Moral Principles

Although some previous studies have investigated the relationship between moral foundations and moral judgment development, the methods used have not been able to fully explore the relationship. In the present study, we used Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) in order to address the limitations in traditional regression methods that have been used previously. Results showed consistency with previous findings that binding foundations are negatively correlated with post-conventional moral reasoning and positively correlated with maintaining norms and personal interest schemas. In addition to (...) previous studies, our results showed a positive correlation for individualizing foundations and post-conventional moral reasoning. Implications are discussed as well as a detailed explanation of the novel BMA method in order to allow others in the field of moral education to be able to use it in their own studies. (shrink)

"Meritocracy" has historically been understood in two ways. The first is as an approach to governance. On this understanding, we seek to put meritorious (somehow defined) people into public office to the benefit of society. This understanding has its roots in Confucius, its scope is political offices, and its justification is consequentialist. The second understanding of "meritocracy" is as a theory of justice. We distribute in accordance with merit in order to give people the things that they deserve, as justice (...) demands. This understanding has its roots in Aristotle, its scope is social goods broadly, and its justification is deontological. In this article, I discuss the differences--especially the conceptual differences--between these two, prima facie distinct, meritocratic traditions. I also argue that despite their differences Eastern Meritocracy and Western Meritocracy are harmonious. In Section I of the article I introduce the two meritocratic traditions through, in part, a highly abbreviated history of talk about "merit" and "meritocracy" in Chinese and Western philosophy. In Section II, I discuss a number of conceptual issues and partition meritocratic theories in accordance with their scopes and normative justifications. I also discuss two scenarios. In one scenario, Eastern Meritocracy appears to deliver the right result and Western Meritocracy, the wrong result. In the other scenario, vice versa. Finally, in Section III, I argue that Eastern Meritocracy and Western Meritocracy are each special cases of a single, compelling notion of "meritocracy.". (shrink)

In Kant scholarship, the concept of maxims is discussed, for the most part, from the perspective of the universalization procedure of the Categorical Imperative. In fact, however, it has a much wider relevance. As is shown in this contribution, maxims are fundamental to Kant’s theory of action and value. Since the agent expresses her pro-attitudes, i.e., interests, preferences, and life-plans based on maxims, they figure as constitutive elements of her practical identity. After some general and historical considerations on Kant’s concept (...) of maxims, it is shown that their function in the theory of the ‘practical syllogism’ implies that maxims play an important role in considerations on the agent’s ends, goals, and purposes. Additionally, I will discuss the function of maxims in Kant’s action theory. I will defend an interpretation of the Kantian idea according to which practical deliberation can be understood based on a hierarchical order of maxims. Finally, the problem of higher-order maxims and the issue of the unity and inner consistency of maxims is debated. (shrink)

I vindicate the thrust of the particularist position in moral deliberation. to this purpose, I focus on some elements that seem to play a crucial role in first-person moral deliberation and argue that they cannot be incorporated into a more sophisticated system of moral principles. More specifically, I emphasize some peculiarities of moral perception in the light of which I defend the irreducible deliberative relevance of a certain phenomenon, namely: the phenomenon of an agent morally coming across a particular situation. (...) Following on from Bernard Williams, I talk of an agent’s character as a factor that con- tributes to fixing what situations an agent comes morally across. A crucial point, in the debate, will be how an agent confronts the normatively loaded features of his own character when he is engaged in first-person deliberation. (shrink)

It's natural to think that the principles expressed by the statements "Promises ought to be kept" and "We ought to help those in need" are defeasible. But how are we to make sense of this defeasibility? On one proposal, moral principles have hedges or built-in unless clauses specifying the conditions under which the principle doesn't apply. On another, such principles are contributory and, thus, do not specify which actions ought to be carried out, but only what counts in favor or (...) against them. Drawing on a defeasible logic framework, this paper sets up three models: one model for each proposal, as well as a third model capturing a mixed view on principles that combines them. It then explores the structural connections between the three models and establishes some equivalence results, suggesting that the seemingly different views captured by the models are closer than standardly thought. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has coincided with the proliferation of ethical guidance documents to assist public health authorities, health care providers, practitioners and staff with responding to ethical challenges posed by the pandemic. Like ethical guidelines relating to infectious disease that have preceded them, what unites many COVID-19 guidance documents is their dependency on an under-developed approach to bioethical principlism, a normative framework that attempts to guide actions based on a list of prima facie, unranked ethical principles. By situating them in (...) relation to the key philosophical debates concerning bioethical principlism, we aim to explore the limits and limitations of pandemic ethical guidance documents as, specifically, ethics documents – documents that fulfil the functions of ethics as a fundamentally normative discipline. This means not only determining whether such ethical guidance documents can, in principle, provide adequate action guidance and action justification, but also, more importantly where pandemics are concerned, determining whether they support consistent decision making and transparent processes of justification. Having highlighted the problems with merely furnishing ethical guidelines with substantive ethical content in terms of principles and values, we argue that organizations that develop these documents should, instead, focus on the procedural dimensions of action guidance and action justification, which extend to questions regarding the make-up of the committees, panels and groups that develop such guidelines, the public transparency of justifications for specific pandemic-related advice or interventions and the development of explicit procedures for transparent and consistent decision making. (shrink)

What ethical stance would be appropriate in today’s messy situation of health crisis, global warming, social and economic antagonisms, etc.? The first one is that of an expert who deals with the specific task imposed on him by those in power, blissfully ignoring the wider social context of his activity. The second one is that of pseudo-radical intellectuals who criticize the existing order from a comfortable morally superior position, well aware that their criticism will have no actual effects. How, then, (...) are we to go on living after we get rid of the illusions of a false critical stance? Not just by accepting our reality: the fascination with the end of our civilization make us spectators who morbidly enjoy the disintegration of normality. A way out of this deadlock is signalled by a line from a song by the German rock band Rammstein: “we have to live till we die”. We have to fight against the pandemic and other crises not by way of withdrawing from life but as a way to live with utmost intensity. Is there anyone more ALIVE today than millions of healthcare workers who with full awareness risk their lives on a daily base? Many of them died, but till they died they were alive. (shrink)

The late Robert Veatch, one of the United States’ founders of bioethics, never tired of reminding us that the paradigm-shifting contribution that bioethics made to patient care was to liberate patients out of the hands of doctors, who were traditionally seen to know best, even when they decidedly did not know best. It seems to us that with the advent of COVID-19, health policy has come full-circle on this. COVID-19 gave rise to a large number of purportedly “ethical” guidance documents (...) aiming to assist health care providers and practitioners with responding to the ethical challenges that might arise in their response to the pandemic. Ethics has two primary functions: provide clear action guidance, and provide clear action justification. The documents in question arguably reflect the ultimate policy triumph of bioethical “principlism”, and, perhaps surprisingly, as a corollary, the ultimate triumph of “doctor-knows-best”. (shrink)

Can the theory of conceptual spaces developed by Peter Gärdenfors and others be applied to moral issues? Martin Peterson argues that several moral principles can be construed as regions in a shared similarity space, but Kristin Shrader-Frechette and Gert-Jan Lokhorst question Peterson’s claim. They argue that the moral similarity judgments used to construct the space are underspecified and subjective. In this paper, we present new data indicating that moral principles can indeed be construed as regions in a multidimensional conceptual space (...) on the basis of moral similarity judgments. Four hundred and seventy-five students taking a course in engineering ethics completed a survey in which they were presented with ten cases featuring ethical issues related to technology and engineering. Participants were asked to judge the moral similarity of each pair of cases and to select which moral principle they believed should be applied for resolving the case. We used interval multidimensional scaling as well as individual differences scaling for analyzing the moral similarity judgments. Despite noteworthy individual variations in the judgments, the five moral principles included in the study were discernable in the aggregate multidimensional spaces, even for participants with no previous exposure to the principles. Participants tended to apply the same moral principles to cases rated as morally similar. Our overall conclusion is that moral similarity judgments, and their representation in multidimensional spaces, can help us identify moral principles that are relevant for assessing difficult moral choice situations. (shrink)

The essay introduces Michael Quante's pragmatistic anthropology, focusing on three main ethical issues, namely: (1) the problem of realism, (2) the problem of particularism, and (3) the question about personal identity and its social conditions. By also emphasizing Quante's historical-philosophical debts, the essay thus aims to present the project of the pragmatistic anthropology as a worthwhile alternative to some of the fundamental assumptions of modern ethics. The essay is the Editor's Introduction to the volume: Michael Quante, "Antropologia pragmatista. Padova Lectures" (...) (Padova University Press, 2020). (shrink)

Eric Campbell has argued that we should abolish moral discourse on the grounds that making moral judgments leads to “potentially severe practical pathologies”, including hypocrisy and self-delusion. However, his account of moral judgments only plausibly describes deontological judgments. Thus, his argument only supports deontological abolitionism. This view is certainly interesting. But it is not as extreme as moral abolitionism. Moreover, I argue that Campbell’s account, when reconstructed as an argument for deontological abolitionism can play only a very limited dialectical role.

The article is devoted to the study of ideological and philosophical components correlation in the worldview formation. According to the author, it is fundamentally important to take for understanding Russian history and culture not speculative, but ideological coordinates as the basis. Ideology as a professed philosophy is incomparably higher than any palliative abstraction. It is necessary not to lower culture to the level of the masses, but to elevate a person to the level of culture, impossible without a cult.

Albert the Great understands wisdom principally as a characteristic of human science, not principally as a feature of revealed theology. The article deals with the texts of his comments on Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics in order to know how he understands this knowledge.

This paper makes a transcendental argument. It assumes the normative validity of the instrumental principle, and then investigates the conditions of its validity. Ultimately, it argues that there are three necessary conditions for its validity. Firstly, agents must be rationally capable of regarding themselves as having a single self that possesses the same reasons, ends, and means. Secondly, agents must be rationally capable of distinguishing themselves from other selves that possess ends. Thirdly, these two conditions must actually obtain, which means (...) that we must have a self that has the same reasons, ends, and means, and that such selves must be distinct from one another. The paper fields two arguments in support of these three conditions and then offers an interpretation of the arguments to show that they vindicate all three conditions. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to make a new distinction in metaethics. Specifically, I distinguish between externalism and internalism about normative principle validity (hereafter EINP). The basic distinction concerns whether the facts that make a given principle normatively valid for some subject are 1) particular facts about that subject (or agent-relative facts) or 2) facts about the world and the nature of agency in general (or agent-neutral facts). I call positions which emphasize 1) internalist positions, and positions which favor (...) 2) externalist positions. I defend the conceptual originality of the distinction by arguing that it isn’t reducible to judgment internalism/externalism, reasons internalism/externalism, or realism/anti-realism about morality. Thereafter, I demonstrate the distinction’s philosophical merit by showing how it can resolve a dispute between Korsgaard and her detractors about whether normative principles need to be capable of “getting a grip” on an agent. (shrink)

Die vorliegenden Beiträge in deutscher und englischer Sprache behandeln begriffliche, normative und empirische Probleme der Demokratie aus Sicht der Analytischen Politischen Theorie. Sie beschäftigen sich mit Themen wie Freiheit und Zwang, Ungleichheit und Ungerechtigkeit, Wahlversprechen und Dirty Hands. Das Motto dieses Sammelbandes ist folglich ‚Einheit in Vielfalt‘: Er gibt einen außergewöhnlichen Einblick in den Facettenreichtum der aktuellen Forschungsdiskussionen im Rahmen der Analytischen Politischen Theorie.

G.A. Cohen argues that Rawlsian constructivism mistakenly conflates principles of justice with optimal rules of regulation, a confusion that arises out of how Rawls has us think about justice. I use the concepts/conceptions distinction to argue that while citizens may reasonably disagree about the substance and demands of justice, some principled convergence may be possible: we can agree upon regulative principles consistent with justice, as each of us understands it. Rawlian constructivism helps us find that principled convergence, and this too (...) is a conception of justice. (shrink)

It’s commonly held that particular moral facts are explained by ‘natural’ or ‘descriptive’ facts, though there’s disagreement over how such explanations work. We defend the view that general moral principles also play a role in explaining particular moral facts. More specifically, we argue that this view best makes sense of some intuitive data points, including the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. We consider two alternative accounts of the nature and structure of moral principles—’the nomic view’ and ‘moral platonism’—before (...) considering in what sense such principles obtain of necessity. (shrink)

Weighing competing obligations and achieving the “greatest balance” of right over wrong guides an individual, an agency or a country in determining what ought to be done in an ethically challenging situation. Conducting controlled human infection model (CHIM) studies in India is one such situation. The ethical challenge in conducting a CHIM study lies in completing the difficult task of introducing standardised, attenuated strains of micro-organisms into normal healthy volunteers, at the same time ensuring the safety of these healthy individuals (...) from potential and completely informed risks in a fashion that is transparent and accountable. The bar is further raised against the background of already fragile public confidence in biomedical research in India; especially when “deliberate” introduction of microbial agents into healthy individuals is involved, with the larger altruistic objective of gain to society as a whole. -/- This paper discusses the uses of CHIM studies with respect to the larger scientific Indian research enterprise of the 21st century. It further explores etic and emic perspectives in conducting such trials in India and seeks to generate an ethical coherence to the justification for conducting CHIM studies in India. The paper deliberates on ethical issues arising out of conducting CHIM studies and reflects on how developing the capacity for CHIM studies in India is likely to strengthen the health research and development sector in the country. -/- . (shrink)

Several moral objectivists try to explain the reliability of moral beliefs by appealing to a third factor, a substantive moral claim that explains, first, why we have the moral beliefs that we have and, second, why these beliefs are true. Folke Tersman has recently suggested that moral disagreement constrains the epistemic legitimacy of third-factor explanations. Apart from constraining third-factor explanations, Tersman’s challenge could support the view that the epistemic significance of debunking explanations depends on the epistemic significance of disagreement. This (...) paper aims to show that disagreement does not constrain the epistemic legitimacy of third-factor explanations in metaethics, and it suggests a way forward in addressing the view that debunking depends on disagreement. First, Tersman’s constraints are impossible to violate, given the assumption that the justification relation exhibits monotonicity. Second, some disagreements are irrelevant, given that they cannot be about beliefs whose reliability the objectivist seeks to defend. Third, actual disagreement about moral beliefs is implausible, given recent ethnographic findings. In light of this discussion, the paper shows that the prospects of the disagreement view depend on which moral beliefs objectivists need to defend and the criteria we use to assess epistemically relevant moral disagreement. (shrink)

A case of Moral Luck occurs whenever we normatively assess agents for things that depend on factors beyond their control. The paper takes a comparative approach and examines how morality and law deal with such cases. The comparative perspective allows us to explain the problem of Moral Luck as a tension inherent in normative orders: While normative orders are based on a strong connection between responsibility and voluntariness, this idealist assumption is at least partly at odds with their functional requirements (...) as social orders. The paper examines how law and morality converge and differ in resolving this tension in cases of Moral Luck. Finally, the paper concludes with a brief discussion of some more general features of the normative orders of morality and the law that follow from this "bottom-up" analysis of Moral Luck. (shrink)

Moral rationalism, the belief that acting contra a moral requirement is always irrational, is a strong claim; if true, seems to greatly reduce in scope the number of plausible moral theories due to what has been called the demandingness objection. One response to this consequence of moral rationalism has been to adopt moral anti-rationalism. Dale Dorsey thinks one can escape the demandingess objection with a weak form of anti-rationalism that still grants morality pride of place among normative systems. In this (...) paper I’ll argue that the demandingness objection is a formidable challenge to moral rationalism, and that Dorsey is correct in arguing that his weak anti-rationalism neatly offers a way to evade the objection. I’ll maintain, however, that weak anti-rationalism opens theories up to another powerful objection, the permissiveness objection, which ought to lead someone comfortable abandoning moral rationalism to abandon weak anti-rationalism as well, accepting moral anti-rationalism. (shrink)

Recently, Floridi has proposed that ethics be centered on the notion of information, which would represent a value in itself. As anything contains information in some form, this stance would imply that anything has intrinsic value. While this perspective is intriguing as it would make information science an even more important domain, it needs to be refined by distinguishing between different levels of organized information. Instances of matter, of life, of minds, of civil society, and of cultural heritage all are (...) different kinds of informational systems, each formed through an evolutionary path that has built on the previous levels, with a corresponding increase in what Bennett has defined as logical depth. This process makes the logically deepest phenomena especially valuable, as they could not be recreated without repeating the whole path. Personal experiences of individual humans, either shared orally or recorded in diaries, as well as collective knowledge and knowledge organization systems, that can be documented in texts or in images before disappearing, are especially precious sorts of information, and should be acknowledged the highest value. -/- 1. Introduction -/- Luciano Floridi's philosophy of information has been gaining a wide popularity in recent years. Among many important issues, Floridi's approach proposes a view of information as a value, which seems to be of special interest to this conference as a possible rationale to claim the objective value of information services and knowledge organization. Indeed, if information is a value in itself, then any activity aimed at the acquisition, conservation, and provision of information has to be considered and treated as intrinsically valuable, too. This paper discusses Floridi's basic claim in the light of notions provided by other theories of information, with special reference to the notion of logical depth, in order to attain a more detailed understanding of the value of information and of its implications for information services and knowledge organization. (shrink)

I take issue with an argument to the effect that because contractualism proves--both practically and theoretically--the philosophically superior moral theory, we have the result that nonhuman animals can have no, nor ought be extended any, moral standing. The combined argument belongs to Peter Carruthers, and appears in his The Animals Issue. My response involves demonstration that on careful analysis contractualism fares even less well than the two theories against which Carruthers compares it--rights and utilitarian. Furthermore, I offer a sketch of (...) a theory which does not fall for reliance on a singularly problematic premise--a premise which plays pivotally in traditional contractualist, rights and utilitarian accounts. The upshot is that this "alternative rights theory" fares best in reflective equilibrium analysis as against not only those theories Carruthers decries, but contractualism as well. We are, it appears, drawn back to the nagging question of whether and how things nonhuman may matter morally. For, Carruthers conclusion is disallowed. That the alternative rights theory offers novel yet satisfactory means by which to account for moral motivation and knowledge, as well as differences in moral respect due morally relevant beings, is explored. That the theory avoids the troublesome pitfalls of intuitionism and supervenience further secures its frontrunning position--which, again, begins to indicate that and how more than solely humans are of moral relevance. (shrink)

The traditional gap between scholarly studies of facts and principles on the one hand, and the practical solution of human problems concerning these facts, on the other hand, has in certain fields been considerably narrowed. The mathematical and empirical sciences have been able to directly apply their theories through universal techniques to the needs of human life. The classic discrepancy between theory and practice seems to have been overcome by the latter. Psychiatry, however, remains ambivalent about its ability to integrate (...) psychiatric theory and practice. For example, in spite of enormous advances in the scientific study of human behavior and mental disorders over the past twenty-five years, public mental health services are in disarray.1 In addition, a proliferation of competing theoretical and treatment programs has emerged. Estimates indicate up to 200 or more “brand names” of psychotherapies.2 In 1984, an editorial in a leading medical journal, Lancet,.challenged the psychotherapies to demonstrate their effectiveness.3 The psychiatric field’s difficulties in extending its scientific advances to its practical domain partially lie in its dual nature. Psychiatry simultaneously belongs to the empirical study of mental illness and human behavior as well as to the humanistic study and treatment of the human mind and emotional suffering. In spite of psychiatry’s striving to achieve scientific universality in its practical usefulness, it still remains in reality much closer in its applications to art than to technique.4 [This fact generates considerable criticism and controversy.] The humanistic domain of psychiatry brings the scholar and the scientist into a confrontation between lived human experience and theoretical conjecture about it. In fact, reality keeps the scientific imagination in check. For example, empirical approaches provide inadequate solutions to the suffering of the homeless patients living on our country’s streets. Like any technical application of science to the practical needs of human life, psychiatry deals directly with the concrete: in concurrence with the concrete human person. However, while the technical application of science deals with the application of universal principles, psychiatry in radical contrast deals more often than not with unique concrete situations.5 For example, although depressive illness might exhibit core depressive symptoms, each individual experiences his or her sadness within a unique and highly personal social and psychological context. However, each situation is a unique and unrepeatable occasion for the practitioner to apply whatever the scientific theories may support. Groping for the appropriate attitude toward the psychiatric patient, the practitioner has to have clearly in mind an aim and a direction toward which to direct his treatment. (shrink)

The paper discusses recent developments in Discourse Ethics and argues for a new proposal of how to spell out its core ideas. It finds that its basic principles ("D" and "U") are too specific: they focus on norms, identify those affected with those participating in discourse and use the narrow vocabulary of interests and consequences. It proposes instead: (D1) Only those claims are valid that can be defended against any objection of any possible agent. Discourse Ethics should be understood as (...) a normative framework for ethical argumentation that allows for a plurality of moral principles and for reflections on their suitability for specific contexts. It demands that one acts according to one's best reasons. (shrink)

Michael Smith’s moral problem is not about whether to betray one’s friends or one’s country. It is a metaethical problem about how to combine three tempting theses that look mutually inconsistent: moral cognitivism, appraiser internalism about moral judgments and motivation, and a “Humean” account of motivation. In Smith’s formulation, these become: 1. Moral judgements of the form, ‘It is right that I φ’ express a subject’s belief about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for (...) her to do. 2. [Necessarily] if someone judges that it is right that she φs, then, ceteris paribus, she is motivated to φ. 3. An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an appropriate desire and a means-end belief, where belief and desire are, in Hume’s terms, distinct existences. As he notes, many metaethical positions can be classified by the way they seek to escape this apparent inconsistency: noncognitivists deny 1 to preserve 2 and 3, some ethical naturalists deny 2 to save 1 and 3, and some internalist cognitivists deny 3 and keep 1 and 2. Smith devotes a chapter to each of these responses and then defends his own view, which retains all three claims in a position advertised as not only consistent but realist, internalist, and, in a broad sense, naturalist. (shrink)

Moral Freedom reconciles three apparently inconsistent truisms about morality: first, moral rules are society's rules; second, morality is a matter of individual choice: and third, some things are wrong regardless of what any society or individual has to say. In developing a moral theory that accommodates all three truisms, Jeffrey Olen offers a view of morality that allows individuals a generous degree of moral freedom.The author explores various answers to the question, "Does anybody or anything have any moral authority over (...) how I live my life?" His answer is "No." In a lively, conversational style, Olen leads the reader through the arguments, examples, and exceptions that contribute to this conclusion. Along the way, he contends that what most philosophers call the moral point of view, but what he refers to as the impersonal moral point of view, is but one of two moral points of view. The other is the personal moral point of view, which Olen defends against the allegedly overriding demands of impersonal morality.Moral Freedom considers the work of philosophers as diverse as Kant, Nietzsche, Kurt Baier, Bernard Williams, and Daniel Dennett. Admitting that this is a personal discussion of the nature of morality, Olen claims the "freedom" to engage these intellectual issues in a personal style to illustrate the personal moral point of view that he champions. Author note: Jeffrey Olen is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point. (shrink)

Virtue theories can plausibly be argued to have important advantages over normative ethical theories which prescribe a strict impartialism in moral judgment, or which neglect people’s special roles and relationships. However, there are clear examples of both virtuous and vicious partiality in people’s moral judgments, and virtue theorists may struggle to adequately distinguish them, much as proponents of other normative ethical theories do. This paper first adapts the “expanding moral circle” concept and some literary examples to illustrate the difficulty of (...) adequately distinguishing virtuous from vicious partiality. Later sections aim to show how an adequate philosophical ethics will be able to both a) attribute virtue (and hence praiseworthiness) to agents whose actions may directly serve only their special interests, roles, or special relationships; and b) attribute vice (and hence censure) where an agent’s attitudes and/or actions mirror known personal biases (for instance, an egoistic attitude) or social biases (for instance, and ethnocentric attitude). This dual ability leaves space for much virtuous partiality, while also reflecting a “risk-aware” approach, recognizing the deleterious consequences of our human penchant for constructing and imbuing moral significance to oftentimes factitious us/them dichotomies. (shrink)

This paper offers a general model of substantive moral principles as a kind of hedged moral principles that can (but don't have to) tolerate exceptions. I argue that the kind of principles I defend provide an account of what would make an exception to them permissible. I also argue that these principles are nonetheless robustly explanatory with respect to a variety of moral facts; that they make sense of error, uncertainty, and disagreement concerning moral principles and their implications; and that (...) one can grasp these principles without having to grasp any particular list of their permissibly exceptional instances. I conclude by pointing out various advantages that this model of principles has over several of its rivals. The bottom line is that we should find nothing peculiarly odd or problematic about the idea of exception-tolerating and yet robustly explanatory moral principles. (shrink)

This is a short review of Moral Particularism, ed. Brad Hooker and Margaret Little (Oxford University Press, 2002).

That human beings have the potential for rationality and the ability to cultivate it is a fact of human nature. But to value rationality and its subsidiary character dispositions - impartiality, intellectual discrimination, foresight, deliberation, prudence, self-reflection, self-control - is another matter entirely. -/- I am going to take it as a given that if a person's freedom to act on her impulses and gratify her desires is constrained by the existence of others' equal, or more powerful, conflicting impulses and (...) desires, then she will need the character dispositions of rationality to survive. The more circumscribed one's freedom and power, the more essential to survival and flourishing the character dispositions of rationality and the spirit may become. (shrink)

In a recent collection of papers - Moral Particularism - some writers argue against a particularist explanation of thick ethical features, particularist in the sense developed by Jonathan Dancy. In this piece I argue that particularists can tackle what I regard as the most interesting argument put forward by these writers, an argument I call the Counting argument. My aim is twofold. First, I wish to make clear exactly what the debate between particularists and their opponents about the thick rests (...) on. Secondly, I do not wish to provide a ‘knock-down’ argument to show particularism as true, but merely to push the onus back onto particularism’s opponents and show that far more needs to be said. (shrink)

Članek se ukvarja s pojmom uklonljivosti, s posebnim ozirom na uklonljivost moralnih in pravnih norm. Na začetku začrtamo grob oris pojava uklonljivosti, ki je zahteven izziv tako za moralno kot tudi za pravno teorijo. Opozorimo na pogoje in primerjalne prednosti, ki naj bi jih izpolnjeval oz. imel model uklonljivosti. Nadalje se v članku osredotočimo na svojstven model uklonljivosti, ki uporablja pojem normalnih pogojev da bi zajel omenjeni pojem uklonljivosti norm. Trdimo, da temu modelu pri tem spodleti, posebej z vidika predpostavke (...) nadaljnjih pomembnih norm, za katere imamo upravičene razloge za dvom, da so prav tako uklonljive. Tako ta model ne dopušča, da bi uklonljivost segala do samih temeljev zadevnega normativnega področja in omeji značilnost uklonljivosti na norme na srednji ravni. V zaključku poudarimo nekaj naukov te razprave in jih umestimo v širše polje pluralističnega pristopa k normam. (shrink)

Cohen’s hostility to Rawls’ justification of the Difference Principle by social facts spawned Cohen’s general thesis that ultimate principles of justice and morality are fact-insensitive, but explain how any fact-sensitive principle is grounded in facts. The problem with this thesis, however, is that when facts F ground principle P, reformulating this relation as the "fact-insensitive" conditional “If F, then P” is trivial and thus explanatorily impotent. Explanatory, hence justificatory, force derives either from subsumption under more general principles, or precisely exhibiting (...) value in light of relevant (actual or hypothetical) facts. In examples where no subsumption occurs, actual facts trivially become hypothetical facts in "fact-insensitive" conditionals, an empty formalism. Indeed, Rawls’ grounding of principles of justice in “conditions of life” can easily be reformulated as a conditional principle “sensitive” only to hypothetical such conditions, and thus formally fact-insensitive in Cohen's sense, for all Cohen’s ire against Rawls’s grounding.Moreover, any plausible “ultimate fact-insensitive principle” must be intricately qualified, which tacit ceteris paribus clauses mask. Each qualification implies prioritisation of one principle over another in conceivable circumstances, and wherever the now qualified principle is given scope, that too implies prioritisation over competing principles in typical circumstances. Any principle is thus sensitive to conceivable circumstances of application, as recognised by more sophisticated intuitionisms. Non-trivial ultimate principles – luck egalitarianism, act utilitarianism, etc. - require defense, which inevitably involves showing how they best interpret and respond to facts about human needs, goals, and capacities in predictable circumstances. Finally, the substantive debate between Rawls and Cohen about which facts are relevant to the DP is only obscured by the doctrine of fact-insensitivity. (shrink)