- Rights and the Second-Person Standpoint: A Challenge to Darwall's Account.Kelly Heuer - manuscriptdetails
- Hypotheticalism and the Objectivity of Morality.Kelly Heuer - manuscriptdetails
- All Reasons Are Moral.Daniel Muñoz - manuscriptdetails
- Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscriptdetails
- Counterfeit Self: A Confirmatory Factor Analysis Among Indonesians.Juneman Abraham, Bagus Takwin & Julia Suleeman - forthcoming - Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences:1-8.details
- Genealogical Inquiry and Universal Moral Values.G. Cavallo - forthcoming - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 2017.details
- On the Practicality of Virtue Ethics.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-24.details
- Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons.J. J. Cunningham - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
- Moral Difference Between Humans and Robots: Paternalism and Human-Relative Reason.Tsung-Hsing Ho - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-11.details
- Weighing Explanations.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - forthcoming - In Andrew Reisner & Iwao Hirose (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome. Oxford University Press.details
- The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism About Practical Reason.Errol Lord - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical.details
- The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism.Theron Pummer - forthcoming - New York: Oxford University Press.details
- Reasoning with Reasons.Daniel Star - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 241-59.details
- "From Outside of Ethics" Review, John Gibbons, *The Norm of Belief* (OUP, 2013). [REVIEW]Daniel Star - forthcoming - Ethics.details
- Cruel Intentions and Evil Deeds.Eyal Tal & Hannah Tierney - forthcoming - Ergo.details
- Parity, Moral Options, and the Weights of Reasons.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Noûs.details
- Weighing Reasons Against.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.details
- Creditworthiness and Matching Principles.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7. Oxford University Press.details
- Incompatibilism and the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Kant’s Nova Dilucidatio.Aaron Wells - 2022 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 4 (1:3):1-20.details
- Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons.Nathan Howard - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (2):97-111.details
- Ambidextrous Reasons (or Why Reasons First's Reasons Aren't Facts).Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (30):1-16.details
- Is Situationism Conservatively Revisionary for Ethics?Derick Hughes - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):69-91.details
- Knowledge of Objective 'Oughts': Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle.Daniel Muñoz & Jack Spencer - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):77-91.details
- The Paradox of Empathy.L. A. Paul - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):347-366.details
- Morality and Practical Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - 2021 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.details
- What If Ideal Advice Conflicts? A Dilemma for Idealizing Accounts of Normative Practical Reasons.Eric Sampson - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1091-1111.details
- ¿Depende la moral de la religión?Julio C. Silva - 2021 - Revista Humanista 1 (2):47-50.details
- Rawls’s Justification Model for Ethics: What Exactly Justifies the Model?Necip Fikri Alican - 2020 - Dialogue and Universalism 30 (1):171–190.details
- Do We Have Normative Powers?Ruth Chang - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):275-300.details
- Honour (Draft of Entry for Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy).Dan Demetriou - 2020 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
- Guilt Feelings and the Intelligibility of Moral Duties.Andrew Tice Ingram - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):56-67.details
- Varieties of Normativity: Reasons, Expectations, Wide-Scope Oughts, and Ought-to-Be's.Arto Laitinen - 2020 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Rachael Mellin & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 133-158.details
- Reasons Internalism, Cooperation, and Law.Olof Leffler - 2020 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Rachael Mellin & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin: pp. 115-132.details
- Constructing Practical Reasons.Andreas Müller - 2020 - Oxford, Vereinigtes Königreich: Oxford University Press.details
- Weighing and Aggregating Reasons Under Uncertainty: A Trilemma.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2853-2871.details
- Reasons Not to Consider Our Options.Jeffrey Seidman - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (3):353-371.details
- Individually Sufficient and Disjunctively Necessary Conditions for Moral Responsibility.Garry Young & Daniel Coren - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):501-515.details
- Decyzje w sytuacjach niepewności normatywnej.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2020 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 29 (2):53-72.details
- Measuring Moral Reasoning Using Moral Dilemmas: Evaluating Reliability, Validity, and Differential Item Functioning of the Behavioral Defining Issues Test (bDIT).Youn-Jeng Choi, Hyemin Han, Kelsie J. Dawson, Stephen J. Thoma & Andrea L. Glenn - 2019 - European Journal of Developmental Psychology 16 (5):622-631.details
- It Only Takes Two to Tango: Against Grounding Morality in Interaction.Sem de Maagt - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2767-2783.details
- Rationalism, Optimism, and the Moral Mind.Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.details
- Constructivism, Intersubjectivity, Provability, and Triviality.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):515-527.details
- Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons.Amelia Hicks - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):765-789.details
- The Possibility of Moral Dilemmas Based on Arguments form Emotional Experience.Zahra Khazaei - 2019 - Metaphysics 11 (27):95-110.details
- Functional Constitutivism’s Misunderstood Resources: A Limited Defense of Smith’s Constitutivism.Kathryn Lindeman - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):79-91.details
- What Is Conventionalism About Moral Rights and Duties?Katharina Nieswandt - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):15-28.details
- III—Normative Facts and Reasons.Fabienne Peter - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (1):53-75.details
- Commitment and the Second-Person Standpoint.Janis Schaab - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (4):511-532.details
- Immorality and Irrationality.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):220-253.details
- Constrained by Reason, Transformed by Love: Murdoch on the Standard of Proof.Carla Bagnoli - 2018 - In Gary Browning (ed.), Murdoch on Truth and Love. Springer Verlag. pp. 63-88.details
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