About this topic
Summary This entry covers work on the theoretical and applied issues surrounding the idea of the moral status of nonhuman animals. Having moral status commonly means being the object of moral consideration and of (direct or indirect) duties. The issues discussed include what sorts of entities can have moral status; what grounds moral status; whether human beings have a distinctive--higher--moral status; whether moral status can be a matter of degree; whether animals can have direct moral status. Also: Is species membership relevant to moral status? Can nonsentient entities have moral status? What is the relation between moral status and welfare? Does moral status involve rights? What does moral status entail regarding our treatment of animals in particular contexts such as biomedical research, farming, hunting, zoos and circuses, and pet keeping, among others?
Key works Clark 1977 Cohen 1986 DeGrazia 1996 Diamond 1978 Gruen 2011 Midgley 1983 Regan 1983 Sapontzis 1987 Singer 1990 Singer 1979 Warren 1997
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  1. added 2018-12-31
    Phenomenology and Normativity: A Merleau-Pontian Approach to Animal Ethics.Nathan Everson - 2015 - Dissertation, Macquarie University
  2. added 2018-10-15
    Duty and the Beast: Should We Eat Meat in the Name of Animal Rights?Andy Lamey - 2019 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    The moral status of animals is a subject of controversy both within and beyond academic philosophy, especially regarding the question of whether and when it is ethical to eat meat. A commitment to animal rights and related notions of animal protection is often thought to entail a plant-based diet, but recent philosophical work challenges this view by arguing that, even if animals warrant a high degree of moral standing, we are permitted - or even obliged - to eat meat. Andy (...)
  3. added 2018-10-05
    Animal Agency, Captivity, and Meaning.Nicolas Delon - 2018 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 25:127-146.
    Can animals be agents? Do they want to be free? Can they have meaningful lives? If so, should we change the way we treat them? This paper offers an account of animal agency and of two continuums: between human and nonhuman agency, and between wildness and captivity. It describes how a wide range of human activities impede on animals’ freedom and argues that, in doing so, we deprive a wide range of animals of opportunities to exercise their agency in ways (...)
  4. added 2018-09-28
    Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters.Susana Monsó, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg & Annika Bremhorst - 2018 - Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):283-310.
    It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations. In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach, we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails (...)
  5. added 2018-08-20
    Animals, Misanthropy, and Humanity.Ian James Kidd - forthcoming - Journal of Animal Ethics.
    David. E. Cooper’s claim in Animals and Misanthropy is that honest reflection on the ways human beings treat and compare with animals encourages a dark, misanthropic judgment on humankind. Treatment of animals manifests a range of vices and failings that are ubiquitous and entrenched in our practices, institutions, and forms of life, organized by Cooper into five clusters. Moreover, comparisons of humans and animals reveals both affinities and similarities, including a crucial difference that animals are capable of virtues while being (...)
  6. added 2018-08-15
    Humanism.Kieran Setiya - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    Argues for a form of humanism on which we have reason to care about human beings that we do not have to care about other animals and human beings have rights against us other animals lack. Humanism respects the equal worth of those born with severe congenital cognitive disabilities. I address the charge of 'speciesism' and explain how being human is an ethically relevant fact.
  7. added 2018-07-12
    For Hierarchy in Animal Ethics.Shelly Kagan - 2018 - Journal of Practical Ethics 6 (1):1-18.
    In my forthcoming book, How to Count Animals, More or Less (based on my 2016 Uehiro Lectures in Practical Ethics), I argue for a hierarchical approach to animal ethics according to which animals have moral standing but nonetheless have a lower moral status than people have. This essay is an overview of that book, drawing primarily from selections from its beginning and end, aiming both to give a feel for the overall project and to indicate the general shape of the (...)
  8. added 2018-07-12
    Don’T Be Cruel: The Significance of Cruelty in the Current Meat-Debate.Peter Kaiser - 2018 - In Svenja Springer & Herwig Grimm (eds.), Professionals in food chains. Wageningen Academic Publishers. pp. 157-162.
    The aim of this paper is to investigate the significant role of the concept of cruelty to animals with regard to its application in the current meat-debate. Even those philosophers who do not advocate vegetarianism/veganism are in almost unanimous agreement when it comes to the condemnation of factory farming: its practices cause massive, unnecessary suffering to animals, therefore they are cruel. Prohibition of cruelty to animals has been central to animal protection acts, and is still playing a pivotal role in (...)
  9. added 2018-06-18
    Who Has the Capacity to Participate as a Rearee in a Person-Rearing Relationship?Agnieszka Jaworska and Julie Tannenbaum - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1096-1113,.
  10. added 2018-06-05
    Can We Use Social Policy to Enhance Compliance with Moral Obligations to Animals?John Basl & Gina Schouten - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):629-647.
    Those who wish to abolish or restrict the use of non-human animals in so-called factory farming and/or experimentation often argue that these animal use practices are incommensurate with animals’ moral status. If sound, these arguments would establish that, as a matter of ethics or justice, we should voluntarily abstain from the immoral animal use practices in question. But these arguments can’t and shouldn’t be taken to establish a related conclusion: that the moral status of animals justifies political intervention to disallow (...)
  11. added 2018-05-09
    Shock the Monkey: Confessions of a Rational Animal Liberationist.Jeremy Yunt - 2004 - Philosophy Now 44:7-10.
    This paper examines the lack of moral clarity accompanying speciesism. Focusing on the many reasons the topic of animal rights deserves a closer look, it investigates such issues as animal experimentation, human diet, what should be the foundation of our moral reasoning when dealing with human-animal relationships, and the connection between speciesism, sexism, and racism.
  12. added 2018-04-20
    The Moral Status of Animals. [REVIEW]Dale Jamieson - 1981 - Noûs 15 (2):230.
  13. added 2018-04-12
    La Mettrie's Objection: Humans Act Like Animals.Gary Comstock - 2016 - In Gary Comstock & Mylan Engel Jr (eds.), The Moral Rights of Animals. Lanham, MD: Lexington. pp. 175-198.
    A common view of nonhuman animals is that they lack rights because they lack conscious control over themselves. Two thoughts put pressure on this view. First, we recognize the rights of radically cognitively limited humans even though they lack conscious control over themselves. So it would seem mere prejudice to deny rights to nonhuman mammals on the grounds that animals lack autonomy. Tom Regan has been the most eloquent, powerful, and resolute defender of this thought. Second, evidence is growing that (...)
  14. added 2018-04-12
    Harming Some to Enhance Others.Gary Comstock - 2015 - In Simon Bateman, Jean Gayon, Sylvie Allouche, Jerome Goffette & Michela Marzano (eds.), Inquiring into Animal Enhancement. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 49-78.
    Let us call the deliberate modification of an individual’s genome to improve it or its progeny intentional genetic enhancement. Governments are almost certain to require that any proposed intentional genetic enhancement of a human (IGEH) be tested first on (what researchers call) animal “models.” Intentional genetic enhancement of animals (IGEA), then, is an ambiguous concept because it could mean one of two very different things: an enhancement made for the sake of the animal’s own welfare, or an enhancement made for (...)
  15. added 2018-04-11
    Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers' Brief.Kristin Andrews, Gary Comstock, G. K. D. Crozier, Sue Donaldson, Andrew Fenton, Tyler John, L. Syd M. Johnson, Robert Jones, Will Kymlicka, Letitia Meynell, Nathan Nobis, David M. Pena-Guzman & Jeff Sebo - 2018 - London: Routledge.
    In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme Court on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living alone in a cage in a shed in rural New York (Barlow, 2017). Under animal welfare laws, Tommy’s owners, the Laverys, were doing nothing illegal by keeping him in those conditions. Nonetheless, the NhRP argued that given the cognitive, social, and emotional capacities of chimpanzees, Tommy’s confinement constituted (...)
  16. added 2018-03-26
    The Philosophers' Brief on Chimpanzee Personhood.Kristin Andrews, Gary Comstock, Gillian Crozier, Sue Donaldson, Andrew Fenton, Tyler John, L. Syd M. Johnson, Robert Jones, Will Kymlicka, Letitia Meynell, Nathan Nobis, David Pena-Guzman, James Rocha, Bernard Rollin, Jeff Sebo, Adam Shriver & Rebecca Walker - 2018 - Proposed Brief by Amici Curiae Philosophers in Support of the Petitioner-Appelllant Court of Appeals, State of New York,.
    In this brief, we argue that there is a diversity of ways in which humans (Homo sapiens) are ‘persons’ and there are no non-arbitrary conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can include all humans and exclude all nonhuman animals. To do so we describe and assess the four most prominent conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can be found in the rulings concerning Kiko and Tommy, with particular focus on the most recent decision, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v Lavery.
  17. added 2018-03-24
    Speciesistic Veganism: An Anthropocentric Argument.A. G. Holdier - 2016 - In Jodey Castricano & Rasmus R. Simonsen (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Veganism. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 41-66.
    The paper proposes an anthropocentric argument for veganism based on a speciesistic premise that most carnists likely affirm: human flourishing should be promoted. I highlight four areas of human suffering promoted by a carnistic diet: (1) health dangers to workers (both physical and psychological), (2) economic dangers to workers, (3) physical dangers to communities around slaughterhouses, and (4) environmental dangers to communities-at-large. Consequently, one could ignore the well-being of non-human animals and nevertheless recognize significant moral failings in the current standard (...)
  18. added 2018-03-23
    Critical Perspectives on Veganism.Jodey Castricano & Rasmus Rahbek Simonsen (eds.) - 2016 - United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book examines the ethics, politics and aesthetics of veganism in contemporary culture and thought. Traditionally a lifestyle located on the margins of western culture, veganism has now been propelled into the mainstream, and as agribusiness grows animal issues are inextricably linked to environmental impact as well as to existing ethical concerns. -/- This collection connects veganism to a range of topics including gender, sexuality, race, the law and popular culture. It explores how something as basic as one’s food choices (...)
  19. added 2018-03-10
    Subhuman: The Moral Psychology of Human Attitudes to Animals.T. J. Kasperbauer - 2018 - Oup Usa.
    How do we think about animals? How do we decide what they deserve and how we ought to treat them? Subhuman takes an interdisciplinary approach to these questions, drawing from research in philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, law, history, sociology, economics, and anthropology. Subhuman argues that our attitudes to nonhuman animals, both positive and negative, largely arise from our need to compare ourselves to them.
  20. added 2018-03-08
    How to Ground Animal Rights on African Values: A Constructive Approach.Thaddeus Metz - 2018 - In Edwin Etieyibo (ed.), Method, Substance and the Future of African Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 275-290.
    Reprinted with minor modifications from an article first appearing in the Journal of Animal Ethics (2017).
  21. added 2018-03-08
    Mental-Threshold Egalitarianism.Rainer Ebert - 2018 - Social Theory and Practice 44 (1):75-93.
    Mental-threshold egalitarianism, well-known examples of which include Jeff McMahan’s two-tiered account of the wrongness of killing and Tom Regan’s theory of animal rights, divides morally considerable beings into equals and unequals on the basis of their individual mental capacities. In this paper, I argue that the line that separates equals from unequals is unavoidably arbitrary and implausibly associates an insignificant difference in empirical reality with a momentous difference in moral status. In response to these objections, McMahan has proposed the introduction (...)
  22. added 2018-02-22
    Animal Rights and Incredulous Stares.Bob Fischer - 2017 - Between the Species 20 (1).
    Based on the claim that animals have rights, Tom Regan ultimately endorses some radical conclusions: we ought to be vegans; it’s wrong to wear leather; we shouldn’t care about conserving species, but about respecting the rights of individual animals; etc. For many, these conclusions are unbelievable, and incredulous stares abound. Incredulous stares are not arguments, but they do force us to consider whether it might be reasonable for some people to reject Regan’s conclusions based on their considered beliefs. My aim (...)
  23. added 2018-02-22
    What If Barron and Klein Are Right About Insect Sentience?Bob Fischer - 2016 - Animal Sentience 115.
    If Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the standard approach to animal ethics generates some implausible results. Philosophers need to develop alternatives to this framework to avoid them.
  24. added 2018-02-19
    Animal Rights or Just Human Wrongs?Evangelos D. Protopapadakis - 2012 - In Animal Rights: Past and Present Perspectives. Berlin: Logos Verlag. pp. 279-291.
  25. added 2018-02-18
    Challenges To Human Equality.Jeff McMahan - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (1):81-104.
    According to liberal egalitarian morality, all human beings are one another's moral equals. Nonhuman animals, by contrast, are not considered to be our moral equals. This essay considers two challenges to the liberal egalitarian view. One is the "separation problem," which is the challenge to identify a morally significant intrinsic difference between all human beings and all nonhuman animals. The other is the "equality problem," which is to explain how all human beings can be morally equal when there are some (...)
  26. added 2018-02-17
    Chimeras, Moral Status, and Public Policy: Implications of the Abortion Debate for Public Policy on Human/Nonhuman Chimera Research.Robert Streiffer - 2010 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 38 (2):238-250.
    Researchers are increasingly interested in creating chimeras by transplanting human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) into animals early in development. One concern is that such research could confer upon an animal the moral status of a normal human adult but then impermissibly fail to accord it the protections it merits in virtue of its enhanced moral status. Understanding the public policy implications of this ethical conclusion, though, is complicated by the fact that claims about moral status cannot play an unfettered role (...)
  27. added 2018-02-17
    Porphyry, Nature, and Community.Owen Goldin - 2001 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (4):353 - 371.
    Within the third book of Porphyry's On Abstinence from Animal Food, an ethic of community is developed in order to provide the basis of an account of our ethical obligations to animals. I argue that in spite of Porphyry's rejection of this account, it constitutes a coherent and comprehensive nonanthropocentric ethical theory. It conforms with ethical intuitions insofar as it grants that animals are moral subjects, but does not demand impartiality. By appealing to Theophrastus's notion of to oikeion and to (...)
  28. added 2018-02-16
    Animal Ethics and Philosophy: Questioning the Orthodoxy.Elisa Aaltola & John Hadley (eds.) - 2014 - Rowman & Littlefield International.
    Bringing together new theory and critical perspectives on a broad range of topics in animal ethics, this book examines the implications of recent developments in the various fields that bear upon animal ethics. Showcasing a new generation of thinkers, it exposes some important shortcomings in existing animal rights theory.
  29. added 2018-02-13
    Wild Animal Suffering is Intractable.Nicolas Delon & Duncan Purves - 2018 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 31 (2):239-260.
    Most people believe that suffering is intrinsically bad. In conjunction with facts about our world and plausible moral principles, this yields a pro tanto obligation to reduce suffering. This is the intuitive starting point for the moral argument in favor of interventions to prevent wild animal suffering. If we accept the moral principle that we ought, pro tanto, to reduce the suffering of all sentient creatures, and we recognize the prevalence of suffering in the wild, then we seem committed to (...)
  30. added 2018-01-30
    Mental-Threshold Egalitarianism in Advance.Rainer Ebert - forthcoming - Social Theory and Practice.
    Mental-threshold egalitarianism, well-known examples of which include Jeff McMahan’s two-tiered account of the wrongness of killing and Tom Regan’s theory of animal rights, divides morally considerable beings into equals and unequals on the basis of their individual mental capacities. In this paper, I argue that the line that separates equals from unequals is unavoidably arbitrary and implausibly associates an insignificant difference in empirical reality with a momentous difference in moral status. In response to these objections, McMahan has proposed the introduction (...)
  31. added 2018-01-30
    The Chicken Fallacy and the Ethics of Cruelty to Non-Human Animals.Akande Michael Aina & Ofuasia Emmanuel - 2017 - Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 8 (1):7-20.
    The ideological underpinning that guides our interaction with non-human animals needs revision. The traditional outlook, according to which humans have a higher moral status vis-à-vis non-human animals, is now otiose. If these claims are to be justified, what ideological framework would serve this end? What are the moral implications of endorsing the view that humans possess no higher moral status than non-human animals? This work takes as foundation Charles Darwins theory of evolution, which affirms that humans emerged from the long (...)
  32. added 2018-01-30
    Existence and Needs: A Case for the Equal Moral Considerability of Non-Human Animals.Yamikani Ndasauka & Girvas M. Kayange - 2016 - Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 7 (3):23-33.
    This paper reflects on the question, Is there a sound justification for the existential view that humans have a higher moral status than other animals? It argues that the existential view that humans have a higher moral status than animals is founded on a weak and inconclusive foundation. While acknowledging various arguments raised for a common foundation between human and non-human animals, the paper attempts to establish a common ground for moral considerability of human and non-human animals. The first common (...)
  33. added 2018-01-22
    Como Não Devemos Discriminar com Base na Espécie.Diogo Santos & Ricardo Miguel - 2017 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 73 (3-4):1495-1516.
    We argue that Anthropocentrism – the kind of speciesism that privilegies the human species – is morally unacceptable. We distinguish and criticize three varieties of Anthropocentrism: unqualified, qualified empirical and qualified non-empirical. Firstly, unqualified Anthropocentrism is dismissed because it is grounded on a moral principle which implies that discriminations like racism and sexism are justified. Secondly, qualified empirical Anthropocentrism falls victim to the marginal cases argument, an argument that shows that properties which allegedly attribute moral status to every human and (...)
  34. added 2018-01-16
    Review of "The Moral Rights of Animals". [REVIEW]Nicolas Delon - 2018 - Essays in Philosophy 19 (1).
  35. added 2017-12-25
    Grounded in Love: A Theistic Account of Animal Rights.M. Cahill Jonathan - 2016 - Journal of Animal Ethics 6 (1):67-80.
    This article attempts to articulate a grounding of animal rights based on inherent worth as the most fitting way to draw attention to the moral status of animals. The primary objective is to identify the proper grounds of those rights. To that end, two influential philosophical accounts of animal rights are first surveyed: Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Tom Regan’s deontological argument. These are followed by two theistic accounts of rights put forth by Andrew Linzey and Nicholas Wolterstorff. It is (...)
  36. added 2017-12-14
    Minds That Matter: Seven Degrees of Moral Standing.Julian Friedland - 2004 - Between the Species 13 (4).
    Prominent non-speciesist attempts to determine the amount of moral standing properly attributable to conscious beings argue that certain non-human animals should be granted the highest consideration as self-conscious persons. Most of these theories also include a lesser moral standing for the sentient, or merely conscious, non-person. Thus, the standard approach has been to advocate a two-tiered theory—'sentience' or 'consciousness' and 'self-consciousness' or 'personhood'. While the first level seems to present little interpretative difficulty, the second has recently been criticized as a (...)
  37. added 2017-11-27
    Animals, Moral Status, and the Objectives of Morality.Ronald A. Lindsay - 2017 - Think 16 (47):33-43.
  38. added 2017-10-23
    Why the Concept of Moral Status Should Be Abandoned.Oscar Horta - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):899-910.
    The use of the concept of moral status is commonplace today in debates about the moral consideration of entities lacking certain special capacities, such as nonhuman animals. This concept has been typically used to defend the view that adult human beings have a status higher than all those entities. However, even those who disagree with this claim have often accepted the idea of moral status as if it were part of an undisputed received way of thinking in ethics. This paper (...)
  39. added 2017-10-23
    Animal Rights Without Liberation: Applied Ethics and Human Obligations.Alasdair Cochrane - 2012 - Columbia University Press.
    Moving beyond theory to the practical aspects of applied ethics, this pragmatic volume provides much-needed perspective on the realities and responsibilities of the human-animal relationship.
  40. added 2017-10-23
    Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership.Martha Nussbaum (ed.) - 2006 - Belknap Press.
    Theories of social justice are necessarily abstract, reaching beyond the particular and the immediate to the general and the timeless. Yet such theories, addressing the world and its problems, must respond to the real and changing dilemmas of the day. A brilliant work of practical philosophy, Frontiers of Justice is dedicated to this proposition. Taking up three urgent problems of social justice neglected by current theories and thus harder to tackle in practical terms and everyday life, Martha Nussbaum seeks a (...)
  41. added 2017-10-23
    Drawing Lines.James Rachels - 2004 - In Cass R. Sunstein & Martha Craven Nussbaum (eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions. Oxford University Press. pp. 162--174.
  42. added 2017-10-12
    Concerning Cattle: Behavioral and Neuroscientific Evidence for Pain, Desire, and Self-Consciousness.Gary Comstock - 2017 - In Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson & Tyler Doggett (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 139-169.
    Should people include beef in their diet? This chapter argues that the answer is “no” by reviewing what is known and not known about the presence in cattle of three psychological traits: pain, desire, and self-consciousness. On the basis of behavioral and neuroanatomical evidence, the chapter argues that cattle are sentient beings who have things they want to do in the proximal future, but they are not self-conscious. The piece rebuts three important objections: that cattle have injury information but not (...)
  43. added 2017-09-07
    La justice animale : de l’éthique à la politique.Valéry Giroux & Jean-Philippe Royer - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (3):25-30.
  44. added 2017-09-03
    On a Failed Defense of Factory Farming.Stephen Puryear, Stijn Bruers & László Erdős - 2017 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 30 (2):311-323.
    Timothy Hsiao attempts to defend industrial animal farming by arguing that it is not inherently cruel. We raise three main objections to his defense. First, his argument rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of cruelty. Second, his conclusion, though technically true, is so weak as to be of virtually no moral significance or interest. Third, his contention that animals lack moral standing, and thus that mistreating them is wrong only insofar as it makes one more disposed to mistreat other (...)
  45. added 2017-09-03
    Non-Identity for Non-Humans.Duncan Purves & Benjamin Hale - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1165-1185.
    This article introduces a non-human version of the non-identity problem and suggests that such a variation exposes weaknesses in several proposed person-focused solutions to the classic version of the problem. It suggests first that person-affecting solutions fail when applied to non-human animals and, second, that many common moral arguments against climate change should be called into question. We argue that a more inclusive version of the person-affecting principle, which we call the ‘patient-affecting principle’, captures more accurately the moral challenge posed (...)
  46. added 2017-08-21
    Doing Right by Our Companion Animals.K. Burgess-Jackson - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2:159-185.
  47. added 2017-07-24
    You're Probably Not Really A Speciesist.Travis Timmerman - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):683-701.
    I defend the bold claim that self-described speciesists are not really speciesists. Of course, I do not deny that self-described speciesists would assent to generic speciesist claims (e.g. Humans matter more than animals). The conclusion I draw is more nuanced. My claim is that such generic speciesist beliefs are inconsistent with other, more deeply held, beliefs of self-described speciesists. Crucially, once these inconsistencies are made apparent, speciesists will reject the generic speciesist beliefs because they are absurd by the speciesists’ own (...)
  48. added 2017-07-24
    On the Relative Value of Human and Animal Lives.Mark Bernstein - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1517-1538.
    It has become virtually a matter of dogma—among both philosophers and laypersons—that human lives are more valuable than animal lives. One argument for this claim dominates the philosophical literature and, despite its employment by a host of philosophers, should be found wanting. I try to show that this line of reasoning, as well as one that is less popular but still with significant appeal, are faulty. The errors in each argument seem fatal: the pervasive argument begs the question, and the (...)
  49. added 2017-07-24
    On ‘Modal Personism’.Jeff McMahan - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):26-30.
    In this article I present several challenges to the view that Shelly Kagan calls ‘modal personism’. First, there is a plausible account of our identity that, if true, greatly diminishes the scope of Kagan's view. But the scope of the view is already quite limited because the category of modal persons is restricted to those non-persons that had but have lost the potential to become persons. If the category were to include non-persons that retain the potential to become persons, Kagan's (...)
  50. added 2017-07-24
    Vegetarianism.Mylan Engel Jr - 2016 - Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics.
    Ethical vegetarians maintain that vegetarianism is morally required. The principal reasons offered in support of ethical vegetarianism are: (i) concern for the welfare and well-being of the animals being eaten, (ii) concern for the environment, (iii) concern over global food scarcity and the just distribution of resources, and (iv) concern for future generations. Each of these reasons is explored in turn, starting with a historical look at ethical vegetarianism and the moral status of animals.
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