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  1. The Incoherence of Moral Relativism.Carlo Alvaro - 2020 - Cultura 17 (1):19-38.
    Abstract: This paper is a response to Park Seungbae’s article, “Defence of Cultural Relativism”. Some of the typical criticisms of moral relativism are the following: moral relativism is erroneously committed to the principle of tolerance, which is a universal principle; there are a number of objective moral rules; a moral relativist must admit that Hitler was right, which is absurd; a moral relativist must deny, in the face of evidence, that moral progress is possible; and, since every individual belongs to (...)
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  2. Compassionate Moral Realism. [REVIEW]Adam Lerner - 2019 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2019.
  3. Parfit : l'âge de la raison de la morale.Yann Schmitt - 2019 - Klēsis Revue Philosophique 1 (43).
    Figure majeure de la philosophie morale, Derek Parfit (1942-2017) reste encore peuconnu en France. Cette introduction vise à montrer l'ampleur des thématiques abordées de Parfit en les rattachant au projet d'une éthique rationnelle, tandis que le numéro dansson ensemble, sans prétendre être exhaustif, propose des présentations et discussions de différents éléments clefs de sa philosophie.
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  4. Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
  5. Moral Realists and Moral Experts.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 1998 - In Bengt-Pedersen Carsten & Niels Thomasse (eds.), Nature and Lifeworld; Theoretical and practical Metaphysics. pp. 281-299.
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  6. Lei de Hume e falácia naturalista.Ricardo Tavares Da Silva - 2016 - Anatomia Do Crime 4:187-204.
  7. Verdade e Normatividade.Ricardo Tavares Da Silva - 2017 - Anatomia Do Crime/Anatomy of Crime 2017 (6):209-232.
  8. Le problème de la souffrance chez Nietzsche et Parfit.Nicolas Delon - 2019 - Klesis 43:156-186.
    Dans On What Matters Parfit défénd un objectivisme moral sur lequel il espère que les philosophes finiront par converger. Au cœur de cet espoir sont des vérités normatives irréductibles telles que l’affirmation que la souffrance est intrinsèquement mauvaise. Parfit se demande si Nietzsche menace son édifice et lui consacre un chapitre entier chapeautant la discussion du désaccord moral et de la convergence, et conclut que Nietzsche soit n’est pas en vrai désaccord, soit ne raisonne pas dans des conditions satisfaisantes. Je (...)
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  9. Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences, Written by Thomas Pölzler. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-9.
  10. Beyond the Surf and Spray: Erring on the Side of Error Theory.Joel Marks - 2019 - In Richard Garner & Richard Joyce (eds.), The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously. New York and London: pp. 94-109.
    Taking as its starting point that morality does not exist (moral error theory), this chapter tries to persuade the reader to eradicate it from her psyche as well (moral abolitionism). It is argued further that the most effective way to rid oneself (and society) of moralist attitudes would be to eliminate moralist vocabulary and manners of speaking and, indeed, to the greatest degree practicable, all normative vocabularies and manners of speaking. This is because moralism lies deep and pervasively in the (...)
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  11. Reply to Bykvist and Olson.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (3):347-349.
    Reply to Krister Bykvist and Jonas Olson's review of Choosing Normative Concepts (OUP, 2017) in Utilitas.
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  12. How to Determine whether Evolution Debunks Moral Realism.Thomas Pölzler - 2018 - Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft Und Ethik 23 (1):35-60.
    Anti-realist evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that if there were objective moral truths, then evolutionary evidence would suggest that our moral judgements are unjustified (which excludes or makes it unlikely that these truths exist). Recent controversies about these arguments can often be traced back to confusion about how its premises are to be supported or undermined. My aim in this paper is accordingly a clarificatory one. I will attempt to identify which kinds of philosophical or scientific evidence would have (...)
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  13. Objectivity.Ross Colebrook & Hagop Sarkissian - 2018 - In Todd K. Shackelford & Vivian A. Weekes-Shackelford (eds.), Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science.
    In this entry, we outline the ways in which evolutionary theory has implications for the objectivity of morality.
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  14. A New Distinction in Metaethics.David DeMatteo - 2019 - A Priori 5 (Spring 2019).
    The purpose of this paper is to make a new distinction in metaethics. Specifically, I distinguish between externalism and internalism about normative principle validity (hereafter EINP). The basic distinction concerns whether the facts that make a given principle normatively valid for some subject are 1) particular facts about that subject (or agent-relative facts) or 2) facts about the world and the nature of agency in general (or agent-neutral facts). I call positions which emphasize 1) internalist positions, and positions which favor (...)
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  15. Aesthetic Properties, Mind-Independence, and Companions in Guilt.Daan Evers - 2019 - In Richard Rowland & Christopher Cowie (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
    I first show how one might argue for a mind-independent conception of beauty and artistic merit. I then discuss whether this makes aesthetic judgements suitable to undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent moral value and categorical reasons.
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  16. Moral Realism and Semantic Accounts of Moral Vagueness.Ali Abasnezhad - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    Miriam Schoenfield argues that moral realism and moral vagueness imply ontic vagueness. In particular, she argues that neither shifty nor rigid semantic accounts of vagueness can provide a satisfactory explanation of moral vagueness for moral realists. This paper constitutes a response. I argue that Schoenfield's argument against the shifty semantic account presupposes that moral indeterminacies can, in fact, be resolved determinately by crunching through linguistic data. I provide different reasons for rejecting this assumption. Furthermore, I argue that Schoenfield's rejection of (...)
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  17. Objectivity and Evaluation.Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics.
    I this article, I introduce the notion of pluralism about an area, and use it to argue that the questions at the center of our normative lives are not settled by the facts -- even the normative facts. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the concept of objectivity, not realism, should take center stage.
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  18. Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking, by Cuneo, Terence: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. Xiv + 259, £35. [REVIEW]Graham Oddie - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):602-605.
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  19. Making Metaethics Work for AI: Realism and Anti-Realism.Michal Klincewicz & Lily E. Frank - 2018 - In Mark Coeckelbergh, M. Loh, J. Funk, M. Seibt & J. Nørskov (eds.), Envisioning Robots in Society – Power, Politics, and Public Space. Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press. pp. 311-318.
    Engineering an artificial intelligence to play an advisory role in morally charged decision making will inevitably introduce meta-ethical positions into the design. Some of these positions, by informing the design and operation of the AI, will introduce risks. This paper offers an analysis of these potential risks along the realism/anti-realism dimension in metaethics and reveals that realism poses greater risks, but, on the other hand, anti-realism undermines the motivation for engineering a moral AI in the first place.
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  20. Enoch’s “Taking-Morality-Seriously Thought” Unpacked and at Work in the Argument From Impartiality.Giuliana Mancuso - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):591-602.
    After a brief outline of Enoch’s defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously, I focus on Enoch’s taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it. Enoch’s argument from impartiality is then reconstructed to show how these assumptions are at work. Next, I explain the reasons why Enoch does not succeed in converting these assumptions into a positive argument for the thesis implied by robust realism that there is a moral objectivity. Finally, I conclude that (...)
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  21. Non-Naturalist Moral Realism and the Limits of Rational Reflection.Max Khan Hayward - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):724-737.
    This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting points. Reflection (...)
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  22. Third Factor Explanations and Disagreement in Metaethics.Michael Klenk - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):427-446.
    Several moral objectivists try to explain the reliability of moral beliefs by appealing to a third factor, a substantive moral claim that explains, first, why we have the moral beliefs that we have and, second, why these beliefs are true. Folke Tersman has recently suggested that moral disagreement constrains the epistemic legitimacy of third-factor explanations. Apart from constraining third-factor explanations, Tersman’s challenge could support the view that the epistemic significance of debunking explanations depends on the epistemic significance of disagreement. This (...)
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  23. Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument.Guy Fletcher - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):474-482.
    The moral error theorist claims that moral discourse is irredeemably in error because it is committed to the existence of properties that do not exist. A common response has been to postulate ‘companions in guilt’—forms of discourse that seem safe from error despite sharing the putatively problematic features of moral discourse. The most developed instance of this pairs moral discourse with epistemic discourse. In this paper, I present a new, prudential, companions-in-guilt argument and argue for its superiority over the epistemic (...)
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  24. Moral Animals: Ideals and Constraints in Moral Theory. [REVIEW]James Mahon - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (4):617-622.
    Wilson's book has two aims: a metaethical aim, to provide a non-moral-realist account of moral judgment and moral theorizing in terms of preferences for certain 'paraworlds' over other 'paraworlds,' and a normative ethical aim, to argue for greater socio-economic, and gender, equality. I am sympathetic to the second normative ethical aim, but I do not consider the metaethical redescription of moral judgment and moral theorizing in terms of preferences for paraworlds to be accurate or helpful. Her critique of "immanentism," or (...)
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  25. Realismo Moral Naturalista: Problemas Semânticos.Rafael Martins - 2010 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal Do Rio de Janeiro
    As the intuitions about moral phenomenology shows the metaphysical distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent properties has set the metaethical distinction between normativity and objectivity in ethics. Traditionally, many arguments were built in order to show that moral realists cannot account, in naturalist vocabulary, for the process of determining moral reference due to the desiderative disposition taken to be necessarily part of the meaning of moral terms. This dissertation assess some anti-realists arguments like is-ought thesis, the argument from queerness, the argument (...)
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  26. Book ReviewsD. D. Raphael, The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. 143. $35.00 .Leonidas Montes,. Adam Smith in Context: A Critical Reassessment of Some Central Components of His Thought. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Pp. 186. $75.00. [REVIEW]Eric Schliesser - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):569-575.
  27. Book ReviewsGilbert Harman,. Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. 238. $19.99. [REVIEW]Michael Ridge - 2002 - Ethics 113 (1):158-160.
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  28. Can Moral Realists Deflect Defeat Due to Evolutionary Explanations of Morality?Michael Klenk - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):227-248.
    I address Andrew Moon's recent discussion (2016, this journal) of the question whether third-factor accounts are valid responses to debunking arguments against moral realism. Moon argues that third-factor responses are valid under certain conditions but leaves open whether moral realists can use his interpretation of the third-factor response to defuse the evolutionary debunking challenge. I rebut Moon's claim and answer his question. Moon's third-factor reply is valid only if we accept externalism about epistemic defeaters. However, even if we do, I (...)
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  29. The Effects of Morality on Acting Against Climate Change.Thomas Pölzler - forthcoming - In Richard Joyce & Richard Garner (eds.), The End of Morality. New York: Routledge.
    Suppose you are a moral error theorist, i.e., you believe that no moral judgment is true. What, then, ought you to do with regard to our common practice of making such judgments? Determining the usefulness of our ordinary moral practice is exacerbated by the great number and variety of moral judgments. In-depth case studies may thus be more helpful in clarifying error theory’s practical implications than reflections about morality in general. In this chapter I pursue this strategy with regard to (...)
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  30. Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Our Shared Hatred of Pain.Ben Bramble - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):94-101.
    This article responds to an argument from Katarzyna de Ladari-Radek and Peter Singer in their article, "The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason.".
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  31. Anthropocentric Realism About Values.Bryan Van Norden - 2014 - In Chenyang Li & Peimin Ni (eds.), Moral Cultivation and Confucian Character. Albany, NY, USA: State University of New York Press. pp. 65-96.
    31 The choice of human goals cannot be completely subjective, because 32 there are some (even ones that motivate many humans) that are simply 33 unintelligible as ultimate goals. For example, wealth is rational as an 34 intermediate goal, a means to achieving some further end, but it is simply 35 unintelligible to suggest that wealth is an ultimate goal in itself. Second, 36 we have seen that some things are reasonable to pursue as aspects of 37 our ultimate goals (...)
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  32. Revisiting Folk Moral Realism.Thomas Pölzler - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):455-476.
    Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. According to one of the most prominent arguments in favour of this view, ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that realism is true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming is supported by psychological research on folk metaethics. While most recent research has been thought to contradict this claim, four prominent earlier studies (...)
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  33. Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences.Thomas Pölzler - 2018 - New York: Routledge.
    Are there objective moral truths, i.e. things that are morally right, wrong, good, or bad independently of what anybody thinks about them? To answer this question more and more scholars have recently turned to evidence from psychology, neuroscience, cultural anthropology, and evolutionary biology. This book investigates this novel scientific approach in a comprehensive, empirically-focused, and partly meta-theoretical way. It suggests that while it is possible for the empirical sciences to contribute to the moral realism/anti-realism debate, most arguments that have so (...)
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  34. Can the Empirical Sciences Contribute to the Moral Realism/Anti-Realism Debate?Thomas Pölzler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4907-4930.
    An increasing number of moral realists and anti-realists have recently attempted to support their views by appeal to science. Arguments of this kind are typically criticized on the object-level. In addition, however, one occasionally also comes across a more sweeping metatheoretical skepticism. Scientific contributions to the question of the existence of objective moral truths, it is claimed, are impossible in principle; most prominently, because such arguments impermissibly derive normative from descriptive propositions, such arguments beg the question against non-naturalist moral realism, (...)
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  35. Do Normative Facts Need to Explain?Jeremy Randel Koons - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246-272.
    Much moral skepticism stems from the charge that moral facts do not figure in causal explanations. However, philosophers committed to normative epistemological discourse are in no position to demand that normative facts serve such a role, since epistemic facts are causally impotentas well. I argue instead that pragmatic reasons can justify our continued participation in practices which, like morality and epistemology, do not servethe function of causal explanation.
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  36. "Walden Two" and Skinner's Ideal Observer.James W. McGray - 1984 - Behavior and Philosophy 12 (2):15.
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  37. Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie.James C. Klagge - 1986 - Ethics 97 (1):278-279.
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  38. The Logic of Moral Discourse. By Robert G. Olson.PAUL EDWARDS - 1955 - Ethics 66 (3):221-222.
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  39. From Science to Moral Realism: The Relevance of Twin Earth Examples.Robert Feleppa - 2003 - Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (2):79-84.
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  40. On Universalism: Communitarians, Rorty, and “Liberal Metaphysicians”.Andrew Jason Cohen - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):39-75.
    It is often claimed that liberalism is falsely and perniciously universalist. I take this charge seriously, exploring three positions: the communitarians’, Rorty’s, and that of “comprehensive” liberalism. After explaining why universalism is thought impossible, I examine the communitarian view that value is determined within communities and argue that it results in a form of relativism that is unacceptable. I next discuss Richard Rorty’s liberal acceptance of “conventionalism” and explain how, despite his rejection of universalism, Rorty remains a liberal. I then (...)
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  41. À la Rescousse du Platonisme Moral.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (3):531-556.
    Moral platonism, the claim that moral entities are both objective and prescriptive, is generally thought to be a dead end. In an attempt to defend a moderate form of moral platonism or more precisely platonism about values, I first argue that several of the many versions of this doctrine are not committed to ontological extravagances. I then discuss an important objection due to John McDowell and developed by Michael Smith, according to which moral platonism is incoherent. I argue that objectivism (...)
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  42. 9. Moral Realism and Personal Variations.Arto Laitinen - 2008 - In Strong Evaluation Without Moral Sources: On Charles Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 324-350.
    A satisfactory theory of “strong evaluation” should manage to do two things: first of all, make sense of the distinction between impersonal ethical issues and personal orientation. Secondly, the deontic layer of reasons and norms should be taken into account, among other things because the central indicators of strong evaluation, namely praise and blame, presuppose norms and reasons as standards of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. These two desiderata seem to pull in different directions. The suggested analysis of the deontic layer in (...)
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  43. Ethics: An Investigation of the Facts and Laws of the Moral LifeVol. I, The Facts of Moral LifeVol. II, Ethical Systems.Frank Chapman Sharp, Wilhelm Wundt, Julia Gulliver, Edward Titchener & Margaret Floy Washburn - 1898 - Philosophical Review 7 (3):300.
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  44. On the Relevance of Metaethics: New Essays on Metaethics.Mark Timmons, Jocelyne Couture & Kai Nielsen - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (3):452.
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  45. The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency.William Andrew Rottschaefer - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    This important book brings findings and theories in biology and psychology to bear on the fundamental question in ethics of what it means to behave morally. It explains how we acquire and put to work our capacities to act morally and how these capacities are reliable means to achieving true moral beliefs, proper moral motivations, and successful moral actions. By presenting a complete model of moral agency based on contemporary evolutionary theory, developmental biology and psychology, and social cognitive theory, the (...)
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  46. Beowulf and the Book of Enoch.R. Kaske - 1970 - Speculum 46 (3):421-431.
    I suppose it would be generally admitted these days that the interpretation of Old English literature can often draw profitably upon Christian Latin writing of the first millennium: the Latin Bible and its commentaries, the New Testament apocrypha, and the enormous and varied corpus of patristic and later Latin literature. In addition, there are occasional signs that Old English poetry — learned and unusually early as it is — may owe something to a colorful body of writings no longer current (...)
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  47. The Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558J. D. Mackie.Conyers Read - 1953 - Speculum 28 (3):591-592.
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  48. Beyond Frege-Geach: Neglected Problems for Expressivism.Sebastian Köhler - unknown
    This thesis is about the viability of meta-normative expressivism. On what I take to be the dominant conception of the view, it subscribes to two theses. First, that the meaning of sentences is to be explained in terms of the mental states these sentences conventionally express. Second, that there is a fundamental difference in the roles of the states expressed by normative sentences and the states expressed by descriptive sentences: descriptive sentences, according to expressivists, express mental states which are representational (...)
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  49. The Pretensions of Moral Realism.Neil Sinclair - unknown
    Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. Moral practice has a certain face-value, only realism can vindicate this face value, and the face-value needs vindicating. Two potential problems with such arguments are discussed. The first is taking the relevant face-value to involve explicitly realist commitments; the second is underestimating the power of non-realist strategies to vindicate that face-value. Case studies of each of these errors (...)
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  50. Defeaters and Practical Knowledge.Carla Bagnoli - 2018 - Synthese, DOI: 10.1007/S11229-016-1095-Z 195 (7):2855–2875.
    This paper situates the problem of defeaters in a larger debate about the source of normative authority. It argues in favour of a constructivist account of defeasibility, which appeals to the justificatory role of moral principles. The argument builds upon the critique of two recent attempts to deal with defeasibility: first, a particularist account, which disposes of moral principles on the ground that reasons are holistic; and second, a proceduralist view, which addresses the problem of defeaters by distinguishing between provisional (...)
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