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  1. A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Moral Theory.Mark Alfano - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3):1-14.
    In this paper, I use an example from the history of philosophy to show how independently defining each side of a pair of contrary predicates is apt to lead to contradiction. In the Euthyphro, piety is defined as that which is loved by some of the gods while impiety is defined as that which is hated by some of the gods. Socrates points out that since the gods harbor contrary sentiments, some things are both pious and impious. But “pious” and (...)
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  2. Constructivism in Metaethics.Carla Bagnoli - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Metaethical constructivism is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, they are not fixed by normative facts that are independent of what rational agents would agree to under some specified conditions of choice. The appeal of this view lies in the promise to explain how normative truths are objective and independent of our actual judgments, while also binding and authoritative for us. -/- Constructivism comes in several varieties, some of which claim a place within metaethics while others claim (...)
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  3. Moral Reality.Paul Bloomfield - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    We typically assume that the standard for what is beautiful lies in the eye of the beholder. Yet this is not the case when we consider morality; what we deem morally good is not usually a matter of opinion. Such thoughts push us toward being realists about moral properties, but a cogent theory of moral realism has long been an elusive philosophical goal. Paul Bloomfield here offers a rigorous defense of moral realism, developing an ontology for morality that models the (...)
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  4. On the Incompleteness of McDowell's Moral Realism.Jan Bransen - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):187-198.
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  5. Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations.Josep Corbí - 2004 - Theoria 19 (2):155-172.
    Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both (...)
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  6. A Sensible Ethics: The Analogy Between Color and Value.Rodney W. Cupp - 2004 - Dissertation, The University of Nebraska - Lincoln
    This dissertation explores an analogy between moral properties and color. Some philosophers claim that moral properties and secondary qualities are similar: both kinds of property are essentially tied to human sensibility, and we seem confronted in our experiences of both kinds of property with something the existence of which is independent of those experiences. Such similarities suggest that the correct analysis of color concepts is a proper model for the correct analysis of moral properties. A particular understanding of this analogy (...)
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  7. The Merits of Dispositional Moral Realism.Kevin Michael DeLapp - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1):1-18.
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  8. A Modest Intuitionist Reply to Greene's fMRI-Based Objections to Deontology.Dan Demetriou - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):107-117.
    I argue that Greene’s research, although fascinating for many reasons, doesn’t undermine deontological moral philosophy. This is because both sentimentalist and rationalist moral epistemologies, applied to deontological value, predict exactly the data Greene has found. My discussion proceeds in three steps. In the first section I summarize Greene’s brief against deontology. In the second section I draw on standard accounts of moral emotions to suggest that there are ‘deontological emotions’ made rational by appearances of ‘deontological value.’ Finally, I outline a (...)
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  9. Book Review: The Moral Problem by Michael Smith. [REVIEW]James Dreier - 1996 - Mind 105 (418):363-367.
  10. Arguing About Metaethics.Andrew Fisher & Simon Kirchin (eds.) - 2006 - Routledge.
    _Arguing about Metaethics_ collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of the most influential philosophers in the field discuss key questions in metaethics: Do moral properties exist? If they do, how do they fit into the world as science conceives it? If they don’t exist, then how should we understand moral thought and language? What is the relation between moral judgement and motivation? As well as these questions, this volume (...)
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  11. Fitting-Attitudes, Secondary Qualities, and Values.Joshua Gert - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (1):87-105.
    Response-dispositional accounts of value defend a biconditional in which the possession of an evaluative property is said to covary with the disposition to cause a certain response. In contrast, a fitting-attitude account of the same property would claim that it is such as to merit or make fitting that same response. This paper argues that even for secondary qualities, response-dispositional accounts are inadequate; we need to import a normative notion such as appropriateness even into accounts of such descriptive properties as (...)
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  12. Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim.Louise Hanson - 2018 - Ethics 129 (1):39-69.
    Many people accept, at least implicitly, what I call the asymmetry claim: the view that moral realism is more defensible than aesthetic realism. This article challenges the asymmetry claim. I argue that it is surprisingly hard to find points of contrast between the two domains that could justify their very different treatment with respect to realism. I consider five potentially promising ways to do this, and I argue that all of them fail. If I am right, those who accept the (...)
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  13. Fitting Attitude Theories of Value.Daniel Jacobson - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  14. 'Nicolai Hartmann: Proper Ethics is Atheistic (Dordrecht; Boston; London, 2002), Pp. 175-96'.Robert Welsh Jordan - 2002 - In John J. Drummond Lester Embree (ed.), Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy. A Handbook. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Hartmann's axiology is intuitionist like that of Max Scheler and acknowledges ,like Scheler's a hierarchy of ideal values. The two also agree that the primary intuitive consciousness of axiotic traits is emotional. Values themselves are ideal entities entailing laws regarding what ought to be and what ought to be done. The requirements about what ought to be are more likely to come into prominence or exigence for the emotional sense of what is of value when real, temporal things are not (...)
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  15. Fittingness and Idealization.Antti Kauppinen - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):572-588.
    This note explores how ideal subjectivism in metanormative theory can help solve two important problems for Fitting Attitude analyses of value. The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is that there may be sufficient reason for attitude Y even if the object is not Y-able. The many-kinds-of-fittingness problem is that the same attitude can be fitting in many ways. Ideal subjectivism addresses both by maintaining that an attitude is W-ly fitting if and only if endorsed by any W-ly ideal subject. A subject is W-ly (...)
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  16. Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics).Antti Kauppinen - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
    Sentimentalism comes in many varieties: explanatory sentimentalism, judgment sentimentalism, metaphysical sentimentalism, and epistemic sentimentalism. This encyclopedia entry gives an overview of the positions and main arguments pro and con.
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  17. Salience, Supervenience, and Layer Cakes in Sellars's Scientific Realism, McDowell's Moral Realism, and the Philosophy of Mind.Marc Lange - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):213-251.
  18. Mencius, Hume, and Sensibility Theory.Xiusheng Liu - 2002 - Philosophy East and West 52 (1):75-97.
    Sensibility theory claims that, for any object x, x is good/right if and only if x is such as to make a certain sentiment appropriate. A realist position, sensibility theory claims conceptual and explanatory advantages over alternative metaethical theories. Sensibility theory, while revealing, presents a problem of its own: its central thesis involves an explanatory circularity. Here, a Mencius-Hume solution to that problem is offered.
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  19. Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism.Colin Marshall - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):293-316.
    schopenhauer has been ignored in contemporary metaethics, and his commentators rarely attempt to analyze his metaethical views in contemporary terms. This is unfortunate. Schopenhauer has something important to teach us about moral realism.1I have both philosophical and interpretive aims in this paper. My philosophical aim is to show how Schopenhauer's views challenge the contemporary understanding of moral realism. The challenge arises from the fact that, while Schopenhauer's view implies that morality is "real" in a metaphysically- and epistemologically-robust sense, that view (...)
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  20. Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. London: Routledge. pp. 110-129.
    J.L. Mackie insists that ordinary evaluative thought presents itself as a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world. And this phenomenological thesis seems correct. When one or another variety of philosophical non-cognitivism claims to capture the truth about what the experience of value is like, or (in a familiar surrogate for phenomenology) about what we mean by our evaluative language, the claim is never based on careful attention to the lived character of evaluative thought or discourse. The idea is, (...)
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  21. Making Sense of Moral Perception.Rafe McGregor - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):745-758.
    The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Francis Hutcheson’s moral sense theory offers a satisfactory account of moral perception. I introduce Hutcheson’s work in §1 and indicate why the existence of a sixth sense is not implausible. I provide a summary of Robert Cowan and Robert Audi’s respective theories of evaluative perception in §2, identifying three problematic objections: the Directness Objection to Cowan’s ethical perception and the aesthetic and perceptual model objections to Audi’s moral perception. §3 examines Hutcheson’s (...)
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  22. Making Sense of Moral Realism.Richard Norman - 1997 - Philosophical Investigations 20 (2):117–135.
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  23. Henry Martyn Lloyd, Ed. The Discourse of Sensibility: The Knowing Body in the Enlightenment. Cham: Springer, 2013. Pp. Xii+215. $129.00. [REVIEW]Carolyn Purnell - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):198-201.
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  24. Hume's Anatomy of Virtue.Paul Russell - 2013 - In Daniel C. Russell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 92-123.
    In his Treatise of Human Nature Hume makes clear that it is his aim to make moral philosophy more scientific and properly grounded on experience and observation. The “experimental” approach to philosophy, Hume warns his readers, is “abstruse,” “abstract” and “speculative” in nature. It depends on careful and exact reasoning that foregoes the path of an “easy” philosophy, which relies on a more direct appeal to our passions and sentiments . Hume justifies this approach by way of an analogy concerning (...)
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  25. Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW]Paul Russell - 1991 - Philosophical Books 32 (4):213-216.
  26. Essays on Moral Realism.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.) - 1988 - Cornell University Press.
    Introduction The Many Moral Realisms Geoffrey Sayre-McCord I. Introduction Recognizing the startling resurgence in realism, ...
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  27. Ahmed Cevdet Pa Sa'n N Felsef Dü Süncesi.Kemal Sözen - 1998
  28. Moral Metaphysics.Daniel Star - 2013 - In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter sketches four forms of realism ascribed to four great historical figures that provide an important set of determinate versions of moral realism. Plato provides a picture according to which moral facts exist in a non-concrete realm of abstract universal properties. Aristotle provides a picture according to which moral facts exist as concrete facts in the world. Hume provides a picture according to which moral facts have their basis in universal human sentiments. Kant provides a picture according to which (...)
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  29. Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics.Elizabeth Tropman - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (1):31-45.
    Sensibility theorists such as John McDowell have argued that once we appreciate certain similarities between moral values and secondary qualities, a new meta-ethical position might emerge, one that avoids the alleged difficulties with moral intuitionism and non-cognitivism. The aim of this paper is to examine the meta-ethical prospects of this secondary-quality analogy. Of particular concern will be the extent to which McDowell’s comparison of values to secondary qualities supports a viewpoint unique from that of the moral intuitionist. Once we disentangle (...)
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  30. A New Moral Sentimentalism.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.
    This paper argues for a novel sentimentalist realist metaethical theory, according to which moral wrongness is analyzed in terms of the sentiments one has most reason to have. As opposed to standard sentimentalist views, the theory does not employ sentiments that are had in response to morally wrong action, but rather sentiments that antecedently dispose people to refrain from immoral behavior, specifically the sentiments of compassion and respect.
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  31. The Essence of Response-Dependence.Ralph Wedgwood - 1997 - European Review of Philosophy 3:31-54.
    Many philosophers have thought that colours or flavours or values are in some way less objective than shape or mass or motion. This paper explores the approach to capturing this thought that is based on the idea of ‘ response-dependence ’. First, it is argued that the conceptions of response-dependence developed by Mark Johnston, Philip Pettit and Crispin Wright fail to capture this thought adequately. Then, the rest of the paper proposes an alternative conception, based in part on Kit Fine's (...)
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