Related categories

3 found
Order:
  1. A Defence of Emotivism.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    As a non-cognitivist analysis of moral language, Charles Stevenson's sophisticated emotivism is widely regarded by moral philosophers as a substantial improvement over its historical antecedent, radical emotivism. None the less, it has come in for its share of criticism. In this essay, Leslie Allan responds to the key philosophical objections to Stevenson's thesis, arguing that the criticisms levelled against his meta-ethical theory rest largely on a too hasty reading of his works.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  2. Permissibility Is the Only Feasible Deontic Primitive.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):117-133.
    Moral obligation and permissibility are usually thought to be interdefinable. Following the pattern of the duality definitions of necessity and possibility, we have that something’s being permissible could be defined as its not being obligatory to not do it. And that something’s being obligatory could be defined as its not being permissible to not do it. In this paper, I argue that neither direction of this alleged interdefinability works. Roughly, the problem is that a claim that some act is obligatory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The Expansion View of Thick Concepts.Brent G. Kyle - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):914-944.
    This paper proposes a new Separabilist account of thick concepts, called the Expansion View (or EV). According to EV, thick concepts are expanded contents of thin terms. An expanded content is, roughly, the semantic content of a predicate along with modifiers. Although EV is a form of Separabilism, it is distinct from the only kind of Separabilism discussed in the literature, and it has many features that Inseparabilists want from an account of thick concepts. EV can also give non-cognitivists a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Are Moral Judgements Semantically Uniform? A Wittgensteinian Approach to the Cognitivism - Non-Cognitivism Debate.Benjamin De Mesel - 2019 - In Benjamin De Mesel & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein. New York: Routledge. pp. 126-148.
    Cognitivists and non-cognitivists in contemporary meta-ethics tend to assume that moral judgments are semantically uniform. That is, they share the assumption that either all moral judgments express beliefs, or they all express non-beliefs. But what if some moral judgments express beliefs and others do not? Then moral judgments are not semantically uniform and the question “Cognitivist or non-cognitivist?” poses a false dilemma. I will question the assumption that moral judgments are semantically uniform. First, I will explain what I mean by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Thick Evaluation, by Simon Kirchin. [REVIEW]Brent G. Kyle - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):954-962.
    Thick Evaluation, by KirchinSimon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xi + 198.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Two Nondescriptivist Views of Normative and Evaluative Statements.Matthew Chrisman - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):405-424.
    The dominant route to nondescriptivist views of normative and evaluative language is through the expressivist idea that normative terms have distinctive expressive roles in conveying our attitudes. This paper explores an alternative route based on two ideas. First, a core normative term ‘ought’ is a modal operator; and second, modal operators play a distinctive nonrepresentational role in generating meanings for the statements in which they figure. I argue that this provides for an attractive alternative to expressivist forms of nondescriptivism about (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Good and Good For.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2017 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.
  8. Non-Descriptive Negation for Normative Sentences.Andrew Alwood - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):1-25.
    Frege-Geach worries about embedding and composition have plagued metaethical theories like emotivism, prescriptivism and expressivism. The sharpened point of such criticism has come to focus on whether negation and inconsistency have to be understood in descriptivist terms. Because they reject descriptivism, these theories must offer a non-standard account of the meanings of ethical and normative sentences as well as related semantic facts, such as why certain sentences are inconsistent with each other. This paper fills out such a solution to the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9. Natural Morality, Descriptivism, and Non-Cognitivism.Edmund Wall - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):233-248.
    I attempt to identify a problem running through the foundation of R. M. Hare’s ethical prescriptivism and the more recent sentimentalism/ethical expressivism of Simon Blackburn. The non-cognitivism to which Hare and Blackburn’s approaches are committed renders them unable to establish stable contents for basic moral principles and, thus, incapable of conducting a logical analysis of moral terms or statements. I argue that objective-descriptive- natural ethical theories are in a much better position to provide a satisfying account of the logical analysis (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Prescriptions and Universalizability: A Defence of Harean Ethical Theory.Daniel Y. Elstein - 2014 - Dissertation, Cambridge University
    R.M. Hare had an ambitious scheme of providing a unified account of meta-ethics and normative ethics by combining expressivism with Kantianism and utilitarianism. The project of this thesis is to defend Hare’s theory in its most ambitious form. This means not just showing how the expressivist, Kantian and utilitarian elements are consistent, or that the three are each correct, but also that they are interdependent. The only defensible form of expressivism is Kantian; the only defensible Kantian theory is both expressivist (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Trei teorii etice. Kant, Mill, Hare.Valentin Muresan - 2012 - Editura Universitatii din Bucuresti.
    This coursebook contains three extensive essays dedicated to presenting, in an relative accesible form, the essential concepts and specific theoretical views of Kant, Mill and RM Hare regarding the philosophical principles of our moral evaluations. Although intended mainly as a tool for teaching basic classical ethical strategies - Kant's deontologism, Mill's normative utilitarianism and Hare's universal prescriptivism - to students, this book is also a very useful instrument for all those who need to get a comprehensive first view over these (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. R.M. Hare’s Irrationalist “Rationalism”: A Critic of Universal Prescriptivism.Nathan Nobis - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):205-214.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. R.M. Hare’s Irrationalist “Rationalism”.Nathan Nobis - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):205-214.
  14. Imperative Clauses and the Frege–Geach Problem.Andrew Alwood - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):105-117.
  15. Snare's Puzzle/Hume's Purpose: Non-Cognitivism and What Hume Was Really Up to with No-Ought-From-Is.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument more precise. I develop (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. Richard Hare En Perspectiva.Olga Ramirez Calle & Olga Ramírez - 2010 - Telos: Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios Utilitaristas 17 (2):209-225.
    Hare’s analysis of moral language have been either obviated in contemporary meta-ethical debates or straightforwardly sided with dated forms of humean noncognitivism. It is assumed that Hare´s conceptual analysis is subject to the same critique that threatens these last positions and is in the same way inadequate. I believe this misrepresents his position and distracts us from his more important contributions to the understanding of moral language. The present paper attempts to show that, even if some miss-adjustments in Hare’s position (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. A Fork in the Road for Expressivism.Mark van Roojen - 2010 - Ethics 120 (2):357-381.
    This is a review essay discussing Mark Schroeder's book, Being For.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Homage to Hare: Ecumenism and the Frege‐Geach Problem.John Eriksson - 2009 - Ethics 120 (1):8-35.
    The Frege‐Geach problem is probably the most serious worry for the prospects of any kind of metaethical expressivism. In a recent article, Ridge suggests that a new version of expressivism, a view he calls ecumenical expressivism, can avoid the Frege‐Geach problem.1 In contrast to pure expressivism, ecumenical expressivism is the view that moral utterances function to express not only desire‐like states of mind but also beliefs with propositional content. Whereas pure expressivists’ solutions to the Frege‐Geach problem usually have rested on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  19. Język a Utylitaryzm. Filozofia Moralna Richarda M. Hare'a.Krzysztof Saja - 2008 - Aureus.
  20. Prescriptive Realism.John E. Hare - 2006 - Philosophia Reformata 71 (1):14-30.
    In my book God’s Call1 I gave an historical account of the debate within twentieth century analytic philosophy between moral realism and expressivism. Moral realism is the view that moral properties like goodness or cruelty exist independently of our making judgements that things have such properties. Such judgements are, on this theory, objectively true when the things referred to have the specified properties and objectively false when they do not. Expressivism is the view that when a person makes a moral (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Dislodging Butterflies From the Supervenient.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:103-112.
    Applied to evaluative properties the supervenience thesis is customarily understood as expressing two intuitions: (i) the idea that there is some kind of dependence between the (supervenient) value of an object and some (or all) of the natural properties of the object; (ii) the idea that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. It (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Sensibility Theory and Conservative Complancency.Peter W. Ross & Dale Turner - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):544–555.
    In Ruling Passions, Simon Blackburn contends that we should reject sensibility theory because it serves to support a conservative complacency. Blackburn's strategy is attractive in that it seeks to win this metaethical dispute – which ultimately stems from a deep disagreement over antireductionism – on the basis of an uncontroversial normative consideration. Therefore, Blackburn seems to offer an easy solution to an apparently intractable debate. We will show, however, that Blackburn's argument against sensibility theory does not succeed; it is no (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23. Towards an Adequate Ethical Theory.Aleksandar Dobrijevic - 2003 - Filozofija I Društvo 2003 (22):65-114.
    The author re-examines Hare?s claim about universal prescriptivism as the most adequate ethical theory in the narrow sense. Validity of that standpoint is being verified in relation to some rival conceptions, and through the requirements which have to be satisfied in order that an ethical theory can be called adequate. Autor preispituje Herovu tvrdnju o univerzalnom preskriptivizmu kao najadekvatnijoj etickoj teoriji u uzem smislu. Validnost tog stanovista odmerava se u odnosu na neke konkurentne koncepcije, i to preko uslova koji moraju (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  24. R.M. Hare.Piers Benn - 2002 - Philosophy Now 35:39-39.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. RM Hare.Peter Dalton - 2002 - In Leemon McHenry, P. Dematteis & P. Fosl (eds.), British Philosophers, 1800-2000. Bruccoli Clark Layman. pp. 262--111.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Response to RM Hare.Donald Hill - 2002 - In Ruth F. Chadwick & Doris Schroeder (eds.), Applied Ethics: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 4--1.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Book Review: The Moral Problem by Michael Smith. [REVIEW]James Dreier - 1996 - Mind 105 (418):363-367.
  28. The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Moral Argument.Mark T. Nelson - 1996 - Religious Studies 32 (1):15-26.
    The Clarke/Rowe version of the Cosmological Argument is sound only if the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is true, but many philosophers, including Rowe, think that there is not adequate evidence for the principle of sufficient reason. I argue that there may be indirect evidence for PSR on the grounds that if we do not accept it, we lose our best justification for an important principle of metaethics, namely, the Principle of Universalizability. To show this, I argue that all the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Universal Prescriptivism Revised Or: The Analyticity of the Golden Rule.Hans-Ulrich Hoche - 1995 - Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 4 (8):337-364.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. Moral Relativism, Cognitivism and Defeasible Rules.Ernest Sosa - 1994 - Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1):116-138.
    Naturalism rejects a sui generis and fundamental realm of the evaluative or normative. Thought and talk about the good and the right must hence be understood without appeal to any such evaluative or normative concepts or properties. In Sections I and II, we see noncognitivism step forward with its account of evaluative and normative language as fundamentally optative or prescriptive. Prescriptivism falls afoul of several problems. Prominent among them below is the “problem of prima facie reasons”: the problem, namely that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. Hare's Route From Universal Prescriptivism to Utilitarianism.Keith Dowling - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21 (1):65-81.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Universal Prescriptivism and Practical Skepticism.James W. McGray - 1990 - Philosophical Papers 19 (1):37-51.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Ought-Implies-Can: Erasmus Luther and R.M. Hare.Charles R. Pigden - 1990 - Sophia 29 (1):2-30.
    l. There is an antinomy in Hare's thought between Ought-Implies-Can and No-Indicatives-from-Imperatives. It cannot be resolved by drawing a distinction between implication and entailment. 2. Luther resolved this antinomy in the l6th century, but to understand his solution, we need to understand his problem. He thought the necessity of Divine foreknowledge removed contingency from human acts, thus making it impossible for sinners to do otherwise than sin. 3. Erasmus objected (on behalf of Free Will) that this violates Ought-Implies-Can which he (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  34. Quasi-Quasi-Realism.Nick Zangwill - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):583-594.
    I. Projcctivism, Subjcctivism, and Error (i) According to Simon Blackburn, somconc who wants t0 avoid a ‘rcalistic’ account of our motal thought faces a choice} Thc choicc is bctwccn his non-rcductionist ‘projcctivism’ and rcductionist ‘subjcctivism’. Thc foymcr is thc vicw that moral judgments cxprcss attitudcs (approval, disapproval, liking or disliking, for example), which wc ‘projcct’ or ‘sprcad’ onto thc world, while thc latter is thc vicw that moral judgments arc bclicfs about attitudes. Blackburn bcratcs philosophers for not sccing thc diffcrcncc, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  35. Moral Dilemmas and Prescriptivism.Christopher W. Gowans - 1989 - American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (3):187 - 197.
    The purpose of this paper is to establish that, For an important class of moral judgments, The claim that there are moral dilemmas is false. The judgments are the judgments an agent committed to morality makes as the conclusion of deliberation about what, All things considered, He or she morally ought to do in some situation. The argument is that these judgments are prescriptive, In the sense of implying an intention to act, And that it is implausible to think there (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Logic and Morality: The Ambiguities of Universal Prescriptivism.Helen Kalokerinou - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Exeter (United Kingdom)
    Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;The present thesis is concerned with examining critically Hare's moral philosophy and with assessing its position in the contemporary British moral thought. I argue that his moral theory not only is not as coherent as it might have first appeared to be but also when appreciated as a whole is not susceptible to the kind of interpretation it usually is. Certain internal inconsistencies of his moral account have been at various times (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. The Language of Decision: An Essay in Prescriptivist Ethical Theory. John Ibberson.A. W. Price - 1988 - Ethics 98 (4):841-842.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. A Prognosis for Universal Prescriptivism.Norman O. Dahl - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (3):383 - 424.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. From Universal Prescriptivism to Utilitarianism.J. W. Roxbee Cox - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142):1-15.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. The Language of Decision: An Essay in Prescriptivist Ethical Theory.John Ibberson - 1986 - Humanities Press.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. From Universal Prescriptivism to Utilitarianism.James W. McGray - 1986 - Philosophy Research Archives 12 (142):79-86.
    This paper is a critique of R.M. Hare’s argument that rational universal prescriptions are equivalent to utilitarian judgments. The problem with Hare’s argument is his restrictive model of rationality. He succeeds in proving that awareness of certain facts is essential to making a fully rational universal prescription. But he fails to prove that other facts, such as the ultimate separateness of persons, are irrelevant. Once such facts are taken seriously, the utilitarian implication is invalidated.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Hare's Proof.Fred Feldman - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (2):269 - 283.
  43. How Incomplete is Prescriptivism?Harry J. Gensler - 1984 - Mind 93 (369):103-107.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Hare on Universal Prescriptivism and Utilitarianism.Ingmar Persson - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):43 - 49.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Hare's Theory of Morals.David Kent Carter - 1982 - Dissertation, Yale University
    R. M. Hare's two main contributions to contemporary ethical theory are his earlier analysis of the logic of moral discourse and his more recent account of moral argument. Of the two, it is the first which is both more fundamental and more viable, and the present study is a critical examination of it. Portions of that analysis, it is argued, are seriously defective and require to be recast, and two of particular importance are singled out for extended treatment. It is (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. The Speech Act Fallacy Fallacy.Thomas Hurka - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):509-526.
    John Searle has charged R.M. Hare's prescriptivist analysis of the meaning of ‘good,’ ‘ought’ and the other evaluative words with committing what he calls the ‘speech act fallacy.’ This is a fallacy which Searle thinks is committed not only by Hare's analysis, but by any analysis which attributes to a word the function of indicating that a particular speech act is being performed, or that an utterance has a particular illocutionary force. ‘There is a condition of adequacy which any analysis (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  47. Moral Judgment and the Moral Point of View.George William Harris - 1981 - Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin
    In recent years, metaethicists have debated the pros and cons of the following five claims regarding the essential features of moral as opposed to nonmoral judgments: Moral judgments are universalizable; Moral judgments are prescriptive; Moral judgments take normative priority over nonmoral evaluative judgments; Moral judgments are essentially connected with a substantive normative concern; Moral judgments can legitimately be said to be objective, intersubjectively valid, or true. The thesis of the dissertation is that on adequate interpretations of , , , and (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Prescriptivism and Incompleteness.Stephen B. Torrance - 1981 - Mind 90 (360):580-585.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. On a Claim of Hare's.P. T. Geach - 1980 - Analysis 41 (1):63 -.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. Prescriptivism and Neo-Naturalism: Hare, Foot and Warnock.Young Jin Kim - 1980 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark