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  1. added 2020-05-08
    Mackie Was Not an Error Theorist.Selim Berker - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
  2. added 2020-04-27
    Love, Reasons, and Desire.Nicholas Drake - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
    This essay defends subjectivism about reasons of love. These are the normative reasons we have to treat those we love especially well, such as the reasons we have to treat our close friends or life partners better than strangers. Subjectivism about reasons of love is the view that every reason of love a person has is correctly explained by her desires. I formulate a version of subjectivism about reasons of love and defend it against three objections that have been made (...)
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  3. added 2019-10-15
    Reid on Moral Sentimentalism.Camil Golub - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):431-444.
    In the Essays on the Active Powers of Man V. 7, Thomas Reid seeks to show “[t]hat moral approbation implies a real judgment,” contrasting this thesis with the view that moral approbation is no more than a feeling. Unfortunately, his criticism of moral sentimentalism systematically conflates two different metaethical views: non-cognitivism about moral thought and subjectivism about moral properties. However, if we properly disentangle the various parts of Reid's discussion, we can isolate pertinent arguments against each of these views. Some (...)
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  4. added 2019-09-09
    The Nihilist.Raff Donelson - 2019 - In Seth Vannatta (ed.), The Pragmatism and Prejudice of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. pp. 31-47.
    Scattered skeptical remarks and a general austerity that infused his writings have given Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes a reputation as some type of nihilist. Noted commentators such as Richard Posner and Albert Alschuler have claimed as much. This article seeks to correct this misunderstanding. Holmes was not a nihilist in the sense of being melancholy due to a belief that the world has no absolute moral values or gods. Instead, Holmes was a pragmatist in the spirit of William James and (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    Moral Relativism, Error Theory, and Ascriptions of Mistakes.Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (10):564-580.
    Moral error-theorists and relativists agree that there are no absolute moral facts, but disagree whether that makes all moral judgments false. Who is right? This paper examines a type of objection used by moral error-theorists against relativists, and vice versa: objections from implausible ascriptions of mistakes. Relativists (and others) object to error-theory that it implausibly implies that people, in having moral beliefs, are systematically mistaken about what exists. Error-theorists (and others) object to relativism that it implausibly implies that people are (...)
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    Regulative Control and the Subjectivist’s View of Moral Responsibility.P. Eddy Wilson - 2006 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (1):28-33.
    In this essay I focus upon John Martin Fischer’s notion of taking on responsibility. In his view moral actors must acquire a proper self-understanding to take on moral responsibility. I question whether Fischer steps out of his role as a subjectivist, when he maintains that having only guidance control is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. I suggest that subjectivists are committed to the notion that taking on responsibility includes the acquisition of a proper phenomenology of freedom. I compare actors (...)
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  7. added 2019-06-06
    Keeping a Place for Metaethics: Assessing Elliot's Dismissal of the Subjectivism/Objectivism Debate.Darren Domsky - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (5):675-694.
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  8. added 2019-06-06
    Ayer's Ethical Theory: Emotivism or Subjectivism?*: David Wiggins.David Wiggins - 1991 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30:181-196.
    In 1936, in a chapter of Language, Truth and Logic clearly influenced by Hume and influenced also by Ogden's and Richards's The Meaning of Meaning, Ayer claimed that judgments of value, in so far as they are not scientific statements, are not in the literal sense significant but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false. To say ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’ is not to state any more than one would have stated by (...)
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  9. added 2019-06-06
    Blanshard’s Critique of Ethical Subjectivism.Oliver A. Johnson - 1990 - Idealistic Studies 20 (2):140-154.
    Brand Blanshard devotes a substantial part of his book Reason and Goodness to a discussion of ethical subjectivism. It need hardly be said that his discussion is critical; Blanshard is a thoroughgoing ethical objectivist. Nevertheless, although he rejects subjectivism as an ethical theory, he is fully appreciative of the importance of subjective elements—emotions, feelings, attitudes—in our ordinary, practical moral activities. He recognizes these, along with reason, to be essential parts of the good life for human beings.
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    Moral Subjectivism: Reply to Prof. Acton.A. C. Ewing - 1948 - Analysis 9 (2):17-23.
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  11. added 2019-01-01
    Subjectivism, Instrumentalism, and Prudentialism About Reasons: On the Normativity of Instrumental Transmission.Arash Abizadeh - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):387-402.
    According to a subjectivist theory, normative reasons are grounded in facts about our desires. According to an instrumentalist theory, reasons are grounded also in facts about the relevant means to desired objects. These are distinct theories. The widespread tendency to conflate the normativity of subjective and instrumentalist precepts obscures two facts. First, instrumentalist precepts incorporate a subjective element with an objective one. Second, combining these elements into a single theory of normative reasons requires explaining how and why they are to (...)
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  12. added 2018-12-18
    Against Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: The Humean Challenge.Lorenzo Greco - 2018 - Teoria: Rivista di Filosofia Fondata da Vittorio Sainati 38 (2):123-33.
    In this essay, I discuss some elements of Hume’s virtue ethics that distinguish​ it from the neo-Aristotelian approach. I stress some of its characteristics – its emphasis on character traits rather than on actions, the role it reserves for moral education, its being sentimentalist – and highlight its points of strength with respect to the neo-Aristotelian version. I do that by defending an interpretation of Hume’s virtue ethics in terms of a form of subjectivism hinging on individuals possessing virtuous or (...)
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  13. added 2017-11-12
    Why Insights in Evolutionary Moral Psychology Help Resolve Long-Standing Meta-Ethical Questions.Uri Harris - manuscript
    In this brief paper, I present some basic arguments for why insights in moral psychology, especially the work of Jonathan Haidt and others in Moral Foundations Theory, points towards a resolution of long-standing meta-ethical questions.
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  14. added 2017-01-17
    From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism.David Sobel - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    David Sobel defends subjectivism about well-being and reasons for action: the idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about, that something is valuable because it is valued. In these essays Sobel explores the tensions between subjective views of reasons and morality, and concludes that they do not undermine subjectivism.
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  15. added 2017-01-16
    Subjectivism, Ethical.David Alm - unknown
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  16. added 2017-01-11
    A Precise Meaning for Objective and Subjective in Value Theory.Harold N. Lee - 1940 - Journal of Philosophy 37 (23):626-637.
  17. added 2017-01-10
    What is Value? Where Does It Come From? A Philosophical Perspective.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation. pp. 3-22.
    Are values objective or subjective? To clarify this question we start with an overview of the main concepts and debates in the philosophy of values. We then discuss the arguments for and against value realism, the thesis that there are objective evaluative facts. By contrast with value anti-realism, which is generally associated with sentimentalism, according to which evaluative judgements are grounded in sentiments, value realism is commonly coupled with rationalism. Against this common view, we argue that value realism can be (...)
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  18. added 2016-12-08
    Subjectivism About Normativity and the Normativity of Intentional States.Gorman Michael - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):5-14.
    Subjectivism about normativity (SN) is the view that norms are never intrinsic to things but are instead always imposed from without. After clarifying what SN is, I argue against it on the basis of its implications concerning intentionality. Intentional states with the mind-to-world direction of fit are essentially norm-subservient, i.e., essentially subject to norms such as truth, coherence, and the like. SN implies that nothing is intrinsically an intentional state of the mind-to-world sort: its being such a state is only (...)
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  19. added 2016-10-17
    Subjectivism: From Infantile Disease to Chronic Illness.Joseph Agassi - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):3 - 14.
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  20. added 2016-06-21
    Is Morality Subjective? – A Reply to Critics.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Leslie Allan defends his thesis that ethics is objective in the sense of requiring moral agents to offer impartial reasons for acting. Radical subjectivists have attacked this requirement for impartiality on a number of grounds. Some critics make the charge that Allan's thesis is simply a version of subjectivism in disguise. He responds by showing how a broadly naturalist view of ethics accommodates objective moral constraints. Allan also counters cases in which impartiality is purportedly not morally required and considers the (...)
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  21. added 2015-10-07
    Harman on Internalism, Relativism, and Logical Form.David Copp - 1982 - Ethics 92 (2):227-242.
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  22. added 2015-10-07
    Ethical Subjectivism Again.Kai Nielsen - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (1):123-124.
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  23. added 2015-07-17
    How to Be Impartial as a Subjectivist.Emad Atiq - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):757-779.
    The metaethical subjectivist claims that there is nothing more to a moral disagreement than a conflict in the desires of the parties involved. Recently, David Enoch has argued that metaethical subjectivism has unacceptable ethical implications. If the subjectivist is right about moral disagreement, then it follows, according to Enoch, that we cannot stand our ground in moral disagreements without violating the demands of impartiality. For being impartial, we’re told, involves being willing to compromise in conflicts that are merely due to (...)
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  24. added 2015-01-26
    Why I Am an Objectivist About Ethics (And Why You Are, Too).David Enoch - 2014 - In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), The Ethical Life, 3rd ed. Oxford University Press.
    You may think that you're a moral relativist or subjectivist - many people today seem to. But I don't think you are. In fact, when we start doing metaethics - when we start, that is, thinking philosophically about our moral discourse and practice - thoughts about morality's objectivity become almost irresistible. Now, as is always the case in philosophy, that some thoughts seem irresistible is only the starting point for the discussion, and under argumentative pressure we may need to revise (...)
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  25. added 2014-09-15
    Defending Moral Mind-Independence: The Expressivist’s Precarious Turn.Lisa Warenski - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):861-69.
    A central feature of ordinary moral thought is that moral judgment is mind-independent in the following sense: judging something to be morally wrong does not thereby make it morally wrong. To deny this would be to accept a form of subjectivism. Neil Sinclair (2008) makes a novel attempt to show how expressivism is simultaneously committed to (1) an understanding of moral judgments as expressions of attitudes and (2) the rejection of subjectivism. In this paper, I discuss Sinclair’s defense of anti-subjectivist (...)
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  26. added 2014-04-02
    Fittingness and Idealization.Antti Kauppinen - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):572-588.
    This note explores how ideal subjectivism in metanormative theory can help solve two important problems for Fitting Attitude analyses of value. The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is that there may be sufficient reason for attitude Y even if the object is not Y-able. The many-kinds-of-fittingness problem is that the same attitude can be fitting in many ways. Ideal subjectivism addresses both by maintaining that an attitude is W-ly fitting if and only if endorsed by any W-ly ideal subject. A subject is W-ly (...)
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  27. added 2014-03-28
    Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism.Seana Valentine Shiffrin - 1999 - Ethics 109 (4):772-794.
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  28. added 2014-03-23
    Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?Philippa Foot - 2000 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46:107-.
    I have asked that this article should be reprinted in the volume dedicated to Elizabeth Anscombe because it in particular reflects throughout my great indebtedness to her. I remember, as long ago as the late 1940s confidently referring to ‘the difference between descriptive and evaluative reasoning’ in one of the many discussions that we began to have from that time on. She, genuinely puzzled, simply asked, ‘What do you mean?’.
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  29. added 2014-03-16
    Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics.Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    Some essays in this book consider whether objective moral truths can be grounded in an understanding of the nature of human beings as rational and social ...
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  30. added 2014-03-14
    Subjectivism and Blame.David Sobel - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 149-170.
    My favorite thing about this paper is that I think I usefully explicate and then mess with Bernard Williams's attempt to explain how his internalism is compatible with our ordinary practices of blame. There are a surprising number of things wrong with Williams's position. Of course that leaves my own favored subjectivism in a pickle, but still...
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  31. added 2014-03-12
    Metaethical Subjectivism. By Richard Double.Hugo Meynell - 2008 - Heythrop Journal 49 (3):492–494.
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  32. added 2014-03-09
    Subjectivism and Idealization.David Sobel - 2009 - Ethics 119 (2):336-352.
  33. added 2014-03-09
    The Subjectivist Consequences of Expressivism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):364-387.
    Jackson and Pettit argue that expressivism in metaethics collapses into subjectivism. A sincere utterer of a moral claim must believe that she has certain attitudes to be expressed. The truth-conditions of that belief then allegedly provide truth-conditions also for the moral utterance. Thus, the expressivist cannot deny that moral claims have subjectivist truth-conditions. Critics have argued that this argument fails as stated. I try to show that expressivism does have subjectivist repercussions in a way that avoids the problems of the (...)
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  34. added 2014-03-07
    In Defense of Objectivism About Moral Obligation.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):88-115.
    There is a debate in normative ethics about whether or not our moral obligations depend solely on either our evidence concerning, or our beliefs about, the world. Subjectivists maintain that they do and objectivists maintain that they do not. I shall offer some arguments in support of objectivism and respond to the strongest argument for subjectivism. I shall also briefly consider the significance of my discussion to the debate over whether one’s future voluntary actions are relevant to one’s current moral (...)
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  35. added 2014-03-06
    The Moral Imaginary of Discourse Ethics.Kenneth MacKendrick - 2000 - Critical Horizons 1 (2):247-269.
    The central claim of this essay is that Habermas' program of discourse ethics fails to establish the necessary immanent connection between the universality of discourse ethics and the quasi-transcendentalism, which is supposed to provide its ground. Habermas' attempt to avoid the spectre of subjectivism leads him to develop an understanding of universalism that hinges on a critical error, the confusion of subjectivity with ethical substance. Using Castoriadis' theory of the imagination to illuminate this failure, I demonstrate the way in which (...)
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  36. added 2014-02-10
    Nielsen on Ethical Subjectivism.R. L. Simpson - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (1):121-122.
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  37. added 2014-02-10
    Does Ethical Subjectivism Have a Coherent Form?Kai Nielsen - 1974 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (1):93-99.
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  38. added 2014-02-10
    Ethical Subjectivism and the Rational Good.William S. Kraemer - 1951 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (4):526-537.
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  39. added 2014-02-10
    The New Subjectivism in Ethics.Brand Blanshard - 1948 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9 (3):504-511.
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  40. added 2012-10-10
    Subjectivism Without Desire.D. Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.
    Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued, under the proper conditions, by x. Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is the phrase “under the proper conditions”: Should the proper conditions of valuing be actual or idealized? What sort of idealization is appropriate? And so forth. Though these concerns are of the first (...)
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  41. added 2012-10-10
    Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism.David Sobel - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 6. Oxford University Press.
    I argue that Parfit's On What Matters does not make a compelling case against subjective accounts of reasons for action.
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  42. added 2012-10-10
    Metaethical Subjectivism – Richard Double.Caj Strandberg - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):690–693.
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  43. added 2012-10-10
    Was Hume a Subjectivist?Fred Wilson - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:247-282.
    In a crucial passage in the Treatise, Hume argues that all our sense impressions are dependent for their existence upon the state of our sense organs. Hume points out that this is not the same as an ontological dependence upon minds; and moreover the argument is clearly causal. Hume uses it to establish the system of the philosophers as opposed to the system of the vulgar. This paper argues that Hume’s case parallels that which, in this century, the critical realists (...)
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  44. added 2012-10-10
    Hutcheson's Perceptual and Moral Subjectivism.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 1986 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):407 - 421.
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  45. added 2012-10-10
    Toward the Reconstruction of Subjectivism: Love as a Paradigm of Values. [REVIEW]Anthony Weston - 1984 - Journal of Value Inquiry 18 (3):181-194.
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  46. added 2012-10-10
    Subjectivism and Seriousness.E. P. Brandon - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119):97-107.
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  47. added 2012-10-10
    Pseudo-Subjectivism in Ethics.R. E. Jennings - 1974 - Dialogue 13 (3):515-518.
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  48. added 2012-10-10
    One More Flaw in G. E. Moore's Critique of Subjectivism.John T. Wilcox & Richard Kurshner - 1973 - Ethics 84 (1):86-88.
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  49. added 2012-10-10
    Some Refutations of Private Subjectivism in Ethics.George W. Roberts - 1971 - Journal of Value Inquiry 5 (4):292-309.
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  50. added 2012-10-10
    Objectivism, Relativism, and Subjectivism in Ethics.Ramon M. Lemos - 1965 - International Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1):56-65.
    The relativist contends that one has a duty to do something if and only if one's society holds that one does. The subjectivist maintains that one has a duty to do something if and only if one believes that one does. The objectivist argues that men have objective duties which are sometimes independent of what either they or their societies believe they are. My object is to indicate what seem to be some obvious, Yet fatal, Objections to relativism and subjectivism, (...)
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1 — 50 / 73