gilbert Harman's Moral Relativism and Moral (...)
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  16. added 2019-05-31
    Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
    Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and ad hoc. After explaining why this (...)
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  17. added 2018-09-09
    V—Moral Truth: Observational or Theoretical?Catherine Wilson - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):97-114.
    Moral properties are widely held to be response‐dependent properties of actions, situations, events and persons. There is controversy as to whether the putative response‐dependence of these properties nullifies any truth‐claims for moral judgements, or rather supports them. The present paper argues that moral judgements are more profitably compared with theoretical judgements in the natural sciences than with the judgements of immediate sense‐perception. The notion of moral truth is dependent on the notion of moral knowledge, which in turn is best understood (...)
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  18. added 2018-08-27
    Disagreement and Objectivity in Ethics.Denis F. Sullivan - 2000 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 74:231-244.
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  19. added 2018-08-03
    Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Objectivity.Sem de Maagt - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (5):443-465.
    Ever since the introduction of reflective equilibrium in ethics, it has been argued that reflective equilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms, reflective equilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method of reflective equilibrium against these objections. Defenders of reflective equilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying (...)
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  20. added 2018-07-29
    The Objectivity of Nihilism.Gregor Schiemann - 2016 - Divinatio. Studia Culturologica:1.
    The discourse on nihilism in the German-speaking world continues to take its orientation primarily from Friedrich Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism as a historical movement of the decline of values. This means that the aspects of nihilism that are not tied to specific epochs and cultures are not accorded due importance (I). In order to make a reappraisal of nihilism that does justice to these objective contents, I will present a classification of types of nihilism and of arguments that support it. (...)
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  21. added 2018-07-18
    Whose Metaethical Minimalism?Noell Birondo - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2):37-43.
    T. M. Scanlon’s ‘Reasons Fundamentalism’ rejects any naturalistic reduction of normative truths and it also rejects the type of non-naturalism that invokes a ‘special metaphysical reality.’ Here I argue that this still does not commit Scanlon—as some have thought—to an extreme ‘metaethical minimalism’ according to which there are no ‘truth makers’ at all for normative truths. I emphasize that the issue here is not just about understanding Scanlon, since the actual position defended by Scanlon might, more significantly, point the way (...)
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  22. added 2018-07-15
    Companions in Guilt: Entailment, Analogy, and Absorbtion.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2019 - In Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
    In this paper, I do three things. First, I say what I mean by a ‘companions in guilt’ argument in meta-ethics. Second, I distinguish between two kinds of argument within this family, which I call ‘arguments by entailment’ and ‘arguments by analogy’. Third, I explore the prospects for companions in guilt arguments by analogy. During the course of this discussion, I identify a distinctive variety of argument, which I call ‘arguments by absorption’. I argue that this variety of argument inherits (...)
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  23. added 2018-01-10
    Metaethical Quietism.Douglas Kremm & Karl Schafer - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 643-658.
  24. added 2017-11-12
    Why Insights in Evolutionary Moral Psychology Help Resolve Long-Standing Meta-Ethical Questions.Uri Harris - manuscript
    In this brief paper, I present some basic arguments for why insights in moral psychology, especially the work of Jonathan Haidt and others in Moral Foundations Theory, points towards a resolution of long-standing meta-ethical questions.
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  25. added 2017-10-05
    Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: From Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance.Jeroen Hopster - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):763-780.
    How should we understand the notion of moral objectivity? Metaethical positions that vindicate morality’s objective appearance are often associated with moral realism. On a realist construal, moral objectivity is understood in terms of mind-, stance-, or attitude-independence. But realism is not the only game in town for moral objectivists. On an antirealist construal, morality’s objective features are understood in virtue of our attitudes. In this paper I aim to develop this antirealist construal of moral objectivity in further detail, and to (...)
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  26. added 2017-09-28
    Three Versions of Objectivity: Aesthetic, Moral, and Scientific.Richard W. Miller - 1998 - In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Cambridge University Press. pp. 26--58.
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  27. added 2017-09-19
    Children’s Developing Metaethical Judgments.Marco F. H. Schmidt, Ivan Gonzalez-Cabrera & Michael Tomasello - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 164:163-177.
    Human adults incline toward moral objectivism but may approach things more relativistically if different cultures are involved. In this study, 4-, 6-, and 9-year-old children (N = 136) witnessed two parties who disagreed about moral matters: a normative judge (e.g., judging that it is wrong to do X) and an antinormative judge (e.g., judging that it is okay to do X). We assessed children’s metaethical judgment, that is, whether they judged that only one party (objectivism) or both parties (relativism) could (...)
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  28. added 2017-06-01
    Truth and Acceptance Conditions for Moral Statements Can Be Identical: Further Support for Subjective Consequentialism.Scott Forschler - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):337-346.
    Two meanings of "subjective consequentialism" are distinguished: conscious deliberation with the aim of producing maximally-good consequences, versus acting in ways that, given one's evidence set and reasoning capabilities, is subjectively most likely to maximize expected consequences. The latter is opposed to "objective consequentialism," which demands that we act in ways that actually produce the best total consequences. Peter Railton's arguments for a version of objective consequentialism confuse the two subjective forms, and are only effective against the first. After reviewing the (...)
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  29. added 2017-01-11
    A Precise Meaning for Objective and Subjective in Value Theory.Harold N. Lee - 1940 - Journal of Philosophy 37 (23):626-637.
  30. added 2016-12-05
    The Debunking Challenge to Realism: How Evolution (Ultimately) Matters.Levy Arnon & Yair Levy - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-8.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) have attracted extensive attention in meta-ethics, as they pose an important challenge to moral realism. Mogensen (2015) suggests that EDAs contain a fallacy, by confusing two distinct forms of biological explanation – ultimate and proximate. If correct, the point is of considerable importance: evolutionary genealogies of human morality are simply irrelevant for debunking. But we argue that the actual situation is subtler: while ultimate claims do not strictly entail proximate ones, there are important evidential connections between (...)
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  31. added 2016-09-15
    Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics 1 : Realism and Constructivism in a Kantian Context.Karl Schafer - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):690-701.
    Metaethical constructivism is one of the main movements within contemporary metaethics – especially among those with Kantian inclinations. But both the philosophical coherence and the Kantian pedigree of constructivism are hotly contested. In the first half of this article, I first explore the sense in which Kant's own views might be described as constructivist and then use the resulting understanding as a guide to how we might think about Kantian constructivism today. Along the way, I hope to suggest that a (...)
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  32. added 2016-09-15
    Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics 2 : The Kantian Conception of Rationality and Rationalist Constructivism.Karl Schafer - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):702-713.
    In the second half of this essay, I discuss the robust conception of rationality that lies at the heart of the Kantian version of Rationalist Constructivism – offering some reasons to prefer this conception to the more minimal accounts of rationality associated with Humean views. I then go on to discuss some of the potential metaethical advantages of the resulting form of constructivism.
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  33. added 2016-07-20
    The Significance of Ethical Disagreement for Theories of Ethical Thought and Talk.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 275-291.
    This chapter has two sections, each focusing on a distinct way in which ethical disagreement and variations in ethical judgment matter for theories of ethical thought and talk. In the first section, we look at how the variation poses problems for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist ways of specifying the nature of ethical judgments. In the second, we look at how disagreement phenomena have been taken to undermine cognitivist accounts, but also at how the seeming variation in cognitive and non-cognitive contents (...)
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  34. added 2016-06-21
    Is Morality Subjective? – A Reply to Critics.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Leslie Allan defends his thesis that ethics is objective in the sense of requiring moral agents to offer impartial reasons for acting. Radical subjectivists have attacked this requirement for impartiality on a number of grounds. Some critics make the charge that Allan's thesis is simply a version of subjectivism in disguise. He responds by showing how a broadly naturalist view of ethics accommodates objective moral constraints. Allan also counters cases in which impartiality is purportedly not morally required and considers the (...)
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  35. added 2016-06-03
    What About Suicide Bombers? A Terse Response to a Terse Objection.Marc Champagne - 2011 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 11 (2):233–236.
    Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up.".
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  36. added 2016-01-13
    A Procedural, Pragmatist Account of Ethical Objectivity.Amanda Roth - 2013 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 23 (2):169-200.
    In this paper I aim to lay out the major aspects of a procedural, pragmatist account of objectivity in ethics. This account is “procedural” insofar as it holds that the objectivity of inquiry depends not on what the results of that inquiry are, but rather whether the proper procedure of inquiry was followed to generate the results. The account is “pragmatic” insofar as it coheres with a broader approach to ethics that conceives of ethical inquiry and progress in terms of (...)
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  37. added 2015-12-03
    Further Problems with Projectivism.Thomas Pölzler - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):92-102.
    From David Hume onwards, many philosophers have argued that moral thinking is characterized by a tendency to “project” our own mental states onto the world. This metaphor of projection may be understood as involving two empirical claims: the claim that humans experience morality as a realm of objective facts (the experiential hypothesis), and the claim that this moral experience is immediately caused by affective attitudes (the causal hypothesis). Elsewhere I argued in detail against one form of the experiential hypothesis. My (...)
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  38. added 2015-12-03
    Climate Change Inaction and Moral Nihilism.Thomas Pölzler - 2015 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 18 (2):202-214.
    The effects of anthropogenic climate change may be devastating. Nevertheless, most people do not seem to be seriously concerned. We consume as much as we always did, drive as much as we always did, eat as much meat as we always did. What can we do to overcome this collective apathy? In order to be able to develop effective measures, we must first get clear about the causes of climate change inaction. In this paper I ask whether moral nihilism is (...)
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  39. added 2015-12-03
    Moral Disagreement, Anti-Realism, and the Worry About Overgeneralization.Thomas Pölzler - 2015 - In Christian Kanzian, Josef Mitterer & Katharina Neges (eds.), Contributions to the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 245-247.
    According to the classical argument from moral disagreement, the existence of widespread or persistent moral disagreement is best explained by, and thus inductively supports the view that there are no objective moral facts. One of the most common charges against this argument is that it “overgeneralizes”: it implausibly forces its proponents to deny the existence of objective facts about certain matters of physics, history, philosophy, etc. as well (companions in guilt), or even about its own conclusion or its own soundness (...)
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  40. added 2015-12-01
    Mr. Walhout's "Objectivity and Value".T. Foster Lindley - 1954 - Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):190-192.
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  41. added 2015-09-30
    Review of Terence Cuneo's Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking. [REVIEW]Spencer Jay Case - 2015 - Tradition and Discovery 42 (1):59-62.
  42. added 2015-08-26
    A Realist Sexual Ethics.Micah Newman - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):223-240.
    A very liberal sexual ethics now holds sway in Western culture, such that mutual consent alone is widely seen as morally legitimizing almost any sexual activity between adults. It is further commonly assumed by both philosophers and nonphilosophers that arguing for some alternative to liberal sexual ethics requires appeal to ethical commands specific to some religious tradition or other. The purpose of this paper is to challenge that assumption by suggesting some purely naturalistic and independently-plausible premises that can be used (...)
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  43. added 2015-07-16
    Ethics as a Science.Charles W. Super - 1914 - International Journal of Ethics 24 (3):265-81.
  44. added 2015-07-13
    Objectivity and Moral Realism: On the Significance of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience.Michael Smith - 1993 - In John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press. pp. 235-256.
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  45. added 2015-06-15
    Reviewed Work: Objectivity and Cultural Divergence by S. C. Brown. [REVIEW]Anthony Ellis - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (236):274-276.
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  46. added 2014-05-17
    Moral Realism Without Moral Metaphysics.Andrew Sepielli - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume XI. Oxford University Press.
  47. added 2014-05-09
    Asserting Moral Sentences.Bastian Reichardt - 2014 - SATS 15 (1):1-19.
    During the last century of meta-ethical debates, moral realism was much criticized for its ontological assumptions. These assumptions arise from the semantic intuition that lies at the heart of realist theories – namely, the intuition that language represents states of affairs. This makes moral realism hardly compatible with a naturalist world view and gives rise to consider ontologically more economic approaches. Moral constructivists can explain objectivity in ethics without inheriting the realist’s ontological burden. Nevertheless, constructivists tend to ignore the semantic (...)
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  48. added 2014-04-02
    Moral Objectivity: Husserl’s Sentiments of the Understanding.John J. Drummond - 1995 - Husserl Studies 12 (2):165-183.
    This paper explores two perspectives in Husserl's recently published writings on ethics and axiology in order to sketch anew a phenomenological account of practical reason. The paper aims a) to show that a phenomenological account of moral intentionality i) transcends the disputes between intellectualist-emotivist and intellectualist-voluntarist disputes and ii) points toward a position in which practical reason has an emotive content or, conversely, the emotions have a cognitive content, and the paper aims b) to show that a phenomenological ethics identifies (...)
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  49. added 2014-03-31
    Theism and Moral Objectivity.John Zeis - 1992 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 66 (4):429-445.
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  50. added 2014-03-31
    Grundfragen zum Problem der objektiven Werte.Joh Erich Heyde - 1926 - Kant-Studien 31 (1-3):46-52.
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