Moral Psychology

Paradigm cases of disappointment occur when we fail to attain the object of our desire, or when doing so frustrates some of our other desires. However, some non-standard cases seem not to fit this pattern. We occasionally find ourselves disappointed despite perceiving that our desire has been fulfilled. Experiences of this sort are sometimes called ‘Dead Sea apples’. Such cases threaten the viability of theories that claim that fulfilling our desires always makes our lives go better for us. This paper (...) considers what reflection on the nature of Dead Sea apples can teach us about the structure of desire and its relationship to well-being. I argue that this type of disappointment often occurs when we have a frustrated conjunctive desire that contains some satisfied conjuncts. The fact that the desire contains some satisfied conjuncts explains why we are prone to misidentifying it as fulfilled. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the structural validity of the Spanish Translation of the Moral Foundations Vignettes, an instrument developed to measure moral judgement in the context of Moral Foundations Theory. With data from 3 countries (N = 1,650, through a polling agency) we identify a restricted set of items that fit the seven-factor solution implied by the theory. We conducted additional analyses (invariance testing and Differential Item Functioning) to examine the stability the results of the across countries. We found (...) non-invariance and uniform differential functioning in a large number of items. Taken together these results suggest that although the current version of the MFV can be adequately used to measure moral judgement within societies, cross-cultural comparisons with this tool are restricted. Our validation raises questions about the cross-cultural validity of the instrument but also of some of the categories that underlie the intended measurements. (shrink)

The Extended Virtues (EV) theory challenges the traditional notion that an individual’s character traits stem solely from one’s mental state and posits that external factors also play a big part in how we characterize virtues. In critiquing the philosopher Robert Howell’s version of EV, the article advocates for EV by examining the essential constituents of virtues. It emphasizes the necessity of consistent moral decision-making and argues that virtues are better characterized through the active engagement of agents rather than being passively (...) influenced by external conditions. The article also envisions future ethical scenarios where virtues are dynamically integrated with technology and social systems. (shrink)

This paper introduces an enactive perspective to Neo-Confucian ethics, specifically focusing on Wang Yangming’s concept of moral knowledge (liangzhi良知). While traditional ethical models in the Song-Ming Neo-Confucian tradition typically emphasize establishing a solid foundation by grasping universal rational principles or cultivating a moral mind essential for ethical living, this paper challenges such notions with the enactive insights of groundlessness. It argues against the existence of a fixed, isolated metaphysical ground in our ethical lives. Instead, it posits that any metaphysical moral (...) mind, if it exists, must manifest through embodied interactions and engagement with the world. This perspective reconceptualizes the moral mind and liangzhi as more than cognitive processes confined to the head; they are part of an integrated mind-body-world system, characterized by supra-reflective, embodied, and contextually grounded coping mechanisms. By redefining these elements, the paper aims to transform our understanding of (Neo-Confucian) ethics and significantly advance the discourse on moral agency, autonomy, and moral responsibility in moral philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how a pragmatist stance may address the problem of the resolvability of moral conflicts. Pragmatism challenges skeptical and relativist views by arguing that moral conflict resolution is possible via inquiry and exchange of reasons. From a normative standpoint, pragmatism also differs from utilitarian and deontological views, according to which a specific moral theory is correct in every context. From a pragmatist point of view, both utilitarian and deontological responses can be justified, depending on contextual conditions (...) and reasons, on the people to whom reasons are offered, and on constraints of inclusivity, publicity, empirical accuracy, and coherence. Pragmatism’s empiricist method for solving conflicts and making normative adjustments can be seen as a form of reflective equilibrium, where moral beliefs and commitments are adjusted in light of new non-moral knowledge, such as evidence about the reliability of decision processes. Recent empirical research also supports pragmatism’s pluralist and flexible approach more than monistic and generalist normative views like deontology and utilitarianism. (shrink)

Munch-Jurisic’s book thoroughly describes several cases of severe distresses reported and expressed by perpetrators of tremendous acts such as mass murders. Arguing against a simplistic reading according to which these signs of distress are straightforward manifestations of some innate moral nature, and against the optimistic reading according to which they will lead to prosocial behaviors, Munch-Jursic offers compelling reasons to adopt a more complex theory of emotion. In this commentary, I aim to stress the implications of her book for the (...) debate on moral enhancement and for emotion theory in general. However, while I concur with Munch-Jurisic that emotion theory must make room for complexity and indeterminacy, I challenge her claim that motivational theories of emotion are ill-equipped to face the challenges she poses. (shrink)

The psychological study of negotiation, influenced by economics, has long emphasized the interests of the bargaining parties as the main driver of the negotiation process. This remains the case, even though psychological research has shown that individuals do not behave in the manner predicted by classical economics. A main drawback of the concept of interests is that it is an individual-level construct and, therefore, does not tap directly into the interindividual nature of the negotiation process. In contrast, entitlements can serve (...) as the key notion in the study of negotiation, both conceptually and epistemologically. I argue that at the heart of negotiation is a rule-making process through which parties define each other’s entitlements and duties. If we view negotiation in this way, we can study it as the primary vehicle for the explicit determination of social norms, obligations, and “ought” standards that permeate social life. This view has ramifications for the study of negotiation itself, for the social-psychological study of coregulation, and even for the function of society as a whole. (shrink)

The history of the thesis of the guise of the good between Kant and Anscombe is not well understood. This article examines a notable disagreement over the thesis during this period, between Green and Sidgwick. It shows that Green accepts versions of the thesis concerning action and desire in one sense of 'desire', and that Sidgwick rejects the thesis concerning both action and desire. It then considers why Green accepts the thesis, and assesses Sidgwick's criticism of Green. Despite the appearance (...) of a mere clash of intuitions, an interesting rationale for the thesis can be found in Green’s theory of free will and moral responsibility, of which I defend a broadly compatibilist interpretation. (shrink)

An interesting class of intentions is commitments: diachronic intentions that are especially representative of human agency. I argue that the justification conditions for knowing our commitments differ from those for knowing ordinary intentions, and I propose an externalist view according to which knowing one’s own commitments is much like knowing those of others. I discuss Sarah Paul’s transparency view, according to which, we know our intentions by making a conscious decision, even when we do not follow through on them. This (...) is because, as she argues, the function of decisions and intentions is similar, and changing one’s mind in the face of weakness of will does not defeat or undermine that knowledge of intention acquired through a conscious decision. In contrast, I show how the same evidence from weakness of will undermines or outright proves a lack of commitment, as commitments require more than decisions; they demand consistent patterns of action to resist temptations and follow-through over time. Therefore, a conscious decision is not a reliable way to know our commitments in the same way it is for ordinary intentions. I conclude that we cannot justify our commitments merely by referring to a mental item, without also referring to our regular patterns of action. (shrink)

People routinely appeal to ‘beliefs’ in explaining behavior; psychologists do so as well (for instance, in explaining belief polarization and learning). Across three studies (N = 1,843, U.S-based adults), we challenge the assumption that ‘belief’ picks out a single construct in people’s theory of mind. Instead, laypeople attribute different kinds of beliefs depending on whether the beliefs play predominantly epistemic roles (such as truth-tracking) or non-epistemic roles (such as social signaling). We demonstrate that epistemic and non-epistemic beliefs are attributed under (...) different circumstances (Study 1) and support different predictions about the believer’s values (Study 2) and behavior (Study 3). This differentiation emerges reliably across three distinct signatures of attributed belief, and even when the believed content and attributed level of certainty about that content are held constant across cases. Our findings call for a more fine-grained characterization of theory of mind and provide indirect support for the hypothesis that human cognition itself features multiple varieties of belief. (shrink)

This paper presents a unifying diagnosis of a number of important problems facing existing models of rational choice under moral uncertainty and proposes a remedy. I argue that the problems of (i) severely limited scope, (ii) intertheoretic comparisons, and (iii) 'swamping’ all stem from the way in which values are assigned to options in decision rules such as Maximisation of Expected Choiceworthiness. By assigning values to options under a given moral theory by asking something like “how much do I desire (...) this option, supposing this theory is true?” rather than “how much value does this theory assign to this option?” these problems can be avoided, while the appealing features of these accounts can be preserved. This amendment provides a role for the preferences, desires, or goals of rational agents that is curiously absent from the existing discussion of what individuals rationally ought to do when they are uncertain about what they morally ought to do. (shrink)

Nietzsche repeatedly criticizes traditional morality for having ruined our health. This raises three questions: (1) How does Nietzsche understand human health? (2) Why are health-impacts evaluatively significant? (3) Why should these impacts override the weight of our traditional moral values? By addressing these questions, I bring clarity to Nietzsche’s ethics and new insight to contemporary philosophy of medicine. First, Nietzsche conceives of health as a balance between one’s abilities and the demands placed upon them by one's motivations. One is healthier (...) the more one is able to meet those demands; less healthy, the less so. This view is similar to “embedded instrumentalism” in current philosophy of medicine. Second, the value health has for Nietzsche is closely related to that of “power.” Power involves the confrontation of difficulty in one’s pursuits. Nietzsche is especially interested in the diachronic value of upward trends in difficult confrontations. One is better off to the extent that one tackles more difficult versions of a task than before. Such upward trends are valuable because they prevent a form of human despair of special concern to Nietzsche. Striving after a prized goal one feels unable to realize is deeply distressing and, Nietzsche argues, leads to a form of self-alienation, resentment of others, evaluative instability, and a sense of futility in acting. This cluster of attitudes diminishes one’s welfare and undermines one’s agency. Upward trends in power contribute to one’s sense that one is able to carry out one’s dearest aims (i.e. to a sense of good health) and so prevent this dissatisfaction. Downward trends contribute to a sense of one’s impotence (of ill health). The value of avoiding this dissatisfaction and its consequences accounts for the value of health. Third, drawing on recent scholarship, I argue that Nietzsche affords health normative force for its being a constitutive aim of genuine agency. Constitutive of genuine action is the realization of a condition in which we act and do not see ourselves as impotent in acting. Therefore we have reason to avoid conditions that eradicate our (sense of our own) health, grounded in the aim of realizing genuine agency. (shrink)

Philosophers who study moral progress often hold a largely unacknowledged conception of moral history, which one may call the problem-solving conception of moral progress. This conception pictures humans as problem solvers, who make progress by advancing morally significant values in society. This conception, however, overlooks the conflict of values. In response, this paper proposes the dual-character conception of moral change to guide the study of the historical change of morality. This conception tracks a self-limiting structure of moral change— since not (...) all values are compatible and combinable, our efforts to actualize certain values entail our neglect and sacrifice of alternative values. In consequence, the “progress” we make actually limits us from experimenting with other ideal forms of life and society. As calling a change process progress keeps us in a state of neglecting alternative values, we should discard the moral-progress thinking and stay aware of the limitations of our moral efforts. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Nietzsche thinks emotional experience is constructed. To say that my experience of a particular emotion—for example, compassion—is constructed is to say that any instance of compassion I experience is something of my own making. Specifically, it is a feeling-state fabricated by my mind as it (automatically and unwittingly) interprets the phenomenally experienced bodily feelings to which I find myself subject in a particular circumstance. In other words, any compassion I experience is the result of (...) my mind having constructed such a feeling. What’s more, since Nietzsche thinks the process by which my mind interprets these bodily feelings will always involve the deployment of socially available emotion concepts and emotion narratives, he will think not only that emotions are constructed, but that they are constructed via social artifacts. Recognizing that Nietzsche understands our emotional lives as shaped by the emotion concepts and narratives we utilize to make sense of them allows us to better understand his claims that enlarging our emotional vocabulary and familiarizing ourselves with new emotional narratives can be profoundly transformative. It also allows us to make sense of the possibility he sees for reflective intervention into our emotional and perceptual lives (i.e., the potential to open up new ways of feeling and seeing by deploying new emotion concepts and narratives). (shrink)

Carlos Pereda's "Mexico Unveiled" is a fresh, idiosyncratic synthesis of twentieth-century Mexican philosophy that puts contemporary debates about Mexican identity politics into a critical perspective. In three engaging essays written in a peerless prose style, Pereda considers the persistent influence of European colonialism on Mexican intellectual life, the politics of inclusion, and the changing ideas of what it means to be Mexican. He identifies three "vices"—social habits, customs, and beliefs inherited from European colonialism—that have influenced the development of Mexican national (...) identity: subaltern fervor, craving for novelty, and nationalist zeal. Pereda demonstrates that these three tendencies have led Mexican intellectuals, and Mexican society more generally, to uncritically adopt a politics of exclusion and destructive nationalist attitudes. To do all of this, Pereda invites readers to follow him along as he explores an often surprising series of arguments and counterarguments. Using a strategy he calls "nomadic" thinking—the act of moving beyond our cultural preconceptions and habits of thinking—he guides readers through a number of examples drawn from Mexican philosophy and culture that illustrate these tendencies. At its core, "Mexico Unveiled" is an accessible and entertaining introduction to the philosophical themes that have long occupied Pereda's life and work and Mexican philosophy more generally. (shrink)

This dissertation reconstructs and defends Theodor W. Adorno’s original conception of hope. I show that Adorno belongs to a tradition in modern philosophy of revising the concept of hope so that it fits the assumptions and expectations of individuals in modern society. I call this process of revision the “secularization of hope,” since the changes to the concept correspond to the general trends of secularizing societies. -/- Adorno, however, argues that there are fundamental impasses to secularizing hope. Traditionally, hope was (...) a religious conception that assured a just and happy condition with reference to an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God. Modern philosophers, such as Hegel and Marx, attempt to absorb this religious conception into a theory of historical progress, according to which we may hope for a just and rational world because humanity’s historical development progresses toward greater justice and rationality. Adorno argues that not only is it impossible for the progressive conception to absorb the religious conception; the two conceptions, in fact, depend on each other to be plausible. -/- Adorno’s novel approach to hope turns on showing how the progressive and religious conceptions are reciprocally conditioning but irreducible to each other. The dissertation develops this conception of hope according to Adorno’s “negative dialectic.” It first shows the insufficiency of a freestanding progressive conception. It then examines failed philosophical efforts to assimilate the progressive and religious conceptions. Finally, it presents Adorno’s original account in which the two conceptions condition each other yet cannot be reconciled into a unified concept of hope. This yields a fallibilistic concept of hope that promises, but does not guarantee, that human beings can create a just, meaningful, and happy world. (shrink)

This article offers a novel interpretation of enacted knowledge through the lens of Wang Yangming’s theory of the unity of knowledge and action. By framing Wang’s concept of knowledge within an enactive model, it advances a holistic perspective that integrates mind, body, and world, as well as knowledge and action, into a unified whole. To bridge historical analysis with contemporary philosophical discourse, this article engages in dialogue with Harvey Lederman’s introspective model, offering a complementary framework that, together, provides a more (...) precise and comprehensive understanding of Wang’s philosophy. Moving beyond Lederman’s dichotomy of correspondence and identity, I introduce a third interpretation of “unity”: the Continuum Thesis. This interpretation places a more fundamental focus on the original condition of moral knowledge, presenting it as a singular entity that inherently integrates the distinct aspects of knowledge and action. By asserting that “action just is knowledge,” Wang indeed affirmed their original unity. (shrink)

The article explores the question of temporal factors of moral luck. The author demonstrates that there are cases where changes in morality can be a factor leading to moral luck. As an illustration, an example is analyzed related to a change in ideas about the morally acceptable and about the necessary grounds for holding one morally responsible. It is concluded that the resultant luck is accompanied by a temporal factor, because not only the result is important, but also how its (...) moral assessment has changed by the time it was achieved. (shrink)

This paper examines the nature of the specific grasp involved in moral understanding. After discussing Hills's ability account of that central component of moral understanding in light of problematic cases, I argue that moral grasp is best conceived of as a type of knowledge that is grounded in a subject's moral appreciation. I then show how and why the relevant notion of moral appreciation is connected to moral virtues and to one's affective and motivational engagement with moral reasons. Finally, I (...) discuss the connection between moral appreciation and a subject's ability to offer moral explanations in relation to the debate between pessimists and optimists about moral understanding's testimonial transmission. (shrink)

Prior research has unveiled a pathologization effect where individuals perceived as having bad moral character are more likely to have their conditions labeled as diseases and are less often considered healthy compared to those viewed as having a good moral character. Moreover, these individuals are perceived as less unlucky in their affliction and more deserving of it. This study explores the broader impacts of moral character on such judgments, hypothesizing that these effects reach deeper and extend to both negative and (...) positive moral evaluations. The pathologization effect also raises concerns about potential discrimination and the overmedicalization of normal health variations, so we also examine whether providing more detailed descriptions of conditions mitigates the influence of judgments of moral character. The methodology and broader implications of our findings are discussed, emphasizing the need for a deeper understanding of how moral judgments might influence patient care. (shrink)

In The Guise of the Good: A Philosophical History I aimed to provide a comprehensive book-length history of a thesis that runs throughout Western philosophy: one can only desire, will, or do something if it appears to her as good or, as the scholastic formulation had it, sub ratione boni – under the aspect or guise of the good. The guise of the good thesis (as now it is commonly referred to, though not everyone likes the label) has earned new (...) attention in its own right in contemporary philosophy, at least since David Velleman’s (critical) article, and thanks to book-length works like Sergio Tenenbaum’s Appearances of the Good and series of articles like Joseph Raz’s. While the ancient and medieval origins of the thesis are often acknowledged in the current literature, no detailed treatment of its historical development had previously appeared. In this précis I summarize the book’s contents. In the introductory chapter, I do two preliminary things. First, I explore a number of possible formulations of the thesis. Second, I lay out the methodology employed in the book, by outlining the questions on which I “interrogate” the relevant texts. What then follows is a birds’-eye view of the history of the guise of the good, as it results from the book. We can distinguish five main phases: (1) the classical canon (Socrates to Aquinas), (2) cracks in the canon (Duns Scotus, Ockham), (3) diversification (Suarez, Descartes all the way to Kant), (4) relative obscurity (1800-1950), (5) rediscovery (Anscombe to nowadays). (shrink)

This paper reflects on the contrast between the individualistic philosophical underpinnings of positive psychology and the relational underpinnings of a particular indigenous philosophical framework: that of Anishinaabe (North American Indigenous peoples) philosophy. The salience of the global loneliness epidemic and the fact that positive psychology, constrained by its existing assumptions, has struggled to address it effectively make such an exploration of alternatives timely (Van Zyl et al., 2023). Traditional positive psychological tools may be iatrogenic by perpetuating an isolated view of (...) the self, particularly when imposed on individuals and groups that value interconnectedness. Thus, we advocate for expanding positive psychology to reflect culturally diverse perspectives, especially non-individualistic perspectives that emphasize the relational nature of the person. Further, we propose a contextualistic approach to the problem of loneliness, one where we challenge and reposition assumptions to improve outcomes, avoiding the pitfalls of cultural relativism or the blind spots of universalism. Drawing on Anishinaabe philosophy, we show how three principles—relationality, process, and reciprocity—and their alignment with mino-bimaadiziwin (the good life) might inform a different inflection of positive psychology that would be better equipped to address loneliness. We provide preexisting and underutilized analogs of Anishinaabe relational approaches within psychology that are adaptable to more diverse worldviews to address the human problem of loneliness. (shrink)

Psychology as a distinct scientific discipline originated within Western contexts, predominantly serving and studying Western populations (the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Western Europe). Likewise, dominant theories of well-being revolve around Western ideals such as individualism, self-actualization, personal achievement, and the pursuit of happiness (Krys et al., 2024; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Furthermore, psychological theories of ‘the good life’ are mostly Aristotelian and Western (Ratchford et al., 2023). Even the selection of what virtues constitute ‘the good life’ reflects (...) preferences and personality traits that are adaptive and socially desirable in Western contexts but not necessarily in other Majority World Contexts (i.e., people from contexts outside of Western localities) (Wilson et al., 2024; Yu & Xie, 2021). The prevailing frameworks of well-being reflect culturally specific ideals of self-actualization and independence, often neglecting broader relational and ecological dimensions. In contrast, communal well-being, as central to many Indigenous philosophies, features relational harmony across generations, interconnectedness with others and the environment, and transcends individual concerns. This distinction underscores the need for communal perspectives to enrich and diversify well-being paradigms toward a truly global science of personality. In response, we present a Majority World perspective of communal well-being that has been largely overlooked in the literature: the Anishinaabe concept of Mino-Bimaadiziwin, or “living in a good way.” Mino-Bimaadiziwin is a philosophy of well-being rooted in the rich teachings, practices, and values of the Anishinaabeg, a particular North American Indigenous group. The Anishinaabeg are Indigenous peoples consisting of the Ojibwe (Chippewa), Potawatomi, Algonquin, Saulteaux, Nipissing, and Mississauga First Nations. We highlight this Indigenous perspective because the lead author is a descendant of the Bois Fort Band of Chippewa. Thus, the purpose of this article is to present insights into the process and content of Mino-Bimaadiziwin and the pursuit of harmony as a First Nations Majority World approach to well-being. Mino-Bimaadiziwin emphasizes the interconnectedness of all life, offering a relational, ecological, and spiritual framework for well-being (Nelson et al., 2024). Central to this framework are the Seven Grandfather Teachings—Truth, Humility, Respect, Love, Courage, Honesty, and Wisdom. These interdependent virtues guide individuals and communities towards harmony—the telos of Anishinaabe flourishing. Moreover, in contrast to empirical epistemologies, Anishinaabe do not view causal relationships as linear, so we present the Seven Grandfather Teachings or virtues as both a process and outcome of Mino-Bimaadiziwin. Because of these distinctions, this dynamic perspective of well-being is best portrayed through the Indigenous methodology of storywork (Archibald, 2008; Smith, 2012). Thus, we employ a narrative approach in the posture of a pluralistic scientific perspective, layering Anishinaabe teachings with Western psychological theories to diversify the discourse of human flourishing. (shrink)

In Ancient Greek, different philosophical teachings agree that the distinctive characteristic of human is reason (logos, ratio). According to Platonist, Aristotelian and Epicurean views, human beings, unlike plants or animals, attain the highest good, i.e., happiness when they live under the guidance of reason without denying their irrational nature. However, Stoicism differs from these teachings with regard to the relation between the irrational and rational nature of humans. The main reason for this difference is due to the difference in Stoic (...) view regarding the nature of the soul. Contrary to Platonic, Aristotelian and Epicurist views, in the traditional Stoicism, the soul is not separable into parts, instead it has an integral structure. That is precisely why Stoic theory of emotion (pathos) differs from other theories of emotion too. While other teachings defend the view that in order to achieve happiness emotions should be simply moderated, Stoics argue that to achieve happiness, emotions must be completely eliminated. Another argument that they use to defend this view is that emotions are judgments. In this respect, Stoicism introduces a novelty both with its teachings regarding the nature of the soul and with respect to the relationship between emotion and reason. While in other philosophical views, reason and emotion are different parts of the soul that can coexist simultaneously, in Stoicism emotion and reason are two faculties of the soul that cannot be present at the same time. In other words, when the soul has the faculty of reason, it cannot have the faculty of emotion, and vice versa. In brief, the aim of this paper is to explain why the Stoics argue (based on their unique account of human soul) that in order to achieve happiness, emotions should be completely eliminated. (shrink)

Released in 2014, this was the first philosophy textbook in moral psychology, introducing students to a range of philosophical topics and debates such as: What is moral motivation? Do reasons for action always depend on desires? Is emotion or reason at the heart of moral judgment? Under what conditions are people morally responsible? Are there self-interested reasons for people to be moral? The Second Edition of Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction, updates its responses to these questions, taking advantage of the (...) explosion of recent research from philosophers and psychologists on these topics, and adding a chapter on the question of whether morality is innate or learned. As before, the book emphasizes the relationship between traditional and interdisciplinary approaches to moral psychology and aims to carefully explain how empirical research is (or is not) relevant to philosophical inquiry. The bulleted summaries, study questions, and lists for further readings at the end of each chapter have been updated. Key Updates to the Second Edition - Includes a new opening section on human nature, borrowing material from elsewhere in the book - Adds a new chapter on evolutionary and developmental arguments for the innateness of morality - Expands coverage of the challenges to psychological research, including the replication crisis and the WEIRDNESSness challenge - Provides a new section on implicit bias and moral responsibility - Offers enhanced clarity and accessibility throughout - Includes up-to-date Further Reading sections and Bibliography. (shrink)

Recommender systems are artificial intelligence technologies, deployed by online platforms, that model our individual preferences and direct our attention to content we’re likely to engage with. As the digital world has become increasingly saturated with information, we’ve become ever more reliant on these tools to efficiently allocate our attention. And our reliance on algorithmic recommendation may, in turn, reshape us as moral agents. While recommender systems could in principle enhance our moral agency by enabling us to cut through the information (...) saturation of the internet and focus on things that matter, as they’re currently designed and implemented they’re apt to interfere with our ability to attend appropriately to morally relevant factors. In order to analyze the distinctive moral problems algorithmic recommendation poses, we develop a framework for the ethics of attention and an account of judicious attention allocation as a moral skill. We then discuss empirical evidence suggesting that attentional moral skill can be thwarted and undermined in various ways by algorithmic recommendation and related affordances of online platforms, as well as economic and technical considerations that support this concern. Finally, we consider how emerging technologies might overcome the problems we identify. (shrink)

This article offers an account of Nietzschean decadence as a psycho-physiological condition characterized by a failure of psychic integration—a failure Nietzsche thinks precludes genuine agency, since the psychic integration the decadent fails to achieve is necessary for agency. As part of this account, this article develops an interpretation of an underexplored but crucial form of decadence: repressed decadence. Exploring this variety of Nietzschean decadence both enables us to make sense of the case of Wagner’s alleged decadence and adds nuance to (...) predominance models of Nietzschean unity. After developing this account, the article argues that Nietzsche finds decadence especially problematic when it disempowers (or obstructs the empowerment of) the individual who suffers from it, even if only in the long run. The article concludes by demonstrating that in (rare) cases in which decadence facilitates individual empowerment, Nietzsche evaluates it positively, finding such a condition worthy of affirmation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT What’s the good of getting angry with a person? Some would argue that angry emotions like indignation or resentment are intrinsically good when they are an apt response. But many think this answer is not fully satisfactory. An increasing number of philosophers add that accusatory anger has value because of what it communicates to the blamee, and because of its downstream cultivating effects on the blamee. Mediators and conflict resolution strategists share an interest with philosophers in the value of (...) reactive attitudes for interpersonal communication, but prominent thinkers from those fields arrive at rather different verdicts about the effects of accusatory anger. On a more therapeutic approach to interpersonal conflict, angry accusation is commonly understood to obfuscate mutual understanding and to have bad downstream effects on the blamee. Below, I discuss how the compassionate communication approach casts doubt on the purported valuable effects of angry accusation, and I provide empirical support for this worry. I argue that philosophers should reconsider their empirical assumptions about the human psychology of discord, and hypothesize that accusatory anger is unlikely to have the communicative and cultivating effects that it is purported to have. I conclude by highlighting further empirical and ethical questions this hypothesis generates. (shrink)

Human emotional expressions can communicate the emotional state of the expresser, but they can also communicate appeals to perceivers. For example, sadness expressions such as crying request perceivers to aid and support, and anger expressions such as shouting urge perceivers to back off. Some contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) systems can mimic human emotional expressions in a (more or less) realistic way, and they are progressively being integrated into our daily lives. How should we respond to them? Do we have reasons (...) to reply to the appeals made by AI emotional expressions? In this paper, we examine the conditions under which AI emotional expressions could give us prudential or even moral reasons to change our behavior. We argue that these conditions do not depend on whether the emotional expression is genuine or not, but rather on the presence of features some of which can be implemented in emotive AI given our current level of technological development. We extract recommendations and warnings for the development of emotive AI. (shrink)

This essay defends an account of what things are assessable for reasonableness and why. On this account, something is assessable for reasonableness if and only if and because it is the functional effect of critical reasoning.

The courage to use one's own reason is an invitation to take more actions---implicating excessive use of agency, even under rampant false consciousness manufactured by mass media and technological priorities. If one does nothing and gains nothing by doing nothing, one is not subject to any evaluation or interpretation. Modernity is an ongoing incessant festival of cruel hermeneutic sacrificial.

What solutions can we find in the research literature for preventing sexual violence, and what psychological theories have guided these efforts? We gather all primary prevention efforts to reduce sexual violence from 1985 to 2018 and provide a bird’s-eye view of the literature. We first review predominant theoretical approaches to sexual-violence perpetration prevention by highlighting three interventions that exemplify the zeitgeist of primary prevention efforts at various points during this time period. We find a throughline in primary prevention interventions: They (...) aim to change attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge (i.e., ideas) to reduce sexual-violence perpetration and victimization. Our meta-analysis of these studies tests the efficacy of this approach directly and finds that although many interventions are successful at changing ideas, behavior change does not follow. There is little to no relationship between changing attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge and reducing victimization or perpetration. We also observe trends over time, including a shift from targeting a reduction in perpetration to targeting an increase in bystander intervention. We conclude by highlighting promising new strategies for measuring victimization and perpetration and calling for interventions that are informed by theories of behavior change and that center sexually violent behavior as the key outcome of interest. (shrink)

This paper argues that praise is governed by a norm of standing, namely the evaluative commitment condition. Even when the target of praise is praiseworthy and known to be so by the praiser, praise can be inappropriate owing to the praiser’s lacking the relevant evaluative commitment. I propose that uncommitted praisers lack the standing to praise in that, owing to their lack of commitment to the relevant value, they have not earned the right to host the co-valuing that is the (...) communicative aim of praise. (shrink)

In the first part (sections 2-5) an empirical theory of practical reasons is sketched and defended. It consists of: hypotheses about what intentions are, namely optimality beliefs, (2), hypotheses about how intentions are formed on the basis of probabilistic beliefs and intrinsic desires (3), a pluralist theory about intrinsic desires (4) and a theory about motives for moral action (5). In the second part (sections 6-8) it is argued that normative practical philosophy must rely on empirical theories of practical reasons (...) (6). Then it is shown that theories of prudential practical rationality and of morals that are not based on such empirical theories run into problems. And it is sketched how the empirical theory outlined in the first part can be used as a basis for a reconstructive approach to practical rationality and of an internalist approach to morals (7-8). (shrink)

One influential tradition holds that blame is a moral attitude: blame is appropriate only when the target of blame has violated a moral norm without excuse or justification. Against this, some have recently argued that agents can be blameworthy for their violation of epistemic norms even when no moral norms are thereby violated. This paper defends the appropriateness of aesthetic blame: agents can be blameworthy for their violation of aesthetic norms as such, where aesthetic norms are the norms of social (...) practices that aim at aesthetic values. I adapt a generic account of blame as protest, which can take variable forms, and then argue that aesthetic distortion cases—cases in which an existing artwork is distorted in its presentation—most clearly warrant blame even in the absence of violations of moral norms. (shrink)

In the wake of Peter Frederick Strawson’s landmark essay Freedom and Resentment (1962), much of the theorizing about moral responsibility has centered around the reactive attitudes – with a particular emphasis on guilt, resentment, and indignation. Although philosophical interest in previously unexamined reactive attitudes has grown rapidly in recent years, remarkably little has hitherto been said about fear as a candidate reactive attitude. The aim of this chapter is to explore the phenomenon of fearing other human agents qua agents. Drawing (...) on P.F. Strawson’s seminal work on the reactive attitudes, I aim to develop an account of agent-directed fear as a distinct reactive attitude (which I refer to as reactive fear). In order to pave the way for such an account, I shall in the first part of this chapter consider a potential objection to the central claim that people can fear other agents. The objection has its roots in a propositionalist view of mental states according to which fear is a propositional attitude and thus essentially about potential events, or state of affairs (something that is, was, or will be the case). I will provide reasons for why we should reject such a restrictive view of fear, and more specifically, why we need to embrace the idea that fear can be directed towards other human agents. In the second part of the chapter, I contrast my proposed account of reactive fear to some existing views of fear, according to which fear is seen as reactive in a very general sense, as a reaction to any number of objects. On the account I propose, reactive fear is a distinct fearing attitude vis-à-vis human agents qua agents. As I aim to show, this kind of attitude is a particular mode of engagement which reflects an underlying concern of the fearing agent not to have her practical identity harmed by the feared agent. I will conclude by discussing the upshot and importance of recognizing fear as a bona fide reactive attitude. (shrink)

This article offers an account of Nietzschean decadence as a psycho-physiological condition characterized by a failure of psychic integration—a failure Nietzsche thinks precludes genuine agency, since the psychic integration the decadent fails to achieve is necessary for agency. As part of this account, this article develops an interpretation of an underexplored but crucial form of decadence: repressed decadence. Exploring this variety of Nietzschean decadence both enables us to make sense of the case of Wagner’s alleged decadence and adds nuance to (...) predominance models of Nietzschean unity. After developing this account, the article argues that Nietzsche finds decadence especially problematic when it disempowers (or obstructs the empowerment of) the individual who suffers from it, even if only in the long run. The article concludes by demonstrating that in (rare) cases in which decadence facilitates individual empowerment, Nietzsche evaluates it positively, finding such a condition worthy of affirmation. (shrink)

This book addresses the medical-ethical dilemma of distributive justice. The focus is on situations where patients compete for limited resources and not everyone can be helped, as was recently observed in connection with the coronavirus. Such conflicts of assistance are characterized by a fundamental tension between the principles of fairness and efficiency. Dufner demonstrates how these opposing principles can be balanced and what such a position means for medicine, for example, in the allocation of donor organs or in triage situations. (...) -/- ----- Dieses Buch befasst sich mit dem medizinethischen Dilemma der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit. Im Fokus stehen dabei Situationen, in denen Patient*innen um begrenzte Ressourcen konkurrieren und nicht allen geholfen werden kann, wie es zuletzt auch im Zusammenhang mit dem Corona-Virus zu beobachten war. Derartige Hilfskonflikte sind gekennzeichnet durch ein elementares Spannungsverhältnis zwischen den Geboten der Fairness und der Effizienz. Dufner zeigt, wie diese gegenläufigen Gebote ins Verhältnis gesetzt werden können und was eine solche Position für die Medizin etwa bei der Verteilung von Spenderorganen oder in Triage-Situationen bedeutet. (shrink)

Rules serve many important functions in society. One such function is to codify, and make public and enforceable, a society's desired prescriptions and proscriptions. This codification means that rules come with predefined punishments administered by third parties. We argue that when we look at how third parties punish rule violations, we see that rules and their punishments often serve dual functions. They support and help to maintain cooperation as it is usually theorized, but they also facilitate the domination of marginalized (...) others. We begin by reviewing literature on rules and third-party punishment, arguing that a great deal of punishment research has neglected to consider the unique power of codified rules. We also argue that by focusing on codified rules, it becomes clear that the enforcement of such rules via third-party punishment is often used to exert control, punish retributively, and oppress outgroup members. By challenging idealized theory of rules as facilitators of social harmony, we highlight their role in satisfying personal punishment motives, and facilitating discrimination in a way that is uniquely justifiable to those who enforce them. (shrink)

This paper develops and defends a paradigm-based explanation of respect. Paradigm-based explanations propose to illuminate subject matter that are basically disunified, by identifying a form of them (“the paradigm”) that is then shown to be explanatorily basic to the subject as a whole. This explanatory strategy is well-suited to the subject of respect, which is widely agreed to encompass two distinct kinds, appraisal respect and recognition respect. Accordingly, the paper sets out to determine which of these two kinds is paradigmatic (...) and which, derivative. It begins by advancing a novel account of appraisal respect (“perspectival respect”), which it also hypothesizes is respect in its paradigmatic form. On this hypothesis, perspectival respect is paradigmatic in virtue of its apparent “point” or function, which is that it constitutively aims at understanding another person’s perspective on things. The paper then tests the viability of this hypothesis by showing how one central form of recognition respect (“respect for persons”) can reasonably be understood to derive from respect in its paradigmatic form, by showing how it is illuminated by the aim of interpersonal understanding. (shrink)

This paper discusses the phenomenon of ethical purity, namely, the complete orientation of the mind in an ethical direction and the absence of any element that detracts from this ethical orientation. It considers the way this phenomenon is presented in Confucian thought, through ideas such as cheng 誠， xu 虛， and jing 靜. The paper then approaches the phenomenon through a discussion of both the moral trials one goes through in life, and of the state of equanimity that accompanies the (...) purity of the mind. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the nature of ethical purity, including the nature of moral progress and the oneness of the mind. -/- . (shrink)

The philosophical life can be a nomadic life, both in thought and practice. In the engaging and insightful work of the Mexican-Uruguayan philosopher Carlos Pereda, the more important of these is nomadic thought—a mode of thinking that moves and explores, that is not stationary or static, that is not stubbornly hidebound. This is a kind of nomadism that characterizes healthy or epistemically virtuous thinking in general, and that might indeed be indispensable to it. But a nomadism in practice—of migration, or (...) exile, or cross-border transplantation—is certainly also central to Pereda’s philosophical outlook. "Mexico Unveiled" brings together for an English-speaking audience some of Pereda’s most recent reflections on the philosophical significance of these two different types of nomadism, with a special emphasis on nomadic thinking. That idea is the through-line for Pereda’s thinking here. But the book also offers an idiosyncratic synthesis of 20th-century Mexican philosophy that considers the persistent influence of European colonialism on Mexican intellectual life, the politics of identity and inclusion, and the changing ideas of what it means to be Mexican. (shrink)

In recent decades, P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) has had an enormous influence on philosophical views of moral responsibility. Many contemporary views follow Strawson in centering questions of responsibility on the appropriateness of certain attitudes in our interpersonal relations, especially attitudes of blame and anger, rather than on the abstract nature of free will. Strawson’s influence has in many ways been beneficial, but the prevailing Strawsonian views have taken on some of the more dubious tendencies of contemporary moral (...) philosophy. Among them is the tendency to think of our ethical relations narrowly in terms of the sort of respect that we owe friends and strangers alike, while neglecting attitudes of concern and understanding. This tendency distorts our views of our ethical relations and how we should respond to one another’s wrongful conduct. To correct those distortions, I retrieve insights from older traditions of ethical thought—especially Platonic, Stoic, and Christian traditions—which give love and understanding a central place in our ethical relations, along with respect. These traditions, which have profoundly shaped the development of Western ethical thought, are unduly neglected in contemporary moral philosophy. By joining the insights of these traditions with the insights of Strawsonian views of responsibility, I believe we can articulate a more complete and compelling view of ethical life and responsibility. (shrink)

This book argues that moralism is a troublesome emotion of the sort one might seek help with from a psychotherapist. Its focus is on how to disabuse ourselves of the illusion that our values are objective, as well as how to manage the manifestations of its residual presence. This thesis may seem odd at first blush because morality is commonly conceived as an antidote to our baser impulses. Desire makes us want to do something, but the voice of conscience urges (...) us not to. If morality is conceived as a myth, as the author contends, then how shall we conduct our lives? The form of abolitionism put forward by the author goes beyond proposing the mere elimination of moral beliefs, attitudes, vocabulary, and institutions to encouraging their replacement by the rational vetting of our desires. He suggests that moralism, conceived as being motivated by belief in objective values, be treated similarly to, or even as, an emotional problem, akin to, or perhaps even identical to, the sort addressed by anger management programs in psychotherapy. By exposing our beliefs and desires to rational scrutiny, we can achieve our rational goals without the adverse side effects engendered by a fictitious moral overlay. Ethical Health will principally appeal to scholars and students working in metaethics and moral psychology, and will also be of interest to clinical practitioners and inquiring laypersons. (shrink)

16 Stephen Stich: "I Walk the Line"--17 Joshua Greene and Liane Young: Trolley Problems -- Glossary -- Index.

According to noncognitivists, when we say that stealing is wrong, what we are doing is more like venting our feelings about stealing or encouraging one another not to steal, than like stating facts about morality. These ideas challenge the core not only of much thinking about morality and metaethics, but also of much philosophical thought about language and meaning. Noncognitivism in Ethics is an outstanding introduction to these theories, ranging from their early history through the latest contemporary developments. Beginning with (...) a general introduction to metaethics, Mark Schroeder introduces and assesses three principal kinds of noncognitivist theory: the speech-act theories of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare, the expressivist theories of Blackburn and Gibbard, and hybrid theories. He pays particular attention both to the philosophical problems about what moral facts could be about or how they could matter which noncognitivism seeks to solve, and to the deep problems that it faces, including the task of explaining both the nature of moral thought and the complexity of moral attitudes, and the 'Frege-Geach' problem. This second edition has been revised and updated throughout. It includes new sections on expressivism as a meta-semantic argument; the rise of relational expressivism; the idea that expressivism leads us to a novel understanding of the nature of propositions; and expressivism and epistemic modals, deontic modals, probability, vagueness and truth. Schroeder makes even the most difficult material accessible by offering crucial background along the way. Also included are exercises at the end of each chapter, chapter summaries, and a glossary of technical terms, making Noncognitivism in Ethics essential reading for all students of ethics and metaethics. (shrink)