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  1. Minds, Brains, and Desert: On the Relevance of Neuroscience for Retributive Punishment.Alva Stråge - 2019 - Dissertation,
    It is a common idea, and an element in many legal systems, that people can deserve punishment when they commit criminal (or immoral) actions. A standard philosophical objection to this retributivist idea about punishment is that if human choices and actions are determined by previous events and the laws of nature, then we are not free in the sense required to be morally responsible for our actions, and therefore cannot deserve blame or punishment. It has recently been suggested that this (...)
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  2. Determinismus der Natur und Freiheit des Geistes. Die Rezeption Fichtes in Frankreich und die Ursprünge des französischen Spiritualismus, in Helmut Girndt (a cura di), „Natur“ in der Transzendentalphilosophie. Eine Tagung zum Gedenken an Reinhard Lauth, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2015, s. 373-406. [ISBN: 978-3-428-14535-5].Tommaso Valentini - 2015 - In Helmut Girndt (ed.), «Begriff und Konkretion. Beiträge zur Gegenwart der klassischen deutschen Philosphie». Berlino, Germania: pp. 373-406.
    In diesem Beitrag betrachte ich die Rezeption des Denkens von J.G. Fichte bei zwei Philosophen, die als die »Begründer des französischen Spiritualismus« gesehen werden können. Es geht um François-Pierre Maine de Biran (Bergerac 1766 - Paris 1824) und Joseph-Luis-Jules Lequier (Quintin 1814 - Saint-Briec 1862). Nach einer kurzen Gesamtdarstellung der Schwerpunkte beider beschäftige ich mich - in zwei verschieden Teilen - mit der historischen und philologischen Frage, was die französischen Philosophen wirklich von den Werken Fichtes gekannt beziehungsweise verstanden haben. Beide (...)
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  3. Free Will: Real or Illusion - A Debate.Gregg D. Caruso, Christian List & Cory J. Clark - 2020 - The Philosopher 108 (1).
    Debate on free will with Christian List, Gregg Caruso, and Cory Clark. The exchange is focused on Christian List's book Why Free Will Is Real.
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  4. The Hurricane Notebook: Three Dialogues on the Human Condition.Alexander Jech - 2019 - Wilmington, NC, USA: Wisdom/Works.
    “No lies": The Hurricane Notebook, found on a Wilmington beach after a storm, contains the thoughts, artistic experiments, vignettes, and recorded dialogues of an unknown author calling herself "Elizabeth M." Its entries record the inner life of a soul in crisis, perpetually returning to the moment she learned of her sister's suicide and making an unrelenting attempt to understand herself and the human condition. Whether engaged in introspective soul-searching, or reconstructing her discussions with friends, mentors, and acquaintances, she challenges herself (...)
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  5. To Be Able to, or to Be Able Not To? That is the Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):13-32.
    A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not (...)
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  6. Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - In Peter Róna & László Zsolnai (eds.), Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics. Virtues and Economics, vol 5. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 3-20.
    While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, (...)
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  7. Video Games, Violence, and the Ethics of Fantasy: Killing Time.Christopher Bartel - forthcoming - London: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Is it ever morally wrong to enjoy fantasizing about immoral things? Many video games allow players to commit numerous violent and immoral acts. But, should players worry about the morality of their virtual actions? A common argument is that games offer merely the virtual representation of violence. No one is actually harmed by committing a violent act in a game. So, it cannot be morally wrong to perform such acts. While this is an intuitive argument, it does not resolve the (...)
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  8. Transmuted Goods and the Legacy of the Atrocity Paradigm.Jill Hernandez - 2019 - Social Philosophy Today 35:103-114.
    This paper responds to a recent challenge posed to Claudia Card’s atrocity paradigm by “transmuted goods,” or, goods which positively transmute victims of atrocity in ways which are difficult for the paradigm to explain. Whereas the legacy of Card’s atrocity paradigm will surely be its demand that we hold others culpable for allowing and perpetuating systems of harm which threaten our ability to flourish, this paper suggests a way for the paradigm to incorporate transmuted goods in a manner that strengthens (...)
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  9. Moral Worth and Consciousness: In Defense of a Value-Secured Reliability Theory.John W. Robison - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    What minimal role—if any—must consciousness of morally significant information play in an account of moral worth? According to one popular view, a right action is morally worthy only if the agent is conscious (in some sense) of the facts that make it right. I argue against this consciousness condition and close cousins of it. As I show, consciousness of such facts requires much more sophistication than writers typically suggest—this condition would bar from moral worth most ordinary, intuitively morally worthy agents. (...)
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  10. Implicit Bias.Alex Madva - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, 5th edition.
    (This contribution is primarily based on "Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility," (2018) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. This version has been shortened and significantly revised to be more accessible and student-oriented.) Are individuals morally responsible for their implicit biases? One reason to think not is that implicit biases are often advertised as unconscious. However, recent empirical evidence consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, although often in partial and inarticulate ways. Here I explore the implications of this evidence (...)
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  11. Levinas and Analytic Philosophy: An Ethical Metaphysics of Reasons.Kevin Houser - 2018 - In Michael L. Morgan (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Levinas. pp. 587-614.
    Recent analytic philosophy often explains our responsibility to one another in terms of normative reasons. Emmanuel Levinas thinks this is backwards. We are not responsible to one another because we have reasons to be. For reasons are themselves something we are responsible to one another to have; and it is only because we are responsible to one another for them that we are able to have our own reasons. Put broadly: Reasons-responsiveness is a form of responsiveness to persons. Standard reasons-first (...)
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  12. Self Control and Moral Security.Jessica Wolfendale & Jeanette Kennett - 2019 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 6. New York, NY, USA: pp. 33-63.
    Self-control is integral to successful human agency. Without it we cannot extend our agency across time and secure central social, moral, and personal goods. But self-control is not a unitary capacity. In the first part of this paper we provide a taxonomy of self-control and trace its connections to agency and the self. In part two, we turn our attention to the external conditions that support successful agency and the exercise of self-control. We argue that what we call moral security (...)
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  13. Free Will, the Self and the Brain.Gilberto Gomes - 2007 - Behavioral Sciences and the Law 2 (25):221-234.
    The free will problem is defined and three solutions are discussed: no-freedom theory, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Strict determinism is often assumed in arguing for libertarianism or no-freedom theory. It assumes that the history of the universe is fixed, but modern physics admits a certain degree of randomness in the determination of events. However, this is not enough for a compatibilist position—which is favored here—since freedom is not randomness. It is the I that chooses what to do. It is argued that (...)
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  14. Que tipo de determinação é compatível com que tipo de liberdade? – Uma resposta a Marcelo Fischborn.Gilberto Gomes - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 2 (20):113-127.
    While agreeing with Fischborn’s (2018) contention that, according to one traditional definition of compatibilism, my position should be classified as that of a libertarian incompatibilist, I argue here for a different view of compatibilism. This view involves, on the one hand, local probabilistic causation of decisions (rather than universal strict determinism) and, on the other, free will conceived as involving decisions generated by a decision-making process carried out by the brain, which consciously contemplates different alternatives and could in principle have (...)
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  15. Self-Deception as Omission.Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-22.
    In this paper I argue against three leading accounts of self-deception in the philosophical literature and propose a heretofore overlooked route to self-deception. The central problem with extant accounts of self-deception is that they are unable to balance two crucial desiderata: (1) to make the dynamics of self-deception (e.g., the formation of self-deceptive beliefs) psychologically plausible and (2) to capture self-deception as an intentional phenomenon for which the self-deceiver is responsible. I argue that the three leading views all fail on (...)
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  16. Psychopathy, Autism and Questions of Moral Agency.Mara Bollard - 2013 - In Alexandra Perry & C. D. Herrera (eds.), Ethics and Neurodiversity. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: pp. 238-259.
  17. When and Why is It Disrespectful to Excuse an Attitude?John Robison - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2391-2409.
    It is intuitive that, under certain circumstances, it can be disrespectful or patronizing to excuse someone for an attitude. While it is easy enough to find instances where it seems disrespectful to excuse an attitude, matters are complicated. When and why, precisely, is it disrespectful to judge that someone is not responsible for his attitude? In this paper, I show, first, that the extant philosophical literature on this question is underdeveloped and overgeneralized: the writers who address the question suggest quite (...)
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  18. Committing Crimes with BCIs: How Brain-Computer Interface Users Can Satisfy Actus Reus and Be Criminally Responsible.Kramer Thompson - 2019 - Neuroethics 1:1-12.
    Brain-computer interfaces allow agents to control computers without moving their bodies. The agents imagine certain things and the brain-computer interfaces read the concomitant neural activity and operate the computer accordingly. But the use of brain-computer interfaces is problematic for criminal law, which requires that someone can only be found criminally responsible if they have satisfied the actus reus requirement: that the agent has performed some (suitably specified) conduct. Agents who affect the world using brain-computer interfaces do not obviously perform any (...)
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  19. Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming. [REVIEW]Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):427-429.
    Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming. By Callard Agnes.
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  20. Negligence: Its Moral Significance.Santiago Amaya - forthcoming - In Manuel Vargas & John M. Doris (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology.
    This is a draft of my chapter on Negligence for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook in Moral Psychology. It discusses philosophical, psychological, and legal approaches to the attribution of culpability in cases of negligent wrongdoing.
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  21. Deviant Causation and the Law.Sara Bernstein - manuscript
    A gunman intends to shoot and kill Victim. He shoots and misses his target, but the gunshot startles a group of water buffalo, causing them to trample the victim to death. The gunman brings about the intended effect, Victim’s death, but in a “deviant” way rather than the one planned. This paper argues that such causal structures, deviant causal chains, pose serious problems for several key legal concepts. -/- I show that deviant causal chains pose problems for the legal distinction (...)
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  22. Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    Martin Luther affirms his theological position by saying “Here I stand. I can do no other.” Supposing that Luther’s claim is true, he lacks alternative possibilities at the moment of choice. Even so, many libertarians have the intuition that he is morally responsible for his action. One way to make sense of this intuition is to assert that Luther’s action is indirectly free, because his action inherits its freedom and moral responsibility from earlier actions when he had alternative possibilities and (...)
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  23. El peso de los daños: estados de daño y razones para no dañar.Santiago Truccone Borgogno - 2016 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política 5 (4):1-25.
    In this paper I intend to analyse the meaning of harm as well as the strength of the reasons against harming provided by harm-states. I will argue that there are two kinds of harms: absolute harms and relative harms. Also, I will argue that when certain harm has been completely covered by considering such harm as absolute, the consideration of such harm as –also– relative is displaced. Such considerations should be taken into account when the suffered harms cannot be entirely (...)
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  24. Skepticism About Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.John W. Robison - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):555-577.
    This article rejects Gideon Rosen's skeptical argument that attributions of blameworthiness are never epistemically justified. Granting Rosen's controversial claim that an act is blameworthy only if it is either akratic or the causal upshot of some akratic act, I show that we can and should resist his skeptical conclusion. I show, first, that Rosen's argument is, at best, hostage to a much more global skepticism about attributions of praiseworthiness, doxastic justification, and other phenomena which essentially involve causal‐historical facts about mental (...)
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  25. Robots, Autonomy, and Responsibility.Raul Hakli & Pekka Mäkelä - 2016 - In Johanna Seibt, Marco Nørskov & Søren Schack Andersen (eds.), What Social Robots Can and Should Do: Proceedings of Robophilosophy 2016. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press. pp. 145-154.
    We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions for agents fit to be held responsible in a normative sense, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. On the basis of Alfred R. Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility it can be argued that even if robots were to have all the capacities usually required of moral agency, their history (...)
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  26. Co-Responsibility and Causal Involvement.Petersson Björn - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):847-866.
    In discussions of moral responsibility for collectively produced effects, it is not uncommon to assume that we have to abandon the view that causal involvement is a necessary condition for individual co-responsibility. In general, considerations of cases where there is "a mismatch between the wrong a group commits and the apparent causal contributions for which we can hold individuals responsible" motivate this move. According to Brian Lawson, "solving this problem requires an approach that deemphasizes the importance of causal contributions". Christopher (...)
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  27. Contraintes Globales Et Responsabilité Individuelle.Daniel Schulthess - 1996 - In La nature: thèmes philosophiques, thèmes d'actualité - Actes du XXVe Congrès de l'ASPLF, Lausanne, 25-28 août 1994. Lausanne, Genève, Neuchâtel: Cahiers de la Revue de théologie et de philosophie, no.18. pp. p.350-354..
    Is the classical model of action, damage, and responsibility, which is based on the idea that it is always possible to individuate the direct or indirect damages resulting from a certain individual or collective action, still valid in the case of the environmental consequences of industrial production and mass consumption? We argue that the absence of a classical plaintiff in these cases implies that we have to conceive of the consequences of our individual actions (as consumers of industrial goods for (...)
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  28. When Do Circumstances Excuse? Moral Prejudices and Beliefs About the True Self Drive Preferences for Agency-Minimizing Explanations.Simon Cullen - 2018 - Cognition 180:165-181.
    When explaining human actions, people usually focus on a small subset of potential causes. What leads us to prefer certain explanations for valenced actions over others? The present studies indicate that our moral attitudes often predict our explanatory preferences far better than our beliefs about how causally sensitive actions are to features of the actor's environment. Study 1 found that high-prejudice participants were much more likely to endorse non-agential explanations of an erotic same-sex encounter, such as that one of the (...)
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  29. Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.
    I argue that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts, despite the fact that we generally do not choose to have them or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. I do so by extending an argument of Angela Smith's; the same features that she says make us morally responsible for some of our attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our concepts. Specifically, like attitudes, concepts can (...)
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  30. ‘More of a Cause’: Recent Work on Degrees of Causation and Responsibility.Alex Kaiserman - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (7):e12498.
    It is often natural to compare two events by describing one as ‘more of a cause’ of some effect than the other. But what do such comparisons amount to, exactly? This paper aims to provide a guided tour of the recent literature on ‘degrees of causation’. Section 2 looks at what I call ‘dependence measures’, which arise from thinking of causes as difference-makers. Section 3 looks at what I call ‘production measures’, which arise from thinking of causes as jointly sufficient (...)
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  31. Education and Free Will: Spinoza, Causal Determinism and Moral Formation.Johan Dahlbeck - 2018 - London, Storbritannien: Routledge.
    Education and Free Will critically assesses and makes use of Spinoza’s insights on human freedom to construe an account of education that is compatible with causal determinism without sacrificing the educational goal of increasing students’ autonomy and self-determination. Offering a thorough investigation into the philosophical position of causal determinism, Dahlbeck discusses Spinoza’s view of self-determination and presents his own suggestions for an education for autonomy from a causal determinist point of view. -/- The book begins by outlining the free will (...)
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  32. Hobbes and the Two Faces of Ethics.Arash Abizadeh - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    Reading Hobbes in light of both the history of ethics and the conceptual apparatus developed in recent work on normativity, this book challenges received interpretations of Hobbes and his historical significance. Arash Abizadeh uncovers the fundamental distinction underwriting Hobbes's ethics: between prudential reasons of the good, articulated via natural laws prescribing the means of self-preservation, and reasons of the right or justice, comprising contractual obligations for which we are accountable to others. He shows how Hobbes's distinction marks a watershed in (...)
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  33. Political Responsibility: Responding to Predicaments of Power.Jade Schiff - 2017 - Contemporary Political Theory 16 (4):561-565.
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  34. Verantwortung: Tradition und Dekonstruktion.Stefan A. Seeger - 2010 - Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
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  35. L'aveu: la vérité et ses effets.Stéphane Lemaire (ed.) - 2014 - Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes.
    L’ambition de ce livre est de présenter les éléments d’une réévaluation de l’aveu. Introduit par une réflexion sur son usage contemporain dans le droit, il croise des approches philosophiques profondément distinctes si ce n’est opposées. La phénoménologie, la psychanalyse et la philosophie analytique sont autant d’éclairages sur ce phénomène multiforme.
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  36. From Moral Responsibility to Legal Responsibility in the Conduct of War.Lavinia Andreea Bejan - 2015 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (3):347–362.
    Different societies came to consider certain behaviors as morally wrong, and, in time, due to a more or less general practice, those behaviors have also become legally prohibited. While, nowadays, the existence of legal responsibility of states and individuals for certain reprehensible acts committed during an armed conflict, international or non-international, is hard to be disputed, an inquiry into the manner in which the behavior of the belligerents has come to be considered reveals long discussions in the field of morals (...)
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  37. The Attribution of Responsibility to Self‐Deceivers.Anna Elisabetta Galeotti - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (4):420-438.
  38. Temptation, Culpability and the Criminal Law.Paul M. Hughes - 2006 - Journal of Social Philosophy 37 (2):221-232.
  39. Confucian and Liberal Ethics for Public Policy: Holistic or Atomistic?Andrew Brennan & Julia Tao - 2003 - Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (4):572-589.
  40. The Moral Problem of Nonvoting.David T. Risser - 2003 - Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (3):348-363.
  41. Why Frankfurt Examples Beg the Question.P. A. Woodward - 2002 - Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (4):540-547.
  42. The Origins of Responsibility. By François Raffoul. (Indiana UP, 2010. Pp. Xiv + 341.). [REVIEW]Roman Altshuler - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):217-220.
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  43. Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW]G. M. - 1976 - Review of Metaphysics 29 (3):550-551.
    This volume contains papers in which Hans Kelsen addresses a number of philosophical issues that are crucial to his defense of the pure theory of law. Although it includes some papers appearing in English for the first time, this collection differs little in scope or substance from an earlier one, What is Justice? Kelsen’s legal theory has raised the ire of critics because they believe it separates far too sharply law from ethics. In these papers, especially those written in recent (...)
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  44. Compatibilism and the ‘Ought’-Implies-‘Can’ Argument.Gregory Rich - 1989 - Southwest Philosophy Review 5 (2):9-16.
  45. Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Goetz.Eleonore Stump - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):413-422.
    In a preceding issue of Faith and Philosophy Stewart Goetz criticized a paper of mine in which I try to show that libertarians need not be committed to the principle of alternative possibilities and that Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP are no threat to libertarianism. In my view, the main problem with Goetz’s arguments is that Goetz does not properly understand my position. In this paper, I respond to Goetz by summarizing my position in as plain a way as possible. Goetz’s (...)
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  46. Neurophilosophy of Moral Responsibility: The Case for Revisionist Compatibilism.Henrik Walter - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):477-503.
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  47. Understanding and Blaming: Problems in the Attribution of Moral Responsibility.Lawrence Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):129-142.
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  48. The Acts of Our Being: A Reflection on Agency and Responsibility. [REVIEW]James W. Felt - 1987 - New Scholasticism 61 (4):477-479.
  49. Reflective Responsibility: Using IS to Ascribe Collective Responsibility.Bernd Carsten Stahl - 2004 - Philosophy of Management 4 (1):13-24.
    While work in modern corporations tends to take place in groups or teams it is not quite clear which status these groups have. Are they genuine agents or are they simply collections of individuals? The question is important because the answer is often held to determine whether collectives can be viewed as subjects ofresponsibility. This paper raises the question of collective responsibility and focuses on the impact the use of information systems has on it. Starting with an analysis of the (...)
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  50. Art and Responsibility: A Phenomenology of the Diverging Paths of Rosenzweig and Heidegger. By Jules Simon. Pp. Ix, 290, Continuum, 2011, £65.00/$120.00.Anna Strhan - unknown
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