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  1. added 2018-11-30
    The Nature of Normativity: Reply to Holton, Railton, and Lenman.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):479-491.
    In this article, I reply to the comments that Richard Holton, Peter Railton, and James Lenman have made on my 2007 book "The Nature of Normativity".
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  2. added 2018-11-15
    Meaning, Moral Realism, and the Importance of Morality.Michael Zhao - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    Many philosophers have suspected that the normative importance of morality depends on moral realism. In this paper, I defend a version of this suspicion: I argue that if teleological forms of moral realism, those that posit an objective purpose to human life, are true, then we gain a distinctive kind of reason to do what is morally required. I argue for this by showing that if these forms of realism are true, then doing what is morally required can provide a (...)
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  3. added 2018-10-26
    L'aritmetica della morale.Andrea Bucci - manuscript
    Un primo tentativo di dare unìinterpretazione morale dell'aritmetica.
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  4. added 2018-10-15
    Reductivism, Nonreductivism and Incredulity About Streumer’s Error Theory.N. G. Laskowski - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):766-776.
    In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer argues via elimination for a global error theory, according to which all normative judgments ascribe properties that do not exist. Streumer also argues that it is not possible to believe his view, which is a claim he uses in defending his view against several objections. I argue that reductivists and nonreductivists have compelling responses to Streumer's elimination argument – responses constituting strong reason to reject Streumer’s diagnosis of any alleged incredulity about his error theory.
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  5. added 2018-10-07
    Grounding the Normative: A Problem for Structured Non-Naturalism.Justin Morton - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    It is wrong for John to kick my cat because it will cause the cat serious pain, but also because it is wrong for people to cause serious pain in certain circumstances. This suggests the following structure: some normative facts hold in virtue of both non-normative facts and normative principles. As I will construe this, it is a claim about the metaphysical grounds of normative facts. Many non-naturalists about the normative want to endorse this view generally—that particular normative facts are (...)
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  6. added 2018-09-24
    Using Benevolent Affections to Learn Our Duty.Marina Folescu - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):467-489.
    The puzzle is this: I argue that for Reid, moral sense needs benevolent affections – i.e. some of our animal, non-cognitive principles of action – to apply the rules of duty. But he also thinks that duty can conflict with benevolent affections. So what happens in these conflict cases? I will argue that Reid takes moral psychology seriously and that he believes that our natural benevolent affections can be used as indicators of duty. Although creative, his account has a major (...)
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  7. added 2018-08-11
    Reply to Sam Harris.Paul Bali - manuscript
    my submission to the 2013 Moral Landscape Challenge: to find an error in his "case for a scientific understanding of morality".
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  8. added 2018-07-18
    Whose Metaethical Minimalism?Noell Birondo - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2):37-43.
    T. M. Scanlon’s ‘Reasons Fundamentalism’ rejects any naturalistic reduction of normative truths and it also rejects the type of non-naturalism that invokes a ‘special metaphysical reality.’ Here I argue that this still does not commit Scanlon—as some have thought—to an extreme ‘metaethical minimalism’ according to which there are no ‘truth makers’ at all for normative truths. I emphasize that the issue here is not just about understanding Scanlon, since the actual position defended by Scanlon might, more significantly, point the way (...)
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  9. added 2018-07-02
    Moral Realism and the Incompletability of Morality.Melis Erdur - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (2):227-237.
    If what we want from moral inquiry were the obtainment of objective moral truths, as moral realism claims it is, then there would be nothing morally unsatisfactory or lacking in a situation, in which we somehow had access to all moral truths, and were fundamentally finished with morality. In fact, that seems to be the realists’ conception of moral heaven. In this essay, however, I argue that some sort of moral wakefulness – that is, always paying attention to the subtleties (...)
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  10. added 2018-06-16
    Brentano et le réalisme moral.Gemmo Iocco - 2018 - Bulletin D’Analyse Phénoménologique 14 (3):1-19.
    Dans ses écrits sur l’éthique, Brentano affirme que les propriétés morales — comme « bon » — sont l’objet d’une représentation intuitive non sensible dont le contenu est de nature « mentale ». Si la nature mentale de ces contenus en garantit le caractère d’évidence, elle en complexifie aussi l’élucidation ontologique et épistémologique, qui doit tenir compte de la classification brentanienne des actes psychiques. C’est justement cette complexité constitutive qui a fait de la théorie éthique de Brentano un passage obligé (...)
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  11. added 2018-05-20
    Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking, Written by Terence Cuneo. [REVIEW]Nicholas Laskowski - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6):781-784.
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  12. added 2018-05-10
    Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim.Louise Hanson - 2018 - Ethics 129 (1):39-69.
    Many people accept, at least implicitly, what I call the asymmetry claim: the view that moral realism is more defensible than aesthetic realism. This article challenges the asymmetry claim. I argue that it is surprisingly hard to find points of contrast between the two domains that could justify their very different treatment with respect to realism. I consider five potentially promising ways to do this, and I argue that all of them fail. If I am right, those who accept the (...)
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  13. added 2018-04-27
    Tracking Eudaimonia.Paul Bloomfield - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (2).
    A basic challenge to naturalistic moral realism is that, even if moral properties existed, there would be no way to naturalistically represent or track them. Here, the basic structure for a tracking account of moral epistemology is given in empirically respectable terms, based on a eudaimonist conception of morality. The goal is to show how this form of moral realism can be seen as consistent with the details of evolutionary biology as well as being amenable to the most current understanding (...)
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  14. added 2018-04-20
    Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking. [REVIEW]James Mahon - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 5.
    In this review I examine Cuneo's comparison of the non-normative, perlocutionary-intention theory of speech acts (Grice) with the normative theory of speech acts (Searle and Alston) and the moral theory of speech acts (Wolterstorff, Cuneo) in his transcendental argument for moral realism (since moral facts are among the necessary conditions for the possibility of speech acts, and since there are speech acts (asserting, promising, asking questions, issuing commands, etc.), it follows that moral facts exist). I argue that Cuneo does not (...)
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  15. added 2018-04-04
    The Self-Undermining Arguments From Disagreement.Eric Sampson - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.
    Arguments from disagreement against non-skeptical moral realism begin by noticing (or supposing) widespread, fundamental moral disagreement among a certain group of people (e.g., the folk, moral philosophers, idealized agents). Then, some skeptical or anti-realist-friendly conclusion is drawn. I argue that arguments from disagreement share a structure that makes them vulnerable to a single, powerful objection: they self-undermine. For each formulation of the argument from disagreement, at least one of its premises casts doubt either on itself or on one of the (...)
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  16. added 2018-03-14
    Are Moral Error Theorists Intellectually Vicious?Stephen Ingram - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):80-89.
    Christos Kyriacou has recently proposed charging moral error theorists with intellectual vice. He does this in response to an objection that Ingram makes against the 'moral fixed points view' developed by Cuneo and Shafer-Landau. This brief paper shows that Kyriacou's proposed vice-charge fails to vindicate the moral fixed points view. I argue that any attempt to make an epistemic vice-charge against error theorists will face major obstacles, and that it is highly unlikely that such a charge could receive the evidential (...)
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  17. added 2018-03-06
    [Title Removed to Preserve Anonymity].Andrew Sepielli - manuscript
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  18. added 2018-03-03
    When Do Replies to the Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism Beg the Question?Justin Morton - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Some proponents of the evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism believe that replies that assume substantive moral claims beg the question. In this paper, I give a new account of what’s wrong with such replies. On this account, many realists beg the question when they rely on substantive moral claims in their replies to the argument, but naturalists do not. While this account generalizes to some other domains, it allows perceptual and inductive realism to go un-debunked.
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  19. added 2018-03-02
    Formulating Moral Objectivity.Elizabeth Tropman - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):1023-1040.
    Objective moral facts are supposed to be independent from us, but it has proven difficult to provide a clear account of this independence condition. Objective moral facts cannot be overly independent of us, as even an objective morality would depend, in important respects, on features of us. The challenge is to respect these moral mind-dependencies without inappropriately counting too many moral facts as objective. In this paper, I delineate and evaluate several different versions of the independence condition in moral objectivity. (...)
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  20. added 2018-02-19
    Moral Realism and Reliance on Moral Testimony.Joshua Blanchard - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    Moral realism and some of its constitutive theses, e.g., cognitivism, face the following challenge. If they are true, then it seems that we should predict that deference to moral testimony is appropriate under the same conditions as deference to non-moral testimony. Yet, many philosophers intuit that deference to moral testimony is not appropriate, even in otherwise ordinary conditions. In this paper I show that the challenge is cogent only if the appropriateness in question is disambiguated in a particular way. To (...)
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  21. added 2018-02-17
    There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew Henry Kramer - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):185-212.
    This paper seeks to clarify and defend the proposition that moral realism is best elaborated as a moral doctrine. I begin by upholding Ronald Dworkin’s anti-Archimedean critique of the error theory against some strictures by Michael Smith, and I then briefly suggest how a proponent of moral realism as a moral doctrine would respond to Smith’s defense of the Archimedeanism of expressivism. Thereafter, this paper moves to its chief endeavor. By differentiating clearly between expressivism and quasi-realism, the paper highlights both (...)
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  22. added 2018-02-17
    Are Naturalism and Moral Realism Incompatible?Rik Peels - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (1):77-86.
    In a recent paper, Alvin Plantinga has argued that there is good reason to think that naturalism and moral realism are incompatible. He has done so by arguing that the most important argument for the compatibility of these two theses, which has been provided by Frank Jackson, fails and that any other argument that serves the same purpose is likely to fail for the same reason. His argument against the compatibility of naturalism and moral realism, then, is indirect: he argues (...)
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  23. added 2018-02-16
    A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skeptics: The Empirical Case for Realism.Michael Huemer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1983-2010.
    Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don’t know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance.
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  24. added 2017-10-30
    Moral Steadfastness and Meta-Ethics.James Fritz & Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Call the following claim Asymmetry: rationality often requires (or permits) a more steadfast response to pure moral disagreement than it does to otherwise analogous non-moral disagreement. This paper briefly motivates Asymmetry and explores its implications for meta-ethics. Some philosophers have thought that anti-realists are better-placed than realists to explain Asymmetry because, if anti-realism is true, disagreement cannot provide evidence against the reliability of one’s thinking about objective moral facts. This paper argues that this simple diagnosis fails to support otherwise plausible (...)
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  25. added 2017-10-30
    Naturalistic Moral Realism, Moral Rationalism, and Non-Fundamental Epistemology.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - In Karen Jones & Francois Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford University Press.
    This paper takes up an important epistemological challenge to the naturalistic moral realist: that her metaphysical commitments are difficult to square with a plausible rationalist view about the epistemology of morality.The paper begins by clarifying and generalizing this challenge. It then illustrates how the generalized challenge can be answered by a form of naturalistic moral realism that I dub joint-carving moral realism. Both my framing of this challenge and my answer advertise the methodological significance of non-fundamental epistemological theorizing, which defends (...)
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  26. added 2017-10-17
    On Parfit’s Ontology.Kian Mintz-Woo - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):707-725.
    Parfit denies that the introduction of reasons into our ontology is costly for his theory. He puts forth two positions to help establish the claim: the Plural Senses View and the Argument from Empty Ontology. I argue that, first, the Plural Senses View for ‘exists’ can be expanded to allow for senses which undermine his ontological claims; second, the Argument from Empty Ontology can be debunked by Platonists. Furthermore, it is difficult to make statements about reasons true unless these statements (...)
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  27. added 2017-09-18
    Experience and Value: A Contextualist Approach to Axiology.Field Richard W. - 1986 - Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
    In this dissertation I offer a theory of intrinsic value based on contextualist principles drawn from the value theories of John Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead. The point of departure for the argument is the contextualist view that the qualitative patters representing in experience objects of states of affairs to which we attribute values provide necessary, but not sufficient, conditions to elicit particular valuations, and ground the evaluative judgments we make. The sufficient conditions for valuation include a broader context of (...)
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  28. added 2017-09-11
    Moral Realism.Kevin DeLapp - 2013 - London, UK: Bloomsbury.
    This book introduces readers to the major debates and positions related to moral realism, and defends a pluralistic version of moral realism.
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  29. added 2017-09-11
    Moral Perception and Moral Realism: An "Intuitive" Account of Epistemic Justification.Kevin DeLapp - 2007 - Review Journal of Political Philosophy 5:43-64.
    This essay examines the relationship between ethical intuitionism and moral perception, and leverages a hybrid account of those two positions to defend moral realism against objections.
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  30. added 2017-07-19
    Review of "Speech and Morality" by T. Cuneo. [REVIEW]Neil Sinclair - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3).
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  31. added 2017-07-15
    Proper‐Function Moral Realism.Jeffrey Wisdom - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1660-1674.
    A common line of thought in contemporary metaethics is that certain facts about the evolutionary history of humans make moral realism implausible. Two of the most developed evolutionary cases against realism are found in the works of Richard Joyce and Sharon Street. In what follows, I argue that a form of moral realism that I call proper-function moral realism can meet Joyce and Street's challenges. I begin by sketching the basics of proper-function moral realism. I then present what I take (...)
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  32. added 2017-06-19
    The Real Problem with Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Louise Hanson - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268):508-33.
    There is a substantial literature on evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) in metaethics. According to these arguments, evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs pose a significant problem for moral realism, specifically by committing the realist to an unattractive pessimism about the prospects of our having moral knowledge. In this paper, I argue that EDAs exploit an equivocation between two distinct readings of their central claim. One is plausibly true but has no epistemic relevance, and the other would have epistemic consequences for (...)
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  33. added 2017-05-30
    Theism and Morality.Christian Miller - 2017 - In Leonard Clapp (ed.), Philosophy for Us. Cognella. pp. 113-123.
    This textbook chapter briefly introduces and defend a way of thinking about the relationship between God and morality. Section one explains how “God” is meant to be understood. Section two then introduces the position that morality depends in some way upon God. Section three turns to some of the leading arguments for this view. Finally, we will conclude with the most powerful challenge to this approach, namely what has come to be called the Euthyphro Dilemma.
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  34. added 2017-05-25
    Epistemic Modesty in Ethics.Nicholas Laskowski - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1577-1596.
    Many prominent ethicists, including Shelly Kagan, John Rawls, and Thomas Scanlon, accept a kind of epistemic modesty thesis concerning our capacity to carry out the project of ethical theorizing. But it is a thesis that has received surprisingly little explicit and focused attention, despite its widespread acceptance. After explaining why the thesis is true, I argue that it has several implications in metaethics, including, especially, implications that should lead us to rethink our understanding of Reductive Realism. In particular, the thesis (...)
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  35. added 2017-04-03
    Normativity All the Way Down: From Normative Realism to Pannormism.Einar Duenger Bohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4107-4124.
    In this paper, I provide an argument for pannormism, the view according to which there are normative properties all the way down. In particular, I argue for what I call the trickling down principle, which says that if there is a metaphysically basic normative property, then, if whatever instantiates it has a ground, that ground instantiates it as well.
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  36. added 2017-03-20
    6. Diversity and Universality.Arto Laitinen - 2008 - In Strong Evaluation Without Moral Sources: On Charles Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 217-256.
    Any view stressing the relevance of the engaged perspective for value realism must face the fact of diversity of moral views. There is significant intercultural diversity in people’s beliefs about values. Skeptics like Mackie argue that the diversity results from there being nothing for people to know, or at least nothing they can know. In this chapter I try to show that engaged value realism is compatible with universal, unrestricted validity of values. In 6.1 and 6.2 I discuss various possible (...)
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  37. added 2017-02-07
    Moral Progress Without Moral Realism.Catherine Wilson - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (1):97-116.
    This paper argues that we can acknowledge the existence of moral truths and moral progress without being committed to moral realism. Rather than defending this claim through the more familiar route of the attempted analysis of the ontological commitments of moral claims, I show how moral belief change for the better shares certain features with theoretical progress in the natural sciences. Proponents of the better theory are able to convince their peers that it is formally and empirically superior to its (...)
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  38. added 2017-02-07
    Real, Modest Moral Realism.Steven Ross - 2004 - Philosophical Forum 35 (4):411-421.
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  39. added 2017-02-07
    Robinson's Moral Realism and Hermeneutics.Frank C. Richardson - 2003 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):22-29.
    Robinson's defense of moral realism is stimulating, admirable, and convincing in many respects. He is particularly effective in mounting a multi-faceted attack on Mackie's famous "argument from queerness" and other views that deny that moral realities can be part of the furniture of the world. Certain other of his arguments about the ontological standing of moral entities, however, might be seen to open rather a wide gulf between them and ordinary experience. I suggest that hermeneutic philosophy, which I find more (...)
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  40. added 2017-01-30
    Essentially Grounded Non-Naturalism and Normative Supervenience.Toppinen Teemu - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):645-653.
    Non-naturalism – roughly the view that normative properties and facts are sui generis and incompatible with a purely scientific worldview – faces a difficult challenge with regard to explaining why it is that the normative features of things supervene on their natural features. More specifically: non-naturalists have trouble explaining the necessitation relations, whatever they are, that hold between the natural and the normative. My focus is on Stephanie Leary's recent response to the challenge, which offers an attempted non-naturalism-friendly explanation for (...)
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  41. added 2017-01-11
    A Precise Meaning for Objective and Subjective in Value Theory.Harold N. Lee - 1940 - Journal of Philosophy 37 (23):626-637.
  42. added 2017-01-10
    What is Value? Where Does It Come From? A Philosophical Perspective.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation. pp. 3-22.
    Are values objective or subjective? To clarify this question we start with an overview of the main concepts and debates in the philosophy of values. We then discuss the arguments for and against value realism, the thesis that there are objective evaluative facts. By contrast with value anti-realism, which is generally associated with sentimentalism, according to which evaluative judgements are grounded in sentiments, value realism is commonly coupled with rationalism. Against this common view, we argue that value realism can be (...)
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  43. added 2017-01-10
    Kantian Value Realism.Alison Hills - 2008 - Ratio 21 (2):182–200.
    Why should we be interested in Kant's ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory. But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethical theory is not (...)
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  44. added 2017-01-10
    Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
    Suppose there is no God. This might imply that human life is meaningless, that there are no moral obligations and hence people can do whatever they want, and that the notions of virtue and vice and good and evil have no place. Erik J. Wielenberg believes this view to be mistaken and in this book he explains why. He argues that even if God does not exist, human life can have meaning, we do have moral obligations, and virtue is possible. (...)
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  45. added 2017-01-10
    Value Realism and the Internalism/Externalism Debate.Ernesto V. Garcia - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):231-258.
  46. added 2017-01-10
    Hume, the BAD Paradox, and Value Realism.Graham Oddie - 2001 - Philo 4 (2):109-122.
    A recent slew of arguments, if sound, would demonstrate that realism about value involves a kind of paradox-I call it the BAD paradox.More precisely, they show that if there are genuine propositions about the good, then one could maintain harmony between one’s desires and one’s beliefs about the good only on pain of violating fundamental principles of decision theory. I show. however, the BAD paradox turns out to be a version of Newcomb’s problem, and that the cognitivist about value can (...)
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  47. added 2017-01-10
    Are There Objective Values?Nicholas Maxwell - 1999 - The Dalhousie Review 79 (3):301-317.
    In this paper I demolish three influential arguments - moral, metaphysical and epistemological - against value realism. We have good reasons to believe, and no good reasons not to believe, that value-features, value-facts, really do exist in the world.
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  48. added 2017-01-10
    A Defense of Value Realism.E. M. Adams - 1966 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):163-175.
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  49. added 2016-12-08
    Base Property Exemplification and Mixed Worlds: Remarks on the Shafer-Landau/Mabrito Exchange.Jeff Wisdom - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):429-434.
    In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic view.
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  50. added 2016-12-08
    Moral Realism and Cross-Cultural Normative Diversity.Machery Edouard, Kelly Daniel & P. Stich Stephen - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):830-830.
    We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong.
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