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  1. Juan José Acero (2011). Origins of Objectivity. Theoria 26 (3):373-376.
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  2. Deborah Achtenberg (1982). What is Goodness? An Introduction. Dissertation, New School for Social Research
    The inquiry is an introduction to the question, what is goodness? In it, realist and anti-realist accounts are considered. In Part I, two kinds of anti-realism are considered, subjectivist and strict. Subjectivism is the belief that goodness is belief-, affect-, or convention-dependent. It is suggested that subjectivism is based on an equivocation, is circular or is difficult consistently to maintain. Strict anti-realism is the belief that there is and can be no such thing as goodness. Three strict anti-realists are considered: (...)
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  3. John D. Bailiff (1964). Some Comments on the `Ideal Observer'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (3):423-428.
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  4. Diane Benedict-Gill (1984). Moral Objectivity. Philosophy of Education: Proceedings 60:219-224.
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  5. Simon Blackburn (2008). Interview - Simon Blackburn. The Philosophers' Magazine 40 (40):38-39.
    Cambridge professor Simon Blackburn is best known to the general public as the author of several books of popular philosophy such as  ink, Being Good andTruth: a Guide for the Perplexed. Academic philosophers also know him as the author of one of the most important books of contemporary moral philosophy, Ruling Passions, and as a former editor of the leading journal Mind.
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  6. Simon Blackburn (2004). What’s It All About?: Simon Blackburn Asks What Philosophy Is. The Philosophers' Magazine 27:20-21.
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  7. Paul Boghossian (2011). The Maze of Moral Relativism. The New York Times.
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  8. Eline Busck Gundersen, Making Sense of Response-Dependence.
    This thesis investigates the distinction, or distinctions, between response-dependent and response-independent concepts or subject matters. I present and discuss the three most influential versions of the distinction: Crispin Wright’s, Mark Johnston’s, and Philip Pettit’s. I argue that the versions do not compete for a single job, but that they can supplement each other, and that a system of different distinctions is more useful than a single distinction. I distinguish two main paradigms of response-dependence: response-dependence of subject matter (Johnston and Wright), (...)
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  9. Lawrence E. Cahoone (1999). Response to Timothy Engstrom' Review of The Ends of Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 30 (1&2):135-139.
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  10. Roberto Casati & Christine Tappolet (eds.) (1998). European Review of Philosophy, 3: Response-Dependence. Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
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  11. Elizabeth Zeron Compton (2008). Varieties of Response-Dependence: A Critique of Zangwill. American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-Journal 1 (1):7-14.
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  12. Darlei Dall'agnol (2002). Quasi-Realism in Moral Philosophy - An Interview with Simon Blackburn. Ethic@ 1:101-114.
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  13. Edward E. Dawson (1977). BLACKBURN, SIMON "Meaning, Reference and Necessity". [REVIEW] Philosophy 52:236.
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  14. Elmer H. Duncan (1970). The Ideal Aesthetic Observer: A Second Look. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 29 (1):47-52.
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  15. Susan Dwyer, How not to argue that morality isn't innate: Comments on Jesse Prinz's “is morality innate?”.
    We must admire the ambition of Prinz’s title question. But does he provide a convincing answer to it? Prinz’s own view of morality as “a byproduct – accidental or invented – of faculties that evolved for different purposes (1),” which appears to express a negative reply, does not receive much direct argument here. Rather, Prinz’s main aim is to try to show that the considerations he believes are typically presented by moral nativists are insufficient or inadequate to establish that morality (...)
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  16. Matti Eklund, Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality.
  17. Matti Eklund (2012). Alternative Normative Concepts. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):139-157.
  18. Luca Ferrero (2009). Constitutivism and the Schmagency Challenge. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. Oxford University Press.
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  19. M. Gilbert (1999). Critical Notice: Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, 1996, Blackwell Publishers. Noûs 33 (2):295-303.
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  20. Charles Hartshorne (1977). Response to Rensch's Paper. In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature. University Press of America. pp. 78.
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  21. M. Whitcomb Hess (1938). Objectivity in Moral Philosophy. Journal of Philosophy 35 (14):381-386.
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  22. Frank A. Hindriks (2006). Acceptance-Dependence: A Social Kind of Response-Dependence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):481–498.
    Neither Johnston's nor Wright's account of response-dependence offers a complete picture of response-dependence, as they do not apply to all concepts that are intrinsically related to our mental responses. In order to (begin to) remedy this situation, a new conception of response-dependence is introduced that I call "acceptance-dependence". This account applies to concepts such as goal, constitutional, and money, the first two of which have mistakenly been taken to be response-dependent in another sense. Whereas on Johnston's and Wright's accounts response-dependent (...)
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  23. John Hospers (1962). The Ideal Aesthetic Observer. British Journal of Aesthetics 2 (2):99-111.
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  24. Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (2002). Response-Dependence Without Tears. Philosophical Issues 12 (1):97-117.
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  25. Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (2002). Response-Dependence Without Tears. Noûs 36 (s1):97-117.
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  26. Robert N. Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.) (2015). Passions and Projections: Themes From the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn. Oxford University Press.
    This volume presents fourteen original essays which explore the philosophy of Simon Blackburn, and his lifetime pursuit of a distinctive projectivist and anti-realist research program. The essays document the range and influence of Blackburn's work and reveal, among other things, the resourcefulness of his brand of philosophical pragmatism.
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  27. Jason Ross Kawall (2001). Virtues, Ideal Observers, and the Foundations of Normativity. Dissertation, Brown University
    The central claim of this dissertation is that the most plausible form of virtue theory will incorporate a number of features from an ideal observer theory, and vice versa. Virtue theorists in ethics and epistemology often characterize the virtues as those traits required for a good human life, and right action in terms of the behaviour of virtuous persons. I argue that while such positions are mistaken , a related form of ideal observer theory can capture the virtue theorists' insights. (...)
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  28. James C. Klagge & Simon Blackburn (1995). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Philosophical Review 104 (1):139.
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  29. Jonathan Lear (1984). Moral Objectivity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 17:135-170.
    The aim of this essay is to set out an argument for moral objectivity. A brief sketch of the considerations at issue should help make it possible to keep sight of the forest amid the profusion of trees.
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  30. López De Sa Dan (2013). The Aposteriori Response-Dependence of the Colors. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):65-79.
    The paper proposes and defends the following characterization of response dependent property: a property is response-dependent iff there is a response-dependence biconditional for a concept signifying it which holds in virtue of the nature of the property. Finding out whether a property is such is to a large extent a posteriori matter. Finally, colors are response dependent: they are essentially tied to issuing the relevant experiences, so that having those experiences does give access to their, dispositional, nature. Finally, some important (...)
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  31. G. A. Malinas (1979). BLACKBURN, Simon "Meaning, Reference and Necessity". [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57:101.
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  32. Pierpaolo Marrone (2008). Espressionismo, Olismo, Deflazionismo in Simon Blackburn. Etica E Politica 10 (1):236-263.
    Expressionism, holism, and deflationism are central concepts in Blackburn quasi-realistic metaethics. The paper deals with these in order to evaluate the general tenability of Blackburn’s version of non-cognitivism.
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  33. Robert Johnson Michael Smith (ed.) (2015). Passions and Projections: Themes From the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn. Oxford University Press.
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  34. Alexander Miller (2012). O quasi-realismo de Blackburn. Critica.
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  35. Armin Nikkhah Shirazi, Biology Vs. Moral Objectivity.
    The original version of this paper was written for the PHIL 320 Worldviews course offered at the University of Michigan.
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  36. D. E. Over (1978). "Meaning, Reference and Necessity". Edited by Simon Blackburn. [REVIEW] Mind 87:146.
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  37. Nancy Rankin (2010). A Substantive Revision To Firth's Ideal Observer Theory. Stance 3:55-61.
    This paper examines Ideal Observer Theory and uses criticisms of it to lay the foundation for a revised theory first suggested by Jonathan Harrison called Ideal Moral Reaction Theory. Harrison’s Ideal Moral Reaction Theory stipulates that the being producing an ideal moral reaction be dispassionate. This paper argues for the opposite: an Ideal Moral Reaction must be performed by a passionate being because it provides motivation for action and places ethical decision-making within human grasp.
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  38. Hastings Rashdall (1905). I.—Moral Objectivity and its Postulates. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 5 (1):1-28.
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  39. Hastings Rashdall (1904). Moral Objectivity and Its Postulates. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 5:1 - 28.
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  40. Rasmussen Alstrup Stig (1985). Quasi-Realism and Mind-Dependence. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (39):185.
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  41. Thomas Martin Rocco (1971). The Ideal Observer Theory of Ethical Statements. Dissertation, The Catholic University of America
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  42. Naomi Scheman (1996). Feeling Our Way Toward Moral Objectivity. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
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  43. Scott Shalkowski (2008). Blackburn’s Rejection of Modals. Philosophia Scientiae 12 (1):93-106.
    In this paper I present Simon Blackburn’s dilemma for truth conditional theories of modality and discuss its limitations. I discuss the nature of conceptual and argumentative circularity and argue that conceptual circularity does not apply to all of the main truth conditional theories of modality and that, likewise, argumentative circularity does not apply. There is nothing wrong, in principle, with theories of the modal in non-modal terms, but attending epistemological issues are significant and have been given too little attention. I (...)
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  44. William H. Shaw (1981). Marxism and Moral Objectivity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (sup1):19-44.
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  45. William H. Shaw (1981). Marxism and Moral Objectivity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 7:19.
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  46. J. R. O. Shea (2001). Simon Blackburn, Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):261-264.
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  47. M. Smith (1985). BLACKBURN, S.: "Spreading the Word". [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:543.
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  48. Sigrun Svavarsdóttir (2001). On Simon Blackburn's Ruling Passions. Philosophical Books 108:18-26.
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  49. K. V. (1978). The Ideal in Law. Review of Metaphysics 32 (1):152-154.
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  50. Alan Weir (1994). Simon Blackburn, "Essays in Quasi-Realism". [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (2):345.
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1 — 50 / 495