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  1. added 2020-05-28
    Conditional Obligations.Tina Rulli - 2020 - Social Theory and Practice 46 (2):365-390.
    Some obligations are conditional such that act A is morally optional, but if one chooses A, one is required to do act B rather than some other less valuable act C. Such conditional obligations arise frequently in research ethics, in the philosophical literature, and in real life. They are controversial: how does a morally optional act give rise to demanding requirements to do the best? Some think that the fact that a putative obligation has a conditional structure, so defined, is (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-13
    Warring Tautologies: Moral Dissent From a Cognitivist Perspective.Matthias Kiesselbach - 2009 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 8 (1):125-145.
    It is commonly thought that the prevalence of moral dissent poses a problem for the moral cognitivist, forcing her to diagnose either a lot of misunderstanding, or a lot of unexplained observational error. Since mere misunderstanding can be ruled out in most cases of moral dissent, and since the diagnosis of widespread unexplained error is interpretively unstable, prevalent dissent has pushed many philosophers towards non-cognitivism. In this essay, I argue that once a diachronic, pragmatist theory of language along the lines (...)
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  3. added 2019-11-04
    Recent Experimental Work on “Ought” Implies “Can”.Jen Semler & Paul Henne - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (9).
    While philosophers generally accept some version of the principle ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, recent work in experimental philosophy and cognitive science provides evidence against a presupposition or a conceptual entailment from ‘ought’ to ‘can’. Here, we review some of this evidence, its effect on particular formulations of the principle, and future directions for cognitive scientists and philosophers.
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  4. added 2019-11-03
    The Error Condition.Jeremy David Fix - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):34-48.
    The possibility of error conditions the possibility of normative principles. I argue that extant interpretations of this condition undermine the possibility of normative principles for our action because they implicitly treat error as a perfection of an action. I then explain how a constitutivist metaphysics of capacities explains why error is an imperfection of an action. Finally, I describe and defend the interpretation of the error condition which follows.
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  5. added 2019-10-31
    Revisiting the Maxim-Law Dynamic in the Light of Kant’s Theory of Action.V. K. Radhakrishnan - 2019 - Kantian Journal 38 (2):45-72.
    A stable classification of practical principles into mutually exclusive types is foundational to Kant’s moral theory. Yet, other than a few brief hints on the distinction between maxims and laws, he does not provide any elaborate discussion on the classification and the types of practical principles in his works. This has led Onora O’Neill and Lewis Beck to reinterpret Kant’s classification of practical principles in a way that would clarify the conceptual connection between maxims and laws. In this paper I (...)
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  6. added 2019-09-12
    What is the Sufficientarian Precautionary Principle?G. Owen Schaefer - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (9):1083-1084.
    In their recent article, Koplin, Gyngell and Savulescu (2019) assess the viability of the precautionary principle as a decision-making tool to determine whether and under what circumstances germline gene editing should proceed. While their survey of different forms of the precautionary principle is illuminating, the most novel contribution is a new account of the precautionary principle, what they dub the Sufficientarian Precautionary Principle (SPP). SPP is meant to avoid several problems with existing accounts, while comporting with at least some of (...)
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  7. added 2019-06-06
    Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism About Rules.Denis Robinson - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):131-156.
    Part 1 of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement—in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism—and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a purely cognitivist account of moral (...)
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  8. added 2019-06-06
    A Single True Morality? The Challenge of Relativism: Harry Bunting.Harry Bunting - 1996 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 40:73-85.
    Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and (...)
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  9. added 2019-05-27
    Habits and Mental Perspectives: Educating Moral Particularism.Nate Jackson - 2017 - The Pluralist 12 (2):27.
    Moral particularism, broadly understood, is the position that morality resists codification into a set of rules or principles.1 Jonathan Dancy, particularism's main contemporary proponent, maintains that there are few, if any, true moral principles, and moral reasoning and judgment do not require them. Instead, acts are justified by the salient features of particular situations, and moral reasoning requires attunement to these elements. In rejecting a rule-bound approach to morality, particularists deny pictures of moral education emphasizing knowledge and application of principles. (...)
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  10. added 2019-04-12
    Review of Moral Particularism (Ed. Brad Hooker and Margaret Little). [REVIEW]Pekka Väyrynen - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):478.
    This is a short review of Moral Particularism, ed. Brad Hooker and Margaret Little (Oxford University Press, 2002).
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  11. added 2019-03-22
    As Boys Pursue the Rainbow. Whewell’s Independent Morality Vs. Sidgwick’s Dogmatic Intuitionism.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2011 - In Placido Bucolo, Roger Crisp & Bart Schultz (eds.), Proceedings of the Second World Congress on Henry Sidgwick. Ethics, Psychics, Politics. Catania, Italy: CUECM. pp. 146-235.
    I discuss Whewell’s philosophy of morality, as opposed to systematic morality, not unlike Kant’s distinction between a pure and an empirical moral philosophy. Whewell worked out a systematization of traditional normative ethics as a first step before its rational justification; he believed that the point in the philosophy of morality is justifying a few rational truths about the structure of morality such as to rule hedonism, eudemonism, and consequentialism; yet a system of positive morality cannot be derived solely from such (...)
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  12. added 2019-03-18
    Sidgwick’s Coherentist Moral Epistemology.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2012 - The Scientific Annals of Andquot;Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iasi (New Series). Philosophy 59:36-50.
    I discuss the ideas of common sense and common-sense morality in Sidgwick. I argue that, far from aiming at overcoming common-sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at grounding a consist code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the natural sciences, in order to reach also in the domain of morality the same kind of “mature” knowledge as in the natural sciences. His whole polemics with intuitionism was vitiated by the apriori assumption that the widespread ethos of the educated part of (...)
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  13. added 2019-02-19
    Supervenience, Repeatability, & Expressivism.Emad H. Atiq - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Expressivists traditionally explain normative supervenience by saying it is a conceptual truth. I argue against this tradition in two steps. First, I show the modal claim that stands in need of explanation has been stated imprecisely. Classic arguments in metaethics for normative supervenience and those that rely on it as a premise presuppose a constraint on the supervenience base that is rarely (if ever) made explicit: the repeatability of the non-normative properties on which the normative supervenes. Non-normative properties are repeatable (...)
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  14. added 2018-10-07
    Grounding the Normative: A Problem for Structured Non-Naturalism.Justin Morton - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):173-196.
    Many non-naturalists about the normative want to endorse the view that some normative facts hold in virtue of both non-normative facts and normative principles. In this paper, I argue that non-naturalism is inconsistent with this thesis, due to the nature of normative principles and their grounds. I then consider two ways in which the nonnaturalist position could be modified or expanded to solve this problem. No solution, it turns out, is without its problems. I end by considering how the non-naturalist (...)
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  15. added 2018-06-22
    Reasons in Moral Philosophy.Carla Bagnoli - 2018 - In G. Bongiovanni, Don Postema, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor, C. Valentini & D. Walton (eds.), Handbook in Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. New York: Springer.
  16. added 2018-05-19
    Complexitatea judecării morale: limitele abordărilor procedurale și tipuri de contexte.Emilian Mihailov - 2017 - Ideo: Romanian Journal of Philosophical and Social Studies 2 (1):51-66.
    How do we make good moral decisions? There is a tendency to answer this question by developing methods and procedures of moral decision making. In this paper I will show some limits and pitfalls of this approach. Good moral decisions need to take into account factors which cannot be codified into procedures. I draw attention to how analyzing the type of context is a necessary preamble for a better handling of procedures.
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  17. added 2018-03-05
    Should We Nudge Informed Consent?Thom Brooks - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (6):22-23.
    Exploring the use of nudges and informed consent in medical ethics.
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  18. added 2018-02-18
    A Response to "Libertarianism and Pollution: The Limits of Absolutist Moralism".J. C. Lester - 2016 - In Arguments for Liberty: A Libetarian Miscellany. Buckingham, England: The University of Buckingham Press. pp. 155-159.
    Most self-identified libertarians unwittingly have a moral muddle without a central factual theory of liberty. They cannot yet see that they first need to sort out what liberty is, and therefore entails if instantiated, and only after that can moral questions about it be coherently raised and tackled.
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  19. added 2018-02-12
    The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles.Selim Berker - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):904-936.
    Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a given action has a given moral property? I argue “No.” If moral principles are merely concerned with the extension of moral properties across all possible worlds, then they cannot be partial explainers of facts about the instantiation of those properties, since in general necessitation (...)
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  20. added 2017-08-10
    How Insensitive: Principles, Facts and Normative Grounds in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls.Daniel Kofman - 2012 - Socialist Studies 8 (1):246-268.
    Cohen’s hostility to Rawls’ justification of the Difference Principle by social facts spawned Cohen’s general thesis that ultimate principles of justice and morality are fact-insensitive, but explain how any fact-sensitive principle is grounded in facts. The problem with this thesis, however, is that when facts F ground principle P, reformulating this relation as the "fact-insensitive" conditional “If F, then P” is trivial and thus explanatorily impotent. Explanatory, hence justificatory, force derives either from subsumption under more general principles, or precisely exhibiting (...)
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  21. added 2016-12-05
    Aristippus & Others.Hugh Chandler - manuscript
    This 'paper' was intended as the first chapter of a book. It sketches Aristippus'theory of ethics, and discusses various objections to it (Plato, Aristotle, etc.).
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  22. added 2016-12-01
    Creditworthiness and Matching Principles.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7. Oxford University Press.
    You are creditworthy for φ-ing only if φ-ing is the right thing to do. Famously though, further conditions are needed too – Kant’s shopkeeper did the right thing, but is not creditworthy for doing so. This case shows that creditworthiness requires that there be a certain kind of explanation of why you did the right thing. The reasons for which you act – your motivating reasons – must meet some further conditions. In this paper, I defend a new account of (...)
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  23. added 2016-11-17
    An Empirical Refutation of ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’.Paul Henne, Vladimir Chituc, Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):283-290.
    Most philosophers assume that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, and most of them hold that this principle is true not only universally but also analytically or conceptually. Some skeptics deny this principle, although they often admit some related one. In this article, we show how new empirical evidence bolsters the skeptics’ arguments. We then defend the skeptical view against some objections to the empirical evidence and to its effect on the traditional principle. In light of the new evidence, we conclude that philosophers (...)
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  24. added 2016-09-28
    In Defense of Moderate Envy.Bernd Lahno - 2000 - Analyse & Kritik 22 (1):98-113.
    In contrast to Axelrod's advice 'don't be envious' it is argued that the emotion of envy may enhance cooperation. TIT FOR TAT does exhibit a certain degree of envy. But, it does so in inconsistent ways. Two variants of TIT FOR TAT are introduced and their strategic properties are analyzed. Both generate the very same actual play as TIT FOR TAT in a computer tournament without noise. However, if noise is introduced they display some greater degree of stability. This is (...)
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  25. added 2016-09-14
    The Demandingness of Morality: Toward a Reflective Equilibrium.Brian Berkey - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3015-3035.
    It is common for philosophers to reject otherwise plausible moral theories on the ground that they are objectionably demanding, and to endorse “Moderate” alternatives. I argue that while support can be found within the method of reflective equilibrium for Moderate moral principles of the kind that are often advocated, it is much more difficult than Moderates have supposed to provide support for the view that morality’s demands in circumstances like ours are also Moderate. Once we draw a clear distinction between (...)
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  26. added 2016-09-05
    Can the Canberrans’ Supervenience Argument Refute Shapeless Moral Particularism?Peter Tsu - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):545-560.
    Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, and Philip Pettit contend in their 2000 paper that an argument from supervenience deals a fatal blow to shapeless moral particularism, the view that the moral is shapeless with respect to the natural. A decade has passed since the Canberrans advanced their highly influential supervenience argument. Yet, there has not been any compelling counter-argument against it, as far as I can see. My aim in this paper is to fill in this void and defend SMP against (...)
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  27. added 2016-09-05
    Symposium on Pluralism and Ethical Theory.Gerald Dworkin - 1992 - University of Chicago Press.
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  28. added 2016-03-31
    What Ought Probably Means, and Why You Can’T Detach It.Stephen Finlay - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.
    Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing 'detaching problems' by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number of senses for 'ought'. The semantics for 'ought' that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory (...)
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  29. added 2016-03-25
    Nicolai Hartmann: Una apostilla bio-bibliográfica a propósito de la traducción de su Ética [Nicolai Hartmann: A bibliographical apostille regarding the translation of his Ethics].Paulo Vélez León - 2012 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 1 (1):113-129.
    [ES] En este trabajo [1] se especifican los aspectos centrales de la estructura y contenido de la monumental obra de Nicolai Hartmann, recientemente traducida al castellano, Ética, y [2] en correspondencia con lo anterior, se indica sumariamente el propósito de su planteamiento ético. [EN] In this work (1) it is specified the central aspects of the structure and content of Nicolai Hartmann´s monumental oeuvre, recently translated into Spanish, Ethics, and (2) in correspondence with the above, it is summarily indicated the (...)
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  30. added 2016-03-08
    From Reasons to Norms.Marko Jurjako - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):292-296.
    This is a review of Torbjorn Tannsjo's book: "From Reasons to Norms".
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  31. added 2016-03-02
    Moral Norms, Moral Ideals and Supererogation.Piotr Machura - 2013 - Folia Philosophica 29:127--159.
    The aim of the paper is to investigate the relations between the basic moral categories, namely those of norms, ideals and supererogation. The subject of discussion is, firstly, the ways that these categories are understood; secondly, the possible approaches towards moral acting that appear due to their use; and thirdly, their relationship within the moral system. However, what is of a special importance here is the relationship between the categories of norms and ideals (or in a wider aspect — laudable (...)
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  32. added 2016-02-29
    The Limits of Moral Obligation: Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies Can.Marcel van Ackeren & Michael Kühler (eds.) - 2015 - Routledge.
    This volume responds to the growing interest in finding explanations for why moral claims may lose their validity based on what they ask of their addressees. Two main ideas relate to that question: the moral demandingness objection and the principle "ought implies can." Though both of these ideas can be understood to provide an answer to the same question, they have usually been discussed separately in the philosophical literature. The aim of this collection is to provide a focused and comprehensive (...)
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  33. added 2016-01-11
    Harming Yourself and Others: A Note on the Asymmetry of Agency in Action Evaluations.Erich Rast - 2016 - Polish Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (2014) (2):65-74.
    Principles are investigated that allow one to establish a preference ordering between possible actions based on the question of whether the acting agent himself or other agents will benefit or be harmed by the consequences of an action. It is shown that a combination of utility maximization, an altruist principle, and weak negative utilitarianism yields an ordering that seems to be intuitively appealing, although it does not necessarily reflect common everyday evaluations of actions.
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  34. added 2015-12-16
    Just the Beginning for Ubuntu: Reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi.Thaddeus Metz - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):65-72.
    In an article titled ‘The end of ubuntu’ recently published in this journal, Bernard Matolino and Wenceslaus Kwindingwi argue that contemporary conditions in (South) Africa are such that there is no justification for appealing to an ethic associated with talk of ‘ubuntu’. They argue that political elites who invoke ubuntu do so in ways that serve nefarious functions, such as unreasonably narrowing discourse about how best to live, while the moral ideals of ubuntu are appropriate only for a bygone, pre-modern (...)
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  35. added 2015-12-16
    The Armchair and the Trolley: An Argument for Experimental Ethics.Guy Kahane - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):421-445.
    Ethical theory often starts with our intuitions about particular cases and tries to uncover the principles that are implicit in them; work on the ‘trolley problem’ is a paradigmatic example of this approach. But ethicists are no longer the only ones chasing trolleys. In recent years, psychologists and neuroscientists have also turned to study our moral intuitions and what underlies them. The relation between these two inquiries, which investigate similar examples and intuitions, and sometimes produce parallel results, is puzzling. Does (...)
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  36. added 2015-12-16
    Patterned Moral Behavior.George W. Watson, Joseph Michlitsch & Thomas Douglas - 2007 - Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society 18:87-92.
    We posit that the weight a person assigns a moral principle is not stable between ideal, or un-contextual assessments and the weight the same moral principle is allocated when applied in a contextual dilemma. Second, we postulate that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior or judgment. Results indicate that the importance of moral principles is dynamic and that patterned moral behavior is a significant predictor of moral judgments.
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  37. added 2015-12-16
    Can There Be 'Unprincipled Virtue'? Comments on Nomy Arpaly.Robert Pippin - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):291 – 301.
    In her book, Unprincipled Virtue, Nomy Arpaly is suspicious of reflective endorsement or deliberative rationality views of agency, those which tie the possibility of responsibility and moral blame to the conscious exercise of deliberation and reflection, and which require as a condition of blame- or praise- worthiness an agent's explicit commitment to ethical principles. I am in sympathy with her attack on standard autonomy theories, but argue that she confuses the phenomenon of unknowing and unreflective responsiveness to the right-making features (...)
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  38. added 2015-12-09
    Friendship and the Law of Reason: Baier and Kant on Love and Principles.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2005 - In Williams Jenkins (ed.), Persons, Promises, and Practices. University of Notre Dame Press. pp. 250-280.
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  39. added 2015-11-29
    Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism.Colin Marshall - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):293-316.
    schopenhauer has been ignored in contemporary metaethics, and his commentators rarely attempt to analyze his metaethical views in contemporary terms. This is unfortunate. Schopenhauer has something important to teach us about moral realism.1I have both philosophical and interpretive aims in this paper. My philosophical aim is to show how Schopenhauer's views challenge the contemporary understanding of moral realism. The challenge arises from the fact that, while Schopenhauer's view implies that morality is "real" in a metaphysically- and epistemologically-robust sense, that view (...)
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  40. added 2015-10-22
    La consideración moral del suicidio en el pensamiento de M. F. Sciacca.Hugo Marcos Ortiz - 2014 - Studium, Filosofía y Teología 34.
    For Michele Federico Sciacca, suicide should not be considered according to an immanent ethical order, comprising moral questions from the perspective of virtues owned by human beings as social subject. Instead, considered from the perspective of a 'moral intelligence' opened to Being as such, the suicidal act expresses a misrepresentation of what it is to be a human being according to its ontological structure, resulting in the absurd attempt of self-fulfilment inducing his own ontological ruin.
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  41. added 2015-10-11
    Über die unüberwundenen Begründungsdefizite der „Kritischen Theorie“ – Von Habermas zu Forst.Uwe Steinhoff - 2015 - Zeitschrift für Kritische Sozialtheorie Und Philosophie 2 (1).
    In the first part of this paper I argue that there is hardly one correct step within the chains of arguments by which Habermas tries to substantiate his theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, and his theory of social order. In the second part of the paper I address Rainer Forst’s “principle of justification,” on which a “right to justification” is supposed to be based. I argue that Forst himself does not really justify his views but instead offers merely unwarranted (...)
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  42. added 2015-10-07
    Facts, Principles, and (Real) Politics.Enzo Rossi - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):505-520.
    Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts. Many others have defended or are committed to various versions or subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory account of how principles generate (...)
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  43. added 2015-07-27
    How not to argue that morality isn't innate: Comments on Jesse Prinz's “is morality innate?”.Susan Dwyer - manuscript
    We must admire the ambition of Prinz’s title question. But does he provide a convincing answer to it? Prinz’s own view of morality as “a byproduct – accidental or invented – of faculties that evolved for different purposes (1),” which appears to express a negative reply, does not receive much direct argument here. Rather, Prinz’s main aim is to try to show that the considerations he believes are typically presented by moral nativists are insufficient or inadequate to establish that morality (...)
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  44. added 2015-07-27
    Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions.Luke Robinson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):289-309.
    What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if they exist) ground moral obligations or—at the very least—particular moral truths? I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of particular (...)
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  45. added 2015-07-27
    On the Meta-Ethical Status of Constructivism: Reflections on G.A. Cohen's `Facts and Principles'.Miriam Ronzoni & Laura Valentini - 2008 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (4):403-422.
    The Queen's College, Oxford, UK In his article `Facts and Principles', G.A. Cohen attempts to refute constructivist approaches to justification by showing that, contrary to what their proponents claim, fundamental normative principles are fact- in sensitive. We argue that Cohen's `fact-insensitivity thesis' does not provide a successful refutation of constructivism because it pertains to an area of meta-ethics which differs from the one tackled by constructivists. While Cohen's thesis concerns the logical structure of normative principles, constructivists ask how normative principles (...)
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  46. added 2015-07-27
    Where the Laws Are.Mark Lance & Margaret Little - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:149-171.
  47. added 2015-07-27
    Perseverations on a Critical Theme.B. Andrew Lustig - 1993 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 18 (5):491-502.
    In response to my earlier critique of recent attempts to rebut principlism as an ethical approach, Green, Gert, and Clouser (GG&C) have in turn offered their own critique of my appraisal. This essay identifies eight major criticisms GG&C raise in their response and offers a rejoinder to each. Among them, three are especially important: (1) that the label of ‘deductivism’ fails to capture GG&C's ethical method and should be replaced by ‘descriptivism’; (2) that pluralistic accounts, including principlism, fail to offer (...)
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  48. added 2015-07-27
    Moral Differences: Truth, Justice, and Conscience in a World of Conflict.Richard W. Miller - 1992 - Princeton University Press.
    In a wide-ranging inquiry Richard W. Miller provides new resources for coping with the most troubling types of moral conflict: disagreements in moral conviction, conflicting interests, and the tension between conscience and desires. Drawing on most fields in philosophy and the social sciences, including his previous work in the philosophy of science, he presents an account of our access to moral truth, and, within this framework, develops a theory of justice and an assessment of the role of morality in rational (...)
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  49. added 2015-07-17
    How to Be Impartial as a Subjectivist.Emad Atiq - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):757-779.
    The metaethical subjectivist claims that there is nothing more to a moral disagreement than a conflict in the desires of the parties involved. Recently, David Enoch has argued that metaethical subjectivism has unacceptable ethical implications. If the subjectivist is right about moral disagreement, then it follows, according to Enoch, that we cannot stand our ground in moral disagreements without violating the demands of impartiality. For being impartial, we’re told, involves being willing to compromise in conflicts that are merely due to (...)
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  50. added 2015-04-10
    Directly Plausible Principles.Howard Nye - 2015 - In Christopher Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 610-636.
    In this chapter I defend a methodological view about how we should conduct substantive ethical inquiries in the fields of normative and practical ethics. I maintain that the direct plausibility and implausibility of general ethical principles – once fully clarified and understood – should be foundational in our substantive ethical reasoning. I argue that, in order to expose our ethical intuitions about particular cases to maximal critical scrutiny, we must determine whether they can be justified by directly plausible principles. To (...)
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