This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related

Contents
9 found
Order:
  1. Moorean Arguments Against the Error Theory: A Defense.Eric Sampson - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    Moorean arguments are a popular and powerful way to engage highly revisionary philosophical views, such as nihilism about motion, time, truth, consciousness, causation, and various kinds of skepticism (e.g., external world, other minds, inductive, global). They take, as a premise, a highly plausible first-order claim (e.g., cars move, I ate breakfast before lunch, it’s true that some fish have gills) and conclude from it the falsity of the highly revisionary philosophical thesis. Moorean arguments can be used against nihilists in ethics (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  2. Abolizionismo Morale.Mattia Cecchinato - 2021 - Aphex 23.
    Secondo la teoria dell’errore tutte le proposizioni morali sono false poiché non si riferiscono ad alcun referente nel mondo. Se tale metaetica fosse corretta, dovremmo abbandonare il pensiero morale o continuare come nulla fosse? Come vivremmo se nelle nostre scelte non tenessimo conto di alcuna considerazione morale? L’abolizionismo morale argomenta che le nostre vite risulterebbero essere migliori, e perciò tenta di persuaderci a eliminare le pratiche morali. Questo contributo presenta un’introduzione critica al progetto abolizionista, indagandone le ragioni e mettendone in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Raddi, phisaddi, and bekar : Locating spivak’s originary queerness in Salman rushdie’s shame.Namita Goswami - 2021 - Angelaki 26 (5):38-56.
    Spivak refers to “originary queerness” as a concept she cannot yet theorize. If concepts convey and uphold heterogeneous lived experience, then the paradoxical missing-ness of a corresponding “what...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Parsimony and the Argument from Queerness.Justin Morton & Eric Sampson - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):609-627.
    In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the argument from queerness originally made famous by J.L. Mackie. In this paper, we do three things. First, we eliminate four untenable formulations of the argument. Second, we argue that the most plausible formulation is one that depends crucially upon considerations of parsimony. Finally, we evaluate this formulation of the argument. We conclude that it is unproblematic for proponents of moral non-naturalism—the target of the argument from (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  5. The possibility of morality.Phil Brown - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):627-636.
    Despite much discussion over the existence of moral facts, metaethicists have largely ignored the related question of their possibility. This paper addresses the issue from the moral error theorist’s perspective, and shows how the arguments that error theorists have produced against the existence of moral facts at this world, if sound, also show that moral facts are impossible, at least at worlds non-morally identical to our own and, on some versions of the error theory, at any world. So error theorists’ (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  6. The Queer Thing about Neoliberal Pleasure: A Foucauldian Warning.Shannon Winnubst - 2012 - Foucault Studies 14:72-97.
    Through a careful reading of Foucault’s 1979 lectures on neoliberalism alongside Volumes 1 and 2 of The History of Sexuality, I argue that scholarship on both neoliberalism and queer theory should heed Foucault’s framing of both neoliberalism and sexuality as central to biopolitics. I thus offer two correctives to these fields of scholarship: for scholarship on neoliberalism, I locate a way to address the ethical bankruptcy of neoliberalism in a manner that Marxist analyses fail to provide; for scholarship in queer (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. How to prove that some acts are wrong (without using substantive moral premises).Christian Coons - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):83-98.
    I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: Φ-ing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain why the following conditional-type is true: If φ-ing would be morally required, if anything is, then anything is actually morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive moral claim; I use (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  8. Mackie's motivational argument.Philip Clark - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (ed.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Mackie doubted anything objective could have the motivational properties of a value. In thinking we are morally required to act in a certain way, he said, we attribute objective value to the action. Since nothing has objective value, these moral judgments are all false. As to whether Mackie proved his error theory, opinions vary. But there is broad agreement on one issue. A litany of examples, ranging from amoralism to depression to downright evil, has everyone convinced that Mackie vastly overstated (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. Troubles on moral twin earth: Moral queerness revived.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1992 - Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
    J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations