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  1. Moral Subjectivism.H. W. B. Acton - 1948 - Analysis 9 (1):1 - 8.
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  2. Subjectivism: From Infantile Disease to Chronic Illness.Joseph Agassi - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):3 - 14.
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  3. Is Morality Subjective? – A Reply to Critics.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Leslie Allan defends his thesis that ethics is objective in the sense of requiring moral agents to offer impartial reasons for acting. Radical subjectivists have attacked this requirement for impartiality on a number of grounds. Some critics make the charge that Allan's thesis is simply a version of subjectivism in disguise. He responds by showing how a broadly naturalist view of ethics accommodates objective moral constraints. Allan also counters cases in which impartiality is purportedly not morally required and considers the (...)
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  4. Subjectivism, Ethical.David Alm - unknown
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  5. How to Be Impartial as a Subjectivist.Emad H. Atiq - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):757-779.
    The metaethical subjectivist claims that there is nothing more to a moral disagreement than a conflict in the desires of the parties involved. Recently, David Enoch has argued that metaethical subjectivism has unacceptable ethical implications. If the subjectivist is right about moral disagreement, then it follows, according to Enoch, that we cannot stand our ground in moral disagreements without violating the demands of impartiality. For being impartial, we’re told, involves being willing to compromise in conflicts that are merely due to (...)
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  6. Subjectivism in Ethics--A Criticism.Brand Blanshard - 1951 - Philosophical Quarterly 1 (2):127-139.
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  7. The New Subjectivism in Ethics.Brand Blanshard - 1948 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9 (3):504-511.
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  8. Subjectivism and Seriousness.E. P. Brandon - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119):97-107.
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  9. The Semantics of Moral Communication.Richard Brown - 2008 - Dissertation, The Graduate Center, CUNY
    Adviser: Professor Stefan Baumrin In the first chapter I introduce the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics and argue that metaethics, properly conceived, is a part of cognitive science. For example, the debate between rationalism and sentimentalism can be informed by recent empirical work in psychology and the neurosciences. In the second chapter I argue that the traditional view that one’s theory of semantics determines what one’s theory of justification must be is mistaken. Though it has been the case that (...)
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  10. The Origins of Subjectivism.Stewart Candlish - 1975 - Journal of Moral Education 4 (3):191-200.
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  11. Harman on Internalism, Relativism, and Logical Form.David Copp - 1982 - Ethics 92 (2):227-242.
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  12. Sens commun et objectivisme moral : Objectivisme "global" ou objectivisme "local" ? Une introduction par l'exemple à la philosophie expérimentale.Florian Cova & Jérôme Ravat - 2008 - Klesis 9:180-202.
    Dans cet article, nous proposons de montrer expérimentalement que le "sens commun" n'est en matière moral ni complètement objectiviste ni complètement relativiste, mais qu'un même individu peut être tantôt objectiviste tantôt relativiste. De même, nous montrons que les jugements de goût portant sur le prédicat "dégoûtant" ne sont pas toujours relativiste mais peuvent varier selon le contexte entre objectivisme et relativisme.
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  13. Ethical Subjectivism.Theodore de Laguna - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (6):642-659.
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  14. Keeping a Place for Metaethics: Assessing Elliot's Dismissal of the Subjectivism/Objectivism Debate in Environmental Ethics.Darren Domsky - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (5):675-694.
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  15. Subjectivism Without Desire.D. Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.
    Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued, under the proper conditions, by x. Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is the phrase “under the proper conditions”: Should the proper conditions of valuing be actual or idealized? What sort of idealization is appropriate? And so forth. Though these concerns are of the first (...)
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  16. Why I Am an Objectivist About Ethics (And Why You Are, Too).David Enoch - 2014 - In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), The Ethical Life, 3rd ed. Oxford University Press.
    You may think that you're a moral relativist or subjectivist - many people today seem to. But I don't think you are. In fact, when we start doing metaethics - when we start, that is, thinking philosophically about our moral discourse and practice - thoughts about morality's objectivity become almost irresistible. Now, as is always the case in philosophy, that some thoughts seem irresistible is only the starting point for the discussion, and under argumentative pressure we may need to revise (...)
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  17. Moral Subjectivism: A Further Reply to Prof. H. B. Acton.A. C. Ewing - 1949 - Analysis 10 (1):15 - 16.
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  18. Moral Subjectivism: Reply to Professor Acton.A. C. Ewing - 1948 - Analysis 9 (2):17 - 23.
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  19. Subjectivism and Naturalism in Ethics.A. C. Ewing - 1944 - Mind 53 (210):120-141.
    This article is a discussion of the relationships of objectivity of value with subjectivist and naturalist ethics. the author considers and clarifies both the subjectivist and the naturalist views of ethics and how they assert judgments in relation to the objectivity of ethical values, and the role of intuition in terms of achievement of agreement that affirms the objectivity of ethical values. (staff).
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  20. Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?Philippa Foot - 2000 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46:107-.
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  21. In Defense of Objectivism About Moral Obligation.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):88-115.
    There is a debate in normative ethics about whether or not our moral obligations depend solely on either our evidence concerning, or our beliefs about, the world. Subjectivists maintain that they do and objectivists maintain that they do not. I shall offer some arguments in support of objectivism and respond to the strongest argument for subjectivism. I shall also briefly consider the significance of my discussion to the debate over whether one’s future voluntary actions are relevant to one’s current moral (...)
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  22. Why Insights in Evolutionary Moral Psychology Help Resolve Long-Standing Meta-Ethical Questions.Uri Harris - manuscript
    In this brief paper, I present some basic arguments for why insights in moral psychology, especially the work of Jonathan Haidt and others in Moral Foundations Theory, points towards a resolution of long-standing meta-ethical questions.
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  23. Pseudo-Subjectivism in Ethics.R. E. Jennings - 1974 - Dialogue 13 (3):515-518.
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  24. Blanshard’s Critique of Ethical Subjectivism.Oliver A. Johnson - 1990 - Idealistic Studies 20 (2):140-154.
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  25. Fittingness and Idealization.Antti Kauppinen - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):572-588.
    This note explores how ideal subjectivism in metanormative theory can help solve two important problems for Fitting Attitude analyses of value. The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is that there may be sufficient reason for attitude Y even if the object is not Y-able. The many-kinds-of-fittingness problem is that the same attitude can be fitting in many ways. Ideal subjectivism addresses both by maintaining that an attitude is W-ly fitting if and only if endorsed by any W-ly ideal subject. A subject is W-ly (...)
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  26. Expressivism, Subjectivism and Moral Disagreement.Sebastian Köhler - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):71-78.
    One worry about metaethical expressivism is that it reduces to some form of subjectivism. This worry is enforced by subjectivists who argue that subjectivism can explain certain phenomena thought to support expressivism equally well. Recently, authors have started to suggest that subjectivism can take away what has often been seen as expressivism's biggest explanatory advantage, namely expressivism's ability to explain the possibility of moral disagreement. In this paper, I will give a response to an argument recently given by Frank Jackson (...)
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  27. Ethical Subjectivism and the Rational Good.William S. Kraemer - 1951 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (4):526-537.
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  28. Ethical Subjectivism.Theodore De Laguna - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (6):642 - 659.
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  29. A Precise Meaning for Objective and Subjective in Value Theory.Harold N. Lee - 1940 - Journal of Philosophy 37 (23):626-637.
  30. Objectivism, Relativism, and Subjectivism in Ethics.Ramon M. Lemos - 1965 - International Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1):56-65.
    The relativist contends that one has a duty to do something if and only if one's society holds that one does. The subjectivist maintains that one has a duty to do something if and only if one believes that one does. The objectivist argues that men have objective duties which are sometimes independent of what either they or their societies believe they are. My object is to indicate what seem to be some obvious, Yet fatal, Objections to relativism and subjectivism, (...)
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  31. Subjectivism as Moral Weakness Projected.Judith Lichtenberg - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (133):378-385.
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  32. The Argument From Queerness.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
  33. The Moral Imaginary of Discourse Ethics.Kenneth MacKendrick - 2000 - Critical Horizons 1 (2):247-269.
    The central claim of this essay is that Habermas' program of discourse ethics fails to establish the necessary immanent connection between the universality of discourse ethics and the quasi-transcendentalism, which is supposed to provide its ground. Habermas' attempt to avoid the spectre of subjectivism leads him to develop an understanding of universalism that hinges on a critical error, the confusion of subjectivity with ethical substance. Using Castoriadis' theory of the imagination to illuminate this failure, I demonstrate the way in which (...)
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  34. Metaethical Subjectivism. By Richard Double.Hugo Meynell - 2008 - Heythrop Journal 49 (3):492–494.
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  35. Subjectivism About Normativity and the Normativity of Intentional States.Gorman Michael - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):5-14.
    Subjectivism about normativity (SN) is the view that norms are never intrinsic to things but are instead always imposed from without. After clarifying what SN is, I argue against it on the basis of its implications concerning intentionality. Intentional states with the mind-to-world direction of fit are essentially norm-subservient, i.e., essentially subject to norms such as truth, coherence, and the like. SN implies that nothing is intrinsically an intentional state of the mind-to-world sort: its being such a state is only (...)
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  36. Subjectivism Versus Relativism in Ethics.D. H. Monro - 1950 - Analysis 11 (1):19 - 24.
    In this article I argue that ethical subjectivism does not lead to relativism, If that is defined as the theory that men do genuinely differ in their ultimate moral judgments, And that there are no grounds for preferring one such moral judgment to another. On the contrary, This view is inconsistent with subjectivism, Since it rests on the objective truth of some such premise as that one ought not to condemn another simply because his tastes are different from one's own.
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  37. Ethical Subjectivism Again.Kai Nielsen - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (1):123-124.
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  38. Does Ethical Subjectivism Have a Coherent Form?Kai Nielsen - 1974 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (1):93-99.
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  39. Moral Relativism, Error-Theory, and Ascriptions of Mistakes.Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (10):564-580.
    Moral error-theorists and relativists agree that there are no absolute moral facts, but disagree whether that makes all moral judgments false. Who is right? This paper examines a type of objection used by moral error-theorists against relativists, and vice versa: objections from implausible ascriptions of mistakes. Relativists (and others) object to error-theory that it implausibly implies that people, in having moral beliefs, are systematically mistaken about what exists. Error-theorists (and others) object to relativism that it implausibly implies that people are (...)
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  40. Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics.Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    Some essays in this book consider whether objective moral truths can be grounded in an understanding of the nature of human beings as rational and social ...
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  41. Hutcheson's Perceptual and Moral Subjectivism.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 1986 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):407 - 421.
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  42. Some Refutations of Private Subjectivism in Ethics.George W. Roberts - 1971 - Journal of Value Inquiry 5 (4):292-309.
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  43. Utility, Subjectivism and Moral Ontology.Philip J. Ross - 1994 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (2):189-199.
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  44. Intention and Permissibility.Amir Saemi - 2009 - Ethical Perspectives 16 (1):81-101.
    There are two kinds of view in the literature concerning the relevance of intention to permissibility. While subjectivism assumes that an agent acts permissibly if he or she believes that the conduct is necessary for a moral purpose, for objectivism the de facto presence of an objective reason to justify one’s deeds is what matters. Recently, Scanlon and Hanser defend a moderate version of objectivism and subjectivism, respectively. Although I have a degree of sympathy toward both views, I will argue (...)
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  45. Book Review:Naturalism and Subjectivism. Marvin Farber. [REVIEW]Richard Schmitt - 1960 - Ethics 71 (1):58-.
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  46. Does Expressivism Have Subjectivist Consequences?Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):278-290.
    Metaethical expressivists claim that we can explain what moral words like ‘wrong’ mean without having to know what they are about – but rather by saying what it is to think that something is wrong – namely, to disapprove of it. Given the close connection between expressivists’ theory of the meaning of moral words and our attitudes of approval and disapproval, expressivists have had a hard time shaking the intuitive charge that theirs is an objectionably subjectivist or mind-dependent view of (...)
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  47. Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism.Seana Valentine Shiffrin - 1999 - Ethics 109 (4):772-794.
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  48. Nielsen on Ethical Subjectivism.R. L. Simpson - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (1):121-122.
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  49. Free Thinking for Expressivists.Neil Sinclair - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (2):263-287.
    This paper elaborates and defends an expressivist account of the claims of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. In response to objections from Zangwill and Jenkins it is argued that the expressivist 'internal reading' of such claims is compatible with their conceptual status and that the only 'external reading' available doesn't commit expressivisists to any sort of subjectivism. In the process a 'commitment-theoretic' account of the semantics of conditionals and negations is defended.
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  50. Senses of Subjectivism in Value Theory.James Ward Smith - 1948 - Journal of Philosophy 45 (15):393-405.
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