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  1. Is Morality Subjective? – A Reply to Critics.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Leslie Allan defends his thesis that ethics is objective in the sense of requiring moral agents to offer impartial reasons for acting. Radical subjectivists have attacked this requirement for impartiality on a number of grounds. Some critics make the charge that Allan's thesis is simply a version of subjectivism in disguise. He responds by showing how a broadly naturalist view of ethics accommodates objective moral constraints. Allan also counters cases in which impartiality is purportedly not morally required and considers the (...)
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  2. A formação da subjetividade moral no pensamento de Michel Foucault.Bruno Camilo de Oliveira - 2021 - Journal Cajuína 6 (1):11-22.
    The objective of this work is to present Michel Foucault's perspective on the formation of moral subjectivity according to his text entitled “The use of pleasures and the techniques of self”. In the referred text, Foucault emphasizes that moral action should not be constituted in acts according to a rule of conduct supported by moral concepts, but in acts according to a pure relation of the subject with his internal wisdom (subjectivity), a relationship that should not be understood as simply (...)
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  3. Love, Reasons, and Desire.Nicholas Drake - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3):591-605.
    This essay defends subjectivism about reasons of love. These are the normative reasons we have to treat those we love especially well, such as the reasons we have to treat our close friends or life partners better than strangers. Subjectivism about reasons of love is the view that every reason of love a person has is correctly explained by her desires. I formulate a version of subjectivism about reasons of love and defend it against three objections that have been made (...)
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  4. Forms and Movements of Life.Zuzana Svobodová - 2020 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 25 (1):89-105.
    Based on an analysis of the theory of the movement of existence, this paper answers the following question: Where can one see the most important connections of philosophical and religious language in the most re-thought part of Jan Patočkaʼs thinking? The third movement of life is seen as a form of the true philosophical life, but also as a form with metaphysical responsibility. The movement of breakthrough, or actual self-comprehension, is the most important, because it leads to care for the (...)
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  5. Subjectivism, Instrumentalism, and Prudentialism About Reasons: On the Normativity of Instrumental Transmission.Arash Abizadeh - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):387-402.
    According to a subjectivist theory, normative reasons are grounded in facts about our desires. According to an instrumentalist theory, reasons are grounded also in facts about the relevant means to desired objects. These are distinct theories. The widespread tendency to conflate the normativity of subjective and instrumentalist precepts obscures two facts. First, instrumentalist precepts incorporate a subjective element with an objective one. Second, combining these elements into a single theory of normative reasons requires explaining how and why they are to (...)
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  6. Mackie Was Not an Error Theorist.Selim Berker - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):5-25.
  7. The Nihilist.Raff Donelson - 2019 - In Seth Vannatta (ed.), The Pragmatism and Prejudice of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. pp. 31-47.
    Scattered skeptical remarks and a general austerity that infused his writings have given Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes a reputation as some type of nihilist. Noted commentators such as Richard Posner and Albert Alschuler have claimed as much. This article seeks to correct this misunderstanding. Holmes was not a nihilist in the sense of being melancholy due to a belief that the world has no absolute moral values or gods. Instead, Holmes was a pragmatist in the spirit of William James and (...)
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  8. Reid on Moral Sentimentalism.Camil Golub - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):431-444.
    In the Essays on the Active Powers of Man V. 7, Thomas Reid seeks to show “[t]hat moral approbation implies a real judgment,” contrasting this thesis with the view that moral approbation is no more than a feeling. Unfortunately, his criticism of moral sentimentalism systematically conflates two different metaethical views: non-cognitivism about moral thought and subjectivism about moral properties. However, if we properly disentangle the various parts of Reid's discussion, we can isolate pertinent arguments against each of these views. Some (...)
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  9. Against Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: The Humean Challenge.Lorenzo Greco - 2018 - Teoria: Rivista di Filosofia Fondata da Vittorio Sainati 38 (2):123-33.
    In this essay, I discuss some elements of Hume’s virtue ethics that distinguish​ it from the neo-Aristotelian approach. I stress some of its characteristics – its emphasis on character traits rather than on actions, the role it reserves for moral education, its being sentimentalist – and highlight its points of strength with respect to the neo-Aristotelian version. I do that by defending an interpretation of Hume’s virtue ethics in terms of a form of subjectivism hinging on individuals possessing virtuous or (...)
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  10. How to Be Impartial as a Subjectivist.Emad Atiq - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):757-779.
    The metaethical subjectivist claims that there is nothing more to a moral disagreement than a conflict in the desires of the parties involved. Recently, David Enoch has argued that metaethical subjectivism has unacceptable ethical implications. If the subjectivist is right about moral disagreement, then it follows, according to Enoch, that we cannot stand our ground in moral disagreements without violating the demands of impartiality. For being impartial, we’re told, involves being willing to compromise in conflicts that are merely due to (...)
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  11. From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism.David Sobel - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    David Sobel defends subjectivism about well-being and reasons for action: the idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about, that something is valuable because it is valued. In these essays Sobel explores the tensions between subjective views of reasons and morality, and concludes that they do not undermine subjectivism.
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  12. What is Value? Where Does It Come From? A Philosophical Perspective.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation. pp. 3-22.
    Are values objective or subjective? To clarify this question we start with an overview of the main concepts and debates in the philosophy of values. We then discuss the arguments for and against value realism, the thesis that there are objective evaluative facts. By contrast with value anti-realism, which is generally associated with sentimentalism, according to which evaluative judgements are grounded in sentiments, value realism is commonly coupled with rationalism. Against this common view, we argue that value realism can be (...)
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  13. Why I Am an Objectivist About Ethics (And Why You Are, Too).David Enoch - 2014 - In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), The Ethical Life, 3rd ed. Oxford University Press.
    You may think that you're a moral relativist or subjectivist - many people today seem to. But I don't think you are. In fact, when we start doing metaethics - when we start, that is, thinking philosophically about our moral discourse and practice - thoughts about morality's objectivity become almost irresistible. Now, as is always the case in philosophy, that some thoughts seem irresistible is only the starting point for the discussion, and under argumentative pressure we may need to revise (...)
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  14. Fittingness and Idealization.Antti Kauppinen - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):572-588.
    This note explores how ideal subjectivism in metanormative theory can help solve two important problems for Fitting Attitude analyses of value. The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is that there may be sufficient reason for attitude Y even if the object is not Y-able. The many-kinds-of-fittingness problem is that the same attitude can be fitting in many ways. Ideal subjectivism addresses both by maintaining that an attitude is W-ly fitting if and only if endorsed by any W-ly ideal subject. A subject is W-ly (...)
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  15. Does Expressivism Have Subjectivist Consequences?Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):278-290.
    Metaethical expressivists claim that we can explain what moral words like ‘wrong’ mean without having to know what they are about – but rather by saying what it is to think that something is wrong – namely, to disapprove of it. Given the close connection between expressivists’ theory of the meaning of moral words and our attitudes of approval and disapproval, expressivists have had a hard time shaking the intuitive charge that theirs is an objectionably subjectivist or mind-dependent view of (...)
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  16. Defending Moral Mind-Independence: The Expressivist’s Precarious Turn.Lisa Warenski - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):861-69.
    A central feature of ordinary moral thought is that moral judgment is mind-independent in the following sense: judging something to be morally wrong does not thereby make it morally wrong. To deny this would be to accept a form of subjectivism. Neil Sinclair (2008) makes a novel attempt to show how expressivism is simultaneously committed to (1) an understanding of moral judgments as expressions of attitudes and (2) the rejection of subjectivism. In this paper, I discuss Sinclair’s defense of anti-subjectivist (...)
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  17. The Argument From Queerness.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
  18. Moral Relativism, Error Theory, and Ascriptions of Mistakes.Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (10):564-580.
    Moral error-theorists and relativists agree that there are no absolute moral facts, but disagree whether that makes all moral judgments false. Who is right? This paper examines a type of objection used by moral error-theorists against relativists, and vice versa: objections from implausible ascriptions of mistakes. Relativists (and others) object to error-theory that it implausibly implies that people, in having moral beliefs, are systematically mistaken about what exists. Error-theorists (and others) object to relativism that it implausibly implies that people are (...)
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  19. Subjectivism Without Desire.D. Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.
    Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued, under the proper conditions, by x. Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is the phrase “under the proper conditions”: Should the proper conditions of valuing be actual or idealized? What sort of idealization is appropriate? And so forth. Though these concerns are of the first (...)
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  20. Expressivism, Subjectivism and Moral Disagreement.Sebastian Köhler - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):71-78.
    One worry about metaethical expressivism is that it reduces to some form of subjectivism. This worry is enforced by subjectivists who argue that subjectivism can explain certain phenomena thought to support expressivism equally well. Recently, authors have started to suggest that subjectivism can take away what has often been seen as expressivism's biggest explanatory advantage, namely expressivism's ability to explain the possibility of moral disagreement. In this paper, I will give a response to an argument recently given by Frank Jackson (...)
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  21. Reasons From Within. [REVIEW]Graham Oddie - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (3):473-476.
  22. Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism.David Sobel - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 6. Oxford University Press.
    I argue that Parfit's On What Matters does not make a compelling case against subjective accounts of reasons for action.
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  23. In Defense of Objectivism About Moral Obligation.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):88-115.
    There is a debate in normative ethics about whether or not our moral obligations depend solely on either our evidence concerning, or our beliefs about, the world. Subjectivists maintain that they do and objectivists maintain that they do not. I shall offer some arguments in support of objectivism and respond to the strongest argument for subjectivism. I shall also briefly consider the significance of my discussion to the debate over whether one’s future voluntary actions are relevant to one’s current moral (...)
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  24. Intention and Permissibility.Amir Saemi - 2009 - Ethical Perspectives 16 (1):81-101.
    There are two kinds of view in the literature concerning the relevance of intention to permissibility. While subjectivism assumes that an agent acts permissibly if he or she believes that the conduct is necessary for a moral purpose, for objectivism the de facto presence of an objective reason to justify one’s deeds is what matters. Recently, Scanlon and Hanser defend a moderate version of objectivism and subjectivism, respectively. Although I have a degree of sympathy toward both views, I will argue (...)
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  25. Subjectivism and Idealization.David Sobel - 2009 - Ethics 119 (2):336-352.
  26. The Subjectivist Consequences of Expressivism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):364-387.
    Jackson and Pettit argue that expressivism in metaethics collapses into subjectivism. A sincere utterer of a moral claim must believe that she has certain attitudes to be expressed. The truth-conditions of that belief then allegedly provide truth-conditions also for the moral utterance. Thus, the expressivist cannot deny that moral claims have subjectivist truth-conditions. Critics have argued that this argument fails as stated. I try to show that expressivism does have subjectivist repercussions in a way that avoids the problems of the (...)
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  27. The Semantics of Moral Communication.Richard Brown - 2008 - Dissertation, The Graduate Center, CUNY
    Adviser: Professor Stefan Baumrin In the first chapter I introduce the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics and argue that metaethics, properly conceived, is a part of cognitive science. For example, the debate between rationalism and sentimentalism can be informed by recent empirical work in psychology and the neurosciences. In the second chapter I argue that the traditional view that one’s theory of semantics determines what one’s theory of justification must be is mistaken. Though it has been the case that (...)
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  28. Sens commun et objectivisme moral : Objectivisme "global" ou objectivisme "local" ? Une introduction par l'exemple à la philosophie expérimentale.Florian Cova & Jérôme Ravat - 2008 - Klesis 9:180-202.
    Dans cet article, nous proposons de montrer expérimentalement que le "sens commun" n'est en matière moral ni complètement objectiviste ni complètement relativiste, mais qu'un même individu peut être tantôt objectiviste tantôt relativiste. De même, nous montrons que les jugements de goût portant sur le prédicat "dégoûtant" ne sont pas toujours relativiste mais peuvent varier selon le contexte entre objectivisme et relativisme.
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  29. Metaethical Subjectivism. By Richard Double.Hugo Meynell - 2008 - Heythrop Journal 49 (3):492–494.
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  30. Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics.Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    Some essays in this book consider whether objective moral truths can be grounded in an understanding of the nature of human beings as rational and social ...
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  31. Free Thinking for Expressivists.Neil Sinclair - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (2):263-287.
    This paper elaborates and defends an expressivist account of the claims of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. In response to objections from Zangwill and Jenkins it is argued that the expressivist 'internal reading' of such claims is compatible with their conceptual status and that the only 'external reading' available doesn't commit expressivisists to any sort of subjectivism. In the process a 'commitment-theoretic' account of the semantics of conditionals and negations is defended.
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  32. Subjectivism and Blame.David Sobel - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 149-170.
    My favorite thing about this paper is that I think I usefully explicate and then mess with Bernard Williams's attempt to explain how his internalism is compatible with our ordinary practices of blame. There are a surprising number of things wrong with Williams's position. Of course that leaves my own favored subjectivism in a pickle, but still...
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  33. Metaethical Subjectivism – Richard Double.Caj Strandberg - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):690–693.
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  34. Regulative Control and the Subjectivist’s View of Moral Responsibility.P. Eddy Wilson - 2006 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (1):28-33.
    In this essay I focus upon John Martin Fischer’s notion of taking on responsibility. In his view moral actors must acquire a proper self-understanding to take on moral responsibility. I question whether Fischer steps out of his role as a subjectivist, when he maintains that having only guidance control is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. I suggest that subjectivists are committed to the notion that taking on responsibility includes the acquisition of a proper phenomenology of freedom. I compare actors (...)
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  35. Keeping a Place for Metaethics: Assessing Elliot's Dismissal of the Subjectivism/Objectivism Debate.Darren Domsky - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (5):675-694.
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  36. Subjectivism About Normativity and the Normativity of Intentional States.Gorman Michael - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):5-14.
    Subjectivism about normativity (SN) is the view that norms are never intrinsic to things but are instead always imposed from without. After clarifying what SN is, I argue against it on the basis of its implications concerning intentionality. Intentional states with the mind-to-world direction of fit are essentially norm-subservient, i.e., essentially subject to norms such as truth, coherence, and the like. SN implies that nothing is intrinsically an intentional state of the mind-to-world sort: its being such a state is only (...)
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  37. Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?Philippa Foot - 2000 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46:107-.
    I have asked that this article should be reprinted in the volume dedicated to Elizabeth Anscombe because it in particular reflects throughout my great indebtedness to her. I remember, as long ago as the late 1940s confidently referring to ‘the difference between descriptive and evaluative reasoning’ in one of the many discussions that we began to have from that time on. She, genuinely puzzled, simply asked, ‘What do you mean?’.
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  38. The Moral Imaginary of Discourse Ethics.Kenneth MacKendrick - 2000 - Critical Horizons 1 (2):247-269.
    The central claim of this essay is that Habermas' program of discourse ethics fails to establish the necessary immanent connection between the universality of discourse ethics and the quasi-transcendentalism, which is supposed to provide its ground. Habermas' attempt to avoid the spectre of subjectivism leads him to develop an understanding of universalism that hinges on a critical error, the confusion of subjectivity with ethical substance. Using Castoriadis' theory of the imagination to illuminate this failure, I demonstrate the way in which (...)
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  39. Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism.Seana Valentine Shiffrin - 1999 - Ethics 109 (4):772-794.
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  40. Utility, Subjectivism and Moral Ontology.Philip J. Ross - 1994 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (2):189-199.
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  41. Ayer's Ethical Theory: Emotivism or Subjectivism?*: David Wiggins.David Wiggins - 1991 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30:181-196.
    In 1936, in a chapter of Language, Truth and Logic clearly influenced by Hume and influenced also by Ogden's and Richards's The Meaning of Meaning, Ayer claimed that judgments of value, in so far as they are not scientific statements, are not in the literal sense significant but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false. To say ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’ is not to state any more than one would have stated by (...)
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  42. Blanshard’s Critique of Ethical Subjectivism.Oliver A. Johnson - 1990 - Idealistic Studies 20 (2):140-154.
    Brand Blanshard devotes a substantial part of his book Reason and Goodness to a discussion of ethical subjectivism. It need hardly be said that his discussion is critical; Blanshard is a thoroughgoing ethical objectivist. Nevertheless, although he rejects subjectivism as an ethical theory, he is fully appreciative of the importance of subjective elements—emotions, feelings, attitudes—in our ordinary, practical moral activities. He recognizes these, along with reason, to be essential parts of the good life for human beings.
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  43. Was Hume a Subjectivist?Fred Wilson - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:247-282.
    In a crucial passage in the Treatise, Hume argues that all our sense impressions are dependent for their existence upon the state of our sense organs. Hume points out that this is not the same as an ontological dependence upon minds; and moreover the argument is clearly causal. Hume uses it to establish the system of the philosophers as opposed to the system of the vulgar. This paper argues that Hume’s case parallels that which, in this century, the critical realists (...)
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  44. A Sensible Subjectivism?David Wiggins - 1987 - Blackwell.
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  45. A Sensible Subjectivism.David Wiggins - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  46. Hutcheson's Perceptual and Moral Subjectivism.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 1986 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):407 - 421.
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  47. Toward the Reconstruction of Subjectivism: Love as a Paradigm of Values. [REVIEW]Anthony Weston - 1984 - Journal of Value Inquiry 18 (3):181-194.
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  48. Subjectivism as Moral Weakness Projected.Judith Lichtenberg - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (133):378-385.
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  49. Ethical Objectivism‐Subjectivism: A Neglected Dimension in the Study of Moral Thought∗.F. E. Trainer - 1983 - Journal of Moral Education 12 (3):192-207.
    Abstract Previous conceptual analyses and empirical research concerning moral development and moral education have almost completely failed to take into account the distinction between objectivist and subjectivist positions on the nature of morality. This paper begins by outlining the essential elements in the two positions and pointing to the significance of the issue for the study of moral thought and for the discussion of moral maturity. Reference is briefly made to problems in current theories arising from the neglect of the (...)
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  50. Harman on Internalism, Relativism, and Logical Form.David Copp - 1982 - Ethics 92 (2):227-242.
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